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PART VII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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April to June 1921.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART VII.

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS.

No. 1.

[E 4376/23/58]

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 346.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter, dated the 27th March, 1921, which I have received from the Armenian diplomatic representative in Constantinople, enclosing a memorandum of information relative to the present situation in the Armenian Republic, which has been supplied by Armenian officials who have escaped from the Caucasus to Constantinople.

2. The delegate of the Armenian Patriarchate had already drawn the attention of this High Commission to the imminent danger of famine in the Erivan region and to the existence of abundant foodstuffs in the neighbouring district of North-Western Persia, and he has been advised to approach the American Committee for Relief in the Near East with a view to making the necessary arrangements for utilising this source of supply.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Armenian Representative to Sir H. Rumbold.

M. le Haut-Commissaire, Constantinople, le 27 mars 1921.
FAISANT suite à mes deux précédentes communications, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre ci-après, en traduction, quelques notes qui m'ont été données par d'anciennes personnalités officielles, venant du Caucase et se trouvant actuellement en cette ville.

Ainsi que votre Excellence voudra bien le relever de la lecture de ces notes, la crise alimentaire sera bientôt suivie d'une famine épouvantable en Arménie, si l'on n'arrive pas à notre secours du dehors, en ravitaillant notre peuple dans la mesure du possible.

Notre pays est nettoyé des bolcheviks, mais on y est menacé des horreurs de la famine.

En soumettant cet envoi à la bienveillante attention de votre Excellence, j'ai, &c.

F. TALITADJIAN.

Memorandum on the present Situation in Armenia.

(Traduction.)

ATTAQUÉE par les Kémalistes et les bolcheviks en même temps et par des forces supérieures, l'armée dû, après une lutte de six à sept semaines, capituler. A l'exception des régions montagneuses de Karabagh et de Zanghézour, qui ne se sont pas soumises à la domination des bolcheviks, tout le pays fut, pour ainsi dire, partagé entre les Kémalistes et les bolcheviks, les premiers ayant occupé Kars et Alexandropol.

La domination des bolcheviks en Arménie n'a pas duré plus de trois mois, pendant lesquels ils n'y eut que violences, pillages et toutes sortes d'exactions. Les bolcheviks commencèrent leurs déprédations par mater toutes les forces intellectuelles militaires et autres du pays, en opérant des arrestations et des déportations en masse. Plus de 1,000 officiers arméniens, y compris plusieurs généraux, furent arrêtés et déportés. En même temps, les bolcheviks désorganisèrent de fond en comble les conditions économiques du pays, déjà fort ébranlées, en enlevant tout ce qui leur est tombé sous la main, sans épargner les bêtes et le dernier blé du paysan arménien.

Ils vidèrent les dépôts du Gouvernement contenant de la farine du lait condensé, des manufactures, des étoffes, du coton, du cognac (fabriqué dans le pays), &c., pour expédier tout en Russie ou en Azerbeïdjan. Ils s'adonnaient à leurs pillages et dévastations avec tant de brutalité que le peuple arménien reconnaissait en les bolcheviks les pires des tyrans et ne pensait plus qu'aux moyens de s'en débarrasser, à quelque prix que cela fût.

Quoique très fatigué et épuisé par l'état de guerre durant depuis sept ans et par toutes les misères qui en découlèrent, le peuple arménien ne pouvait guère tolérer plus longtemps le régime destructeur des bolcheviks.

Ainsi qu'on le sait déjà par les radios reçus d'Erivan, le 17 février dernier, le peuple s'est soulevé comme un seul homme, pour renverser la tyrannie bolcheviste.

Ne pouvant résister au torrent impétueux du peuple soulevé contre le joug détesté, le Gouvernement soviétique, composé des comités révolutionnaires ("revkoms") et des commissaires, prit précipitamment la fuite, en dévalisant au préalable le Trésor.

Un Gouvernement légitime sous forme d'un Comité de Salut ayant à sa tête M. Vratzian, ancien Président du Conseil, s'y est de suite substitué.

Ce comité organisa immédiatement la lutte contre les bolcheviks, lutte qui donna les meilleurs résultats. Les troupes soviétiques attaquèrent, à trois reprises différentes, Erivan, pour être chaque fois repoussées après des combats sanglants. Des combats acharnés eurent lieu du côté d'Etchmiadzin, de Dilijan et de Novo-Bayazat. La lutte fut particulièrement opiniâtre à proximité du couvent historique d'Etchmiadzin, résidence du chef suprême de l'Eglise arménienne. D'après un radio d'Erivan du 9 mars, les héros tombés dans la bataille en ces saints lieux furent solennellement enterrés dans l'enceinte même du couvent d'Etchmiadzin, en présence du Catholicos.

Nous espérons fermement que l'Arménie sera bientôt entièrement nettoyée des bolcheviks; d'autant plus que, d'après nos renseignements, des renforts venant de Karabagh et de Zanghézour et ayant à leur tête M. Terminassian, ancien Ministre de la Guerre, sont déjà en marche vers Erivan.

Il peut même se faire que ces renforts soient déjà à Erivan.

Aussi l'objet principal de nos inquiétudes en ce moment, c'est la crise financière et alimentaire qui règne en Arménie. Les bolcheviks ayant fait le vide autour d'eux, notre peuple se trouve sous le coup d'une famine imminente, et cette fois-ci la situation sera d'autant plus catastrophique, que le pays est coupé du dehors. Voilà pourquoi, nous sommes dans des trauces chaque fois que nous pensons que, malgré les succès remportés sur les bolcheviks, la crise alimentaire et financière peut amener le naufrage de notre indépendance et de notre avenir.

Le nouveau Gouvernement est entré en lutte contre les bolcheviks sans la moindre réserve de blé et sans ressources pécuniaires, étant donné que les bolcheviks n'avaient rien laissé dans le pays.

La crise est tellement aiguë que si le paysan arménien qui se bat en ce moment pour sa liberté n'est pas ravitaillé du dehors jusqu'au 15-20 avril, et si le Gouvernement continue à être sans ressources, le premier mourra d'inanition, tandis que le second en sera réduit à lâcher la défense de sa juste cause.

Le blé existe en abondance dans le khanat de Makou, mais il faut qu'il y soit

acheté par l'entremise d'Européens et expédié en Arménie; quant à l'argent, il peut être envoyé via Téhéran, Tauris et Zanghézour.

On pourrait aussi agir par voie diplomatique à Angora et à Moscou, en vue d'ouvrir pour ces transports la voie de Batoum-Tiflis-Alexandropol et Erivan. Nous nous dispensons de nous arrêter plus longtemps sur les voies et communications, étant donné que si, comme nous l'espérons, les grandes Puissances alliées sont animées du désir de venir à l'aide de l'Arménie affamée luttant contre les bolcheviks, il ne leur sera pas très difficile d'aviser aux moyens nécessaires pour atteindre le but.

En vous priant, M. le Représentant, de vouloir bien communiquer ces notes à leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées à Constantinople, nous avons, &c.

(Signatures.)

Constantinople, le 23 mars 1921.

[E 4625/56/58]

No. 2.

Consul Stevens to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

Batoum, April 9, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has reached me by the Italian steamship "Georgio" in regard to events at Batoum since the withdrawal of Kemalist forces and the occupation of the town by Bolshevik troops. The particulars have been obtained from private, but thoroughly reliable, sources.

2. It would appear that after the events which took place at Batoum on the night of the 17th-18th March, when quite a number of stores were entered into and the goods they contained were looted by armed bands of various nationalities, the Kemalists, who had been invited to enter the town by the Georgian Government, were compelled to withdraw in the face of military operations undertaken by superior Bolshevik and Georgian troops combined.

3. On the occupation of the town by the Bolsheviks, Soviet government was proclaimed and a Russian workman named Pevtsoff, who since the outbreak of the revolution was always a leading spirit in all movements of a revolutionary character and caused some trouble to our Administration during the British occupation which led to his being deported from Batoum, was nominated President of the Revolutionary Committee that now administers all the affairs of the town. Apparently he is the only Russian commissar, all his subordinates being Georgians. Pevtsoff, who is a fitter by profession, although uneducated, has shown common sense in most of his doings. He is reported to be level-headed, tolerant, moderate and fairly just in his decisions, which are invariably well considered before being taken.

4. Houses and apartments are being requisitioned for military purposes and all the best premises vacated by refugees have been occupied by the various commissars for their personal use and that of their offices. My residence has been taken by the commander of the Bolshevik troops.

5. The Soviet authorities at Tiflis and Batoum are stated to be inclined to enter into trade relations with the outer world and are prepared to negotiate the barter of raw material produced in the Trans-Caucasus, i.e., Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, on conditions which are to form the subject of special discussion between them and would-be traders.

In connection with the foregoing, considerable activity on the part of the Italians, who have been well in the Caucasian field all along, is to be expected.

6. I have been unable to obtain figures as to the exact number of troops now at the disposal of the Bolsheviks at Batoum. They are, however, reported to be considerable. The cavalry is stated to be well manned, uniformed, otherwise equipped and horsed. Their artillery is said to be good, but their infantry regiments are much criticised and chiefly consist of undisciplined youths of bad moral who are stated to be mostly in rags.

There is some talk of an onward movement of Bolshevik forces across the river Tchokh into Turkish territory being in contemplation. I have, however, no means of verifying this information, nor am I in a position to furnish particulars in regard to the units that are to be employed in the proposed expedition.

I have, &c.

P. STEVENS.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20.)

My Lord,

London, April 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on events in Georgia which led to the withdrawal of my mission from that country.

On the 12th February the Bolsheviks suddenly attacked the Georgian troops which in scattered detachments were occupying the portion of the Borchalinsk district claimed by both Armenia and Georgia and known as the neutral zone. Simultaneously, anti-Georgian risings occurred in several places in this zone, and such Georgian detachments as were not cut off withdrew to the northern boundary of the zone. The attack was made by Armenian and Russian Bolshevik troops. The inhabitants of the zone who attacked the Georgians were Molokans and Armenians, amongst whom it was known that active Bolshevik propaganda had been conducted for some time.

On the 15th February the Georgian troops, having received reinforcements, made a counter-attack on the Bolsheviks in the neighbourhood of Sadakhlo and met with some success, but an attack by Bolsheviks at Poili and Red Bridge, which resulted in their crossing to the Georgian side of the river Kura, compelled the Georgian troops at Sadakhlo to fall back. The entire Georgian forces then took up a line running from Kosalo to Bolshoi Muganlo, thence west along the river Khram. This line was not intended to be held permanently, and during the night the Georgian troops fell back to the line of the foothills some 10 versts to the north. Here they were attacked on the morning of the 16th February, and repulsed the Bolsheviks. The attack was renewed on the night of the 16th-17th February, and the Georgian line penetrated. News of this event reached the Georgian Government at an early hour on the morning of the 17th February, and at 3.15 A.M. I was awakened by a representative of the Georgian Foreign Office, who informed me that the Government had decided to evacuate Tiflis, and that all foreign missions should also leave. He added that a train would leave at 7 A.M. Immediate steps were taken to warn all British subjects and others who had compromised themselves in Bolshevik's eyes by working in our interests. As the representative of the Georgian Foreign Office had informed me that the Bolsheviks were advancing rapidly on Tiflis and the front was only some ten to twelve miles distant, I decided to burn practically all my archives, cyphers and a few important documents excepted. This was carried out in a short time. Thanks to the zeal and energy of my staff, about half the persons to be evacuated were sent off by a train which left at about 10.30 A.M., accompanied by half of my staff. The remainder of the mission and persons to be evacuated reached the railway station with me a few minutes later. The town was perfectly quiet, and complete order prevailed at the station despite the large number of people who wished to obtain places in any train leaving Tiflis.

The British colony received but short warning to prepare to leave Tiflis. I had carefully considered the question of warning them from the time the Bolshevik troops entered Georgian territory at Red Bridge on the 15th February. I decided not to issue any warning, as such warning would certainly become known in a short time and might easily start a panic. The short notice given is undoubtedly the cause of some members of the British colony having to leave behind much of their personal property. This I greatly regret, but I consider that in the circumstances it was unavoidable. News from the front was now received that the Georgians had re-established their line, and that there was no immediate danger. The Government decided to await further news and take a final decision in the afternoon as to their staying or leaving. Favourable reports continued to be received during the day, and at 7 P.M. I was officially informed that the Government had decided to stay. I was asked what I proposed to do. I decided to go to Batoum myself, leaving Mr. Rooker and Captain Court, both of whom volunteered to remain before I mentioned the matter to them. In taking this decision I was influenced by the following considerations:—

- (a.) The necessity of keeping in communication with London. My cyphers had already gone in the first train to Batoum.
- (b.) The disposal of the British colony, half of whom had already gone and the other half were about to go to Batoum, necessitated my presence in Batoum.

The French representative decided to go to Batoum, but the Italian and German representatives remained at Tiflis.

Our train left Tiflis at 1.30 A.M. on the 18th February, and owing to the inferior quality of the coal used in the engines, did not reach Batoum until the 20th February. I was then able to get into telegraphic communication with Mr. Rooker at Tiflis. He reported that on the 17th February the Georgians held the enemy some 13 miles south-east of Tiflis and repulsed a cavalry attack on Boroblo. On the 18th February, at 2 A.M., the enemy delivered an attack in force on both sides of the Kura river. Their main attack, on the west bank, succeeded in penetrating to the outskirts of Tiflis itself, when it was stopped by the Georgian artillery. The Georgians then delivered a vigorous counter-attack and drove the enemy back. A flanking detachment of the enemy, consisting of two Armenian battalions and a cavalry brigade, however, had succeeded in occupying Kajuri. Fighting continued here on the 19th and 20th February, and on the latter day on the Telaf railway some 12 to 15 miles east of Tiflis. In the fighting described above the Georgians captured over 2,000 prisoners, their own casualties being reported as slight.

On the 19th February a wireless message received at Tiflis from Erivan announced that the Bolshevik Government in Armenia had been overthrown and a Provisional Government formed under the Presidency of M. Vratzian.

On the 20th February, in the fighting near Tiflis, the Bolshevik troops penetrated the Georgian line, but a vigorous counter-attack drove them back with the loss of four guns, eight machine-guns, numerous prisoners and horses. The Bolsheviks then withdrew several versts. The Georgian troops fought very well, and thousands of volunteers came forward, but the Government had no arms to give them. There was no serious fighting on the Tiflis front on the 21st, 22nd or 23rd February. Meanwhile, on the 22nd February the Georgian Government received from the Turkish Nationalists a demand to evacuate immediately the districts of Ardahan and Artvin. To this demand the Georgian Government was compelled to accede.

On the 22nd February the Georgians were attacked in two fresh directions, viz., on the Darial Pass and at Pelinkovo near Gagri. The Georgians succeeded in repulsing all attacks on the Darial Pass on the 22nd and again on the 23rd, but at Pelinkovo, despite the assistance of French warships which bombarded the Bolsheviks, the Georgians were driven back and, evacuating Gagri, retired to the river Bzib.

On the 24th February the Bolsheviks renewed their attack on the Tiflis front. The fighting was stubborn, and all attacks were ultimately repulsed, but a report from a subordinate commander stating that a Bolshevik cavalry division had got round to the west of Tiflis and astride the railway line led to the Georgians deciding to withdraw from their positions and evacuate Tiflis. This was carried out during the night of the 24th-25th February unmolested by the Bolsheviks. Reliable information which has since come to hand shows that only 200 enemy cavalry had got round in rear of the Georgian line, and that the Georgian withdrawal came as a great surprise to the Bolsheviks, all of whose attacks had been repulsed after severe fighting.

Although Mr. Rooker and Captain Court had been obliged to leave Tiflis I was still in telegraphic communication with Tiflis during the 25th February, and received information that the Bolshevik troops had entered and occupied the town.

On the 26th February Mr. Rooker telegraphed to me from Kutais his arrival there with one of the Georgian Ministers. The remainder of the Government was with the general staff in rear of the army which was holding a position at Mshket.

On this day on the Gagri front the Bolshevik troops were reported to be at Novo Athos. As Sukhum was thus threatened, the British subjects there were withdrawn to Batoum.

During the 26th and 27th February the Georgian forces withdrew unmolested from Mshket to Gori, and on the 28th day continued their withdrawal to a strong position at Suram. The Bolsheviks made no immediate attempt to follow up the Georgians, but Bolshevik cavalry was reported at Gori on the 1st March. The Georgians were meanwhile consolidating their position at Suram.

At this time the Turks occupied the province of Ardahan and the town of Artvin, but there was as yet no sign of an advance towards Batoum. Although, with Georgian permission, their troops moved from Khorra to Artvin via Borchka, the Bolsheviks now invaded Georgia at a fresh point, 300 of them crossing the Mamison Pass and advancing to Oni.

On the 28th February I took advantage of the departure of H.M.S. "Calypso" to send in her to Constantinople about half of the British colony.

On the 3rd March, at the request of the Georgian Minister of the Interior, I went to Kutais to discuss the situation. This appeared to be satisfactory on the main or Suram front, where the Georgians had made a short advance, encountered Bolshevik infantry and taken some prisoners. On the Sukhum front the situation was not satisfactory, as the Georgians had evacuated Sukhum and retired to the line of the river Mohva, while in the Oni sector it was dangerous, three Bolshevik regiments having been identified there. On the 4th March I found the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs confident, but events on the next day took an unfavourable turn, and the Government decided on the 6th March to move with the foreign missions to Batoum. On the Suram front a battalion of the National Guard had left its position without firing a shot, and the Bolsheviks had captured Suram station. From Oni the Bolsheviks had advanced a considerable way along the road to Kutais and on the Black Sea coast the Georgians had retired to Ochenderi.

I returned to Batoum on the 7th March accompanied by Mr. Rooker. I learnt that the Georgian Government had invited the Turkish Nationalists to occupy Batoum province with their troops on condition that the Georgian Government should continue to exist and its civil administration be carried on.

On the 8th March the Georgians held a line near Marilisi station on their main front. On this day H.M.S. "Caradoc" left for Constantinople with the remainder of the British colony and others to be evacuated. The uncertainty of the situation, the improbability of the Georgians being able to continue fighting for long, and the doubtful attitude of the Turkish Nationalists, made it desirable to embark and send them off and not to retain any of them there unnecessarily.

On the 10th March, although Angora had sent no reply to the Georgian proposal for a joint Georgian-Turkish military occupation of Batoum province and the districts of Akbalsik and Akhalkalaki, the Turkish Nationalist representative, Colonel Kiazim Bey, informed the Georgian Government that Turkish troops would immediately occupy the districts and province named. As the continuance of my mission depended upon the continued existence of the Georgian Government, I called upon Colonel Kiazim Bey and enquired what would be the status of the Georgian Government after the arrival in Batoum province of the Nationalist troops. He replied that the Nationalist occupation would be military and provisional, their troops occupying strategic points and the forts round the town, but not the town itself, that the Georgian flag would continue to fly and the civil administration continue. In reply to a further question as to what would happen if the Georgian army were driven back into Batoum province, Colonel Kiazim Bey said it would have to cease fighting and leave the Turks and Bolsheviks to settle the question of the further advance of the latter. He added that the question of Batoum province was one which concerned Georgia and Turkey alone, and that his Government would accept the decision of a plebiscite.

On the 11th March Nationalist troops passed through Batoum. Except for the appearance of a number of Turkish flags on the houses of Mahomedans, the aspect of the town remained unchanged. The Georgian army had withdrawn by this time to the neighbourhood of Samtredi, considerably reduced in numbers owing to men deserting, although not to the enemy. The Georgian Government was now at Batoum. On this day the Georgian troops evacuated Kutais, which was occupied by the Bolsheviks, who had advanced from Oni, and the Georgian troops on the Black Sea coast retired from the Ingur line through Zugdidi. The entire Georgian army, numbering some 10,000 (excluding 5,000 in reserve in Batoum), were holding a line running from Rion railway station along the river Rion to Samtredi, thence along the railway to Poti.

The Bolshevik Government at Tiflis had for some time been endeavouring to enter into negotiations with the Georgian Government with a view to ceasing hostilities and forming a Coalition Government. It was not until now that the Georgian Government decided to negotiate. At the same time, a verbal reply given to the Georgian representative at Angora by the Turkish Nationalist Government agreeing to the continuance of Georgian sovereignty and administration in Batoum province and the districts of Akhalsik and Akhalkalaki was received by the Georgian Government.

On the 13th March the Georgian line ran from Poti along the left bank of the river Rion to a point 5 versts south-south-west of Samtredi, thence south-east to Tsiagubanie. The Bolsheviks were reported to have crossed the Rion south of Samtredi and to be advancing also against Poti, which they took the same day. On the 14th March an armistice was arranged with the Bolsheviks for twenty-four hours. This was indefinitely prolonged next day, and Georgian representatives were sent to

Samtredi to communicate with Tiflis regarding negotiations. These negotiations resulted on the 17th March in the Georgian Government deciding to leave Georgia and inviting the Bolsheviks to occupy the province and town of Batoum. This result was in great measure due to the arrival at Batoum of three Georgian Nationalists, not Bolsheviks, sent by the Tiflis Bolshevik Government. Their argument, which the Georgian Government finally accepted, was that as all Georgians, Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik, agreed that Batoum was Georgian, it was preferable for the Georgian Government to hand over Batoum to Georgian Bolsheviks than to Turks.

The Georgian Government embarked on an Italian steamer late on the evening of the 17th March. By this time all foreign missions were on board their respective ships, except the French, who had left Batoum for Constantinople on the 11th March. Before embarking the Georgian Government informed its troops that it was going, and that they were free to do as they chose. General Masnief assumed command of the troops, who decided to side with the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the leading members of the former Bolshevik mission in Tiflis, who had been brought to Batoum as prisoners, were released. Some of these, under the leadership of Kafteradze, formed a Revolutionary Committee, and published a proclamation taking over Batoum in the name of the Bolsheviks. Simultaneously was published a proclamation by Colonel Kiazim Bey taking over Batoum town and province and appointing himself Governor-General. Apart from some looting in one quarter of the town by local hooligans, which was forcibly suppressed by troops, the town at large remained quiet. Attacks were, however, made by the Turks on the telegraph office and the railway station. The former they secured, but from the latter they were beaten off. On the outskirts of the town, where the Turks held the forts, fighting took place between Georgians and Turks, and continued until the afternoon without any decisive result. About 1,000 to 1,500 Russian Bolshevik troops arrived by train, but remained outside the town until fighting had ceased. They then marched into the town, but announced that they had no intention of taking part in the Georgian and Turkish conflict.

The German mission, under Herr Rauscher, under instructions from Berlin, landed from the Italian steamer on which their passages had been booked and, in company with M. Shainemann, former Bolshevik representative in Georgia, left for Tiflis by train in the evening.

On the 19th March a truce was reported to have been arranged between Georgians and Turks pending orders from Moscow and Angora. During this day the remaining foreign vessels, naval and mercantile, the Italian cruiser "Agordat" excepted, left Batoum, H.M.S. "Montrose" with the British mission on board leaving at 5 p.m.

From the beginning of hostilities until the evacuation of Tiflis on the 24th February the Georgian army fought gallantly and successfully, every attack by the Bolsheviks up to that time being defeated. The strength of the army would easily have been greatly increased, as trained men volunteered in thousands, but there were no arms to give them. After the evacuation of Tiflis the *moral* of some of the troops began to suffer, although at the Suram position it was in the main good. The feeling began to spread that Georgia could not unaided fight Russia, and no sign of assistance was forthcoming. There was no instance of Georgian troops deserting to the Bolsheviks, but certain units of the National Guard undoubtedly more than once imperilled the Georgian position by their poor fighting qualities. In one case, in the later stages of the conflict, direct sympathy with Bolshevism was displayed and stamped out drastically. The Georgian people at large remained staunchly anti-Bolshevik, as did the Government, and it is to their credit that, with limited means, they made a gallant fight for their independence.

In conclusion, I desire to express my thanks to the Royal Navy and in particular to the following officers, Captain C. Seymour, H.M.S. "Calypso," Captain Colvin, H.M.S. "Caradoc," and Lieutenant-Commander Crabbe, H.M.S. "Montrose," for their invaluable assistance in evacuating the British mission and colony and other persons who had worked in British interests.

I further request permission to bring to your Lordship's notice the excellent work done by the members of my staff. To all of them I am greatly indebted for their loyal and efficient assistance throughout the time that I was in Georgia, and in particular during our enforced evacuation.

Mr. J. V. Rooker performed his duties with zeal and judgment, and deserves special praise for his work at Tiflis after my departure, when he kept me informed by excellent reports of the changes in the situation.

Captain Court, R.E., remained with Mr. Rooker and deserves great credit for

his work, also Mr. J. Waite and Mr. T. Walton rendered most efficient service in looking after and securing the comfort of the British colony, which entailed a great deal of hard work.

To Major Pinder, my commercial adviser, is due the credit of securing the export from Batoum in an entirely friendly manner and without friction of all British-owned goods. I may mention here that at least one foreign representative found it necessary to land marines to seize forcibly the goods of his nationals.

Major Euler, R.E., of the staff of the army of the Black Sea, was present during the evacuation of Tiflis, and rendered most valuable assistance in every way.

I am glad to be able to record that, with the exception of one typewriter and one "Sunbeam" car, under repairs at the time and therefore immobile, no Government property was left in Georgia. The "Sunbeam" car is, I hope, in the hands of the American Near East Relief Workers at Tiflis.

I have, &c.

C. B. STOKES, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Chief British Commissioner in Transcaucasia.

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

[E 3931/50/44]

No. 4.

Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received April 2.)

THE Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and transmits herewith a copy of a despatch from the Commercial Secretary at Constantinople respecting economic conditions in Smyrna.

Department of Overseas Trade,
April 1, 1921.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Monroe to Department of Overseas Trade.

Sir,

Constantinople, March 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have recently returned from an official tour in Smyrna, and enclose a report on the prevailing economic conditions in that district on the 15th March, 1921.

I have, &c.

C. COURTHOPE MONROE,
Commercial Secretary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Report on the Prevailing Economic Conditions in Smyrna on March 15, 1921.

THE import and export trade of Smyrna at the present day is at a complete standstill, and there appears to be no business of any sort whatever except for Greek military requirements. When I visited the town in November 1918, after five years of war, it looked far more flourishing than at the present time. There are only two or three vessels in the harbour, when in 1919, before the evil effects of the Greek administration were felt, there used to be fifteen or twenty. The condition of the town is almost beggars description, and the inhabitants, both European and native, seem completely apathetic.

No law exists. The only authority with any power being M. Sterghiades, the Greek High Commissioner. The Turkish municipality has ceased to function, and owing to the action taken by the Greek authorities the Ottoman Gas Company is unable to light the public streets. The company is, in consequence, losing the greater part of its revenue and has had to increase considerably its prices to private consumers. These consumers are in most cases unable to afford such high prices, and either avoid the necessity of lighting at all or install private electric sets. After nightfall, with the exception of one or two hotels and the larger shops, the town is in complete darkness.

The streets have large holes in them, and where they have fallen in communicate with underground cesspools, and the smell and filth is indescribable. The cafés and restaurants are filled with Greek officers, who appear to spend most of their day in drinking and discussing politics. The English club fills at noon with the majority of the European business men, who apparently do not leave it again until 6 o'clock, which fact alone proves the complete stagnation of business in this town. The only efficient undertaking that I noticed during my visit is the Ottoman-Aidin Railway. This railway is a most thriving concern, and throughout that portion of it which is running is in excellent condition. It makes a certain revenue out of the transport of the Greek army and stores, but owing to the interruption of traffic through a large part of its length there is not much hope of dividends for the shareholders at present.

The bazaars are exceptionally empty, and I understand that they are especially feeling the present situation, as their clientele is chiefly composed of the poorer classes,

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who are only able now to afford the bare necessities of life. European merchants shortly after the armistice, however, realised large profits in the same manner as they did in Constantinople. These consequently are able to hold out during the present crisis, and there have been few cases of failures. Furthermore, owing to the absence of legal procedure, firms are unable to be declared bankrupt.

The customs are at present crammed to overflowing, and many local merchants refuse to take delivery of goods merely on the grounds of the rise in the exchange.

Owing to this stagnation in trade, caused partially by the war conditions in the hinterland, but also by the incompetency and maladministration of the Greek authorities, the greater part of the trade of the vilayet of Smyrna is gradually filtering to Scala Nova, and unless a radical change soon occurs Smyrna will become a second Salonika.

As an example of the way trade has dwindled a table follows showing the statistics of different articles arriving in Smyrna by the Aidin Railway during the years 1913 and 1920 :—

STATEMENT of Goods Transported to Smyrna by the Aidin Railway Company.

Goods.	January 1 to December 31, 1913.		January 1 to December 31, 1920.	
	Tons.		Tons.	
Barley	46,289	50	660	46
Ind. Corn Dari.	2,659	30	280	61
Wheat	21,629	15	243	42
Sundry grain	5,386	30	232	38
Beans and peas	14,713	91	602	15
Flour and meal	3,642	50	36	07
Sundry seeds	8,097	52	756	12
Sundry fruits	40,742	10	25,328	80
Olive oil.. .. .	1,293	71	1,505	61
Tobacco, Tumbelki	4,137	72	3,101	54
Cotton	4,102	39	428	29
Liquorice	4,306	09	2,310	95
Valonea.. .. .	14,461	19	2,959	58
Timber and boards	1,292	40	150	20
Charcoal and bark	3,197	23	2,612	36
Minerals	35,158	83	3,967	29
Beer, wine, &c.	369	61	12	36
Machinery and implements.. .. .	81	50	311	09
Manufactures	1,177	75	248	04
Leather and skins	702	84	176	03
Groceries, &c.	1,287	99	1,099	18
Pirina	1,470	36	2,952	32
Eggs and poultry.. .. .	1,810	68	12	15
Sundries	5,639	78	7,345	93
Total	223,648	44	57,332	93

These figures, of course, do not give any definite proof as the sowings of cereals, &c., were obviously not as large since the armistice as in pre-war days, but, on the other hand, when one looks at the figure for barley alone for 1913, of which 46,289 tons were brought into Smyrna by this railway and during 1920 only 660 tons arrived, it is easy to realise the paralysing effect the Greek army and Greek Administration have had on the trade of Smyrna.

During my visit I called on the majority of English business houses in Smyrna, among them the following :—

The Imperial Ottoman Bank.
The National Bank of Turkey.
C. C. Whittall and Co., General Importers and Exporters.
Paterson and Co., bankers.
The Ottoman-Aidin Railway Company.
J. Hadkinson and Sons, insurance company.
F. S. McVittie, importer of office furniture and general merchandise.
Mr. La Fontaine, President of the British Chamber of Commerce.
Mr. Wallace, barrister-at-law.
R. E. Turrell and Co., general importers and exporters.
Thomas Bottomley, general merchandise.
Cox's Shipping Agency.

I collated their views in general, which are expressed in the following notes :—

Chamber of Commerce.

The British Chamber of Commerce has good offices and up to the present is dependent mainly on the very energetic work put into its organisation on the part of Mr. La Fontaine, the President and Mr. McVittie, honorary secretary. Recently, however, a paid secretary has been appointed. The British Chamber appears to be almost the only one in Smyrna possessing offices of its own, consequently, the American, French, Italian and Dutch Chambers usually meet in these offices and when any official action is contemplated they take it conjointly. The Chamber is in particular need of trade periodicals, catalogues and bulletins of information generally.

The British Post Office.

I have received numerous complaints about the local organisation of the British Post Office. It is stated that there is no proper post office official, that a clerk, who is at present appointed there, appears only for two or three hours a day, that there is only one employee to sort the periodicals and parcels, which, consequently, take more than three months between despatch from England and delivery in Smyrna. I have taken this matter up in Constantinople with Major Routh, the postmaster of the British Civil Post Office, and he has promised to look into the matter.

Greek Authorities.

M. Sterghiades, the Greek High Commissioner, seems to be popular; he is an honest man and a hard worker. He suffers, however, from a very inferior staff and owing to their uselessness, unless applications or orders emanate from him personally, there is little hope of any satisfactory result, and there are invariably great delays.

Refusal to take Delivery of Goods.

The difficulties from which British merchants suffer on account of local merchants refusing to take delivery of goods consigned to them in this country are not nearly so acute in Smyrna as in Constantinople. This is owing to the fact that if the matter is brought officially to the notice of the Greek High Commissioner, the case is tried before a Judicial Commission, formed of Greek lawyers, appointed by him, the two chief being a M. Tolman and a M. Vlastos. These examine claims of British and other firms against Greek subjects. Their decisions are usually considered fair and in the event of them deciding that the Greek subject is in the wrong, they use arbitrary measures. In this one respect the Greek administration does seem to be satisfactory. The Chamber of Commerce, has, in consequence, issued a circular to all its members in England suggesting that in the case of any firm having British goods not taken up by native houses in Smyrna on account of the rise in the exchange, or other equally futile reasons, that they should send a memorandum of such goods to the secretary who will, through official channels, approach the Greek authorities and obtain settlement.

Export of Cereals from the Greek Area to Smyrna.

The merchants of Smyrna are suffering great hardships from the prohibition of export by the Greek military authorities of barley and wheat from the occupied zone to Smyrna. The delegates of the various chambers of commerce submitted to the Allied High Commissioners a statement of their case, copy of which is attached.* They state, however, that, in spite of action taken by the Allied High Commissioners, no steps have yet been taken locally for the removal of this prohibition, and that only by bribery of the military authorities on the spot, can any results be obtained.

On the other hand, I received varying reports from different firms concerning the estimates of stocks of cereals in the interior, Messrs. C. C. Whittall and Co., one of the leading firms, being of opinion that large stocks of barley do not exist in the interior, but that there is a certain amount of wheat. They also added that the reason why considerably less now entered Smyrna from up-country was the fact that the price in the interior was higher than that of imported wheat in Smyrna owing to the fall in value of this commodity in the countries of origin.

Olive Oil.

The chambers of commerce complained that in spite of the removal of prohibition of export of olive oil, ordered some months ago by the Allied High Commissioners, that

* Not printed.

in the Greek instructions in connection with this matter they contained a clause that this prohibition might be reimposed at any time. This, consequently, caused great hardship to merchants interested in this trade as they were unable to make forward contracts, which they might be unable to fulfil. They particularly requested that this clause should at least be removed on the present year's crop and only reimposed if next year's crop turned out to be insufficient for local consumption. Messrs. Whittall, on the other hand, said that, in their opinion, there was no great demand for olive oil in Europe, which alone accounted for the slackness in this trade in Smyrna.

Machinery.

Apart from the reasons already discussed the variation in the exchange has been a great stumbling block to trade of all kinds, and more especially to the importation of agricultural and other machinery, where a long delay occurs before delivery. I received one complaint from a firm who ordered a consignment of agricultural machinery from Messrs. Hetherington, of Manchester, who, in reply, stated that no delivery could be promised before the expiration of eighteen months. They were thus forced to send their orders to America. Furthermore, America has a complete monopoly of reaping machinery on account of the fact that they manufacture a considerably lighter article than the British production. This is, in consequence, cheaper and more suitable for the land.

Owing to the lack of lighting in the town there has been a big demand recently for electric installation plants. These have chiefly been supplied by the American firm "Delco." A local English firm, however, has recently obtained the agency for an English installation set, which is said to be both cheaper and to give a stronger voltage. It, however, has the failing of being non-automatic, and apparently, owing to the absence of skilled mechanics up to date, the American machine has been preferred. They, however, hope to place some British-made machines on this market, and in due course to prove their superiority.

Commercial Travellers.

In spite of the considerable business done in Smyrna during 1919, before the evil effects of the Greek Administration were felt, I am informed that practically no commercial travellers from English firms have paid a visit to Smyrna during the last two years.

There is a strong demand for English goods in normal times and if these ever return, commercial travellers should make a point of visiting this district.

Incendiary Fires.

In a place like Smyrna, where both commerce and commercial morality are at a very low ebb, the natural result has been a number of incendiary fires for the purpose of obtaining the insurance money. I have received a complaint from one assessor to a British insurance company that he had not received sufficient support from the British Consular authorities in connection with a claim for 300,000*l.* made against this company over a fire that occurred in some warehouse, of which there was proof that it had been caused intentionally. I do not think there is much truth in this statement, but the matter is being looked into.

Summer Time.

Great confusion is caused in Smyrna by the introduction of summer-time, which was ordered from Constantinople by the Allied High Commissioners. This confusion arises from the fact that the Greek authorities refuse to abide by it, in consequence, no local inhabitants do, the only people who are actually compelled to being the railways. During the present week, however, the Allied High Commissioners have notified the consular authorities that "summer time" shall not apply to Smyrna.

[E 4014/3696/44]

No. 5

Sir H. Dering to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord,

Bucharest, March 23, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 71 of this day's date, I have the honour to report that I observed in last evening's "Progrès," M. Marghiloman's organ, a statement to the following effect:—

"The Greek Legation communicates to us the following:

"Athens, March 19.—The 'Daily Telegraph' announces that British circles expect a protest on the part of Roumania against certain proposals of the Conference of London.

"The 'Nea Imera' writes that the intervention of Roumania in the matter of the Treaty of Sèvres constitutes an event of the highest importance.

"The 'Embros' remarks that the intervention of Roumania, which cannot live without the freedom of the Straits, is a valuable support against the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.

"The 'Elefteros Typos' says the news declaring that the Roumanian Government proposes to make strong objection to the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres has been received in Greece with the greatest satisfaction, for Roumania has the right to intervene.

"The 'Politia' writes that the protest of Roumania, which rendered so great services to the Allied cause, will not be without effect."

I telephoned this morning to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enquire whether he had seen the Greek Legation communiqué in the "Progrès," which I had not found elsewhere, and whether I could come and ask him what truth there was in the statement of intervention by the Roumanian Government.

M. Take Jonescu, whose dislike of M. Marghiloman and everything connected with him is proverbial, replied somewhat peevishly that he must decline to discuss anything to do with or published by the "Progrès." I then enquired whether he would discuss the communiqué issued by the Greek Legation, and, on receiving an affirmative answer, visited him at the Foreign Office and explained that I was merely desirous of hearing from him if the "Daily Telegraph" and Greek press statements had any foundation. M. Take Jonescu, who received me very cordially, said, in excuse of his crusty telephone message, that even if all other public men in Roumania were corrupt and unscrupulous he himself was honest—a pointed allusion to his *bête noire*, M. Marghiloman, who had permitted the publication of the Greek communiqué. The Minister said that he had read the communiqué and had immediately issued a categorical denial of the intention of Roumania to protest, to be published in the "Universul"—one of his own press—the "Adeverul" and other papers of yesterday evening and to-day. He added that sensible papers had refrained from publishing the Greek Legation communiqué. He gave me the details of his *démenti*, which corresponded to the translation from the "Universul" of to-day's date, herewith enclosed.

He explained that M. Boeresco had, before the London Conference, been instructed to enquire whether the question would arise of modifying the Treaty of Sèvres in regard to the Commission of the Straits, and had received the reply that there was no intention to raise this point. It had, however, notwithstanding, been discussed, whereupon M. Boeresco, even before he received his further instructions, had expressed surprise, and had pointed out that Roumania considered that she had a right to the same number of any delegates on the commission as Turkey might be accorded under revision of the treaty. M. Take Jonescu said that he considered it quite natural that Turkey should take part in the Straits Commission, but that Roumania had an equal interest with Turkey in the regulations affecting the Straits. Roumania's interest in the Straits was certainly greater than that of Greece. He repeated that there was no question of the Roumanian Government making any protest. Protests were a sign of weakness.

I observed that the aim of the new Greek Minister seemed to be to endeavour to enlist Roumanian support, on the strength of the recent Royal marriages, for the Greek attitude towards the Treaty of Sèvres. M. Take Jonescu intimated that it would not be successful, adding that M. Panas had announced to him a few days ago the intention of the Greek Government to mobilise three classes of reservists, obviously in order to

seek approval, whereas the Allies did not favour fresh Greek military enterprise in Asia Minor. He added that personally he had always deplored the alliances which had just been contracted by the Roumanian Royal family with the most corrupt and disreputable dynasty in Europe, thereby introducing the "infernal blood of Wilhelm." He had not been previously consulted as to the marriages and had seriously thought of resigning at the time, which he was quite ready to do at any moment now if other reasons arose, for he had no desire to cling to office. His own personal feelings of friendship and past negotiations with M. Veniselos rendered it impossible, as he had said to Prince George of Greece soon after the latter's arrival here, for him to change his policy and inaugurate a period of cordiality with the Constantinian régime.

I remarked that Prince George was reported to be as bitter about M. Veniselos as the rest of his own family, and to have referred to him in conversation here as "cette canaille."

I have the honour to enclose translation of the *démenti* referred to above and published in the "Adeverul" by M. Take Jonescu in parallel columns with the Greek communiqué.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Extract from "Adeverul," March 22, 1921.

ROUMANIA was informed that that part of the Treaty of Sèvres which relates to the regulation of the Straits, the only matter affecting her, would not be modified.

Now that Turkey has been admitted to the Straits Commission Roumania will not object to the admission of Turkey, but will ask for a number of votes equal to Turkey.

Up to the present the Roumanian Government has taken no action, as the whole matter is in a process of elaboration.

All the statements of the Athens papers are therefore incorrect.

[F 3988/1/44]

No. 6.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 1003.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the text of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 11th March, 1921, as communicated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Accord franco-turc politique, militaire, économique sur les Frontières entre la Turquie et la Syrie.

ENTRE les hautes parties contractantes soussignées :

Son Excellence M. Briand, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, agissant au nom du Gouvernement français, d'une part ; et son Excellence Békir Samy Bey, délégué de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora, agissant au nom du Gouvernement national turc, et muni à cet effet de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont été trouvés en règle, d'autre part,

Il a été convenu ce qui suit :

(A.) Cessation des hostilités et échange des prisonniers, dans les termes de l'annexe ci-jointe.

(B.) Désarmement des populations et des bandes armées, d'accord entre les commandements français et turcs.

(C.) Constitution de forces de police (en utilisant la gendarmerie déjà formée sous le commandement turc, assisté d'officiers français, mis à la disposition du Gouvernement turc).

(D.) D'accord avec les commandements français et turcs : Évacuation dans un délai d'un mois (après la cessation des hostilités) des territoires occupés par les troupes combattantes, au nord des frontières du Traité de Sèvres. Les troupes turques se retireront les premières et occuperont, huit jours après l'évacuation, les localités évacuées par les troupes françaises.

Des dispositions transitoires seront prises en ce qui concerne l'évacuation des territoires attribués à la Syrie par le Traité de Sèvres et réincorporés à l'État turc par le présent accord, en raison de leur caractère ethnique.

En raison de l'état de guerre prolongé et des troubles profonds qui en sont résultés, les troupes françaises se retireront progressivement dans un délai maximum de deux mois dans des conditions déterminées par les autorités françaises et turques réunies en commission, sur les bases générales suivantes : pacification effective, garantie de la sécurité des communications par voie ferrée entre l'Euphrate et le golfe d'Alexandrette, y compris le rétablissement des ouvrages d'art de l'Amanus et du pont de Djéرابلس, droit de suite militaire éventuel en cas d'attentats par des bandes, punition des coupables du guet-apens d'Ourfa.

(E.) Amnistie politique entière et maintien en fonctions du personnel administratif cilicien.

(F.) Engagement de protéger les minorités ethniques, de leur garantir l'égalité absolue des droits à tous égards et de tenir compte, dans une mesure équitable, de la quotité des populations pour l'établissement dans les régions à population mixte d'un équilibre pour la constitution de la gendarmerie et de l'administration municipale.

(G.) Collaboration économique franco-turque avec droit de priorité pour les concessions à accorder par l'État, comprenant notamment les voies de communication, mines, minères, travaux d'assainissement et d'irrigation, &c., en vue de la mise en valeur et du développement économique de la Cilicie, des régions évacuées par les troupes françaises, ainsi que des vilayets de Mamuret-el-Aziz, Diarbékir et Sivas, dans la mesure où cela ne serait pas effectué directement par le Gouvernement ottoman ou les ressortissants ottomans à l'aide de capitaux nationaux.

Concession à un groupe français des mines d'Argana-Maden.

Les concessions comportant monopole ou privilège seront exploitées par des sociétés constituées selon la loi ottomane.

Association la plus large possible des capitaux ottomans et français (pouvant aller à 50 pour cent du capital ottoman).

(H.) Institution d'un régime douanier approprié entre les régions turque et syrienne.

(I.) Maintien des œuvres scolaires et hospitalières françaises et des institutions d'assistance.

(J.) Le Gouvernement français instituera un régime administratif spécial pour la région d'Alexandrette, où les populations ont un caractère mixte, et s'engage à donner aux habitants de race turque toutes facilités pour le développement de leur culture et l'emploi de la langue turque, qui y aura le caractère officiel au même titre que les langues arabe et française.

(K.) Transfert à un groupe français, désigné par le Gouvernement français, de la section du Chemin de fer de Bagdad entre les portes de Cilicie et Nisibin, avec tous les droits, privilèges et avantages attachés à la concession, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'exploitation et le trafic. La police de la voie et des gares sera faite par la société concessionnaire avec l'aide de la gendarmerie turque. Le Gouvernement français aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par le chemin de fer.

(L.) La frontière entre la Turquie et la Syrie partira d'un point à choisir sur le golfe d'Alexandrette, immédiatement au sud de la localité de Payas et se dirigeant sensiblement en ligne droite vers Meidan Ekbès (la station du chemin de fer et la localité restant à la Syrie) ;

De là, la frontière s'infléchira vers le sud-est, de manière à laisser à la Syrie la localité de Marseva et à la Turquie celle de Karnaba, ainsi que la ville de Killis ;

De là, la frontière rejoindra la voie ferrée à la station de Chobanbeg. Ensuite, la frontière suivra la voie ferrée de Bagdad, dont la plate-forme restera sur le territoire ottoman jusqu'à Nisibin.

Puis la frontière rejoindra le coude du Tigre au nord d'Azek et suivra le Tigre jusqu'à Djeziret-ibn-Omar.

(M.) La ligne des douanes turques sera installée au nord de la voie et la ligne des douanes syriennes au sud.

Fait à Londres, le 11 mars 1921.

A. BRIAND.
S. BÉKIR.

Annexe.

Entre les hautes parties contractantes soussignées :

Son Excellence M. Briand, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, agissant au nom du Gouvernement français, d'une part ; et son Excellence Békir Samy Bey, délégué de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora agissant au nom du Gouvernement national turc, et muni à cet effet de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont été trouvés en règle, d'autre part,

Il a été convenu ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

En attendant la conclusion imminente entre les hautes parties contractantes d'un accord plus général, toutes opérations militaires actives seront entièrement arrêtées sur le front de Cilicie, et sur les confins de la Turquie et de la Syrie dès la réception des ordres donnés à cet effet à leurs troupes respectives, tant par les autorités françaises que par les autorités d'Angora et au plus tard dans un délai d'une semaine.

Pour hâter cette suspension d'hostilités, les chefs d'unités françaises ou turques feront connaître, dès qu'elles en seront avisées, aux forces adverses qui leur sont opposées, la signature des présentes et l'arrêt des opérations.

ARTICLE 2.

Dès réception des ordres urgents qui seront donnés par les deux hautes parties contractantes, les prisonniers respectifs, ainsi que toutes personnes françaises ou turques, détenues à la suite des hostilités, seront remises en liberté et reconduites aux frais de la partie qui les détient aux avant-postes ou dans telle ville la plus proche qui sera désignée à cet effet. Il ne sera fait exception que pour les criminels de droit commun, dont le cas sera réservé pour un examen en commun.

ARTICLE 3.

La présente convention est conclue sans limitation de durée, la reprise d'hostilités ne pouvant avoir lieu de part et d'autre qu'après dénonciation en règle un mois à l'avance. Pendant la suspension des hostilités, les parties s'engagent à s'abstenir de tout renforcement d'effectifs et de toutes mesures tendant à améliorer leur position respective ; les seuls transports militaires autorisés seront ceux des relèves normales ainsi que ce qui concerne le ravitaillement et l'entretien des troupes.

Fait à Londres, en double original, le 11 mars 1921.

A. BRIAND.
S. BÉKIR.

[E 4063/1492/44]

No. 7.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 323.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 29, 1921.

THE newly elected *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate, who is Archbishop of Caesarea, called on me yesterday to ask me to convey to His Majesty's Government the deep gratitude of the Greek Patriarchate and of the Ottoman Greeks for the consideration and courtesy shown to the late *locum tenens* in London.

2. In reply to my congratulations on his election and to the wish which I expressed that under his tenure of office as *locum tenens* the unredeemed Greeks would flourish, his Eminence replied that the Patriarchate had always looked to Great Britain as their protector and traditional friend. He hoped that he might count on the support of Great Britain in the future. His Eminence went on to say that the situation was now very difficult and critical. I replied that, as he would no doubt admit, the Greek offensive had still further embittered the already strained relations between Moslems and Greeks. The *locum tenens* acknowledged this, and, referring particularly to the withdrawal of the Greek division at Ismid and the Greek battalion at Beicos from General Harington's command, expressed the hope that the Greeks in the latter locality would not be left unprotected, as he feared that there might be

serious disorders, if not massacres, should no British troops replace the Greek forces. I have mentioned this to General Harington, who will not allow the Greek force at Beicos to withdraw until he has made provision for its replacement by a small detachment of British troops.

3. The *locum tenens* then alluded to one or two deplorable incidents which have occurred recently, such as the deportation of Greeks from Koundje and Kara Mursal and the events of Samsoun. I replied that these incidents were very regrettable, but that the Turks were bringing somewhat similar allegations against the Greek authorities. They accused the latter in particular of forcibly extracting declarations from Ottoman subjects expressing satisfaction with the Greek rule over territories in the occupation of the Hellenic forces. I said that it was very necessary that both parties should avoid any action which might lead to trouble at this particular moment, and I had in mind the possibility of disturbances in Constantinople itself should the Patriarchate wish to organise a funeral procession through the town when the body of Mgr. Dorotheos is brought back. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has told my colleagues and myself that the Turkish Government have information to the effect that shots would be fired at such a procession by persons in Greek pay in order to cast discredit on the Turks. I am in consultation with General Harington about this matter, and I think that the Patriarchate will accept a solution by which the body of the late *locum tenens* will be brought by water to a spot near the Phanar where it will lie in state and afterwards be conveyed by water to a landing-stage near the cemetery, thus avoiding any procession either through Stamboul or Galata.

4. The new *locum tenens* has not the same personality as his predecessor.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4066/22/44]

No. 8.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 329.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Black Sea, dated the 29th March, 1921, respecting the command of Allied armies of occupation.

Constantinople, March 30, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. H. Harington to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, March 29, 1921.

AFTER careful consideration, I feel compelled to bring the following situation to your notice with reference to the command of the Allied troops of the armies of occupation, so that you may, if you think fit, discuss this subject with your colleagues with a view to representation to the various Governments concerned.

I have hesitated to bring this matter forward before, as I quite realise that I came here by agreement of the Allied nations to have the honour of assuming the Allied command for a period of two years from the date of ratification, during which period I was also appointed to be president of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation. Recent events have shown the probability of still further delay in the ratification being effected.

I have also hesitated to raise this point on account of the extreme courtesy and cordiality shown to me by the Allied High Commissioners and the Allied services since my arrival.

I do so, however, now because I feel that the military situation in this theatre is sufficiently serious to warrant the limited forces of all the Allies being under one command. I do not raise it from a personal point of view, but solely because I honestly believe that we are taking a military risk which we are not justified in taking under present circumstances.

I am fully aware that if a serious situation developed the military commanders

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here would all help each other in that cordial way which all the Allied soldiers have learned during the past few years, but I feel that, unless a definite unity of command is established, a situation might arise with which it would be very difficult to cope.

For reasons of policy, the Greek division at Ismid has now passed from my command. The resources of the combined Allies have therefore been reduced, whereas the factors which make for possible disturbances have been increased. The factors to which I allude are the following:—

- (a.) The general unrest amongst the Turks and Greeks in Constantinople consequent on the operations which have now commenced, and the prospect of still further delay in settlement.
- (b.) The situation as regards the Russian ex-army and refugees.
- (c.) The Georgian situation.
- (d.) Bolshevik and other agencies plotting for general disturbance.

I do not anticipate trouble, but the above are factors which we cannot afford to ignore.

If we study the situation from a military point of view, we find that we are constrained to hold what is virtually a bridge-head, and if we examine the protection of this against a possible attack from the west, we find that it would be possible, with the Allied troops in Europe working harmoniously together, to defend the position approximately from Therapia, via the north of the Golden Horn, to Makrikeui; but when we examine the defence of the Asiatic side, we find we should have to defend a position approximately from Anadolu Hissar, via Geukdagh-Ereukeui, which would require at least a French brigade in addition to the forces at my disposal.

I understand it is the order of the French Government that French troops are not to be sent to Asia, and possibly this proviso also applies to the Italian troops.

I have no doubt whatever that both the Allies would be only too anxious to help me if I was placed in a serious position on that shore; but the situation, as I said above, might develop so quickly that it would be unfair to any commander to place him in the position of having to make plans which were entirely dependent on reference to Allied Governments at a critical moment.

It has never been my intention, when honoured by the Allied command on ratification, to do anything without the full approval of the Allied military commanders, with whom I am in the most cordial agreement; but I do represent that the picture I have presented above is a situation which is militarily unsound and opposed to the teachings of the recent war and to the Allied command now existing on the Rhine, where the Allied forces are under the French command.

The matter is one for the Allied Governments to settle, but I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent strongly that the present situation here is one which grows daily more difficult and should most certainly be controlled by one command.

I can assure your Excellency that it is only my conception of duty to the troops themselves which prompts me to put forward this question entirely as a military problem.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARRINGTON, *Lieutenant-General,*
Commanding-in-chief, British Army of the Black Sea.

[E 4067/800/44]

No. 9.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 330)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 30, 1921.

THE Vekil or head of the Protestant community in Turkey, which as your Lordship is aware consists mainly of Armenians, a considerable number of whom are established in Cilicia, called at this High Commission on the 29th March to speak about the agreement concluded between the French Government and the Nationalist Government of Angora.

2. The Vekil said he understood it contained a clause relative to the privileges of schools and other institutions. He said he hoped that this did not mean that French institutions were to obtain a preferential position, and that others would be left at the mercy of any legislation which the Kemalist Government might think fit to exact. He said that his community either themselves ran or were cointerested with the Americans

in higher educational institutions at places like Aintab, Urfa, Marash, Tarsus, Kharpout, &c., besides numerous elementary institutions belonging to the community elsewhere. He dwelt on the importance of maintaining the privileges of such institutions at least on the pre-war scale, and urged that they should, if possible, be placed on the same footing legally and practically as that of foreign scholastic and charitable institutions.

3. It was pointed out to the Vekil that any separate agreement contracted by the French could not of itself affect the status of non-French institutions, whether native Christian or foreign, and that the question really turned not on the French agreement, but on the future of article 149 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

4. The Vekil went on to express grave misgivings as to the future of the Christians in Cilicia. He said that a gendarmerie with Allied officers would not suffice to assure their safety, and he expressed serious doubt as to the solid value of any assurances which the French might have obtained, especially in view of the exacerbation of feeling which the events of the last two years had produced among the Moslems. He evidently thought that nothing would really avail except the presence of Allied military forces. There is now no prospect of the maintenance of such forces, but there is much ground for the Vekil's anxiety, and it is to be hoped that everything will be done to make the Minorities clauses of the revised treaty as real a safeguard as possible.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4372/143/44]

No. 10.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 339.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 5, 1921.

AFTER very severe fighting in front of Eskishehr for several days, during which the Greek troops incurred heavy losses, the Greeks have been obliged to fall back. Both the northern and southern columns are retiring to their original lines. The effective rifle strength of the Broussa forces seems to have been reduced from 13,000 to 8,000. Their casualties are estimated at 2,700 in one division and 2,000 in another, and the moral of the troops is reported to be falling steadily.

2. The Greeks assert that reinforcements to the extent of 20,000 are *en route* from Thrace, and reinforcements are being hurriedly collected at Smyrna. The Greek authorities at Constantinople state that, after the arrival of these reinforcements, the Greeks will advance again.

3. I had occasion to see the Greek High Commissioner yesterday, who admitted spontaneously that the Greek losses had been enormous. He stated that at In-Eunu all the officers of one regiment, from the colonel downwards, had been killed. He attributed the Greek failure partly to the fact that the Kemalist artillery had been able to register the ground over which the attack was to take place, whereas the Greeks had been unable to bring up their artillery for counter-battery work. M. Votsis likewise stated that if it had not been for the help which the Kemalists had received from both the French and Italians the operations would have been over by now. He said that the Italians in particular had supplied the Nationalist forces with arms and ammunition; three Italian ships had recently sailed from Taranto to Adalia with material of war for the Kemalists. He also asserted that there were two French and three Italian officers serving with the Kemalist staff at Eskishehr, and that a French officer in uniform had been found amongst the Turkish dead. The French High Commissioner is issuing a *démenti* of this story.

4. I understand that one of the main reasons for the losses and set-back which the Greeks have sustained is that the Kemalists brought up 6-inch Howitzers, the existence of which was quite unsuspected by the Greeks. Another reason which has undoubtedly contributed to the Greek failure has been the replacement of capable officers by incompetent adherents of the Constantinist régime.

5. So far the Kemalist troops do not seem to have been able to take advantage of their successful resistance in order to pursue the retreating Greeks. No doubt they have had severe losses themselves.

6. Thus it would seem that both sides have been somewhat exhausted by the first round of this conflict, and since the Greeks have elected to renew hostilities in order to settle the question of the Treaty of Sèvres by the sword, the best solution would seem

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to be that Turks and Greeks should fight one another to a standstill. Then, presumably, they would be more amenable to pressure or advice from the Allies. It is impossible to contemplate a complete Greek or Kemalist victory without dismay.

7. Military opinion inclines to the belief that the Greek commanders will not be able to get their troops to advance again, and General Papoulos may, indeed, find himself filling the rôle of a modern Xenophon.

8. An interesting indication of the state of mind of the Angora Government is furnished by a telegram sent by that Government to the secretary of the Régie Company at Constantinople, pointing out that the Angora Government will not necessarily recognise the arrangement recently concluded between the company and, what they contemptuously call, the Constantinople administration. The telegram reminds the Régie Company that the Angora Government is the sole Government in Turkey.

9. The situation is curious and possibly without precedent. The Greek Government apparently considers itself at war with Turkey, but not, presumably, with the Constantinople Government, which remains an impotent but deeply interested spectator of events in Anatolia. The unredeemed Greeks, through the mouth of the Patriarchate, have sent their best wishes to the Greek army for its success in the present struggle. On the other hand, prayers have been offered up in the mosque of Eyoub for the success of the Kemalist arms. All the mosques were illuminated last night in honour of the Turkish victory.

10. The present situation has given rise to a variety of questions in the domain of international law, in view of the attitude of neutrality which the Powers have decided to observe in the present conflict. The situation is extraordinarily interesting, but, having regard to the rapid and often unexpected sequence of events, it would be rash to predict what is likely to take place even within the period of a week.

11. Hardly a day passes without the Allied High Commissions receiving notes of protest, either from the Turkish Government or from the Greek High Commissioner, about deeds of violence committed by one or other of the contending parties. In present circumstances it is perfectly futile passing these notes on.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4601/143/44]

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord,

Athens, April 7, 1921.

TO-DAY being the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the struggle for Greek independence in 1821, the town is profusely beflagged, it is a public holiday and large crowds are wandering about, salutes are fired, and there was a *Te Deum* in the cathedral and a ceremonial lecture in the university, both attended by the King and the Royal Family.

In the upper classes at least, there is a deep feeling of depression which makes it difficult for them to celebrate this centenary as joyously as they would have wished. After some days of concealment, the news has now been published that the troops which were attacking Eskishehr have been withdrawn to their original positions just east of Broussa, and though ridiculous official explanations have been issued that the attack on Eskishehr was never intended as a serious operation, but only as a feint to render easier the capture of Afium Karahissar, everybody realised that the Greeks had met with a serious rebuff which has cost a terrible lot of casualties. I think a good many people also realise the danger that Afium Karahissar may now be very seriously attacked by Turks coming up from the south and by others from the north released by the Greek retirement. There was a report yesterday that Afium Karahissar had already been retaken, but I gather that this is at any rate premature.

So far, public opinion appears to be taking this bad news better than I should have expected; possibly the man in the street swallows the optimistic declarations of the Government and the press and does not quite realise the situation. On the other hand, I suppose there is a possibility that the optimism is justified and that when the reinforcements arrive, which I am told they should do in a week or ten days, the Greeks may be able to execute an enveloping operation and still take Eskishehr and inflict a real defeat on the Turks. M. Theotokis, who has been Acting Minister of War during

M. Gounaris's absence, told me two or three days ago that the mobilisation of three classes had already yielded 40,000 men, and that he felt confident of getting 45,000, which was the figure the Government had counted on. I have no means of verifying this statement, which does not tally with General Gramat's impressions or with the stories I still hear constantly of great difficulties throughout the country in getting the men to present themselves. An Englishman travelled in a train full of newly mobilised men a day or two ago and heard the most violent abuse of the mobilisation, of the Government, and even of the King himself; on the other hand, the men I have seen marching through the streets of Athens have been most cheery.

A press telegram reached Athens from Smyrna the other day that the body of a French officer had been found in the Turkish trenches. The Government stopped this telegram, but it was followed by many more telling the same story with numerous embellishments, and they were allowed to be published. This produced a crop of articles in almost every Government paper attacking the French in unrestrained language, while the Veniselist papers showed common sense in refusing to believe the story, and anyhow deprecating these attacks on a Power whom it is in Greece's interest to endeavour to conciliate. The abuse was such that my French colleague protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, insisted on his issuing a *démenti*, and begged him to keep the press in order; the *démenti* was issued—rather a half-hearted one—and was greeted with contempt and disbelief and fresh abuse of France by the Government press. The Italian Minister also issues periodical *démentis* of the accusations against Italy and protests to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but with no apparent result.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

[E 4608/143/44]

No. 12.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 362.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 12, 1921.

THE Greek High Commissioner called on me on the 9th instant to communicate three items of information which had been reported to him by his Intelligence Service:—

- (1.) That one of the Turkish torpedo-boats at present in the Golden Horn was getting ready to torpedo the "Kilkis," which is the Greek cruiser now lying in the Bosphorus.
- (2.) That the "Goeben" had taken in 1,500 tons of coal which had been supplied by the French.
- (3.) That war material for the Nationalists was being disembarked at Zunguldak under the supervision of the French detachment at that place, part of which was going up-country with the material in question.

2. M. Votsis stated that the information as regards (1) came to him from a source which he could not disregard. He hinted that if anything of the kind was on foot the Greek troops might march on Constantinople from the frontier. The report under (2) did not cause him so much anxiety, because he understood that there was a British detachment on board the "Goeben." He considered that the information under (3) was more than likely, and again asserted positively that the French and Italians were helping the Kemalists.

3. I told M. Votsis that I did not, for the moment, believe in the alleged plot to torpedo the "Kilkis." As regards the "Goeben," I said that there was no British or Allied detachment on board. The "Goeben" consumed a certain quantity of coal in connection with the electric plant on board. I promised to enquire into the reports which he had mentioned to me, but I warned him that it was unwise, at the present moment, to believe all the rumours which were going about Constantinople.

4. I immediately brought the three reports in question to the notice of Admiral Tyrwhitt, who had the Turkish torpedo-boats examined. Admiral Tyrwhitt reported that none of them was in a position to perform a belligerent act and that there was nothing to give colour to the report mentioned to me by M. Votsis. As regards the "Goeben," Admiral Tyrwhitt explained that the British naval forces had recently sent her 120 tons of coal, which probably accounted for the report received by M. Votsis. Admiral Tyrwhitt added that the "Goeben" would be useless even if she could go to

sea. As regards item (3), Admiral Tyrwhitt immediately despatched a destroyer to Zunguldak to make enquiries.

5. I informed M. Votsis of the result of my enquiries, and trust that he is now less nervous. M. Votsis, who, until the departure of his predecessor, was captain of the "Kilkis," is pleasant to deal with, but he is, I venture to think, entirely unsuited for his position. The Greek High Commissioner should be a level-headed and calm person, able to appraise the value of the countless rumours which are going about this town. He is, however, the very opposite to this, and it does not appear to occur to him that action hastily taken on an exaggerated or unfounded report could do great harm. One of the awkward features of the complicated situation here is that the Turks have no official relations with the Greek High Commissioner. This High Commission is, therefore, the principal intermediary for communications which pass between the two.

6. I should add that in bringing the first two of the above-mentioned reports to my notice the Greek High Commissioner stated that the Turks had no right, under the Treaty of Sévres, to use Constantinople as a base for belligerent operations. I replied that the Greeks seemed to me to be in the same position in this respect as the Turks, although I had noticed that the Greeks sometimes, when it suited them, stated that the treaty, which had not been ratified, was not in operation. He contended, however, that the Turks, "who had ratified the treaty," were in a different position. I pointed out that the Turks had not ratified the treaty; in fact, the High Commissioners had spent several months in trying to induce them to do so. This was news to him.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4612/1/44]

No. 13.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 368.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

A SIGNIFICANT feature of the situation here since the London Conference is the extent to which the Turkish newspapers here already known to be Nationalist in their sympathies have come into the open. Of the nine daily Turkish papers appearing in Constantinople six are Nationalist, two anti-Nationalist and one technically non-political, but run in the Nationalist interest. Out of the first six, four, namely, the "Wakt," "Ileri," "Ikdam" and "Aksham" work in close co-operation. They now no longer make any secret of their devotion to the Angora Government, and, though the Allied censorship exercises a restraining influence, it is impossible in present circumstances to attempt to do more than prevent violent explosions and the grosser forms of propaganda, such as the exploitation of real or alleged Greek misdeeds. Even this is increasingly difficult owing to the attitude of the French and Italian representatives on the censorship, who take their cue from the higher authorities.

2. The recent outbreak of active warfare between the Greeks and the Kemalists has given a stimulus to the chauvinism of Turkish and Greek papers alike, and makes the task of the Allied censors still more difficult. All the Turkish papers alike naturally regard the present war as one between Turkey as such and Greece, but those mentioned above make a special feature of illustrations and letterpress which imply that Turkey is represented exclusively by the Angora Government and its military leaders. As a sample of the kind of matter which is published I enclose in translation an extract from the "Ileri" of the 7th instant.* The reference to the prayers offered in the Constantinople mosque is of interest. There is no doubt that such prayers are offered, and that the mosques are a centre of propaganda representing the Kemalists as shouldering the burden of Turkey as a whole.

3. The insistence on financial and judicial independence is also significant. In this matter also the hope now held out of territorial concessions only serves to stimulate the desire for complete independence of foreign control, the abolition of the Capitulations and a free hand in regard to minorities, subject to safeguards similar to those provided in treaties with European Powers. This desire has always occupied a foremost place in the Nationalist conception of legitimate Turkish aims, and here again

* Not printed.

Constantinople is now in line with Angora. The Minister for Foreign Affairs loses no opportunity of deprecating the creation of zones of influence, and while he carefully avoids any suggestion that financial control can be wholly done away with, it is easy to see in what direction his thoughts are tending. Indeed, Sefa Bey frequently expresses misgiving as to whether in recent conventions, especially that with the Italians, the Nationalists themselves may not have given away too much.

4. The "Ileri," the same paper which published the enclosed extract, printed on the 6th April the telegram mentioned in my telegram No. 259 of the 9th April as having been a source of embarrassment to Izzet Pasha. The telegram was simply a message of congratulations. The sting lay in the fact of its being represented as having been addressed to the Pasha as Minister of the Interior by the members of the Angora Government, thereby seeking to involve him in complete complicity with his recent gaolers. The Pasha, who must for the time being be regarded as a moderate Nationalist, and who, as I have explained in my telegrams, possibly regards himself as being destined to dominate the next phase of the Nationalist movement, was much upset. He explained that the signatures to the telegram he had actually received were entirely different from those published in the "Ileri." "May God put us all right!" he piously observed in his interview on the subject.

5. The local Greek press is equally strong on the Greek side, and has also to be restrained by the Allied censors. Constantinople thus presents the spectacle of a Turkish capital in which both parties to what is, in effect, on both sides, a national war are vociferously acclaimed by their respective partisans, with the Allied authorities not very successfully endeavouring to maintain a balance between the rival propagandas.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4613/1/44]

No. 14.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 369.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

IN my despatch No. 368 I had the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that the majority of the principal Turkish newspapers in Constantinople have openly espoused the Nationalist cause. One or two other features of the situation here show the same trend of feeling.

2. The renewal of hostilities in Asia Minor has greatly embittered the Constantinople Government, and particularly men like Sefa Bey. These consider that the Greeks have launched an unprovoked attack on the Nationalist forces. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs loses no opportunity of drawing the attention of this High Commission to the perpetration by Greek troops, or by bands formed by Ottoman Greeks, of outrages in various localities in the Ismidt peninsula and further afield. The Constantinople Government are practically the self-constituted mouthpiece of the Angora Government in these matters.

3. The Constantinople Government have organised a Red Crescent Mission for service with the Nationalist forces. General Harington reports that a considerable number of arms have disappeared from the stores which are under the control of the Minister of War. Steps have been taken to make an inventory of the contents of these stores with a view to checking any further withdrawals of arms or munitions. There can be no doubt that these arms have found their way to the Nationalist forces.

4. The Constantinople Government have not, as yet, given effect to the request of the Allied Commissioners for the reimposition of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. It is understood that this matter has been held up pending the return of the Grand Vizier, from whom his colleagues expect to hear his version of what passed on the subject in London between your Lordship and himself. In spite of Sefa Bey's protestations to the contrary, there is little doubt that the real motive of the Constantinople Government in stubbornly resisting a return to the 11 per cent. tariff is their fear of Angora and their unwillingness to have two different customs régimes in Turkey.

5. The situation of the Turkish exchequer has been temporarily relieved by the consent of the Eastern Telegraph Company to pay over, immediately, a sum of 294,688*l.* in respect of terminal charges. This sum will enable the Provisional Financial

Commission to pay the balance of the January salaries, and probably a large part of the February salaries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday evening to express the gratitude of the Turkish Government for the prompt manner in which the claim of that Government against the Eastern Telegraph Company had been settled.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4615/1/44]

No. 15.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 371.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in duplicate, a certain number of French bulletins issued by the "Agence d'Anatolie," which is the official mouthpiece of the Angora Government, in January and February. They are extracted from a large number of these bulletins which recently reached me, and I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the marked passages. They show that the hostility and mistrust of governing circles in Angora towards Great Britain remained as strong as ever, both before and after the departure of Bekir Sami Bey for the London Conference, though the expression given to these feelings is less violent in form than it used to be. They show also that, while there is a hope of playing France off against Great Britain, the feeling against the French is hardly less strong, especially so long as the French retain any hold on Cilicia. The article marked 5 is especially significant in this connection, when regard is had to the date, the 17th February.

2. There is reason to fear that the attitude of the leaders, who, so far as we know, are still dominant at Angora, is such that neither Great Britain nor France can have any strong hope of coming to terms with them on any basis which strikes us as reasonable. Apart from anything else, the extremist leaders have had to fortify their position for a long time past by stimulating passions which they themselves would probably have difficulty in controlling. As an example of the sort of propaganda which has been scattered broadcast in Anatolia, I may mention a pamphlet printed at Samsoun under the title, "Let those who sell their Religion for a shilling [*sic*] know that God is Most Great.—To Damad Ferid and his associates."

3. The one hope lies in the possibility of a more moderate party evolving from the Nationalists in Asia Minor and Constantinople, and acquiring sufficient influence to dominate the movement as a whole. This hope, not very strong at the best, is weakened by the recent Greek reverse. Nevertheless, if it is right to regard men like Izzet Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey as relatively moderate, it may be possible to promote their becoming, with others of the same way of thinking, the nucleus of a new movement which would stand for a united Turkey, loyalty to the Sultan or at least the throne, and a certain amount of give-and-take in the next stage of the negotiations with the Allies.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4616/143/44]

No. 16.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 372.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

IN my telegram No. 250 of the 7th instant, I had the honour to summarise the situation resulting from the severe reverse suffered by the Greek troops, as it presented itself to me, and I venture to supplement that telegram by the following brief remarks.

2. Although it is dangerous to prophesy the probable sequence of events in this part of the world, I anticipate that the Nationalist forces will devote all their energies to driving the Greeks down to the coast, or out of as many places in Asia Minor as possible, neglecting Constantinople for the moment. Even if and when they are at

* Not printed.

liberty to move on Constantinople, I do not believe that they will commit any act of hostility against the Allied forces; in other words, they will come to Constantinople peaceably. But it is certain that they will, in co-operation with their numerous sympathisers here, devote all their energies to bringing about the cessation of the military occupation of Constantinople by the Allies, neglecting no form of pressure short of force for this purpose. Their attitude towards the Sultan may also be expected to be the reverse of benevolent.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4707/1/44]

No. 17.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris.)

(No. 1132.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1921.

THE French Ambassador having asked to see me this afternoon, in order to present to me the note which, in my absence, he had handed to the Prime Minister yesterday, regarding the question of German reparations and the views of the French Government thereon, I took advantage of the occasion to make a few observations to him about the agreement which his Government had recently concluded, without reference to us, with the Angora Government while Bekir Sami Bey and the delegates of the latter were in London.

I said that our first knowledge of this agreement, apart from the fact that we knew that negotiations were proceeding for the cessation of hostilities and the return of prisoners, had come from a publication, in some French newspaper, of the text of the treaty concluded. We had thereupon expressed our great surprise to the French Government that they had come to this arrangement behind our backs and without any communication to us. Nor did the reply, which we had then received, that parliamentary reasons had prevented its disclosure to us before it was laid before the French Chamber, appear to me to be at all an adequate explanation.

Subsequently, the French Government had handed to us the text, and I had now had an opportunity of carefully perusing this. It seemed to me to raise two points of some importance.

In the first place, I found it difficult to reconcile the conclusion of any such agreement with one of our enemies in the recent war with the declaration which had been signed in London in November 1915 between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Russia, in which each of the signatory parties engaged not to conclude peace separately during the war, and, further, that when terms of peace came to be discussed no one of the Allies would demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. I thought it difficult to contend that this clause of the declaration had not been violated in letter as well as in spirit.

Further, I noticed that certain of the provisions of the agreement, notably those with regard to the frontier line between the Turkish territory and the French mandated territory in northern Syria, were in apparent disagreement with, or at any rate were departures from, the tripartite agreement and the Treaty of Sévres; and this added to my surprise that the French Government had not thought it desirable to consult us upon a matter which equally affected all the Allies, and which could not become operative without their consent.

The case was not rendered better by the fact that Count Sforza had taken advantage of the conference in London to conclude an independent agreement on his own part with the same enemy. Indeed, the Italian agreement was in some respects in wider divergence from existing obligations than the French. In neither case did it seem to me possible to pass by the incident without indicating the anxiety which it had caused us.

The French Ambassador's explanation was a mixture of candour and ingenuity. He said, in the first place, that everyone knew that the French military position in Cilicia was so precarious that they were bound to conclude peace with Mustapha Kemal in order to get out their troops and to avoid the enormous expenditure of a protracted campaign. This was as well known to us as to everybody else.

Further, as to our complaint of being kept in the dark, M. Briand claimed that he had informed Mr. Lloyd George at every stage, if not of the actual details, at least of

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the lines upon which he was proceeding, and he conceived that he was acting in strict co-operation with his allies in what he had done.

I remarked that I had heard of no such revelations, and that I could not help thinking that there had been some exaggeration in the explanations of M. Briand. Several opportunities had occurred of acquainting the Foreign Office with what had passed, and certainly we had been kept entirely in the dark.

His Excellency then explained that, had the matter been left to him to conduct by the traditional diplomatic methods, he would have been only too glad to have kept us informed with what was passing and to show us the document before it was signed. He could see no reason why this should not have been done, but we were living in days now when the old conventions were not always strictly observed and when conversations took place, and arrangements were made between Prime Ministers which sometimes superseded the efforts of the old diplomacy. Had M. Briand been acting as Foreign Minister, he would undoubtedly have behaved in the way I had suggested. On the other hand, as Prime Minister, he evidently thought he had discharged his duty by whatever communications he had made to the British Prime Minister.

I replied to this argument, which did not altogether convince me, by postulating a situation in which the British Government having done the same or a similar thing, and the Comte de Saint-Aulaire having come to me on instructions from his Government to make a protest, I had delivered the reply with which I had just been favoured by him. Would he have been altogether satisfied with such an explanation?

His Excellency endeavoured to dismiss the subject as one of no great importance, arising from the peculiar circumstances of the hour.

I said that I was not content to accept this plea and that I had discharged what I thought was a necessary duty in informing him of the point of view, from which we had no alternative but to regard it.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4745/143/44]

No. 18.

Memorandum on the Supply of War Material to Greece.

IT was decided in December last, as one of the sanctions against King Constantine, to suspend the supply of war material to Greece, and it would not appear that during the recent conference in London any very specific agreement was reached as to an actual prohibition of export. It seems to have been generally agreed among the principal Allies, however, that if fighting was to be renewed between the Turks and the Greeks they must remain neutral.

2. The legal aspect of this attitude of neutrality towards the present Græco-Turkish hostilities has since been carefully considered at the Foreign Office, and the view was taken that the relation of the principal Allies to the Greeks and the Turks should not be regarded as analogous to that of neutral States towards the belligerents generally, and in particular during the recent war, since the present belligerents were two parties with whom the principal Allies had recently been seated at conference here in London, and to both of whom identical proposals of peace had been submitted. It had also been made clear to both the Greeks and the Turks that, while the principal Allied Powers could undertake no responsibility for restraining either of the two parties from such movements as they might consider necessary to secure the safety of their armies, the responsibility for such movements must rest on those who took them. While the proposals of peace were still under discussion, one party had attacked the other.

3. Since, therefore, His Majesty's Government and the Allied authorities at Constantinople were preventing the despatch of munitions of war to the Kemalists, and since His Majesty's Government had protested strongly to the Italian Government in the matter of the alleged supply of war material to the Kemalists, whether by the Italian Government or by private Italian firms, it was felt at the Foreign Office that we must adopt a consistent attitude and intervene, so far as the powers of His Majesty's Government went, to prevent the export of munitions of war to the Greeks. The Greek Chargé d'Affaires was therefore informed on the 14th April that "His Majesty's Government have agreed with their Allies to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in regard to the present hostilities in Asia Minor, and they have therefore decided that no facilities can be accorded for the export of war material from this country to either

Greece or Turkey." A copy of this note and of other relevant correspondence was sent to the Board of Trade, who, together with the Department of Overseas Trade, had previously been informed verbally of the attitude which the Foreign Office had decided to adopt.

It is understood that the French Government are adopting precisely the same attitude as His Majesty's Government, and it is believed that the Italian Government are acting similarly. They have certainly concurred in this line of policy being adopted by the principal Allies.

4. The power of His Majesty's Government to withhold such facilities is, in fact, confined to various Orders in Council, consolidated in the Order in Council of the 24th March last, published in the "Board of Trade Journal," which gives a list of various munitions of war which can only be exported under licence from this country. This list really comprises only arms and ammunition, &c., and would not extend to such supplies as military boots, blankets, &c. The object of the above Order in Council was to enable His Majesty's Government to carry out the Arms Traffic Convention, which generally prohibits the supply of arms and ammunition to certain specified areas. The Arms Traffic Convention, as such, has not yet been ratified by the signatories or entered into force, but the principal Allies have agreed to apply it so far as the prohibited areas mentioned in the convention are concerned, and one of these is pre-war Asiatic Turkey.

5. It is not unprecedented for a State to prohibit the export of munitions to another State for special reasons which appear to justify that course. At present, all the States represented in China, with the exception of Holland, are restraining their nationals from exporting to, or importing into, China arms and munitions until the establishment of a Government whose authority is recognised throughout the whole country. The reason given to the Chinese Government for this action was that the Powers concerned "in considering the present state of disunion between north and south in China have been impressed by the fact that the continued possibility of importing military arms and ammunition into the country from abroad could not but exercise a disturbing influence," and that they were "firmly determined to discountenance any condition or action which might favour the reversion to hostilities."

6. Again, a joint resolution of Congress on the 14th March, 1912, gave the President power to prohibit the export of arms to any American country in which it was found that "conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States." Acting under this power, President Wilson on the 12th July, 1919, prohibited the export of arms and munitions of war to Mexico.

7. Although the action now taken in regard to Greece and Turkey has not been promoted by considerations of neutrality as generally understood, it may be pointed out that, while "a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit on behalf of one or other of the belligerents of arms or munitions of war" (5th Hague Convention, article 7), there is nothing to prevent a neutral Power from doing so if it thinks fit, and this has sometimes been done, as, for instance, by Switzerland and Belgium during the Franco-German War.

E. G. F. ADAM.
H. W. MALKIN

Foreign Office, April 22, 1921.

[E 4776/201/44]

No. 19.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 378.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a statement by Sir A. Block of Government expenditure and receipts for March and April 1921.

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

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Enclosure in No. 19.

Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir,

Constantinople, April 5, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to place before you a statement of the sums paid by the Government in salaries and expenses during the first fortnight in March 1921, a short survey regarding the receipts obtained in March 1921, and an estimate of the expenses for April 1921.

Salaries and Expenses (first Fortnight of March).

	£ T.
Salaries	381,784
Payment on account of arrears for the financial year 1336 (1920-21)	19,844
Refunds	2,087
Advances to various departments	147,584
Expenses in March	32,403
Secret Service	1,690
Total	585,392

Receipts.

Apart from its normal receipts, the Government has lately obtained an advance of £ T. 100,000 from the Agricultural Bank as well as £ T. 1,951,700 from the Tobacco Régie, representing its share in the surplus receipts during the six last years.

These two windfalls have enabled the Treasury to pay the balance of the December salaries, as well as 50 per cent. of those of January, and the second half of the February salaries of the police, public security, gendarmerie corps and tax collectors.

Estimate of Expenditure for April 1921.

	£ T.
Salaries	1,814,646
Expenses	578,503
	2,393,149
To meet this the Treasury's estimate of receipts in April is	964,450
Total	1,428,609

After deduction from the general receipts (£ T. 960,540) of the priority salaries and expenses, which amount to £ T. 503,970,* there remains a balance of £ 460,570 to meet the expenditure, reduced, after payment of priority salaries and expenses, to £ T. 1,889,179. There therefore remain on expenses alone a deficit of £ T. 94,321, and another on salaries of £ T. 1,334,288.

I append herewith a table of the credits for April 1921.

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK.

* £ T. 480,358 for salaries and £ T. 23,612 for expenses.

Annex.

TABLE of Credits for April 1921.

	Salaries.	Expenses.	Total.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Various departments	879,657	378,504	1,258,161
Schools	74,435	44,074	118,509
Various establishments	399,652	99,925	499,577
	1,353,744	522,503	1,876,247
Pensions for widows and orphans	192,736	..	192,736
Other pensions	193,166	..	193,166
Payments to officers, prisoners of war repatriated	40,000	..	40,000
Payment on account of arrears to various departments	50,000	50,000
Payments to elementary schools, vilayet of Constantinople	35,000	..	35,000
Upkeep of navy ships*	6,000	6,000
Total	1,814,646	578,503	2,393,149

* This will form the subject of a separate report later.

[E 4849/143/44]

No. 20.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord,

Athens, April 14, 1921.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 130 of the 29th ultimo calling for my observations on Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch No. 270, relative to alleged irregularities committed by the Greek authorities in Thrace and at Adrianople. I have unfortunately no means at my disposal, as there is no British consular officer in any of the districts in question, to check the truth of these allegations, many of which, I much fear, are not inherently improbable. I have the honour to suggest that the only way of obtaining reliable information on the matter, if, as I presume, it is not possible to appoint a consular officer at present to Adrianople, would be to send an Allied commission of enquiry, as requested by the Porte, or to entrust the task to a British officer or official. Such an officer who knew Turkish should have no great difficulty in checking the allegations made, as pretty complete details are given in the Turkish note. The proposal would no doubt not be agreeable to the Greek Government, but I have no doubt I could obtain their consent.

On the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 117 of the 19th ultimo, I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the list of Moslem notables alleged to have been arrested, and asked him to cause enquiries to be made and to inform me of the result. I propose to take a very early opportunity to revert to the subject, to tell M. Baltazzi that constant complaints reach His Majesty's Government of ill-treatment of Moslems in territories taken over by Greece, and to urge him to cause the strictest instructions to be sent to all Greek authorities concerned, pointing out how very desirable it is in Greek interests to avoid any possibility of Greece's critics being able to say that under her rule her Moslem subjects are little better off than the Greeks under Turkish rule.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

[E 4854/3654/44]

No. 21.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 19, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 132 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the agreement between the Italian Government and the Angora Government, which was handed to me on the 15th instant by the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for the confidential information of His Majesty's Government, as reported in my telegram No. 127 of the 16th April.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Agreement between the Italian Government and the Angora Government.

SON Excellence le Comte Sforza, président de la délégation italienne et Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Royaume d'Italie, d'une part, et son Excellence Bekir Samy Bey, président de la délégation de la grande Assemblée nationale et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Turquie, d'autre part, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

1. Collaboration économique italo-turque, avec droit de priorité pour les concessions d'ordre économique à accorder par l'État en vue de la mise en valeur et du développement économique dans les sandjaks d'Adalia, Bourdour, Moughla, Isparta et d'une partie des sandjaks d'Afioun, Kara Hissar et de Kutaya, Aidin et Konia à déterminer dans l'accord définitif, dans la mesure où cela ne serait pas effectué directement par le Gouvernement ottoman et les ressortissants ottomans à l'aide de capitaux nationaux. Concession à un groupe italo-turc de la mine houillère d'Héraclée, dont la limite sera déterminée dans la carte qui sera jointe à l'accord définitif ;
2. Les concessions comportant monopole ou privilège seront exploitées par des sociétés constituées selon la loi ottomane ;
3. Association la plus large possible de capitaux ottomans et italiens (la participation ottomane pouvait aller jusqu'à 50 pour cent) ;
4. Le Gouvernement royal d'Italie s'engage à appuyer efficacement auprès de ses Alliés toutes les demandes de la délégation turque relatives au Traité de Paix, spécialement la restitution à la Turquie de la Thrace et de Smyrne ;
5. Le Gouvernement royal d'Italie donne son assurance formelle que, au plus tard à la ratification de la paix et d'après un accord entre les deux pays, il procédera au rappel de ses troupes actuellement sur le territoire ottoman ;
6. Les dispositions ci-haut formulées seront mises en vigueur en vertu d'une convention qui sera stipulée entre les deux parties contractantes immédiatement après la conclusion d'une paix assurant à la Turquie une existence viable et indépendante et acceptée par elle.

Fait à Londres, en double exemplaire, le 12 mars 1921.

C. SFORZA.
S. BEKIR.

[E 4892/340/44]

No. 22.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 18, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 343, dated the 6th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the minutes of the sixtieth meeting, held on the 13th April, of the Armenian-Greek section of this High Commission with the representatives of the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates.

2. As your Lordship will observe, the deportation and enforced enlistment of the Christian populations of the Black Sea littoral still continue, while the report of the Nationalist attack on Christians in the Yalova area is not without interest in view of your Lordship's telegram No. 216 of the 7th instant to the effect that the Turkish

representative in London had protested against the alleged massacre of Turks in the same region. The truth would appear to be that, owing to the repeated advances and withdrawals of the Greek forces in this district, it has been the scene of continual excesses and reprisals by irregular bands, alternatively Christian and Moslem, to the great loss and suffering of the inhabitants of both religions.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Minutes of the Sixtieth Meeting of the Armenian-Greek Section and Armenian and Greek Representatives, Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

Present :

R. W. Graves, Esq., C.M.G.

C. H. W. Tucker, Esq.

Dr. Tavitian, representing the Armenian Patriarch.

M. Calvocoressi, representing the Greek Patriarch.

Public Security.

Dr. Tavitian gave news dated the 8th April of the attack and burning, by Kemalists bands from the village of Baghtchejik, of two Greek villages, Kara Tépé and Yenikeuy (near Ismidt), and also of two Armenian villages, Ovajik and Tchenguiler, the latter of which had been partially burnt in a previous raid.

At Orkhan Gaza (near Yalova) the high road has been closed, and a group of travellers in the vicinity had been attacked by the Kemalists and carried to an unknown destination.

M. Calvocoressi confirmed Dr. Tavitian's report of the burning of Yenikeuy, adding that the whole of the population, numbering some 250 families, had taken refuge at Ismidt. Several peasants had been wounded in the attack on the village.

From Inebolou (Black Sea), on the 8th April, ninety-five Christians had been exiled to the interior, and the Christians of the 1307-1316 (1898-1900) classes had been called to the colours, while from Sinope also several notables had been exiled to the interior.

M. Calvocoressi stated that the Greek Patriarchate had received a petition through the Greek Metropolitan of Kadikeuy from the inhabitants of Shile (Black Sea), asking if it were possible to establish a local gendarmerie in the event of both the British and Greek troops being withdrawn, and thus avoid a repetition of the events which took place last year in the same district.

With reference to the proposal submitted by the Turkish delegates to the London Conference that conscription should be retained in Turkey, Mr. Graves informed the meeting that, as a result of enquiries, it was ascertained that the proposal had been rejected.

[E 4896/1/44]

No. 23.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 399.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 20, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 368 of the 13th instant, relative to the recent attitude of the Turkish press of Constantinople, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article on British policy in the Near East which appeared in the "Wakt" on the 15th instant,* the day after the arrival of Bekir Sami Bey herd on his way to Angora. It is hardly likely that this article can have been submitted to Bekir Sami Bey, but its appearance at that moment in a newspaper so strongly Nationalist as the "Wakt" is not without significance.

2. The principal recipient in the press of Bekir Sami Bey's views and impressions was the "Ileri," the most extreme of the Nationalist papers here. He authorised this journal to announce the news (which he had just received from me) that forty of the Malta exiles were to be released at once. Owing possibly to inaccurate reporting, the

* Not printed.

remainder of his statement on this subject, as printed, was misleading, for he is represented as having said that twenty-four persons would be released to a port to be designated by Angora, without adding that this was conditional on the release of the British prisoners in Anatolia, and as having said, further, that four persons would be kept in custody in accordance with the agreement.

3. According to the same paper, Bekir Sami Bey expressed confidence in the early conclusion of a peace compatible with Turkey's national resolve. He bade the people of Constantinople to be of good heart, and claimed it as a success that the Allied Powers had been induced to take up an attitude of neutrality in regard to the Greeks, with whom Turkey was now directly at grips, and of whom she could make short work.

4. In its leading article on the Anatolian delegation, published the same day—the 15th April—the “*Ileri*” still further emphasises the fact that Greece is no longer acting as mandatory of the Allies, with whom Turkey, which for the “*Ileri*” means the Grand National Assembly of Angora, continues to be in peaceful negotiation. The writer congratulates Bekir Sami Bey's mission on having done away for good and all with the Treaty of Sèvres. The mission, he says, is returning to Angora with the new proposals of Europe, and he anticipates that these proposals will be accepted by the Grand National Assembly.

5. The last phrase would appear to suggest that a paper so rabid as the “*Ileri*” leans to what has now to be regarded as “moderate” Nationalism, i.e., a Nationalism desirous of good relations with all the Allied Great Powers and prepared to sacrifice something of the complete Nationalist programme. This impression is unfortunately counteracted by a perusal of the portions of the article deleted by the censors, in which Bekir Sami is represented as having obtained far more than is contained in the London proposals. These passages suggest, *inter alia*, that the Anatolian Government has been officially recognised; that there will be no Straits Commission; that financial questions will be left to the Turkish Parliament; that the Chataldja lines may be refortified; and that Adrianople will return to Turkey.

6. It remains to be seen how far Bekir Sami Bey will remain a “moderate” Nationalist in the stimulating air of Angora, and how far, if he resists the fumes produced by the recent success against the Greeks, he will be able to carry other Nationalists with him. Meanwhile articles like those of the “*Wakt*” and the “*Ileri*” show that, while ready to make the most of any favourable turn of policy in Allied countries, the more ardent Constantinople Nationalists will give their full support to any policy which Angora may decide to follow.

7. While on the subject of the press, I take the opportunity of enclosing also a translation of an article which appeared in the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*,”* the organ of the Angora Government, on the 22nd March, which shows how little the Angora leaders are disposed to do for the *beaux yeux* of even so devoted a toady as Italy. I would beg your Lordship to read this article in conjunction with my despatch No. 371 of the 13th April, in which I pointed out how fundamentally hostile are the extreme Nationalists to Great Britain and France alike. The “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*” article shows that the xenophobia of that wing of the Nationalist movement, however dissembled in the case of Italy, really extends to that country also, so long as she maintains pretensions to enjoy special privileges in Turkey.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 4897/1/44]

No. 24.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 401.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 20, 1921.

FOR some time past reports have been reaching me of political intercourse between Angora and Afghanistan. Up to a short time ago the information was very meagre, and amounted to little more than occasional news, not always well-authenticated, of the movements of emissaries of a political or religious kind.

2. It has now become known that a definite agreement was concluded between the Angora Government and Afghanistan early in March. Somewhat different versions of

* Not printed.

this agreement have come to my notice, but the summary published on the 24th March in the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*,” the organ of the Angora Government, may presumably be regarded as authentic, if not very complete. I enclose a translation of the article containing this summary.

3. According to other accounts, for which, however, I cannot vouch, the agreement is for a period of twenty years, and it contemplates: (a) an exchange of military missions and the despatch of a Turkish military mission of instruction to Afghanistan, and (b) the creation of a Pan-Islamic federation embracing Persia and Azerbaijan as well as the two principals, under the auspices of the Caliphate. The report that Turkey is to help Afghanistan with military instruction seems intrinsically probable, and may well be covered by articles 8 and 9, the summary of which in the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*” article is extremely brief.

4. The report that the treaty expressly contemplates the inclusion of Persia and Azerbaijan in a federation seems more open to doubt, and may be founded on the fact, which appears from the enclosed version, that the agreement does refer to two States not parties to it, which are, however, not Persia and Azerbaijan, but Bokhara and Khiva.

5. The “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*” summary suggests several interesting subjects of speculation. It is, for instance, noteworthy, having regard to the practically certain fact of direct intercourse having existed between Angora and Afghanistan that the present treaty should have been concluded at Moscow. One wonders what rôle the Soviet Government have played in the matter, and what is the position of Jemal Pasha, whose mission to Cabul was undertaken under Bolshevik auspices, but who, according to secret reports, has aroused the worst suspicions of the Bolsheviks themselves, owing to his supposed intention of running Pan-Islamism not as an instrument of the Soviet, but as an independent and self-sufficing movement.

6. It is also significant that the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*” summary represents the Afghans as recognising a Turkish hegemony, but makes no mention of the Caliphate. Altogether, the treaty shows traces of Bolshevik inspiration, as would be expected from the fact of its having been negotiated at Moscow.

7. Incidentally, it will be observed that the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*,” in an article published as recently as the 24th March, describes the Angora delegation to the London Conference as being on its way back without having found any basis of agreement with the Allies.

8. My information as to the steps taken to establish mutual diplomatic representation in the capitals of Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan is very incomplete, but I may, perhaps, be able to report something on this subject later on. In the meanwhile I would draw your Lordship's attention to the issue of the “*Islamic News*” of the 17th February last, which contains a leading article on “*Afghanistan and England*,” and what purports to be the gist of a letter addressed by the Ameer to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

9. I should be grateful if any fuller information on the subject of relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan which may have reached your Lordship from India or other sources might be communicated to me. I should also be glad to learn whether Turkish activities in Cabul have had any effect on the position and progress of the British Special Mission, which is still, I understand, in that place.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Extract from the “*Hakimiet-i-Millie*” (Angora) of March 24, 1921.

(Translation.)

THE TURKISH-AFGHAN TREATY.

(The Turkish-Afghan Treaty was concluded and signed at Moscow on March 1, 1921.)

WHAT remarkable new developments these days are producing! Just as the Turkish delegation sent to London are returning without having found it possible to arrive at an agreement with the Imperialist Powers of Europe, comes the good news that on the other side treaties of friendship have been concluded with two Great Powers in Asia. Our issue of yesterday gave the essential clauses of the treaty

concluded at Moscow between Turkey and the Russian Soviet Government. To-day we publish the essential clauses of the treaty concluded between Turkey and that powerful Asiatic Moslem State, Afghanistan. This treaty means that Turkey begins to have a share in Asiatic policy, with which she had not hitherto been able to concern herself. There is no doubt that Turkey, like other Eastern States, must draw her force from the East, and that only by this force can she stand up against the colonising mentality of Europe.

A treaty of alliance in ten articles was concluded and signed at Moscow on the 1st March between the delegates of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Moscow and Mehmed Veli Khan, Ambassador Extraordinary and delegate, with full powers, of Afghanistan. The preamble of the treaty speaks of the bonds which unite the two Moslem and brotherly States, of the historical duties which devolve on them in these days of incipient awakening of the East, and of their decision to transfer to the political plans the long existing spiritual and natural alliance between them and to convert it into an official and material alliance.

Article 1 deals with the position of Turkey and Afghanistan in regard to each other.

Article 2 lays down that the Eastern peoples are endowed with full liberty and rights of independence, and that each is free to adopt and apply the form of administration which it individually desires, and confirms the independence of the States of Bokhara and Khiva.

Article 3 states that Afghanistan recognises the hegemony of Turkey as a State which has for centuries rendered signal services to Islam.

Article 4 lays down that each of the contracting parties will regard any aggression against the other on the part of any Imperialist Power whatsoever pursuing a policy of exploitation [?] as directed against itself, and undertakes to resist it by all available means in its power.

Article 5 lays down that neither Power will conclude any treaty or international instrument in compliance with the wishes of any third Power which is at variance with the other or injurious to the interests of the two contracting parties, and that each will inform the other on the occasion of the conclusion of a treaty with any Power whatsoever.

Article 6 provides for the conclusion of commercial and consular conventions.

Article 7 provides for the organisation of communications and the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries.

Articles 8 and 9 deal with Turkish assistance to Afghanistan, and provide for the ratification of the treaty as soon as possible.

Article 10 states that the treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in two copies.

[E 4899/143/44]

No. 25.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 403.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 20, 1921.

THE *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate, accompanied by two lay members of the Greek Patriarchate, called on me on the 18th instant to thank me for having attended the funeral service for the late *locum tenens*, Mgr. Dorotheos.

2. After expressing once again the hope that Great Britain would continue to interest herself in the fortunes of the unredeemed Greeks, the *locum tenens* went on to say that he feared that the inter-Allied censorship was not holding an even balance between the Greek and Turkish press. Thus, for instance, the censorship in question apparently cut out of the Greek press reports of atrocities committed by the Nationalists on Greek subjects or Ottoman Greeks, whilst it had allowed one Turkish paper to attack the Patriarchate for holding a service in memory of the Greeks who have fallen in the recent fighting. The *locum tenens* said that if this procedure continued to be followed it might exacerbate the feelings of the unredeemed Greeks and have dangerous consequences.

3. I replied that I would go into the matter, but that the Allied censorship was concerned to cut out anything in the press which might contribute still further to inflame feelings which were already embittered by the renewal of hostilities in Anatolia. In point of fact, the inter-Allied censorship, principally at the instigation of this High Commission, has been exercising very strict vigilance over the press, and has performed

its duties very satisfactorily. Any appearance of bias against the Greeks, however, may be ascribed to French or Italian influence; indeed, the British censor, in order to obviate this as far as possible, does more than his fair share of the work.

4. I then enquired of the *locum tenens* whether it was a fact, as reported in the press, that the Patriarchate had urged the Greek Government to reinstate in their commands the Veneselist officers now at Constantinople. The *locum tenens* admitted that he had taken the step in question in an unofficial manner. I suggested that the Patriarchate was indulging in political activities, which were bound to produce an unfortunate impression on Turkish opinion. He replied that he had acted in the interests of public order, because he thought it desirable to get the Veneselist officers away from this town. In reply to a further suggestion of mine, the gentleman who accompanied the *locum tenens* admitted, quite freely, that the motive in asking for the reinstatement of the Veneselist officers was in order that the Greek army should be better equipped to defeat the Nationalist forces. I then remarked that the Greek Patriarchate could hardly be surprised if its motives were misinterpreted and caused resentment.

5. The situation created at Constantinople by the resumption of hostilities in Anatolia is, I venture to think, without precedent. On the one hand, arms have been disappearing from various dumps at Constantinople for some little time past. Machine-guns belonging to the armed Turkish force still in this town have also disappeared, and there is little doubt that these weapons have found their way to the Nationalist forces. I have made strong representations on this subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have said that if any more leakage occurs the remaining machine-guns will be withdrawn from the Turkish force in question. It is likewise impossible to disregard the numerous reports to the effect that the Italians are supplying the Nationalists with a considerable quantity of arms and munitions. On the other hand, the Greeks are freely using the Sea of Marmora for belligerent operations. They have even used Constantinople as a naval base, from which to prevent Turkish subjects returning to Turkey, and three days ago a Greek destroyer took 157 Turkish subjects, who were returning to Constantinople, off a Bulgarian ship coming from Varna. The Greek destroyer subsequently returned to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 5042/3654/44]

No. 26.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 314.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 24, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Italian Colonial Institute and the Colonial Institute of Agriculture recently organised a congress for the discussion of subjects connected with the future development of the Italian zone in Anatolia. The Congress met last week in Rome and was largely attended, a great number of deputies and professors and a sprinkling of senators being present.

The programme of matters to be discussed was:—

1. Economic undertakings that Italy can develop in Anatolia;
2. Improvement of geographical information and statistics to assist the development of the Italian zone;
3. Questions of sea and land communication for facilitating Italian enterprise;
4. Effect of Mussulman law on property, especially as regards concessions and contracts;
5. Agricultural, zoological and forest resources of Anatolia and the existing land system there;
6. Cotton and hemp cultivation in the coast districts and afforestation in the interior; possible production of silk;
7. The population of the country and the traditions of Italian trade there.

The Congress held six sittings, during which a number of speeches were delivered, but the somewhat ambitious programme was only adhered to in a very sketchy manner, and no concrete scheme for the development of the Italian zone in Anatolia was forthcoming.

[6831]

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Both the President of the Congress, Senator Arton and Signor Vassello (a well-known parliamentary speaker on questions concerning the Orient), insisted on the necessity for some form of co-ordination in any enterprises undertaken in Anatolia and the desirability of first securing financial assistance for pushing Italian interests. It was generally agreed that the Italo-Turkish agreement signed recently at London ought to be of use in promoting the development of the Italian zone, but one speaker made the point that care must be taken not to offend Turkish susceptibilities by giving the impression that Italy intends to plant colonists in the zone and that it must be clearly laid down that Italians proceeding thither will be simply labourers, as in the case of Italian emigrants to South America.

In connection with the nature of the economic undertakings to be set on foot, it was recommended that in the first instance Italian activity should confine itself to agriculture, since means of communication in Anatolia are still so deficient that foreign industrial enterprise cannot yet hope to succeed there. In dealing with the general question of communications, allusion was made to the prejudice which the loss of Smyrna must entail for Italian enterprise, and it was suggested that trade should be encouraged to flow through all possible ports, with, for the present, Rhodes as a kind of "sorting station" linking up the Anatolian ports with the western Mediterranean; later on Rhodes might be replaced by a station at Mermeritza, a harbour on the mainland somewhat more to the north-east.

A speaker on the subject of the population of Anatolia called attention to the preponderance of the Greek element amongst the traders of the coast, and expressed the hope that some steps would be taken to prevent the "force of attraction of Hellenism" from prejudicing Italian immigration. It was urged that the Italian Government should expedite the appointment of consular officers or agencies throughout the Italian zone.

A question was asked as to the truth of a rumour that Arab Nationalist syndicates were acquiring land concessions in the zone reserved for Italy, but it was stated by a subsequent speaker that this report had not been confirmed.

The President of the Congress, dealing with the political aspects of Italian penetration into Anatolia, declared that Italy would never contest the national aspirations of any people, and that Italian operations would be entirely in the nature of collaboration with the local population, and of assistance to them in the work of developing the country. The employment of Turkish capital along with Italian was recommended, especially in the initiation of any large undertaking, such as the work of the Heraclea coal district, where there is need of road-making and of irrigation works.

The Congress finally approved a resolution to the effect that, in the interests of both Italy and Turkey, co-ordination was essential in any undertakings started for developing the Italian zone; that experts should be chosen outside the bureaucracy to collaborate with the Government functionaries; that to this end a central committee for Anatolia should be constituted as soon as the political situation admits, which will keep in close touch with the Government, and will assist in determining the general lines to be taken for ensuring the free development of private enterprises, co-ordinating such enterprises and carrying on a work of propaganda which will tend to confirm the "Italianism" of the zone; that this committee should also be an information bureau, operating to facilitate all proposed enterprises; that its members should be experts and representatives of the more important bodies which already have, or intend to obtain, interests in Anatolia; that it should be nominated by the presidents of the Colonial Institute of Rome and the Colonial Agricultural Institute of Florence and that its headquarters should, for the present, be at the Rome Institute; and that it should take steps to constitute financial means for setting in operation works of public utility and for developing the public services in Anatolia, invoking the assistance both of the local population, who will derive the greatest benefits from its activities, and of private ventures whose development will be materially advanced by the improved means of communication by sea and by land, which it will be its object to promote.

Simultaneously with this Congress at Rome there has been a meeting at Milan, organised by the Italian Institute for Commercial and Colonial Expansion, at the Milan Chamber of Commerce, which was attended by representatives of the chief banks and delegates from the various Chambers of Commerce and from the Roman Colonial Institute. Signor Scarpari, the principal member of a recent commercial mission sent to Anatolia, made the chief speech of the day, in which—like at the proceedings in Rome—the importance of developing Rhodes as a centre for concentrating the exports of Anatolian ports was urged; he also recommended that one of the first undertakings to be put through in Anatolia should be the construction

of a railway from Adalia into the hinterland as far as Konia, and of lines from Denizli to ports of Giora and Macri. The Milan meeting approved a resolution to invite its president (Senator Pavia) to nominate a committee for co-ordinating and fostering the study and development at Milan of possible economic, industrial and commercial enterprises in Anatolia.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[E 5220/50/44]

No. 27.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 408.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Sir H. Lamb's despatch No. 90/10, dated the 15th April, 1921, respecting Christian and Moslem relations at Smyrna.

Constantinople, April 21, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. 90/10.)

Sir,

Smyrna, April 15, 1921.

I HAVE had the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice by telegram the regrettable and dangerous exacerbation of feeling between the Christian and Mussulman elements of the population in this district which has manifested itself since the resumption of the Greek offensive in the latter part of last month.

2. This has been mainly due to the attitude and conduct of the troops called under arms as a consequence of their reverses following on the failure of their attack on Eskishehir; but there is some ground for fearing that this was, at least in some measure, provoked by the action of the Greek authorities themselves in permitting, and even encouraging, the circulation of highly exaggerated, if not entirely unfounded, narratives of the persecution to which the Christian population were being subjected in the districts beyond the occupied zone—of massacres at Kaisserich, Sokia and elsewhere.

3. As instances of the conduct referred to, I may mention the following.

4. The soldiers entraining at the Basma-Khane station, the terminus of the Cassaba Railway, amused themselves on several days in succession by firing at the minaret of the adjacent mosque of Tchhorak-Kapou, the upper portion of which was badly chipped, considerable fragments of masonry falling on the dome of the building and bringing down the plaster from the roof. Those bullets which missed their mark showered on a tekke situated behind it, and on the Mussulman quarter covering the slopes of the citadel hill. In other quarters shots were fired at the muezzim calling to prayer, at pedestrians traversing open spaces or exposed streets on the hill-side, or merely in the air. Several fatal accidents were the result. On the 6th April, for instance, a Turkish girl traversing the street called Yemish Tchharshi was struck by a falling bullet, which pierced her head. She died on reaching the Turkish hospital to which she was carried. On the 8th a Jewish glazier named Mosché Bahar was shot in the side and died almost immediately, whilst a Turkish boy of 15 named Mustafa Khalil was seriously wounded at Dolabli Kouyou. A volley fired from the troop train in motion on the Cassaba line mortally wounded a Greek soldier who was on duty on the Aidin Company's pier, and caused a considerable panic in the neighbourhood. Another volley was poured into the Standard Oil Company's tanks, under which the line passes, causing some loss of oil and risking a serious conflagration.

5. As the trains proceeded up the line the soldiers are reported to have fired indiscriminately at any Turk who was visible from their windows. At least twelve such are reported to have been killed. Thus between the villages of Balatchik and

Ghermendjik were found the corpses of Eyoub-oglou Mehmed, Mouhadji Osman, Ali-Mollah-oglou Veli, and Tik-tabak Hodja-oghlu Ali, of Selatin. Near Mersinli a shepherd named Mehmed was killed.

6. The numerous protests to which these events gave rise resulted in strict orders being issued that no ammunition should be served out to troops entraining, but as the men landing here were already in possession of supplies these orders were of little effect, and firing continued as before. It was not until the 11th that the military authorities were persuaded to resort to the obvious measure of withdrawing the men's rifles, since which I understand that there have been no complaints on this score.

7. Numerous cases are reported in which Mussulmans, both men and women, have been mishandled, insulted or threatened in the streets of the town, the fezzes of the former or veils of the latter being torn off their heads and trodden on. Even children going to and from school have not escaped insult and ill-treatment. The civil authorities, to do them justice, appeared fully alive to the impolicy of this conduct and its possible dangers, but incapable of restraining the men.

8. The danger of course consists mainly in the bitterness of spirit which these incidents engender, and which will most certainly have its repercussion elsewhere, and lead to reprisals and counter-reprisals of the customary nature. There is no inconsiderable risk, as an old inhabitant expressed it to me, of the present hostilities, which began as a purely political manœuvre, degenerating into a religious war, with consequences which cannot fail to be disastrous for the country, and which is all the more regrettable when one considers on what terms the two elements managed to exist together up to the commencement of the present century.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB, *Representative of the
British High Commissioner, Smyrna.*

[E 5224/201/44]

No. 28.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 413.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a statement showing the present financial situation of the Turkish Government.

2. This statement has been prepared by Sir Adam Block, British representative on the Provisional Financial Commission, and I would like to draw your Lordship's attention to the great services being rendered by that commission in the face of much difficulty.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Financial Situation of Turkish Government.

THE Turkish Government have been able to pay the total salaries of January and to make certain "priority" payments.

With the ordinary receipts this would not have been possible, but the Government have had several windfalls in the last few weeks.

These are notably:—

	£T.
1. Advance of the Debt Council	1,200,000
2. Payment of a sum due by the Bank of France ...	198,855
3. Payment by the Tobacco Régie Company, being Government's share in profits of last six years ...	1,951,758
4. Payment by Eastern Telegraph Company ...	1,701,828
	<hr/>
	5,052,441

These extraordinary receipts together with the ordinary receipts have enabled the Government to make the payments above mentioned, and will leave them with, say, £T. 1,420,230 up to the end of April, as follows:—

	£T.
1. Balance at the Imperial Ottoman Bank	901,800
2. Reimbursement of delegation to London	15,000
3. Payment by vilayet of Constantinople	30,000
4. Estimated receipts of customs, 20th to 30th April ...	150,000
5. Estimated receipts of vilayet, 20th to 30th April ...	60,000
6. Surpluses left over from credits accorded but not yet utilised	263,430
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	1,420,230
The Government, with the consent of the Financial Commission, will pay urgent expenditure to 30th April ...	60,000
	<hr/>
Leaving a balance of	1,360,230

which I propose to apply to payment of one month's salary for the month of Ramazan.

The payments in view up to the 30th April are estimated to be—

	£T.
1. Widows and orphans for February	192,800
2. Police and gendarmerie (balance for March) ...	71,380
3. Special police (March)	5,123
4. Central office of gendarmerie (March)	1,885
5. Customs salaries (March)	21,800
6. Tax collectors of vilayet (March)	11,300
7. Prisons, hospitals, finance section of vilayet (March)...	6,500
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	310,788
8. Salaries of various other departments	1,229,458
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	1,540,246

There is therefore a deficit of £T. 180,016 up to the end of April, but I hope to be able to reduce it or to find here and there some small sums to meet it.

The payment to widows and orphans will commence on the 25th April and the other payments on the 28th instant.

This being so, the situation on the 1st May will be as follows:—

	£T.
Balance of March salaries unpaid (the priority payments being settled to end of April)	1,536,128
Total April salaries	1,814,646
	<hr/>
	3,350,774
If I add current and urgent expenditure for May, say ...	575,000
And salaries for May	1,814,646
	<hr/>
The Government will have to find at end of May ...	5,740,420

The daily receipts are dropping and will drop still further in the month of fasting, and I estimate the current receipts for May at—

	£T.
1. Customs (£T. 16,000 a day)	500,000
2. From the vilayet	200,000
3. Various	50,000
	<hr/>
Total	750,000

If the Greeks pay the 34,000 <i>l.</i> odd sequestered at Smyrna with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and if, as I hope, the Eastern Telegraph Company pays the Government their share of receipts for the first quarter of the year, this would produce say	£T. 421,800
If, again, the Régie Company were to advance to the Government their share in the profits of the year 1336, that would give (I am not sanguine about this)	2,500,000
The Financial Commission could count on a total of receipts of	3,671,800
To meet a liability of	5,740,420
Being an insufficiency of	2,068,620

After that it would appear as if the Government would have only their ordinary receipts to fall back upon.

I venture to say that it is surprising that the Financial Commission has been able to carry on for so long, and it is only if Anatolia and Constantinople unite that there is any real hope of establishing an equilibrium.

In conclusion, I would add that the Sales Commission have realised £T. 580,026-91, which is not yet sufficient to reimburse the banks' advances of £T. 800,000, and it will be long before the advance of the Debt Council of £T. 1,200,000 will be reimbursed by the proceeds of the sale of stocks.

ADAM BLOCK.

Constantinople, April 23, 1921.

[E 5231/1/44]

No. 29.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 426. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 27, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 20th instant, I have now obtained a certain amount of additional information regarding the relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan. As it is mainly based on reports from secret sources, I would beg that it be treated for the time being as confidential, though if the reports are correct, the facts will shortly be a matter of general knowledge.

2. In his speech in the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March Mustafa Kemal Pasha mentioned Afghanistan as one of the Asiatic countries with which the Angora Government had cordial relations, but there was nothing in his speech to suggest that formal diplomatic intercourse had been established. The balance of the evidence is that up to the conclusion of the Turco-Afghan Agreement at Moscow any Afghan emissaries who may have visited Angora were at most unofficial agents, and in some cases, perhaps, irresponsible individuals. Towards the end of March, however, a regular Afghan diplomatic mission was stated to be on its way to Angora. This mission appears to have arrived there the second week of the current month. It is headed by a certain Sultan Ahmed Khan, with a staff of two Afghan secretaries and one Indian secretary named Hadji Mansour, who is known as an Indian seditionist.

3. There is nothing to show that a corresponding diplomatic mission has yet proceeded from Angora to Kabul. Such emissaries from the Turkish side as have been reported have been persons in the nature of propagandists. Among them is another well-known Indian seditionist, Abdurrahman Peshwari. The most important Turks who have visited Afghanistan recently have been Jemal Pasha and Bedri Bey, but they went rather as Bolshevik than as Turkish representatives. Jemal Pasha is known to have executed his mission in such a way as to excite grave suspicion among the Bolsheviks for the reason indicated in paragraph 5 of my despatch under reference. There is, however, no evidence that he can as yet be regarded as being an instrument of Angora policy. He stands for the pan-Islamism of the Union and Progress gang, and a distinction must still be drawn between these and the Angora leaders, although in so far as the extreme and at present dominant party in Angora is concerned, there is no real difference in the ultimate programme.

4. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie," the organ of the Angora Government, announced on

the 9th March that it learned on good authority that an important and select military mission was ready to start for Kabul in response to an invitation from the Ameer. The secret reports state that this military mission will be headed by Nureddin Pasha, and will be composed of some fifty officers and experts.

5. I have received from the same secret source the translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey, Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Turco-Afghan Treaty. I enclose a copy of this document which, if genuine, is not without significance. I have not yet been able to verify it by reference to the Angora press, in which it would presumably have been reported. It is not intrinsically improbable that Mouhtar Bey would have held the language ascribed to him, but pending verification the report concerning his speech must be accepted with reserve.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 29.

The Turco-Afghan Treaty.

(Secret.)

THE following is a translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey at the Great National Assembly in connection with the Turco-Afghan Treaty recently signed in Moscow:—

"A treaty of alliance has just been concluded between our Government and that of Afghanistan, which is a Moslem State inhabited by a people of sturdy character, who have preserved their independence for centuries. The union of the Eastern world against the same danger is a very important event. The Imperialist Powers of the West are on the point of losing their authority and their prestige over the oppressed and innocent nations of the East. Islam and Turkism are struggling for national and religious liberty and independence, and will succeed in their endeavours. They have realised the criminal and cowardly objects of the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, at the London Conference. I hope that the Conference, which was nothing more than a stratagem for the purpose of allowing the Hellenic army to prepare, has dissipated all doubts in the matter. In spite of the exceedingly conciliatory attitude of our delegates, the Western world still wishes to sap the strength of the East, and particularly of Islam. The Entente Powers, especially Great Britain, will never acknowledge our rights and those of the Moslem. They will foment intrigues until we have attained victory by our arms wielded in the name of right and justice. The agreement concluded at the Moscow Conference was an important step towards our triumph in the East. The Western world is in the throes of upheaval, becoming more acute every day, of the oppressed who groan in slavery. The alliance concluded with Afghanistan is thus a guarantee for the welfare of the Moslem world. The Government of Afghanistan is a strong Islamic Government, and Afghanistan is the Turkey of Central Asia. It possesses a regular army and perfect military resources. At all times it has rebelled against British domination, and only two years ago had recourse to war against Great Britain. The Afghans are strongly attached to their religion and their liberty. I am of opinion that we have in a manner taken a practical step for the achievement of the pan-Islamic project. I can conceive of nothing more likely to raise anxiety in Great Britain than this co-operation between Turkey and Afghanistan. Our Government is exercising every effort to reforming the army and finances of Afghanistan. I hope and believe that this summer the Moslem world will recover its ancient grandeur and power. I may inform you in confidence that Bolshevik Russia has agreed that the Afghan army shall be reinforced not only from the independent Turkish khanats of Bokhara and Khiva, but also from the territories with a Turkish population directly under Bolshevik rule. We are hoping to-day that very shortly a Moslem federation of half a million people will exist ready at any moment to rise against the Imperialists of the West. In this manner we shall put an end to the Indian Empire, and we shall ensure the development of a strong Islam. The plans elaborated to this end by the Government are of course known to the National Defence, and the military authorities are occupied with the matter. I can therefore give no further details."

Constantinople, April 16, 1921.

[6831]

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[E 5236/1/44]

No. 30.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 432.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 27, 1921.

WITH reference to recent correspondence relative to the attitude of the Turkish Nationalists since the London Conference, I have the honour to state that I have recently received copies of the two Angora daily papers, the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" and the "Yeni Gyun," for the last days of March. As your Lordship is aware, the former paper is the semi-official organ of the Angora Government, while the "Yeni Gyun," which is much the more chauvinistic of the two, is the organ of Yunus Nadi Bey, one of the delegates to the London Conference.

2. The copies in question of the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" present few features of special interest, though even this paper manifests considerable hostility towards Great Britain. The "Yeni Gyun," on the other hand, shows clearly certain tendencies which augur ill for the prospects of any settlement on the basis of the London proposals, if, as I have reason to fear, extremist counsels are still in the ascendant at Angora.

3. I enclose a summary of two articles dealing directly with the proposals and a translation of a third article on "The Two-Act Tragedy in London."

4. The "Yeni Gyun" displays an intense hostility towards Great Britain, whom she represents as being completely identified with recent Greek proceedings. It also strikes a note of insulting disloyalty to the Sultan, whom, in at least one place, it describes as a "Caliph who has played the traitor to his country and his people."

5. I do not wish to attach an exaggerated importance to such fulminations or to prejudge the issue when Bekir Sami Bey, who must by now have reached Angora, gives an account of his mission to the leaders there. There is, however, no evidence up to date that these leaders are prepared to compromise with the Allies, and it would be the greatest mistake to count with any confidence on the moderation displayed by Bekir Sami in London being reflected in Angora, especially if, in the next phase of the military operations in Asia Minor, the Nationalists should score further success against the Greeks.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 5491/132/44]

No. 31.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 436.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1921.

RESHID PASHA, representing the Constantinople Government in London, asked to see me this afternoon.

I had no idea what he wanted, but welcomed the opportunity of saying something to him about the bad faith of the Angora Turks in respect of our British prisoners.

However, he opened at once on the question of the *ad valorem* basis of the customs duties at Constantinople.

When he began by referring to the Grand Vizier's conversation with me on the subject during the recent conference in London, and the sympathy which I was alleged to have then professed for the Turkish views as regards a specific tariff, I had to tell Reshid Pasha quite plainly that the Grand Vizier had not only grossly exaggerated, but had entirely misrepresented what I had said on the subject; that he had reported both in Paris and at Constantinople that I had used language which I had never employed; and that there was not the least ground for saying that I expressed any sympathy at all with the Turkish proposals. What had happened was this:—

The Grand Vizier had expatiated upon the miserable position of the Turkish Government in relation to its officials, upon the impossibility of paying their salaries, and upon the destitute condition of those unfortunate persons. He had laid great stress accordingly upon the desirability of a revision of the tariffs, to which I had replied that I understood the matter to have been under examination at Constantinople, where I believe proposals had been made—I was alluding to the *ad valorem* duties—

* Not printed.

which would to some extent place the Turkish Government in possession of funds. I had never expressed any sympathy with the Turkish proposals, which, indeed, I had never examined. I was not prepared to express any sympathy now.

My recollection was that the three High Commissioners at Constantinople were acting in close co-operation, and I was not willing to go behind their backs. Had I known that Reshid Pasha was going to reopen the matter I would have refreshed my recollection. As it was, I could promise no more than to send for the papers and examine the latest aspect of the case.

I then said to Reshid Pasha that I had a much more serious question to raise, and that was the apparent bad faith of the Angora Government with regard to the exchange of prisoners of war. The agreement had been concluded, not with the Grand Vizier or himself, but with Bekir Sami Bey, for the reason that the whole of the British prisoners were in Asia Minor in the hands of the Angora Government. It was an agreement by which the Turks were to be largely the gainers, because, in return for twenty-nine British prisoners known to be in Turkish hands, we had been willing to surrender over forty Turks, who were interned at Malta. Further, when Bekir Sami Bey, on his return to the East, had arrived in Rome, he had complained bitterly that we were not executing the terms of the agreement, because the Malta prisoners had not actually been delivered. In our anxiety to show our good faith, we had since landed them all in Italy and lost control over their movements. Nevertheless, although Bekir Sami Bey had been back at Angora for the best part of a fortnight, we had heard nothing about the release of the British prisoners. Not a single one of them had been produced, and news had reached us that Colonel Rawlinson, who had got as far as Trebizond on what was believed to be his return journey, had actually been sent back to Erzeroum. The whole case appeared to be one of a gross breach of faith on the Turkish side, and, although I was ignorant of the degree to which the Constantinople Government held themselves responsible for the actions of their brethren at Angora, I could not fail to utter an indignant remonstrance.

Reshid Pasha admitted that his relations with the Angora Turks were slight and his influence over them small. Indeed, he knew nothing about the matter, and seemed even to be unaware of the agreement which had been concluded. He undertook, however, to telegraph at once to Constantinople on the matter, and thought that the best means of getting into touch with Angora was to take advantage of the presence in London of Nihad Reshad, who was in touch with the Angora people, and get him to telegraph in the sense of my remarks.

As the Pasha is suffering from acute inflammation of the jaw, which rendered our conversation a source of as much physical pain to himself as it was of irritation to me, we separated with mutual pleasure.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 5445/800/44]

No. 32.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 439.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 2, 1921.

ARMENIAN opinion continues to be much agitated by the fear of an early evacuation of Cilicia by the French forces. In my despatch No. 330 to your Lordship of the 30th March, 1921, I reported the anxiety expressed by the head of the Armenian Protestant community in Turkey which was aroused by the news of the conclusion of a convention between the French Government and the Turkish Nationalists, and it is clear that this anxiety is shared by Armenians of all denominations. The Armenian Patriarch called on me on the 26th ultimo, and left with me two memoranda, of which I have the honour to enclose copies.

2. The first memorandum deals with the apprehensions felt by the spiritual chiefs of the three Armenian communities in Turkey as to the fate to which their co-religionists will be exposed when the French authorities evacuate Cilicia. The Armenian Patriarch urges that France should take a mandate over Cilicia. But should the French Government not be willing to assume such a mandate, the heads

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G 2

of the Armenian religious bodies advocate the adoption of the following five measures:—

- (1.) Progressive evacuation extended over a sufficiently long period.
- (2.) Organisation of a gendarmerie and of a mixed police force under the control of French officers.
- (3.) The administration of justice under French supervision.
- (4.) General amnesty to be promulgated by the Turkish Government in order to forestall any acts of vengeance.
- (5.) The expatriation and the setting up in other localities of Armenians who would not feel safe after the departure of the French.

3. Whilst expressing sympathy with the Armenian Patriarch in his apprehensions, I said that I assumed he had, in the first instance, been to see the French High Commissioner, who was more immediately concerned. The Patriarch replied in the affirmative. I did not gather that he had obtained any concrete assurances from General Pellé. I then drew the Patriarch's attention to a leading article which had appeared that morning in the "Bosphore," stating, in categorical terms, that it would be a point of honour for the French to see that the Christian communities in Cilicia were not molested by the Turks. Finally, I informed the Armenian Patriarch that I would forward to your Lordship the memoranda which he had left with me.

4. The events of the last two and a-half years, and the attitude of the French authorities in Cilicia, both civil and military, towards the Christian inhabitants of that province appear fully to justify the apprehension of the spiritual chiefs of the Armenian communities. The French administrators have repeatedly advised the Armenians to make the best terms they could with the Turks or else prepare to leave the country, offering them transport to Batoum *en route* for the Armenian Republic—now overrun by the Soviet forces—or to other destinations such as Cyprus, Egypt and Syria, where their presence is not wanted, and where they would have great difficulty in making a living. If they chose to remain in Cilicia, it must be at their own risk, and without any prospect of protection from the French forces, which would shortly be withdrawn.

5. Such a policy would be in direct contradiction with the engagement by which the French Government has bound itself in signing the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, and the five measures the adoption of which is advocated by the heads of the Armenian religious communities practically amount to no more than the fulfilment by France of her part of the provisions of article 8 of that agreement, namely, that the French and Italian Governments will withdraw their troops from the respective areas where their special interests are recognised, when the contracting parties are agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace is being executed and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of the Christian minorities have been put into force, and execution fully guaranteed.

6. Any comfort which the Armenians may have derived from the French Government's indignant denial of any intention to abandon Cilicia, which was communicated in your Lordship's telegram No. 990 of the 21st October, 1920, has been dissipated by the information which has reached them as to the nature and scope of the direct negotiations between the French Government and Bekir Sami Bey. It would, therefore, seem desirable that Armenian opinion should be reassured by some further declaration that their brethren in Cilicia will not be sacrificed to the exigencies of French policy in the convention to be concluded between the French Government and Angora.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Memorandum No. 1 from Armenian Patriarch.

LA nouvelle de la conclusion d'un accord entre la France et les Kémalistes, en vue de l'évacuation de la Cilicie par les forces d'occupation françaises, a causé une vive inquiétude parmi les Arméniens de Turquie. Cette éventualité signifie à leurs yeux, inévitablement, qu'on est à la veille de nouveaux massacres aussi sanglants et

aussi terribles que les massacres qui ont eu lieu pendant la guerre et depuis l'armistice. Nul honnête homme, quelque peu au courant de la situation politique en Asie Mineure et de l'état psychologique des éléments qui peuplent cette contrée, ne peut se permettre une illusion quelconque sur ce point.

Car les Arméniens, que les Puissances occidentales traitèrent pendant la guerre de "petits Alliés," parce qu'ils avaient embrassé spontanément avec elles la cause de la justice et de la liberté, avaient pris une part active aux hostilités aux côtés des grandes Puissances civilisatrices et risqué dans cette lutte leur existence nationale même. Après la victoire commune, ils ont continué à apporter à leurs grands Alliés un concours précieux et sans réserve pour l'application des dispositions de l'acte d'armistice. Ces circonstances devaient fatalement augmenter l'hostilité de leurs ennemis contre eux.

Et, effectivement, même à une époque où l'on pouvait supposer que les Turcs avaient tout intérêt à se tenir tranquilles, cette hostilité s'est manifestée par des explosions au cours desquelles des milliers d'Arméniens étaient massacrés en présence même des forces de l'Etat chargé de leur protection. A plus forte raison, si, après avoir traité sur un pied d'égalité avec les Kémalistes, la France évacuait militairement la Cilicie, aucune disposition conventionnelle ne pourrait jamais empêcher que les Arméniens indigènes ou émigrés, concentrés dans cette région, ne soient inévitablement exterminés.

Mais, même en mettant les choses au mieux, l'apaisement des esprits, la reprise des rapports pacifiques entre les divers éléments, en un mot, le retour à des conditions de vie normales, ne pourrait en aucun cas s'effectuer du jour au lendemain. Ce n'est que peu à peu, par le développement des relations constantes sous l'égide d'une administration puissante, consciente de ses devoirs et soucieuse du bien-être moral et matériel de tous ses administrés sans distinction, qu'avec l'oubli du passé, la confiance mutuelle pourrait renaître.

Mus par l'unique souci de sauver l'existence physique des restes de leurs populations infortunées, les chefs spirituels de trois communautés arméniennes de Turquie, après avoir pris connaissance du vœu télégraphié à la Conférence de Londres par les communautés chrétiennes et les musulmans alaouites de la Cilicie, ont adressé, le 9 avril courant, une note au Haut-Commissariat de France à Constantinople pour demander, conformément au vœu susmentionné, le mandat français sur la Cilicie.

Toutefois, pour le cas où la France ne croirait pas devoir assumer le mandat, les trois chefs spirituels ont recommandé la prise en considération des suggestions suivantes, qu'ils croient être le plus appropriées pour assurer la sécurité des Arméniens:

1. L'évacuation progressive, échelonnée sur une période assez longue;
- *2. L'organisation d'une gendarmerie et d'une police mixtes, placées sous le contrôle d'officiers français;
3. La répartition de la justice sous la surveillance française;
4. Une amnistie générale promulguée par le Gouvernement turc pour parer à une action de vengeance;
5. Expatriation et installation en d'autres lieux des Arméniens qui ne se sentiraient pas en sécurité après le départ des Français.

Les renseignements reçus des différents centres de la Cilicie, après l'exécution de cette démarche, confirment à quel point les inquiétudes ressenties ici étaient fondées. Dès que la nouvelle de la signature de l'accord fut connue, notamment en ce qui concerne la clause de l'évacuation des territoires situés à l'est du Djihan, une vive panique s'est emparée des populations chrétiennes dont la première pensée fut d'émigrer vers d'autres lieux. Les Arméniens d'Aintab, qui avaient si efficacement aidé les Français dans leurs opérations militaires, ont été le plus affectés par les nouvelles résolutions prises à Londres et ont commencé immédiatement un exode hâtif.

L'émigration apparut bientôt comme une opération très malaisée et rencontra des difficultés matérielles quelquefois insurmontables. Force fut donc à la grande majorité des Arméniens d'en prendre son parti et de rester chez elle dans l'attente du retour prochain du régime kémaliste sur la Cilicie.

Devant cette situation épouvantable, les Arméniens tournent leurs yeux vers l'Angleterre, l'une des Puissances alliées qui ont confié à la France le soin de l'administration de la Cilicie. Ils ne peuvent pas oublier toutes les marques de la bienveillante sympathie qu'elle a bien voulu témoigner pour leur juste cause et espèrent fermement qu'elle avisera, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République

française, aux mesures efficaces nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs droits et la garantie de leur libre développement.

Les chefs spirituels des communautés arméniennes de Turquie prient instamment son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire britannique de vouloir bien porter d'urgence ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, en l'appuyant de ses gracieuses recommandations.

Constantinople, le 26 avril 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 32.

Memorandum No. 2 from Armenian Patriarch.

LA concentration des émigrés arméniens à Adana appelle quelques explications. Ces émigrés sont de deux catégories : les Arméniens originaires des provinces orientales, qui avaient été déportés dans le désert et qui, après l'armistice, ont été concentrés en Cilicie par les soins des autorités françaises d'émigration ; et les Arméniens originaires d'autres points de la Cilicie, tels que Sis, Hadjine, &c.

Il paraît indispensable de prendre en considération cette différence lors du règlement définitif de cette grave question, car il ne serait ni juste, ni équitable de traiter de la même façon ces deux catégories d'émigrés.

Constantinople, le 26 avril 1921.

[E 5450/1/44]

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 446.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 4, 1921.

SINCE the date of my despatch No. 432 of the 27th April, I have had brought to my notice a further batch of Angora newspapers for the first half of April, including a complete set of the "Hakimiet-i-Millie," except for one missing copy, from the 3rd to 14th April inclusive.

2. In my previous despatch I drew attention to the comparative reserve displayed by the semi-official "Hakimiet-i-Millie" as compared with the extremist "Yeni Gyun" in the last days of March. In the numbers now under review, however, the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" reproduces every feature which I had already noted in the "Yeni Gyun," with the single exception that there is no specific reference to the London proposals. This is the more significant, as the period covered is that during which the Kemalist successes against the Greeks became public property in Angora.

3. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" of the 3rd April gives an account of the rejoicings in Angora over the Nationalist victory on the Eski-Shehir front. The leading article, signed by a lady, acclaims the triumph of a handful of Turkish heroes over a Europe in arms, and expressly declares that the victory has been won not merely against Greece, but against "the English, fearing to advance from the sea-coast, but lending help therefrom with all their might; Lloyd George, thinking to have to do with a beaten Turk in a month's time, still further back all Europe, perceptible or imperceptible; then a whole world—the whole new-old Christian world—trembling to strangle Islam," all of whose hopes have been shattered by the Turkish victory and the defeat of Greece. Prominence is given in the same paper to various festive orations, in one of which the speaker claimed that Turkey alone of all the beaten nations had torn up the bond of slavery proffered in the guise of a peace treaty.

4. Subsequent numbers of the same paper single out Great Britain for the bitterest hostility and hold the Sultan up to opprobrium. I enclose translations of two leading articles,* which require no comment, except to state that it is entirely untrue that I had to use any pressure to secure the publication in the Constantinople press of my communiqué regarding the neutrality of His Majesty's Government in the new war between Greece and the Kemalists. On the 14th April the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" accuses your Lordship of a change of front, on the strength of a report that you had stated that the Eastern question must be settled not by arms but by diplomacy, a statement which the journal attributes to disappointment over the Greek defeat.

* Not printed

5. There is little mention of France and Italy, except for a statement that French officers are making ready to leave Constantinople in view of the prospect of a declaration of war by Germany against France and a short article on the sorry plight of the Italians in Tripoli. Incidentally, the Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs is attacked for having dared to tell the Constantinople press that it was untrue that Tewfik Pasha in London had left it to the Anatolian delegates to speak for Turkey. Sefa Bey is accused of flying in the face of facts certified by Tewfik Pasha, Bekir Sami Bey, and the press of Europe, and it is suggested that his motive may have been "to please the Sultan."

6. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" records "with regret" the confirmation of the news of Talaat Pasha's death. The "Yeni Gyun" is much more expressive on this subject. It is unnecessary to dwell on this paper's utterances in its numbers for the first half of April, as they are naturally not less flamboyant than those already reported. It is, however, worth noting that in its issue of the 12th April it contains an article on "Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress." The writer compares the work of Talaat with that of Reshid Pasha in the nineteenth century, and emphasises the far greater difficulties which the former had to contend with owing to foreign enmities. He says little either way of the Committee, but if he hints at a criticism it is that the Committee shrank from an immediate assumption of full power on the morrow of the 1908 revolution. The article concludes as follows:—

"The termination in this manner of the general war has for us consigned those periods entirely into the region of history. As for the question of how Talaat Pasha would have taken his part in the epoch now opening, it may not be difficult to form an estimate, but it is out of place; only, having regard to the large part of the past which they created, history, when sizing up Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress, will not forget in what conditions of foreign pressure they began their task and by what foreign pressure they were again compelled to leave the task which they had begun."

7. If I venture to trouble your Lordship with these lucubrations of Angora journalists, it is because, however extravagant in expression, they reflect only too faithfully the deep-seated convictions and permanent orientation of those who have hitherto counted for most in the Nationalist movement. Idealists and adventurers alike, the leaders are at present flushed with the wine of recent successes, and unless something occurs to weaken their position, they may be expected to be peculiarly intractable in their dealings with the Allies in the immediate future.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 5452/1492/44]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 450.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 4, 1921.

WITH reference to the third paragraph of my despatch No. 207 of the 23rd February, I have the honour to state that after the death of the late *locum tenens*, Mgr. Dorotheos, the Greek patriarchal authorities definitely decided to hold an election to the patriarchal see, which has been vacant since October 1918, and that the preliminary step of issuing an encyclical to the provincial dioceses has already been taken. The ecclesiastical authorities speak, though not with great confidence, of completing the election in the course of June.

2. This decision raises certain questions of political interest. The system of election is defined in a Turkish regulation, the text of which will be found in Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," Vol. II, p. 28. Briefly, the principle of it is that all metropolitans subject to the patriarchal see are called upon to nominate candidates, thus producing a list of candidates which may, but need not necessarily, be added to by nominations made by the representatives of the laity. A mixed ecclesiastical and lay electoral assembly chooses three names from the list as prepared. The final choice among these three rests with the members of the Holy Synod and the other metropolitans actually present in Constantinople. The Sublime Porte has the right of eliminating any name displeasing to it from the preliminary list of candidates, and in due course the Patriarch-elect is officially admitted to his functions by the Porte.

3. In view of the rupture of relations between the Patriarchate and the Porte, it may be assumed that on this occasion the patriarchal authorities will disregard the Turkish Government entirely. There remains, however, the question of the constitution of the electoral assembly. The regulation contemplates the participation of a large number of lay representatives, including delegates from the provincial dioceses. The view which at present seems to prevail at the Patriarchate is that, while all the metropolitans whose sees have not been ecclesiastically detached from the Patriarchate must participate in the election, the laity of such dioceses as have become politically detached from Turkey are no longer concerned, as they have ceased to be Ottoman subjects. According to this theory, the metropolitans of Macedonia and Thrace would participate, but the laity of those countries would be excluded. This would apply even in the case of Eastern Thrace, which the Greeks regard as having definitely ceased to form part of the Ottoman Empire. I am not quite clear as to whether it is intended that the laity of the Smyrna district should be represented.

4. The Patriarchate does not appear to have any definite ideas as to how to overcome the obvious difficulty of assuring the participation of the numerous dioceses in Anatolia which are under the control of the Angora Government. Angora is, of course, hostile both to the Patriarchate and to the perpetuation of the privileges of the Ottoman Greek community in their old form. It is therefore unlikely to allow any participation in the election which it can prevent by local pressure. In this connection the enclosed cutting from to-day's "Journal d'Orient" is of interest.*

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 5624/132/44]

No. 35.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 353.)

My Lord,

Rome, May 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence with Djamy Bey, the representative of Bekir Samy Bey at Rome, relative to the exchange of British and Turkish prisoners of war, which formed the subject of your Lordship's telegram No. 164 of the 28th ultimo and of previous telegraphic correspondence with the Foreign Office.

Your Lordship will observe that Djamy Bey has now taken delivery of thirty-seven of the prisoners sent to Italy from Malta, and requests the early delivery of the twenty-four still remaining in the island. The total number of prisoners to be delivered from Malta was sixty-four, and Lord Plumer informed me that three of these proceeded, under special authority and at their own expense, to Italy.

Your Lordship will doubtless inform me in due course whether you wish me to return any other reply to Djamy Bey's present application than that which I have already sent.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Djamy Bey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Excellence,

Rome, le 6 mai 1921.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que je viens de prendre livraison de trente-sept détenus turcs arrivés récemment à Taranto et que j'attends, selon la promesse de votre Excellence, la mise en liberté de vingt-quatre autres détenus de Malte.

Je me permets d'attirer particulièrement l'attention de votre Excellence sur la saisie par les Grecs de deux bateaux et sur l'arrestation des sujets turcs se trouvant à bord.

Pour éviter donc la probabilité d'une telle action de la part des Grecs à l'égard des détenus turcs de Malte, libérés dernièrement, je prie votre Excellence, de bien vouloir faire donner à ce sujet des instructions à l'Amiral Kelly.

* Not printed.

Le Gouvernement italien, auprès duquel j'ai fait les démarches nécessaires pour assurer le voyage des détenus turcs, m'a confirmé aussi nécessité.

Comme il est connu de votre Excellence, l'application intégrale des stipulations de la convention signée le 16 mars entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et la délégation turque dépend de l'arrivée dans leur pays, sains et saufs, des détenus turcs en question.

Veillez agréer, &c.

DJAMY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Sir G. Buchanan to Djamy Bey.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to Djamy Bey and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of his note of the 6th instant on the subject of the liberation of Turkish prisoners of war. His Excellency desires to call the attention of Djamy Bey to the fact that the remaining twenty-four prisoners detained at Malta will be sent to any port desired by Bekir Samy Bey as soon as the British prisoners in Anatolia reach Constantinople. It appears from the first sentence of the note under reply that Djamy Bey has overlooked this understanding, which was communicated in the last sentence of Sir George Buchanan's note of the 13th April.

As regards the request contained in the third paragraph of Djamy Bey's note, his Excellency has the honour to point out that he is not in a position to cause instructions to be sent to Admiral Kelly on the subject. His Excellency is, however, forwarding a copy of Djamy Bey's note to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his consideration.

Rome, May 7, 1921.

[E 5699/3654/44]

No. 36.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 458.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 7, 1921.

THE Grand Vizier called on me on the 5th instant.

2. After discussing other matters, he spontaneously informed me that the Italian High Commissioner had asked him for a statement in writing to the effect that the Central Government would endorse the agreement recently concluded in London between Count Sforza and Bekir Sami Bey. The Grand Vizier had pointed out to Marquis Garroni that it remained to be seen whether the Angora Government would ratify the agreement in question. If it did not do so, a written statement such as Marquis Garroni had asked for would be valueless. The Council of Ministers subsequently approved the Grand Vizier's reply, but Marquis Garroni, whilst admitting that the non-ratification of the agreement would render a written endorsement of it by the Constantinople Government valueless, said that this did not matter. I did not gather that the Constantinople Government have any intention of giving my Italian colleague any such paper.

3. The Grand Vizier added that on his way through Rome an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had asked him for a letter to the effect that he would get the Constantinople Government to give favourable consideration to the agreement in question. Subsequently the Italian official had waived the demand for a letter, and had stated that the Grand Vizier's verbal promise to recommend the agreement to the favourable consideration of his colleagues would be quite sufficient.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

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[E 5704/143/44]

No. 37.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 465.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1921.

THE *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate called on me to-day, accompanied by his political adviser and another lay member of the Patriarchate.

2. The *locum tenens* stated that the Greek Patriarchate had lately noticed a marked recrudescence of hostility on the part of the Turkish officials and of the Moslem population towards the Patriarchate and the unredeemed Greeks. This was causing the Patriarchate considerable concern. As a proof of this hostility the *locum tenens* instanced the recent arrest by the Turkish police of certain Greeks who had come from the district of Yalova, and who, he stated, were to be tried by Turkish court-martial as being implicated in the outrages in that region. I enquired whether the persons concerned were Hellenic subjects or Ottoman Greeks. The *locum tenens* replied that they were Ottoman Greeks. The *locum tenens* said that these persons should, in any case, have only been arrested by the inter-Allied police.

3. I then enquired whether the Patriarchate wished to challenge the right of the Turkish police to arrest Turkish subjects, and I said that I did not think that the armistice had transferred this right from the Turkish police to the inter-Allied police. The *locum tenens* replied that he did not challenge the right of the Turkish police to arrest Ottoman Greeks at Constantinople for offences committed, or alleged to have been committed, in this town, but he could not admit their right to arrest Ottoman Greeks who had come from districts in the military occupation of the Hellenic forces, since the Turkish police could not know whether, in fact, such persons had been implicated in the outrages in question. The arrest of these Ottoman Greeks was causing the Patriarchate the greatest anxiety, and the *locum tenens* had, therefore, thought it well to come to me.

4. I informed the *locum tenens* that I had already taken such action as I could in this matter. I had heard some days ago that the Turkish police had, in fact, arrested some Armenians, whom they accused of being implicated in the incidents at Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi. Amongst these Armenians were, no doubt, some Ottoman Greeks. I had immediately spoken to the Grand Vizier about this matter, and had written a semi-official letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting the suspension of all proceedings against the persons arrested until the result of the enquiry which the Inter-Allied Commission is about to make into the events at Orkhan Ghazi had been received. I may say here that the Grand Vizier received my remarks in a sympathetic manner. The *locum tenens* expressed himself as greatly relieved by what I told him.

5. I then went on to tell the *locum tenens* that the Mussulman refugees from the Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi districts had brought harrowing accounts of the outrages of which they and their co-religionists had been the victims at the hands of Greek bands in these districts. These stories have caused great bitterness at the Porte and at Constantinople generally, and I had been informed from various sources that the feeling against the Greeks was rising very fast in this town. I was therefore not surprised to hear that the Patriarchate had noticed a recrudescence of hostility on the part of the Mussulman population. I added that the High Commissioners, with the authorisation of their Governments, were about to despatch Commissions of Enquiry to the Ismidt Peninsula and to the Orkhan Ghazi district to enquire into the real facts of the reported outrages. It was hoped that these Commissions of Enquiry would in themselves have a tranquillising effect on the populations of the districts concerned.

6. The *locum tenens* observed that, whatever might be the facts as regards events in the Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi districts, there was no doubt whatever that Turkish bands were being formed for operations on the Turco-Greek frontier in Thrace. Two such bands, in fact, had surrounded two villages inhabited by Greeks. I am bringing this statement to the notice of General Harington. To my mind there is little doubt that the troubles on the Greek-Albanian frontier and the formation of Turkish bands in Thrace are engineered by the Angora Government with a view to immobilising as large a portion as possible of the Greek forces.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 5710/201/44]

No. 38.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 473.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 338, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a letter which I have received from Sir Adam Block, enclosing copy of a letter which he has addressed to the Grand Vizier, drawing his serious attention to the present critical state of Turkish finances.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold.

Sir,

Constantinople, May 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter I have addressed to His Highness the Grand Vizier, drawing his serious attention to the critical state of the Treasury at this moment. My French colleague and myself consider it most necessary that the Turkish Government should realise how precarious the situation is.

I have, &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

Sir A. Block to Tewfik Pasha.

Altesse,

Constantinople, le 6 mai 1921.

JE considère comme de mon devoir de vous exposer succinctement la situation difficile et même critique dans laquelle se trouve actuellement le Trésor impérial.

Depuis que la Commission provisoire de Contrôle est entrée en fonctions, c'est-à-dire depuis le mois d'octobre de l'année dernière, elle s'est occupée sans répit d'aider le Gouvernement à assurer le paiement des appointements des fonctionnaires ainsi que des dépenses urgentes de l'État. Elle a, de tous ses efforts, collaboré avec le Ministère des Finances pour la diminution des dépenses et l'augmentation des ressources du Trésor.

Votre Altesse ainsi que son Excellence le Ministre des Finances conviendront certainement que les résultats obtenus, pour inférieurs qu'ils soient à nos désirs, ne sont pas négligeables; mais ce n'est qu'au prix de grandes difficultés que le Malié est parvenu à régler les appointements jusqu'à fin février, plus quelques paiements de priorité jusqu'à fin mars, tout en faisant face aux autres dépenses urgentes. Ceci n'aurait d'ailleurs pas été possible sans les encaissements extraordinaires dont le Trésor a heureusement pu bénéficier et qui comprennent, en dehors de l'avance de £ T. 2,000,000, les versements de la Régie des Tabacs, de l'Eastern Telegraph Company, de la Banque française, de la Banque agricole, &c.

Le total de ces rentrées extraordinaires atteint £ T. 6,000,000 environ.

Cette somme ajoutée aux recettes normales a permis au Trésor de régler en totalité les traitements jusqu'à fin février et ceux de priorité (sauf pensions aux veuves et orphelins) du mois de mars.

Pour ce mois de mai la situation du Trésor se présente comme suit:

À payer—

£ T.

1. Traitements du mois de mars (sous déduction des traitements de priorité payés) ...	1,536,128
2. Traitements du mois d'avril (en totalité) ...	1,814,600
3. " " de mai (") ...	1,831,198
4. Frais du mois de mai... ..	632,680

Total environ ... 5,814,006

[6831]

H 2

Par suite du Ramazan et de la situation économique du pays de plus en plus mauvaise, les recettes subiront ce mois-ci par rapport à celles prévues pour le mois d'avril une moins-value assez importante (cette diminution des recettes a déjà été constatée en avril sur les prévisions établies par rapport aux encaissements des mois précédents).

On ne doit donc raisonnablement tabler que sur les recettes suivantes :

	£ T.
1. Encaissements de la douane, chiffre rond (à raison de £ T. 16,000 par jour)	500,000
2. Recettes du vilayet de Constantinople (impôt foncier et ténnet) à raison de £ T. 10,000 par jour	310,000
3. Recettes diverses	50,000
Total	860,000

Auxquelles il est toutefois possible d'ajouter la part revenant au Gouvernement sur les recettes de l'Eastern Telegraph Company, pour le premier trimestre de l'année courante 1921 (janvier, février et mars), environ 40,000*l.* sterling représentant au cours de 540 piastres environ

Ce qui donnerait un total probable d'encaissements pour le mois de mai de 1,076,000

Le total à payer à la fin de mai étant comme ci-haut de 5,814,006
Pour un total de recettes de 1,076,000

L'insuffisance fin mai serait de 4,738,006

Sur les recettes prévues pour le mois courant (£ T. 1,076,000), il doit être, comme chaque mois, fait face tout d'abord aux traitements et frais de priorité (£ T. 480,000), et ensuite aux frais courants considérés comme irréductibles. Ces frais s'élèvent pour le mois de mai à £ T. 632,080, lesquelles ajoutées aux £ T. 480,000 précitées font un total de £ T. 1,112,080, supérieur de £ T. 36,080 au total des recettes.

Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas possible d'envisager l'éventualité du paiement d'un acompte sur les traitements arriérés des fonctionnaires à l'occasion des fêtes du Bairam.

Il me semble que cette situation mérite l'attention sérieuse et immédiate du Gouvernement impérial; c'est pour cette raison que je crois pouvoir me permettre de la signaler à votre Altesse.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

[E 5711/132/44]

No. 39.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 474.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 252 of 23rd April and other previous correspondence relative to the execution of the agreement for the exchange of prisoners, signed by Bekir Sami Bey in London, I have the honour to state that, although Bekir Sami Bey reached Angora on the 25th April, no news has reached me as to the intentions of the Angora Government regarding the execution of their side of the agreement. I have therefore addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, a letter, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

2. I enclose also copies of a despatch and enclosure from my representative in Smyrna regarding the three civilians at Sochia, of whom mention is made in my letter to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief. I have not thought it advisable to overload my personal message to Bekir Sami Bey with details of individual cases, as I wish in the first instance to elicit information as to the general intentions of the

authorities at Angora. In the meantime, however, I am officially requesting my Italian colleague to move the Italian authorities concerned to use their good offices to secure the release of the three British civilians detained at Sochia.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

High Commissioner to General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.

Sir,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921.

WITH reference to recent correspondence relative to the execution of the agreement for the exchange of prisoners, signed by Bekir Sami Bey in London, I have the honour to state that, as Bekir Sami Bey arrived in Angora on 25th April, the time appears to have come to call for some statement of the intentions of the Angora Government in regard to the execution of their side of the agreement. As Bekir Sami Bey stated in Rome that he would take the necessary steps to ensure this immediately on his arrival in Angora, I would propose to give the enquiry the form of a personal message from myself to him. I enclose a draft of the proposed message.

2. I understand that you have means of conveying such a message by wireless. If this is so, and if you concur in the proposed telegram, I should be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible without any further reference to me.

3. Since Bekir Sami Bey passed through Constantinople, I have, as you are aware, received from the Foreign Office a further list of British officers believed to be in Kemalist hands. I passed this list to the Sublime Porte with the request that Angora should be informed that the terms of the agreement required that these officers should also be released. I understand that the Turkish Ministry of War has sent an unofficial letter to Angora regarding these officers. I have now received, moreover, a despatch from my representative in Smyrna giving the names of three British civilians, Messrs. Hodder, Campling and de Swart, employees of the firm of McAndrews and Forbes, who are detained against their will at Sochia.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 39.

Draft Note to Bekir Sami Bey.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD ayant appris que Bekir Sami Bey est arrivé à Angora, il y a déjà plus de quinze jours, serait reconnaissant si Bekir Sami Bey lui ferait savoir quelles dispositions ont été prises pour l'exécution de la partie de l'accord signé à Londres visant la mise en liberté des ressortissants anglais se trouvant emprisonnés ou détenus contre leur volonté en Anatolie. Sir Horace Rumbold rappelle que Bekir Sami Bey a promis d'assurer l'exécution de cette partie de l'accord dès son arrivée à Angora, et que le Gouvernement britannique confiant dans les intentions des autorités d'Angora a déjà relâché quarante des détenus se trouvant à Malte. Depuis le départ de Bekir Sami Bey de Constantinople, Sir Horace Rumbold a appris les noms de plusieurs ressortissants anglais militaires et civils qui sont détenus en Anatolie outre ceux dont les noms sont portés dans la première annexe de l'accord. Ces personnes ont également le droit de bénéficier de l'accord.

Sir Horace Rumbold prie Bekir Sami Bey de lui accuser réception de ce télégramme.

Enclosure 3 in No. 39.

Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. 110.)

Sir,

Smyrna, May 4, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. David Forbes, manager of the firm of McAndrews and Forbes, of this place.

2. This firm is, as your Excellency is doubtless aware, an American one, but

Messrs. Hodder, Campling and de Swart, though employees of the company, are, like Mr. David Forbes himself, British subjects, and it is significant that the change in the attitude of the Turks towards them roughly coincides with the recommencement of the Greek offensive.

3. I am doubtful whether, even now, there is any possibility of bringing pressure to bear on the authorities at Sochia through the Government of Constantinople, but I regard it as desirable that the position of these gentlemen should be known and perhaps considered in connection with the negotiations for mutual release of prisoners, in case those have not been concluded.

4. It has also been suggested that it might be possible to solicit the intervention of the Italian Government in their favour, but there again it is not clear to me in what way such intervention is likely to be efficacious.

5. I may mention that there are also a certain number of employees of the Aidin Railway Company who are in the hands of the Kemalists, but, so far as I am aware, these do not comprise any British subjects.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 4 in No. 39.

Mr. Forbes to Sir H. Lamb.

Sir,

Smyrna, May 2, 1921.

I AM requested by Mr. Hodder, who is resident of Sochia, to bring to your notice that for the last three months he and the other two Englishmen with him—Messrs. Campling and de Swart—have been, to all intents and purposes, prisoners of the Turks in Sochia, and not allowed to travel.

Mr. Hodder has made all sorts of representations to the Turks and to the Italians to be given some facilities for moving about and visiting Smyrna, but has been informed by the local authorities that nobody, except Italians, is allowed to travel.

I should be much obliged if you could take this matter up with the High Commissioner in Constantinople and see if anything can be done to alleviate the position of these gentlemen, who are finding things extremely unpleasant at the present time.

Anything you can do in this matter will be very much appreciated.

I might mention that Mr. Hodder has been a resident in Sochia for 35 years, and has always been on very good terms with the Turks, and it is only during the last three or four months that they have changed their attitude towards him, and are practically holding him a hostage as a reprisal for events which are taking place in the Greek zone.

I have, &c.

DAVID FORBES.

[E 5713/43/93]

No. 40.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 476. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921.

WITH reference to your Lordship's secret despatch No. 358 of the 21st April, I have the honour to state that it appears to me quite possible that the Greeks may have been exploring the possibilities of encouraging the Kurds to give the Kemalists trouble on their Eastern borders. As your Lordship is aware, every scheme for reducing the Kemalists by force of arms has included more or less vague plans for raising Kurdistan against them, and there have always been a certain number of Kurds imbued with Kurdish national ideas who have been anxious to see some such plan put into execution, as the Kemalists have been consistently opposed to giving the Kurds any real autonomy, much less independence.

2. I doubt, however, whether, even if united Kurdish action were possible, responsible Kurdish leaders would be very ready to enter into formal relations with the Greeks, as religious and racial sentiment would make it difficult to unite Kurds on such a platform. The two persons named in your Lordship's despatch under reference are of some interest, but can hardly be regarded as leaders in any true sense.

3. Mustapha Pasha is a well-known Turkish officer belonging by origin to

Suleimanieh. He came into great prominence some time after the armistice as a staunch supporter of Ferid Pasha's anti-Kemalist policy. His last part was that of president of the special court-martial for dealing with massacrers and other war criminals. In this capacity he showed a praiseworthy zeal, and incurred much odium in Turkish nationalist circles. Soon after Ferid Pasha's fall last October, Mustapha Pasha was arrested on a trumped-up charge arising out of his activities on the court-martial, and it was only owing to the intervention of this High Commission that he escaped with a sentence of seven months' imprisonment, and was pardoned before he even completed that term. I have recently obtained from Mesopotamia permission for his return to that country, and I hope he may shortly go there, as his presence here is undesirable in his own interest.

4. Mustapha Pasha is honest, well-meaning and energetic, but he is too indiscreet to be of great value except as an instrument in careful hands. Properly handled he might be useful, e.g., to the British authorities in Mesopotamia, but he is certainly not the man to induce Kurds generally to commit themselves to definite co-operation with the Greeks. The report that he and they may have some such plan in their minds derives nevertheless support from the fact that, when told he might go to Mesopotamia, he broached the question of his being allowed to take some other Kurdish officers of Suleimanieh origin with him. I have not encouraged him in this, as my grounds for wishing to facilitate his departure from here are personal to himself.

5. I know less about Kurd Hakki Bey, but it is significant that he recently applied to me for facilities to proceed to Bagdad en route for his own country in the neighbourhood of Diarbekr, with a select company of other Kurdish notables. His account of himself is that he was in Paris, a fugitive from the Young Turks, when the general war broke out; that he then went to Athens, and that he was in Egypt when Turkey entered the war. He was imprisoned in Egypt as an enemy and sent to Malta, where he remained throughout the war and the first months of the armistice. He was eventually repatriated to Constantinople as a Turkish prisoner of war and has since been here. He seems to have been involved in some brawl in Malta in which certain Turks were killed, but he states that he was acquitted by the British Military Court which dealt with the matter. He claims to be head of the Melikan tribe. He is a well set-up man, but appears to be of the adventurer or komitaji type.

6. I had Kurd Hakki Bey's application under consideration when I received your Lordship's despatch under reference. In view of the information which has reached you, it seems preferable that I should leave it to your Lordship to decide what, if any, action should be taken. I should be glad to be informed of your Lordship's decision regarding this.

7. In conclusion, I would refer your Lordship to my telegram to Bagdad of the 3rd May, which was repeated to the Foreign Office in my telegram No. 320 of the same date. I am still without any definite information regarding the anti-Kemalist movement, which broke out some time ago among the Kurds in the country east of Sivas. It appears to have been of sufficient importance to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong military action. I have, however, no reason to suppose that it has had any extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alevis Kurds, who are numerous in the Dersim and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a local insurrection, which the Kemalists authorities, with their superior military organisation and equipment, are capable of repressing.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 5881/1826/44]

No. 41.

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 4, 1921.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 1, Confidential, dated the 16th February, 1921, enclosing a report on the subject of Italian economic activity in Adalia, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:—

Thanks to the Italians, Adalia has undoubtedly become a port of great importance. If it were connected with the railway system it would soon become the most important

port in Asia Minor, not even excepting Smyrna, in spite of the advantage of the excellent harbour which the latter enjoys. One of the Italian schemes is to build a breakwater in deep water from the eastern side of the bay to improve the harbour, but nothing has yet been actually started, not even the dredging of the shallower part. On shore, the broad road from the market to the port has not been finished, work on it having been temporarily suspended.

There is considerable shipping activity. During the month of April sixteen steamers passed through Rhodes bound for Adalia, and twelve passed through from Adalia. The following lines call there more or less regularly: (Italian): Puglia, Servizi Marittimi, Lloyd Triestino, Navigazione Italiana; (British): Khedivial Mail Line, Rees Steamship Company; (French): Messageries maritimes, Affaires réunies; (Greek): Palios Company, Hadji Constandi; (Russian): Russian Navigation Company. Besides these there are frequent visits of steamers from Naples and Taranto chartered by the Italian Government.

The British, Greek and Russian steamers have superseded the motor-coasting service between Kuch Adasi (the native name for Scala Nuova), Rhodes and Adalia.

The land transport by lorry service, &c., had been organised before the war in Anatolia, also the making of roads, but it is probable that both are temporarily suspended, as also all other economic activities. All Italian efforts are now to secure and maintain the goodwill of the Turks for commercial purposes when the country shall have settled down again. Although there are no proofs of Italian assistance to the Kemalists, there is no doubt about their sympathy with the Turks as against the Greeks or even the Allies. The Turks, for their part, seem ready to promise the Italians anything in return for assistance to get the Greeks out of Smyrna.

It is impossible for any European, except Italian, or even any Christian to land in Anatolia just now, the whole coast outside Greek influence being Kemalist. The Turks have become very threatening to strangers since their recent successes against the Greeks; the Italians look on and do not interfere with anything the Turks may do in Adalia or anywhere else along the coast of their sphere of influence.

I would instance the case of a British steamer, the "North Sands," which in March last delivered a load of firewood for the British Government at El Kantara in Egypt under charter of a Syrian firm of Adalia. Whilst loading at Marmariss the agent went ashore, and was locked up by the Turkish authorities for six or eight hours and accused of being a spy for the British. Fortunately he was well known to the Governor and others, and so got released and back on board the ship. The Italian police looked on and did nothing. After the ship had been loading for about five days the Turks came and took away all labour, so the loading was finished by the officers and crew. The agent has since received a warning from his firm at Adalia to be careful and not to attempt to land in Anatolia. This warning came in a letter which I have seen and was censored by the Italian authority at Adalia. The censorship of letters seems to show that the Italians have something to conceal.

The Kemalist deputation went to London through Rhodes, and will, I understand, return through Rhodes. It is possible that an Italian vessel will be put at their disposal.

Rhodes and other islands under Italian protectorate are full of refugees from Anatolia. These people are said to be landowners and other well-to-do classes who are escaping the demands of the Kemalists for contributions or military service. All this under the eyes of the Italians.

Of the various projects studied by the Italians, such as new railways, improvement of ports, roads, agriculture, &c., nothing is likely to materialise in the near future on account of the great expense and possible opposition of the Turks, but all would undoubtedly follow successful exploitation of the interior.

The translation of a cutting from the Italian paper the "Sole" on the subject of Anatolia and Rhodes is attached, dated the 20th April last.

It is not probable that Italian immigration would have any success until some of the above works were started, either by State or private enterprise. The Italian peasant could not live in Anatolia by working on the land alone.

At Rhodes nothing is being done. It is doubtful if the Italians would ever undertake the expense of building a safe port here in view of the uncertainty of the island's future fate. In the meantime it would seem that trade here is bound to diminish, a chief factor being that there is now a different customs tariff in Rhodes from that in Anatolia.

I cannot find that the Banca Commerciale Italiana is in any way taking the place of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, but news from Adalia is difficult to obtain.

The Royal yacht "Trinacria" is expected at Rhodes early in June on a cruise in these parts carrying a cargo of samples of Italian manufactures of all sorts with a commercial commission to exploit them.

I have, &c.

A. TREVELYAN TAYLOR.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Extract from the "Sole" of April 21, 1921.

(Translation.)

THE NATIONAL MEETING ON ANATOLIA.

IN the presence of very many personalities, representatives of all the large banks, delegates of the various chambers of commerce and of the Colonial Institute of Rome, of many industries and national societies, a conference took place yesterday on Anatolia, promoted by the Italian Institute of Commercial and Colonial Expansion at the Chamber of Commerce, presided over by Senator Pavia, who had at his side Senator Salmoiraghi, president of the Chamber of Commerce, and Comm. Battista Pellegrini, president of the Italian Institute.

After an applauded speech, the president introduced the advocate, Dr. Scarpari, director of the mission to Anatolia.

Of particular interest were the notes furnished by him on the possibility of developing in Rhodes certain opportune agricultural and industrial initiatives, since Rhodes, in the opinion of the speaker, although collaboration with the Turks will not be firmly realised, represents the natural base for the secure development of those initiatives which will lead us to know and understand always better the markets of Anatolia. The Turks, in this period of their political life, are animated by an intransigent nationalist sentiment which makes them see in every enterprise, on the grounds of making the lands unproductive, a policy of denaturalisation.

Dr. Scarpari, with great clearness, produced arguments for now considering the commencement of various enterprises, although it is still uncertain in what part our Government will start the putting in value of the zone reserved for our commercial prominence.

About Adalia, this should before all, according to Scarpari, be the object of our more diligent attention, so that its important interior lands, which ascend to the fertile region of Konia, may be made productive by a railway.

After a brilliant discussion, the following order of the day was carried unanimously:—

"That this assembly, pleased at the opportune initiative of the Italian Institute for Colonial and Commercial Expansion, decides to invite the presidency to nominate an appropriate committee whose duty it will be to co-ordinate and study Italian economical, industrial and commercial action in Asia Minor, to sit in Milan near the above-mentioned institute."

The nomination of the committee national for Anatolia will take place as soon as possible.

[E 5882/2519/44]

No. 42.

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 8, 1921.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch to me, No. 2, dated the 5th March last, enclosing a copy of a memorandum submitted by the Greek Rhodian delegation, I have the honour to submit the following observations:—

This account of the sufferings of the Greek population under Italian rule is rather exaggerated; it appears to have been written hastily, during a time of some excitement.

In any case the state of affairs described, which may possibly have existed for a short time, is altered now.

[6831]

It is hardly possible that a certain display of authority should not occur in any militarily occupied country, and I can quite believe that the Italians went a little further than was necessary even in dealing with the discontented Greeks.

The "large local autonomy" promised by the treaty and proclaimed by the Governor in October last is often sarcastically spoken of by the Greeks. As a matter of fact there is a municipal council for the city of Rhodes, consisting of one Greek, one Turk, one Jew, and one European of any other race, and a mayor. Each of the villages is also to send an elected delegate to represent it on the general council.

The actual council has been nominated by the Governor, not elected by the people, so that at present it is not considered by the Italians thoroughly representative, and its powers are limited to control of expenditure for the current year only. No schemes of improvement can therefore be proposed or carried out until the council is properly elected. The Italian Government is accused of purposely retarding the elections, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this. I hear that the elections are to take place this summer and that they have already occurred in most of the villages.

An unarmed police force, called the "Municipal Guard," has been formed to patrol the city. The armed Carabinieri also patrol the city as well as every country district; I believe they are well received and even welcomed. They have little to do, the people seem to be quite orderly and crime non-existent. The Greeks of Rhodes used to be thoroughly Veniselist, but it seems probable that they will follow any Government of which the Orthodox Church approves.

As for paragraph 5 of the memorandum, martial law no longer exists, nor does the postal censorship; the police espionage exists, but is no worse than anywhere else. It is unreasonable to think the Italians would permit open displays of Greek nationality. The rest of the paragraph is untrue.

Regarding paragraph 6, there are restrictions about leaving the island for more than three months, and permission has to be obtained before anyone can land, but I have not heard of any refusals. Permission has also to be obtained for religious ceremonies and fêtes, but any restrictions there may be have probably been caused by the Greeks introducing a nationalist character into them. Italian has to be taught in the schools. As to restrictions on commerce, agriculture and industry, the excessive customs duties on anything outside Italian origin certainly check progress and will have a bad effect on commerce, but it seems hardly probable that the Italians would desire to cripple the industries.

The Italians, presumably for economical purposes in Anatolia, are certainly very friendly with the Turks, but I have heard of no injustice being allowed as between Turkish, Greek or Jewish Rhodian subjects.

In conclusion I would remark that discontent is natural amongst the Greek inhabitants, who are in the great majority, at finding themselves under the rule of perhaps rather unsympathetic strangers, and who expected more autonomy than they were likely to get. The Italians have brought some modern ideas into Rhodes, have improved the roads and rescued the ruins from the Turkish neglect, but that the Greeks will ever be happy under their rule or that they, the Italians, will ever do any good in Rhodes I do not believe; but the sufferings which are described in this memorandum are, as I have above submitted, exaggerated.

I have, &c.

A. TREVELYAN TAYLOR.

[E 5883/143/44]

No. 43.

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2 of this date, on the subject of the boarding of the Khedivial steamer "Palitana" by Turkish soldiers or police at Adalia, I have the honour to report that the "Palitana" arrived at Rhodes yesterday morning from Adalia, and sailed again for Smyrna in about two hours. Her master did not come ashore, and it was not until she had left that I heard about the events at Adalia.

There are different versions of the story, which is now on everybody's lips, but the facts would seem to be approximately as follows:—

The "Palitana," which flies British colours, was boarded on arrival by Turkish armed police or soldiers, who forcibly arrested ten or twelve passengers, including two

Armenians, threatening the master and officers if they should dare to resist, and actually shooting one or more of the prisoners before dragging the others ashore.

I hear that these arrested men were the leaders of an anti-Kemalist revolution in Konia some time ago, the chief of them being a man called Hamid Omar; that they had escaped to Adana, but that when the French retired from that part these men embarked at Mersina, intending to escape to Smyrna.

I would observe that I had been informed unofficially some weeks ago that a British subject of some sort had been similarly taken out of an Italian steamer by the Turks at Adalia last month.

I would refer to paragraphs 5 and 6 of my despatch No. 10, Confidential, of the 4th May, in which I referred to the apparent collusion of the Italians with the Turks in Anatolia.

In this case of the "Palitana," I cannot find that any action was taken by the Italians to hinder the outrage to the British flag.

I have, &c.

A. TREVELYAN TAYLOR.

[E 5924/1/44]

No. 44

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 490.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 16, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 349 of the 16th instant, and previous correspondence concerning the relations between Afghanistan and the Angora Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the official text of the agreement between the two Governments, as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of Angora on the 25th April.

2. As I have observed in my telegram under reference, the only significant passage in the official text which was omitted from the summary on which my previous reports were based is that which expressly mentions the Caliphate as an appanage of Turkey.

3. The Afghan representative, according to reports in the Angora press, arrived in Angora on the 21st April. Both the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" and the "Yeni-Gyun" give great prominence to the event, as being a turning point in the history of Islam and the East.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 44.

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of April 25, 1921.

TREATY CONCLUDED WITH AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.

(Official text.)

(Translation.)

THE blessed clauses which bind together two brother Governments of the East, united in faith and interest.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

The Turkish and Afghan Governments, convinced that they are bound together by sincere ties of sympathy, are imbued with one desire and one sacred purpose, and each possess the same high, moral and material interests, and that the happiness or misfortune of one State will redound to the happiness or misfortune of the other, and recognising that it is no longer possible that they should remain disconnected and isolated as in the past, and that certain historical duties necessarily devolves upon them at this moment, when is seen with infinite thankfulness that an era of awakening and deliverance of the Eastern world has begun; these two brother States and nations, therefore, observing that, as with the members of one body the troubles and afflictions of one of the parties must affect and pain the other, have resolved to transfer their age-long moral unity and natural alliance to the political sphere, to bring about a state of material and official alliance, and, in the name of the future welfare of the whole

[6831]

I 2

East, to conclude a Treaty of Alliance as a prelude to future welfare. For this purpose, delegates have been nominated: Youssouf Kemal Bey, Commissioner (Minister) of Economic Affairs, and Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Commissaire of Public Instruction, members of the Government, on behalf of the Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey, and his Highness General Mohammed Veli Khan, Ambassador Extraordinary, on behalf of Afghanistan;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in due and proper order, have accepted the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Turkish nation, in possession of an independant existence for such time as God wills, considers it to be a sacred duty to recognise the independence, in the full significance of the term, of the Afghan nation to which she is bound with ties of the utmost sincerity and conscientiousness.

ARTICLE 2.

The two high contracting parties recognise that all Eastern nations possess complete liberty and right of independence, and that each of these nations is free to administer itself by such form of administration as it may particularly desire, and they recognise the independence of the States of Bokhara and Khiva.

ARTICLE 3.

Turkey having for centuries given guidance to and rendered distinguished services to Islam, and holding in her hand the standard of the Caliphate, Afghanistan in this connection recognises the leadership of Turkey.

ARTICLE 4.

Each of the high contracting parties will consider as directed against herself personally, and will oppose with all the means at her disposal, any attack made against the other by any Imperialistic State in pursuance of the policy of invasion and exploitation of the East.

ARTICLE 5.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to conclude any treaty or convention injurious to the interests of the other party, or which would be in the interests of a third State with which the other is not on friendly terms, and to give prior notice to the other of the forthcoming conclusion of an agreement with any nation whatsoever.

ARTICLE 6.

With a view to the regularisation of commercial and economic relations and consular affairs, the two contracting parties will conclude the necessary conventions separately, and Ambassadors will from henceforth be sent by each to the capital of the other.

ARTICLE 7.

The two contracting parties will establish regular and special postal services between the two countries, and will give to each other in the quickest possible manner all information regarding their political and economic situations, their position as regards public instruction and respecting their needs and desires in general.

ARTICLE 8.

Turkey undertakes to help Afghanistan militarily* and to send instructors and officers. These missions of teachers and officers will serve for a minimum period of five years, and on the expiration of that period, if Afghanistan so desires, a new mission of instructors will be sent.

ARTICLE 9.

This treaty will be ratified with the least possible delay, and its clauses will be in force as from that time.

* This appears to be the sense, though the word is apparently misprinted.—Translator's note.

ARTICLE 10.

This treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in duplicate, signed and exchanged by the delegates of the two parties.

This treaty has been signed on Tuesday, the 1st day of March, 1337 (1921), corresponding with the 21st day of Djumadi-ul-Akhir, in the 1339th year of the Hirja.

YOUSSEUF KEMAL.

DR. RIZA NOUR.

MOHAMMED VELI, Ambassador Extraordinary.

[E 5926/143/44]

No. 45.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 493.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 18, 1921.

THE situation here may be summed up as follows:—

2. There is a temporary lull pending the resumption of active hostilities in Anatolia. According to a communiqué issued at Athens the Greek Government repudiate the idea of intervention, and it is generally understood that they mean to see their enterprise in Asia Minor through to the end. I do not find any suggestion that the Kemalists intend to anticipate the Greek offensive, though I have noticed a statement in one Turkish paper that the Kemal forces will start an offensive after Bairam. It would seem more likely, however, that, having worked hard to strengthen their positions, they will await the Greek attack.

3. In the meanwhile, the sufferers from the present state of things are the inhabitants of the regions in the zone of hostilities. Although the two commissions of enquiry have only been at work for three or four days, their reports point to the fact that irregular bands, organised by the Greeks for operations with the Greek regular troops, have committed and are committing serious excesses. No doubt some of the members of these bands are persons who have suffered at the hands of the Kemalists a year ago, and are actuated by feelings of revenge. A regrettable feature of these excesses is that in some cases Greek regular troops have been a party to them. The outcome is that the hatred as between Mussulmans and Christians in this part of the world is greater than ever.

4. Chauvinistic feelings seem to be getting the upper hand at Angora, and Bekir Sami Bey has resigned. The Constantinople press regret his resignation. I am informed that General Fewsi Pasha, who temporarily succeeds Bekir Sami Bey, is a man of moderate views and not a firebrand. But the moderation with which Bekir Sami Bey has been credited has not prevented the Nationalist Government from giving the impression that they are hostile, in varying degrees, to the Allies.

5. It may be said that the further political course of events depends almost entirely on the issue of the hostilities in Anatolia. On a review of the situation I venture to think that a complete Greek victory would be less disastrous than a complete Nationalist victory. The best result to hope for is a stalemate, which will leave both sides exhausted.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 6157/1/44]

No. 46.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 1573.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 28, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the "Echo de Paris" giving the conditions imposed by the Angora Government before ratifying the Franco-Turkish Treaty concluded last March.

I enquired to-day of M. Berthelot whether the information was correct, and he stated that practically it was so. He added that the extremists at Angora appeared to

have gained the upper hand, and consequently the French Government intend to do nothing further for the time being.

It was interesting to note the change in the views of the French Government, since he expressed his ardent hope that the Greeks would obtain a great victory over the Turks in the Smyrna region.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Extract from the "Écho de Paris," May 27, 1921.

LES CONDITIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ANGORA.

Aucune Négociation ne peut être engagée sur de pareilles Bases.

VOICI les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement d'Angora subordonne la ratification du Traité franco-turc conclu au mois de mars dernier :

1. Les hostilités pourront être reprises à tout moment : suppression du préavis d'un mois stipulé à Londres ;
2. L'échange des prisonniers ne sera pas immédiat ;
3. Pas de désarmement de la population ;
4. L'évacuation par les troupes françaises des territoires attribués à la Turquie s'accomplira, suivant les régions, dans un délai de quinze jours et de huit jours, au lieu de deux mois et de un mois ;
5. Il n'y aura que dix-huit jours d'intervalle entre le départ des troupes françaises et l'arrivée des troupes turques ;
6. L'amnistie ne sera proclamée qu'à l'arrivée des troupes turques (c'est dire que pendant l'intervalle de quarante-huit heures toutes les représailles seront possibles) ;
7. Aucune communication n'est assurée entre Ourfa et Alexandrette ;
8. Aucune garantie de sécurité n'est accordée aux populations ;
9. Aucune garantie n'est accordée aux écoles françaises ;
10. La France n'aura pas à intervenir dans l'organisation de la police en Cilicie ;
11. Suppression de la zone économique attribuée à la France. Les avantages accordés à la France seront énumérés dans une lettre ;
12. Aucune zone d'occupation intermédiaire n'existera entre la frontière turque et la Syrie ;
13. Modification de frontière faisant entrer toute la ligne de Bagdad en territoire turc et mettant la limite turque à une portée de canon d'Alexandrette.

Le Gouvernement français n'accepte pas de négocier sur de pareilles bases, et Munir Bey, qui est venu apporter à Adana les propositions du Gouvernement d'Angora, en sera pour son voyage.

[E 6204/143/44]

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 506.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of an interim report furnished by the Commission of Enquiry, presided over by Colonel H. M. Farmar, on termination of its investigations on the Black Sea and Bosphorus coasts of the Ismid Peninsula.

2. Colonel Farmar informs me, in connection with the recommendations made by the commission, that the words "existing Turkish machinery" were adopted at the request of his French colleague, who would not admit the use of the word "gendarmérie."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 47.

Commission of Enquiry for the Ismid Peninsula to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

WE have the honour to report that in accordance with your instructions and with the terms of reference for the above-named enquiry the commission left Constantinople on the 12th May in H.M.S. "Centaur" (Captain W. F. French, C.M.G.).

According to instructions, attention was first given to the northern portions of the peninsula. A warning was received from the British General Staff as to the uncertain conditions prevailing about Kandra owing to the withdrawal of Greek troops and to reported advances by Kemalists, and we were given instructions not to risk becoming involved in hostilities.

The necessity for this was borne out at Shile when the commission received a message from one Shevket to the effect that he was representing Mustapha Kemal at Kandra with orders to prevent anyone either coming in or going out.

On arrival at Sirek, witnesses stated that there were very few Nationalist soldiers with Shevket, and the commission proceeded to Kandra.

Shevket, with fifteen alleged Nationalist soldiers, retired and watched proceedings from a neighbouring hill, at which time this party was observed to be signalling.

The commission were of opinion that it would be unwise to take the risk of proceeding further east and south themselves, but had witnesses from the neighbourhood collected and took their depositions.

To report in general terms:—

Credible evidence has been produced as to crimes committed by both Greek officers and soldiers during the last year, and more especially lately, when the troops have been on the march. This is set out in the attached schedule ; a few examples in *précis* only.

During the occupation by regular Greek troops there has been either entire or partial interruption of civilian police jurisdiction.

Civilian control has not been replaced by any capable military organisation. Full advantage has been taken of this by all bad characters, probably including deserters from the Greek army.

The commission is of opinion that the Greek military authorities did not take adequate steps to safeguard the civilian inhabitants from the depredations and acts of violence of outlaws, nor did they make adequate provision for the maintenance of discipline amongst their regular troops.

Turkish officials appear to have done their best to carry out their duties, but have been much handicapped, and charges preferred by them against the Greek soldiers do not appear to have been investigated.

There appear to be no complaints by Greek civilians of any trouble caused to them by Moslems during the last few months.

The commission recommend that full advantage should be taken at once of existing Turkish machinery for the maintenance of order and that this should be expanded and made more powerful. European officers to be made available to give their assistance as far as this may be practicable.

There is evidence that adjacent villages of different creeds exist side by side in the same districts without trouble when the Greeks are in a minority and the administration Turkish.

It is certain that many people have been prevented from settling on the land owing to the disturbed conditions. Some Greeks have already left and others will try to get away if the Kemalists troops come forward, as there is often only a shadowy distinction between brigand bands and groups calling themselves Nationalist soldiers. The Greek civilians are in dread of being made to suffer in their turn and the Moslems are in very genuine fear of the return of the Greek troops.

The countryside is sparsely populated and many villages are in a state of decay.

The members of the commission are of opinion that the displaced population will speedily return when they are assured of protection, and emphasise their opinion that the forces of law and order should be made under Moslem administration.

We beg to submit this half of our report before proceeding south in order to save time, being of opinion that it is necessary for action to be taken at once.

We have, &c.

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. FARMAR, *President*.
 LIEUT.-COLONEL S. VITELLI,
 LIEUT.-COLONEL DE WITKOWSKI, } *Members*.
 MAJOR O. H. VAN MILLINGEN,

Constantinople,
 May 18, 1921.

SCHEDULE.

Neighbourhood: Bozalfat and Esser Keuy, near Aghva.

During the last nine months parties of regular Greek soldiers with their officers have marched at intervals into these villages.

Katsaros has been a visitor and has behaved badly.

Both Greek regular officers and men have raped women, and robberies and acts of violence have been committed.

About March last the inhabitants lived in the hills for a month to escape further atrocities.

Witnesses, being also sufferers:—

Aieshe, wife of Jemal, raped five times.

Emne, wife of Alleddin, raped twice.

Feyze, wife of Temirdjali Mustafa, raped five times.

Karagoutch, an old man of 60, was beaten.

Halil Oglou Edhem, of Aghva, with two other Turks, were in a boat on the 26th-27th March, 1921. They were fired at by Greek regular soldiers, who were the worse for drink. The Turks came to shore and were ordered to take the soldiers to Shileh, and were there beaten. A fresh scar was displayed on the head of Halil.

Halil Ibrahim, of Shuaipli, was made to entertain Katsaros on his demand in March last. Katsaros subjected him to ill-treatment.

Evidence, and supporting evidence, was taken on oath.

Neighbourhood: Kandra. Witnesses: Salil Agha and Munir Beg.

No atrocities were committed in Kandra village. The Greek soldiers confined themselves to requisitioning cattle and carts without payment.

The different villages of this area were frequently occupied by Greek detachments under Greek officers or n.c.os.

First occupation was in November 1920, the others during February and March 1921.

The soldiers took everything possible, such as money, cattle and effects, having recourse to torture in all instances where pressure seemed necessary to them.

Cases of rape and murder were prevalent.

Some villages were either totally or in part destroyed.

Totally destroyed: Mehter Keui, Lazlar Keui, Armak Keui, Omer Agha Keui and Sira Keui.

Witness: Ahmet. At Eregli 4 men and 2 women were killed; two Moustafas, Idris and Issa, and Fatma and Fetiyeh.

Fourteen persons were killed at Karadere. Witnesses: the surviving villagers.

Neighbourhood: Kandra. Witnesses:—

Ahmed of Erikli, one and a-half hour's distant from Kandra by march towards Adabazar, stated that in last November regular soldiers of the Greek army took all the money they could find in Erikli and drove away cattle. They killed people who they supposed to be hiding money, and the witness himself saw the murder of two men named Mustafa, one named Idris, and two women, Fatma and Fethie.

Fifteen houses out of twenty were burnt.

Esref of Sidiklar, one hour distant from Kandra by march towards Adabazar, stated that two weeks ago Greek soldiers entered the village and took away money, clothes and cattle. The witness was wounded; no one was killed.

Abdullah of Kaialar, half an hour's march from Kandra towards Ismid, stated Greek troops which came to this village two weeks ago pillaged it.

Jalua of Montardjilar, one hour's march from Kandra towards Ismid, stated Greek troops came for the first time in February, but did not do anything wrong. They came back two weeks ago and pillaged the village.

Hussnic was badly treated and violated. Two other women on whom attempts were made escaped. Hussnic, mother of twenty-four months' baby, corroborated this statement. This woman appeared to be modest and truthful.

Five male witnesses, as well as seven women who came with them, stated that neighbouring villages to their own were pillaged and houses fired by regular Greek troops during the last five weeks.

Neighbourhood: Aghva. Whole village witness.

Large and small detachments of Greek troops occupied the villages in the district of Aghva twice, and passing through others, first in the autumn of 1920, and secondly in March 1921.

In all these villages money and valuables were extorted by menaces, threats and beatings, and other harsh methods.

In a few villages the cattle were removed, Katsaros appearing in several of these exploits. Everywhere the Greek soldiers behaved savagely. Hadji Moustafa was the village that suffered most in proportion to size (twelve houses).

The seven men killed formed almost the entire male population. One woman was also killed.

Two Moustafas, two Hassans, Yousouf, Hussein Ali, and one woman. Date, 4th April, 1921.

Six women were raped.

Other villages that suffered from this invasion were:—

Kourfali-Aghva, where Salih was hanged by his feet twice, for one hour each time. Issak Keui-Redjee, witness hanged by his feet.

Shoupli (witness), Uzair (witness) and Djemal (witness), hanged by their feet.

Keutche Keui (witness Sheman) and Kilitchlar (witness Ibrahim).

Witnesses of Hadji Moustafa Keui: Nefsa, Emne and Fatma, whose relatives were killed; and Halib Mehmed Hodji, his uncle killed.

Kowfali witness: Sindun Hanife, Gulsein Hanoums, and Hussein Hodje.

Neighbourhood: Shile. Witnesses: the kaimakam and chief gendarmerie officer.

Greek troops occupied the district of Shile. First in the summer of 1920, committing no atrocities, but robbing the countryside.

During the second occupation from November 1920 to March 1921, a band of 200 men on their way to Ismid, composed of soldiers and some civilians, officered by a captain and three lieutenants, terrorised the district.

Twenty of these men under Katsaros remained in the district destroying nearly all the villages and robbing the peasantry of their valuables and cattle.

Many of the inhabitants were beaten, some were hanged by their feet over straw fires, others were killed outright, and some women were raped.

At Shile the police agent, Ali, was killed under the pretext of having concealed arms.

At Darlik a woman and a young girl were killed after having been raped.

Neighbourhood: Beicos.

The commission were given information as to widespread murder committed by Greek regular troops at Tchiboukli, and, following this up, the commission have had bodies exhumed; these had been buried fully clothed and shod, thrown together in all attitudes.

Evidence is being collected which is expected to lead to the discovery of other bodies.

The appearance of the bodies examined led the commission to suppose that they had been buried not later than last October, or perhaps as early as last July.

Evidence is also available as to the imprisonment of eighteen Turks, by the orders of the Greek regular officers, in a dry underground cistern adjoining a Greek camp at Tchiboukli.

The prisoners were kept for ten days, being given food and water only when able to pay money to the Greek guards.

The majority of these prisoners were finally killed.

[E 6208/800/44]

No. 48.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 510.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter dated the 17th May, 1921, which I have received from the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople, stating that, according to a telegram which his Beatitude has received from an authentic source at Adana, Turkish Nationalist forces are marching on the Armenian town of Zeitoun, and begging for my intervention to save the inhabitants from the fate with which they are threatened by the impending attack.

2. The Armenians of Zeitoun are said to number about 1,500 souls, the survivors of some 25,000 Armenian inhabitants of the town and neighbouring villages who were deported in April 1915. From a previous report received by the Armenian Patriarch it appears that the Nationalists had recently sent a summons for the surrender of their arms and the enrolment of their men of military age in the Nationalist forces, and that, on their refusing to comply, it was decided to send a punitive expedition to Zeitoun.

3. I have no means of verifying the accuracy of the Armenian Patriarch's statement, and, even supposing it to be true, I am, as your Lordship is aware, quite powerless under existing circumstances to intervene with any effect in the manner desired by his Beatitude.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 48.

Armenian Patriarch to Sir H. Rumbold.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 17 mai 1921.

NOUS avons l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que d'après un télégramme que nous venons de recevoir d'Adana, de source autorisée, les forces kémalistes marchent sur Zeitoun.

C'est un nouveau crime qui se prépare contre les milliers d'Arméniens, de tout âge et de tout sexe, occupés tranquillement à leurs travaux pacifiques, sans aucune provocation de leur part, les Zeitouniotes vont bientôt subir l'attaque des bandes kémalistes acharnées à leur destruction, et fatalement ils partageront le sort sanglant des habitants de Marache.

Sans autre ressource, pour parer efficacement à cette éventualité tragique, nous prenons la liberté de prier instamment votre Excellence de vouloir bien user de sa haute et gracieuse influence pour empêcher que les événements redoutés et irréparables ne se produisent de nouveau dans cette région déjà si éprouvée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Patriarche des Arméniens,

ZAVEN.

[E 6211/1/44]

No. 49.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 516.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 24, 1921.

IN the course of a visit which I paid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, Sefa Bey urged on me the desirability of Great Britain showing, in an unmistakable manner, that she took what he described as "a benevolent interest in Turkey." He said that the proceedings of the London Conference had produced a current of opinion favourable to Great Britain in this country. The renewal of hostilities by the Greeks had, to a certain extent, spoilt this good impression, because it was impossible to eradicate from the minds of many Turks that Great Britain was really behind Greece.

2. I asked Sefa Bey what he intended to convey by the expression "benevolent interest," and he replied that His Majesty's Government should openly accept the principle of a "viable" Turkey within her ethnic frontier. This meant that the Turks

should not be unnecessarily hampered in their administration of their own country. He was prepared to accept the Financial Commission, but with restricted powers of interference. He quite realised that certain Departments of State were in need of strengthening, and that the collaboration of Allied subjects might be necessary. He objected to what he called "the financial capitulations," although I pointed out to him that article 264 of the treaty expressly stipulated that foreigners should bear the burdens of taxation equally with Ottoman subjects.

3. I told Sefa Bey that in the present temper of the Angora Government no reasonable offer would content the Nationalists. He disputed this view, and maintained that, if the Greeks left Asia Minor altogether and Eastern Thrace were restored to Turkey, the other difficulties could be easily solved. He even said that the Turks would be satisfied with the Enos-Midia line.

4. Finally, Sefa Bey said that Turkey could not stand alone in the future. She must turn either to Russia or to England, and he thought it would be more in our interest that the Turks should lean on England. There was a risk of the Bolsheviks extending their influence over Anatolia. Sefa Bey again said that it was very desirable that Great Britain should come down definitely on the side of Turkey.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 6212/201/44]

No. 50.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 517.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 24, 1921.

I CALLED on the Grand Vizier yesterday before my departure on leave of absence. After his Highness had alluded to the various difficulties which were especially affecting the United Kingdom at this moment, such as the coal strike and the Irish situation, as also the Upper Silesian question, I led the conversation on to the financial embarrassments of the Constantinople Government. Sir Adam Block had previously informed me that he had written a memorandum for the Grand Vizier, pointing out the extreme gravity of the present situation, and urging his Highness to enforce all possible economies in the various Departments of the State. I had also learnt from Sir Adam Block that the Finance Minister, at the Council of Ministers, had stated that he could effect economies to the extent of £T. 300,000 a month if his colleagues would assist him. None of them, however, had volunteered to do so.

2. I told the Grand Vizier that, so far as I could see, there were only two ways in which the Turkish Government could improve their financial situation. These were by doing away with superfluous officials and by a return to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* system. The Turkish Government could not expect any more windfalls. I reminded his Highness that in two recent notes my Allied colleagues and I had again emphasised the desirability of a return to the *ad valorem* tariff, which would, it was calculated, bring in an additional £T. 200,000 a month, without reckoning the proceeds of the consumption taxes. The Grand Vizier said that he understood that the American Government were opposed to a return to the *ad valorem* system, but I said that this was a mistake. That Government were most anxious for a return to the *ad valorem*, but the American High Commission objected to the maintenance of the consumption taxes side by side with the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. The Grand Vizier repeated the argument that it was undesirable to have two customs régimes in Turkey.

3. I continued to urge the Grand Vizier to return to the *ad valorem* system. His Highness, whose attitude in this matter was evidently shaken in consequence of the firm stand taken by the three Allied Governments, then promised that he would take up the question again with his colleagues. I have little hope, however, that he will seriously try to overcome the opposition of his colleagues and, in particular, of Sefa Bey in this matter. We have thus reached a deadlock.

4. I then alluded to the Commission of Enquiry, which had just returned from the Orkhan Ghazi and Yalova districts. This commission had verified the occurrence of outrages, including murders, perpetrated by Greek irregular bands. But the commission had also ascertained that the Kemalist troops had, less than a year ago, devastated and burnt Greek villages situated further inland. This had led to a displacement of the Greek population in those regions, and some of the Greeks who had suffered at the

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hands of the Kemalists had undoubtedly taken part in the recent excesses against Moslems, under the stimulus of revenge.

5. The Grand Vizier then spoke about the situation at Angora. His impression was that the politicians in the Angora Parliament were likely to hamper the conduct of military operations. Situated as they were now, martial law was the only sensible régime for the Nationalists. He expressed the conviction that the Greeks would not be able to stand the strain for any length of time. The Nationalists were better off in that respect, because they were defending their own soil.

6. I then took leave of the Grand Vizier.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 6213/1/44]

No. 51.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 518.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to state that I was received in private audience by the Sultan on the 23rd May, in order to take leave of His Majesty before my departure from Constantinople. No very settled practice exists as regards visits to His Majesty in armistice conditions, but I desired to seize the opportunity which presented itself of being received by His Majesty independently of my colleagues, and to mark the fact that His Majesty's Government regard the Sultan as a personage to be treated with consideration, and as still being the ultimate fount of authority in this country.

2. The Sultan, as on previous occasions, was unattended, and Mr. Ryan, who accompanied me, acted as interpreter. His Majesty opened the conversation by referring to the occasion of my visit. He observed that my presence in Constantinople in the present serious situation was a source of comfort, but that it was also possible to derive some comfort from my departure on leave, as being perhaps an indication that the situation did not appear to me quite so black as it did to the people of the country. I replied that the situation might in the future enter on new and complicated phases, to which I would hope to return with renewed strength and energy.

3. The Sultan said that I would doubtless take the opportunity afforded by my visit to England to report verbally on the state of affairs in this country. He reminded me of what I had said at our first interview regarding the importance of moral and spiritual factors. He said that I was now in a position to appreciate the operation of such factors, and to present to His Majesty's Government the views which, as a conscientious observer, I had formed on the spot. He spoke of the atrocious conduct of the Greeks in places quite close to Constantinople. He accused the Greeks of pursuing a definite plan of extermination, and dwelt at some length on the horrors to which the Moslem population were exposed. Our own commissions of enquiry had, he said, seen what was happening. The suffering of the Moslems were such as could not be conceived possible by people living in Western conditions.

4. I said that His Majesty's Government had taken the lead in arranging for the despatch of commissions to enquire into the occurrences of which His Majesty spoke. I had on the previous day seen General Franks, the president of one of the commissions. What he told me confirmed the reports of atrocities. General Franks had indeed discovered cases in which the reports were exaggerated or unfounded, and I gave His Majesty one salient instance. I admitted that, notwithstanding this, the state of affairs in the Ismid and Yalova districts was very bad. I said, however, that the despatch of the missions had already impressed the Greeks, and was having a deterrent effect.

5. The Sultan said he realised how much His Majesty's Government had done, and thanked them for their efforts. He said, however, that peace was the only cure for the situation he had described. On the one hand, the Greeks were pursuing a policy of extermination. On the other hand, the Angora leaders, bent on personal aims, were sustaining disturbance. The innocent and suffering people were the victims of both. His own country abounded in people with mad ideas. They relied on Bolshevik assistance. His Majesty adverted to the recent change of Government at Angora, where Bekir Sami Bey, a comparatively moderate man, had been replaced by a "fellow" fresh from Moscow. The only cure, he repeated, was the re-establishment of peace by the Great Powers. It must be a peace founded on justice. The population

of the hinterland of Smyrna was overwhelmingly Turkish. Even in the town the Turks constituted 60-70 per cent. of the inhabitants. The Greeks might assert the contrary, but Greek, like Persian, exaggeration had passed into a proverb in this country. As for Thrace, 90 per cent. of the population, both in Eastern and Western Thrace, were Turkish. The solution there was to form a kind of buffer State.

6. I said I was sure His Majesty's Government were alive to the considerations put forward by His Majesty and to the danger of Bolshevik penetration in Asia Minor. I said that Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have stated that His Majesty's Government were disposed to intervene in the conflict in Asia Minor when a favourable opportunity presented itself. His Majesty's Government were following the course of events very closely, and might be relied on to do everything possible to promote the re-establishment of peace. The British Empire was so widespread that its interests were touched by disturbance in any part of the world, and we were hardly less interested than Turkey herself in the restoration of peace in Anatolia. For myself, I said, I could not believe that the present conflict between Kemalists and Greeks would last, as neither side had the means of sustaining a prolonged struggle. I doubted whether the war would continue for more than a month or two longer.

7. The Sultan thanked me for what was reassuring in my remarks, but proceeded to develop his own views at some length, explaining more than once that they were personal expressions of opinion, which he offered with a view to assist me in forming my appreciation of the situation. The following is a summary of what he said, drawn up without any attempt to reproduce the precise order of his remarks.

8. Starting from my observation regarding the weakness of both sides in the Turco-Greek struggle, the Sultan said that the Kemalists drew strength from Bolshevism, and he insisted once more on the gravity of the Bolshevik menace. In his view the policy should be to throw the Bolsheviks back on to the Caucasus, in order to avert a danger which would otherwise threaten first Turkey and then the peace of the world. To do this it was necessary to arrive at a basis of settlement which would satisfy people sufficiently to enable peaceable men to settle down to the task of reconstructing their lives by individual endeavour. He compared the continued presence of the Greeks in predominantly Turkish areas to the artificial methods sometimes used in surgery of keeping a wound open. While the Greeks remained in Smyrna and Thrace it was impossible that Turkey's wounds should be healed. Eastern and Western Thrace, he said, belonged properly to Turkey, but Turkey was incapable of holding them by her own resources against two rapacious neighbours. When restored to Turkey they should at the same time be neutralised, under guarantee of the Powers, and formed into a buffer between Europe and Asia. I understood His Majesty to say that controls need not be objected to, as they would be good for Turkey; but this was merely a passing remark, and I do not know how far it can be taken as a considered statement. As regards the prolongation of hostilities, he said that the leaders on both sides had an interest in the continuance of a disturbed state of affairs. Neither side would take the offensive, and it cost them nothing to remain facing each other as at present. What was wanted was not mediation, but the exercise by the Powers of a strong and just pressure from above. This alone could put an end to the present state of affairs, which, if allowed to drift on through the summer and autumn, might produce disastrous consequences. The Sultan, while admitting that the interests of minorities must be safeguarded, spoke with noticeable bitterness of the minorities in this country as belonging to some of the worst races of the East.

9. After asking that, in reporting personally to His Majesty's Government, I should combine what he had said with what I had myself witnessed, His Majesty said it only remained to wish me a pleasant journey. I thanked him for the great courtesy he had shown me on the three occasions on which he had been pleased to receive me, and said I should not fail to report it personally to the King and his Ministers. The Sultan reminded me of what he had told me more than once of his hereditary admiration for Great Britain, and his conviction that Turkey's best hope lay in the assimilation of British ideals. It was therefore natural, he said, that he should show particular consideration for one who came to him as British representative. He was good enough to give, as a further reason, the personal regard which he had conceived for me in the course of our conversations. After a few further courtesies of the same kind, I withdrew.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 6215/43/93]

No. 52.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 521. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 476, Secret, of the 11th May, I have the honour to state that on the 25th instant Emin Ali Bey, the head of the Bedrhan family, called on Mr. Ryan, accompanied by his son Jeladet Bey, who is one of the more active promoters of the Kurdish national movement. Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situation, he and his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative here, who had listened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement against the Kemalists, which, without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greece and the Kurdish nationalists, but had said that he could not proceed in the matter unless the movement were sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Emin Ali Bey asked whether, if he or other movers applied for permission to go to Mosul for instance, it would be granted, and whether, if an organisation were set on foot at some place in British occupied territory, it would be favourably regarded.

2. Mr. Ryan, following the line which has always been laid down in Foreign Office instructions since the armistice, at once replied that no encouragement could be given in present circumstances to attempts to create a rising in Kurdistan. He pointed out that the Greeks had embarked on the present hostilities in defiance of the wishes of His Majesty's Government, who had declared their neutrality and deprecated the submission of such proposals as that made by Emin Ali Bey. As regards the journey to Mosul, he said that if members of the Bedrhan family applied as travellers for permission to go to Mosul this High Commission would not oppose their going, but that the application would have to be made through the ordinary channels.

3. Your Lordship will doubtless agree that no other attitude could be taken up at present towards proposals of this kind from Kurdish notables in Constantinople. They have, however, been put forward by so many different persons at different times that they are worth bearing in mind. A Kurdish movement would be a very difficult instrument to handle, but if the extremist tendencies of Angora should end in forcing Great Britain and France into a definite conflict with the Kemalists, the anti-Kemalist sections of the Kurdish race might possibly be turned to account.

4. Emin Ali Bey enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any information regarding his brother Kiamil Bey Bedrhan, who used to reside at Tiflis, and who, according to a report in the Paris "Humanité," had recently appeared somewhere in Kurdistan. I have no knowledge of the movements of this person since the date of a long memorial which he submitted for the consideration of His Majesty's Government some considerable time ago. I have been unable to put my hand on this document, but it was drawn up at Tiflis, and put forward the claim of Prince Kiamil, as he called himself, to be installed as ruler of Kurdistan.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 6217/1/44]

No. 53.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 523.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 370 and 371 of the 23rd instant, relative to the change of Government at Angora, I have the honour to state that the newspapers of Nationalist sympathies in Constantinople have been at great pains to explain that recent events at Angora have nothing to do with foreign policy.

2. Much publicity has also been given within the last two or three days to the formation of a new party in the Grand National Assembly under the name of "Group for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia." The title of the group recalls the autumn of 1919, when the programme of the Nationalist movement was definitely laid down by the Erzeroum Congress. The platform of the group is the National Pact, which has recently been the subject of correspondence with the Foreign Office. Mustapha Kemal Pasha has himself accepted the presidency, and the group claims to have already secured the adhesion of 170 members of the Assembly.

3. This would appear to indicate that, as a result of recent tension in political circles at Angora, Mustapha Kemal is mobilising as many elements as possible round his own person, on the basis of the National Pact and nothing but the National Pact.

4. It is further reported from Angora that an important sitting of the Grand National Assembly is to be held on the 26th May in order to consider future policy. According to some accounts, the Cabinet recently appointed is merely transitional, and further changes may be expected after the sitting of the 26th May. However that may be, I see no reason at present to alter the opinion expressed in the last paragraph of my telegram No. 370 of the 23rd May.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

[E 6455/143/44]

No. 54.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

Athens, May 23, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo, reporting on the failure of the mobilisation throughout Thessaly and the "peace-at-any-price" sentiment in all classes in his district.

Very similar reports reach me from more or less reliable sources from almost every part of Greece except from the Peloponnesus, where the mobilisation appears to have gone pretty well, and I think now that the categorical statements made to me and to Mr. Bentinck by the Ministers of War and Finance respectively cannot possibly command credit in face of the general evidence that a very small percentage have actually joined the colours. When I said to my Serbian colleague that it was difficult to believe that such categorical statements by responsible Ministers could be deliberately untrue, he explained it by saying that many men had responded to the call, but had then obtained two or three days' leave to settle their private affairs and had never been seen again; the result of this was, he said, that recruits once collared were now never left free even for a day.

The Government issued an official *démenti* the other day of the report that the reservists in Crete were refusing to answer the call, but I have been informed by a Deputy who has just returned from Crete that few have joined up.

Stories reach me that recruits left Piræus for the front the other day with shouts of "It is unjust—they have fooled us!"; that those of Eastern Macedonia cheered enthusiastically for Veniselos at the railway station of Drama; that those from Cavalla and Thasos sang the "Veniselist Hymn" during the whole of their voyage; and that 150 reservists left Adrianople for the front on the 23rd April cheering for Veniselos and shouting "He is coming!" (the cry we got so tired of between the elections and the King's arrival).

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE

Enclosure in No. 54.

Vice-Consul Knight to Earl Granville.

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

Volo, May 17, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the various Greek mobilisation decrees issued since the London Conference have met with very little response throughout Thessaly, and particularly in the populous Mount Pelion district. Shortly after the first of these decrees had been published I was told by a villager that in Makrynitza, one of the largest and richest of the Pelion villages, out of a total of sixty men called up only four had presented themselves, which was perhaps but a slightly exaggerated statement of fact. About the same time I was informed, on excellent authority, that the managing director of the Thessalian railways at Volo had received orders to make arrangements for the conveyance on a certain date, from Larissa to Volo, of 3,000 recruits from the Larissa district, while only 400 were actually forthcoming. The percentage of recruits obtained in the latter case is double that in the former, but this is easily accountable for by the fact that the Larissa district, being a plain, offers fewer facilities for defaulters.

Makrynitza is, in this respect, no exception among the numerous villages of Pelion, which, with one exception, voted at the last elections for supporters of the present Government, in the firm belief that they were thereby contributing towards the speedy termination of a war which the statesman until then in power was supposed to be protracting indefinitely for his own ends. Even last November, when the church bells in Volo were summoning the people to some demonstration in favour of the new régime, I overheard one villager remark to another: "We have turned out the lamb and brought in the bear," with an air of disillusionment and apprehension which made it clear that he took to himself a share of the blame. The same feeling has undoubtedly made very considerable headway since then.

The two following anecdotes, bearing on recent recruiting in this district, have been seriously related to me, but I am unable to vouch for the absolute authenticity:—

A brother of the recently-deceased Volo Deputy, D. Karakittes, well known as a local Royalist firebrand, went up to Makrynitza since the Greek Easter and treated from fifteen to twenty of the young men of the place to roast lamb and limitless wine. He then had them conveyed to Volo and placed in the train, he himself accompanying them to Larissa and handing them over to the military authorities there. M. Karakittes is understood to have gained much "kudos" as a result of this incident.

The defaulters of Mount Pelion having organised themselves into the "Pelion Division," presumably for home defence, a small force of gendarmerie was despatched to reason with them at their headquarters in the village of Hagios Lavrendios. Persuasion, however, proved useless, and the gendarmes returned with a message to the effect that if the Government wanted to take them by force it had much under-estimated their numbers and determination.

As to the general local attitude towards the war, my impression is that, apart from a few zealous patriots, all classes and parties would welcome peace at almost any price. The total lack of news, good or bad, since the imposition of the censorship has prepared everyone for the worst. A near relation by marriage of a member of the present Cabinet informed me the other day, with much satisfaction, that her son was "in hiding" in London, and her only anxiety was that the British Government might agree to extradite Greeks of military age. Such an attitude is so general here that it provokes no surprise, save in the foreign mind.

I have, &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT.

[E 6440/201/44]

No. 55.

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 534.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 28, 1921.

WITH reference to Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 473 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to inform you that Sir Adam Block, at his own request, attended the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners held yesterday, and communicated a detailed statement on the financial situation.

2. He pointed out that complete bankruptcy was now only a question of days. Every possible expedient had already been resorted to, and it was only due to a series of unexpected windfalls that the Turkish Treasury had been hitherto enabled to carry on. There was no reason to anticipate any further windfall of this kind, and in these circumstances the Ottoman Government would not even be in a position to pay the priority claims on the Treasury or the salaries of officials for the month of Bairam. This would naturally create an outbreak of violent discontent, the end of which it was difficult to foresee.

3. Sir Adam Block pressed the French High Commissioner to exert his influence with a view to obtaining from the Ottoman Bank the statutory advance of £ T. 1,500,000 which would enable the Turkish Treasury to carry on its present hand-to-mouth existence for a little longer. General Pellé promised to do his best to induce the bank to make the proposed advance without delay.

4. On being asked whether he could prescribe anything in the nature of a real remedy, Sir Adam Block replied that, as he had already pointed out, a saving of some £ T. 300,000 a month could be effected by the diminution of the personnel in Government offices. Some 90 per cent. of these functionaries were superfluous and did practically

no work, and he had done all he could to induce the Government to pension them off. Further, he estimated a monthly gain of £ T. 200,000 would accrue to the Treasurer as a result of the reversion to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff, if and when this measure was adopted. He had no further remedy to suggest until the Financial Commission, established under the Treaty of Sévres, came into being. He thought the Ottoman Government should be pressed to allow the provisions of the treaty to this effect to enter into force without waiting for the ratification of the treaty as a whole. He thought the Financial Commission might, with the powers conferred upon them, conceivably save the situation, though it might already be too late. Anyhow, this was the only hope.

5. I suggested to the French and Italian High Commissioners that it could do no harm to instruct our respective dragomans to make strong representations to the Grand Vizier in support of Sir A. Block's representations. I did not think it feasible to bring into force a section of the Treaty of Sévres before its actual ratification. But it might be possible to induce the Turkish Government themselves to ask that the proposed Financial Commission should be called into being forthwith and empowered to take charge of the financial situation. At the same time I was bound to confess that, in the view of Mr. Ryan, the Constantinople Government was too frightened of Angora for there to be much chance of their accepting this solution. The same consideration applied to the question of reversion to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff.

6. It was finally agreed that the three dragomans should ask for an immediate audience of the Grand Vizier, and press upon him the adoption of the measures advocated by Sir A. Block, and especially of the *ad valorem* tariff. They could then, in a friendly and unofficial manner, suggest to the Grand Vizier that the one real hope of saving the desperate financial situation appeared to lie in the establishment of the Financial Commission, and sound him as to whether the Porte would be disposed to ask for the immediate entry into force of this commission.

7. Sir A. Block thought that there was some hope of the Porte accepting this advice.

8. The dragomans are to see the Grand Vizier on Monday. But neither Mr. Ryan nor myself are very sanguine as to the success of this *démarche*. I will report the result of the interview in a further despatch.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 6445/143/44]

No. 56.

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 541.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 1, 1921.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 314 of the 19th May, relative to the despatch of Commissions of Enquiry to the Ismid and Yalova districts in order to investigate the atrocities alleged to have taken place there, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, the report and daily journal of the Allied Commission, under Major-General Franks, of the investigations carried out in the Yalova and Guemlek areas.

2. Numerous enclosures were transmitted with this report, but, owing to their voluminous character, it has not been found practicable to have them copied, owing to pressure of work, and they will not, therefore, be forwarded unless desired by your Lordship.

3. The report of the Ismid Commission has not yet been completed, but will be transmitted to your Lordship immediately on receipt.

I have, &c.
FRANK RATTIGAN,
Acting High Commissioner.

Rapport de la Commission interalliée chargée d'enquêter sur les Exactions commises contre la Population turque dans les Régions de Yalova et de Guemlek.

LES membres de la Commission d'Enquête, quittant Constantinople le 12 mai, sont arrivés à Guemlek dans la soirée. Ils se sont mis immédiatement en rapport avec le Général Léonardopoulos, commandant la 10^e Division hellénique, en résidence à Guemlek.

Ils ont reçu de cet officier général tous les moyens matériels nécessaires à leur mission.

2. La région à visiter par la commission comprend la majeure partie des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek. C'est une presqu'île montagneuse comptant une quarantaine de villages, dont trente-cinq exclusivement turcs. Dans la région voisine de Bazarkeni, sur les rives ouest et nord du lac d'Isnik, se trouvent une dizaine de villages arméniens, dont quelques-uns—exception faite pour le village de Tchenguiler, qui a été incendié par les Kémalistes en avril dernier—ont été détruits par les Turcs au cours de la guerre et après l'armistice.

A Guemlek actuellement 2,000 réfugiés de ces villages arméniens ainsi que 1,500 réfugiés musulmans provenant des villages voisins détruits et environ 3,500 réfugiés grecs des localités grecques d'Elmalik, Fouladjik, Ortakeui, Nicée, incendiées ou détruites par les Kémalistes au cours de l'année 1920.

La ville de Guemlek, la principale de la région, comptait avant les derniers événements environ 6,000 Grecs et un millier de musulmans.

3. La région est occupée depuis neuf mois par de faibles détachements de l'armée hellénique : au total, huit compagnies environ. La première ligne : Yalova-Bazarkeni, est tenue par cinq compagnies et une compagnie de mitrailleuses. Deux compagnies environ occupent Guemlek. Un petit détachement de vingt-six hommes est à Armoudli.

Le quartier général de la 10^e Division hellénique est à Guemlek. Les troupes de cette division assurent plus à l'est la couverture de l'armée hellénique dans la direction de Yéni Chéir.

4. Dans toute la région, l'administration civile ottomane est inexistante. Elle n'a été remplacée par aucune autre organisation.

5. La commission a opéré du 13 au 20 mai dans la région à l'est de Guemlek et sur la rive nord du golfe de Moudania. Elle s'est rendue le 20 mai dans la région de Yalova et est rentrée le 22 mai à Constantinople, sa mission terminée.

Elle a, durant cette période, procédé aux opérations suivantes :

(a.) Pendant deux jours, audition, soit chez le maire, soit au quartier général turc de Guemlek, de tous les habitants grecs, arméniens, musulmans, ayant des déclarations à faire sur les événements récents qui se sont passés dans la région.

Toutes les dispositions, même celles concernant des faits déjà anciens ou s'étant produits dans des localités éloignées, ont été recueillies.

(b.) Visite des villages incendiés de la ligne des avant-postes : Tchenguiler (arménien), Bazarkeni (turc), puis des villages turcs situés en arrière de cette ligne et également incendiés : Tchiteldji, Guedelek.

La commission ayant vu, le 15 mai, de son bateau, brûler des villages sur la rive nord du golfe de Moudania, s'est rendue les 15, 16 et 17 mai dans les localités turques de Narli, Karadja Ali, Koumla, Kapakli, Fitikli, et dans la localité d'Armoudli habitée par des Grecs et des musulmans.

Elle a constaté le passage récent de bandes grecques et arméniennes armées, et l'incendie, encore en cours, des localités de Kapakli, Narli, Karadja Ali. Elle a trouvé tant dans ces villages qu'aux environs de celui de Koumla vingt-huit cadavres (hommes et femmes âgés) récemment tués à coup de feu ou assommés. Un bébé vivant a également été trouvé à Kapakli.

(c.) Elle a recueilli toutes les déclarations concernant les événements qui venaient de se passer et notamment celle de l'officier grec commandant un détachement de reconnaissance ayant opéré entre Guemlek et Armoudli les 13, 14 et 15 mai, et celle de l'officier grec commandant le poste fixe d'Armoudli.

(d.) Elle a assuré l'embarquement pour Constantinople des habitants de Koumla et des réfugiés musulmans de Guemlek (environ 2,300).

(e.) Dans la région de Yalova elle a visité Yalova, Tchinaradjik, Inguéré, Kodja Déré. Elle a reçu les dépositions des habitants grecs et turcs de Yalova et celle des habitants grecs de Tchinaradjik.

La commission a jugé inopportune la visite des villages turcs d'Ak Keui et de Samanli, où se trouvent encore environ 300 musulmans. N'ayant pas la certitude de pouvoir leur porter immédiatement secours, elle a craint de se voir placée dans une situation aussi délicate que celle où elle s'est trouvée quelques jours auparavant à Kutchuk-Koumla, lorsque la population terrorisée s'est mise spontanément sous sa protection.

Le récit détaillé des opérations de chaque jour ainsi que les dépositions recueillies sont joints au présent rapport.

6. A la suite des dépositions qu'ils ont reçues, des constatations qu'ils ont faites et de l'ensemble de leurs impressions, les membres de la commission croient pouvoir faire les déclarations suivantes :

(a.) Tous les villages musulmans de la région visitée—à l'exception d'Oumour bey, Yalova, Ak Keui, Samanli—sont abandonnés et pour la plupart ont été, depuis moins de deux mois, pillés et incendiés par des bandes chrétiennes.

(b.) La population de ces villages est actuellement dispersée. Quelques habitants ont pu se mettre en sûreté en quittant le pays avant que leur village soit détruit. Les autres, ou bien ont réussi à s'enfuir dans les montagnes au moment de l'attaque des bandes, ou bien suivant certaines déclarations ont été emmenés par les assaillants. Quelques-uns ont été massacrés.

On ignore le sort réservé à la partie de la population la plus nombreuse, qui est réfugiée dans la montagne. Aucune précision de chiffre ne peut non plus être donnée.

(c.) Aucune des atrocités proprement dites (hommes enfermés et brûlés, enfants jetés au feu, femmes violées et éventrées) signalées dans les rapports des autorités ottomanes n'a pu être matériellement vérifiée. Mais, il a été effectivement constaté dans les villages de Kapakli et de Karadjadli que des femmes et des vieillards sans défense ont été tués à coup de feu ou assommés, parfois même dans leur propre maison.

(d.) La population chrétienne ne paraît pas avoir été désarmée et il semble également que la population musulmane ait réussi à conserver encore des armes cachées.

(e.) Dans les localités occupées par les troupes grecques, la population musulmane se plaint des vexations et des menaces. Il ne paraît pas qu'il faille voir dans ces faits autre chose que l'application—parfois peut-être un peu brutale—des mesures de police inhérentes à l'état d'occupation.

(f.) Les autorités helléniques qui pourvoient à Guemlek à la subsistance des réfugiés arméniens et grecs laissent sans nourriture et sans soins médicaux les réfugiés musulmans (environ 1,500 provenant de l'évacuation de Bazarkeni).

(g.) Des actes de violence et de barbarie, des massacres importants ont été certainement commis au cours de l'année 1920 par des bandes kémalistes ou des soldats de l'armée régulière contre la population chrétienne de la région non occupée par l'armée hellénique, à l'est de Yalova, au nord du lac d'Isnik et dans la région de Nicée.

Les dépositions concernant, notamment, les atrocités commises dans les villages grecs d'Elmalik, Filadjik, Nicée, sont jointes au présent rapport ainsi que celles relatant les excès commis par les Kémalistes dans certaines localités de la région déjà plus lointaine de Yéni Chéir.

Toutes ces dépositions n'ont pu être contrôlées sur place. Au même titre que celles analogues faites par les Turcs, elles peuvent être entachées d'exagération, bien que paraissant contenir une part de vérité.

(h.) Dans la région visitée, le village arménien de Tchenguiler, situé en avant de la ligne grecque, a été attaqué et incendié en avril dernier par une bande kémaliste. La population s'est enfuie à Bazarkeni—alors occupée par un détachement grec—et de là a été évacuée sur Guemlek. Quelques personnes tuées, pas de massacres. En représailles le village de Bazarkeni a été incendié après que la population musulmane eut été évacuée, par l'autorité hellénique, sur Guemlek.

(i.) Des militaires et des habitants chrétiens ont affirmé que des bandes de brigands turcs parcouraient le pays et que les paysans turcs se livraient à des attentats sur les chrétiens isolés. Un détachement de soldats grecs en reconnaissance aurait, le 13 mai, essuyé—aux environs de Narli—le feu d'une bande de brigands turcs et aurait eu un soldat tué. Aux environs d'Armoudli, sept personnes grecques auraient également été tuées il y a quelques jours. Ces attentats n'ont pu être vérifiés. Mais, d'autre part, le 12 mai, deux jeunes gens grecs de Guemlek, se

rendant à Koumla, ont été trouvés tués sur la plage. Ce meurtre, que l'autorité hellénique n'a pas signalé, est parvenu indirectement à la connaissance de la commission.

(j.) L'incendie et le pillage des villages turcs de la région ont lieu depuis moins de deux mois. Cette destruction paraît méthodique. Elle est effectuée par des bandes grecques et arméniennes et il paraît certain que des détachements réguliers de l'armée hellénique y participent.

(k.) Le commandement hellénique s'est dérobé à toute demande de la commission au sujet de son impression personnelle sur la situation actuelle dans le pays. Il affecte, en apparence, de n'attacher que peu d'importance à ces destructions, qu'il considère comme des représailles pour des attentats isolés ou pour des faits de violence commis antérieurement par des Turcs.

Ce n'est qu'après les événements du 15 mai, et seulement tard dans la soirée que des mesures ont été prises pour protéger la population musulmane de Koumla.

Un détachement de reconnaissance a bien été envoyé du 12 au 15 mai dans la région entre Guemlek et Armoudli; mais ce détachement, qui avait une mission de "désarmement et d'épuration," n'a pas empêché les exactions ou incendies qui ont eu lieu à la date même de son passage dans les localités de Karadja Ali, Narli, Kutchuk Koumla.

7. La commission s'est efforcée de rechercher les causes qui ont amené en moins de deux mois la destruction ou l'évacuation de la presque totalité des villages musulmans de la partie des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek soumise à l'occupation hellénique.

Si les événements qui se sont produits à l'occasion des mouvements de l'armée hellénique à la fin du mois de mars peuvent expliquer les destructions ou l'abandon successifs à la suite d'attaques ou par représailles des villages voisins de la ligne grecque (Dijan Keui - Rechadié - Sogouldjak - Bazar-Keui (turcs) - Tchenguiler (arménien)), il n'en est pas de même sur la rive nord du golfe de Moudania. Ces derniers ont été incendiés, le 15 mai, dans une période peu active d'opérations militaires, alors que la commission se trouvait en rade de Guemlek depuis le 12 mai, et sans que le commandant grec ait signalé des actes particuliers de provocation.

Sans doute, la haine séculaire entre les diverses races, haine encore alimentée, chez les soldats helléniques et chez la population grecque de Guemlek qui vivent en contact permanent, par la présence des 2.000 Arméniens réfugiés ayant particulièrement souffert des exactions turques pendant la guerre et par celle des 3.600 réfugiés grecs, dont beaucoup ont été témoins des atrocités commises par les Kémalistes à Filadjik, Elmalik, Nicée, est-elle une cause suffisante. Mais si cette haine peut expliquer la rigueur du traitement qu'ont subi les villages musulmans, elle ne paraît pas être la cause déterminante de leur destruction aussi générale et aussi rapide.

Il semble qu'il y ait une méthode apparente et suivie dans l'exécution de ces destructions qui depuis deux mois se produisent successivement par groupes de villages jusqu'à proximité même du quartier général hellénique.

Les membres de la commission concluent qu'ils se sont trouvés—dans la partie des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek occupée par l'armée hellénique—en présence d'un plan systématique de destruction des villages turcs et d'extinction de la population musulmane. Ce plan est exécuté par des bandes grecques et arméniennes qui semblent opérer sous le contrôle hellénique et parfois même avec le concours de détachements de soldats réguliers.

Ces destructions de villages et la disparition de la population musulmane qui en est la suite ont, sans doute, pour but d'assurer, contre tout mouvement possible de la population, les flancs et les derrières de l'armée hellénique en cas d'une offensive prochaine, et peut-être même aussi de créer dans la région une situation politique favorable au Gouvernement hellénique.

En tout cas, la commission est d'avis que les exactions signalées contre les chrétiens d'une part, contre les musulmans d'autre part, sont indignes d'un Gouvernement civilisé et qu'elles engagent également—dans la région occupée par l'armée grecque—la responsabilité des autorités helléniques seules en fonctions, et—dans la région soumise au régime kémaliste—celle des autorités ottomanes.

8. En raison des conclusions de son enquête, la commission ne pense pas avoir qualité pour proposer les mesures propres à remédier à la situation dans la région de Guemlek. Aussi bien la dispersion de la presque totalité de la population musulmane des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek est-elle déjà un fait accompli.

Mais pour éviter à l'avenir le retour de faits semblables dans les autres régions

occupées par l'armée hellénique, la commission propose l'installation d'une gendarmerie interalliée dans ces régions, ou tout au moins l'envoi auprès des divers commandements helléniques d'officiers alliés chargés d'une mission de surveillance.

Elle émet, enfin, le vœu que les musulmans se trouvant encore à Yalova, Ak-Keui, Samanli, au nombre d'environ 600, soient autorisés à se réfugier à Constantinople ou environs et que des mesures soient prises dans ce but.

Les membres de la commission—

Grande-Bretagne.

Italie.

France.

G. M. FRANKS,

E. ROLLETO,

G. VIEG,

Major-General.

Colonel.

Lieut.-Colonel.

Le 23 mai 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Journal de la Commission interalliée envoyée pour enquêter sur les Incidents dans les Régions de Guemlek et de Yalova.

LE 12 mai à midi, la commission quitte Constantinople. Elle arrive à Guemlek à 4 heures 30. La Commission trouve le Général hellénique Léonardopoulos, commandant la 10^e Division, à Guemlek; il vint de suite à bord et paraissait quelque peu contrarié de cette expédition, mais fut courtois et offrit même de mettre à sa disposition deux automobiles pour le lendemain, afin qu'elle visite Bazar-Keui. A 6 heures la commission débarque et rencontre le maire sur la plage; il la conduit au quartier grec de la ville. Des centaines de réfugiés venant des villages grecs et arméniens détruits par les Kémalistes sont rencontrés; en particulier de Kez Dervent, d'Elmalik, de Vizir Han, Houdié, Foulardjik, Levké et Kouplu. Les réfugiés grecs de Guemlek sont très mal logés, mais sont nourris par l'armée grecque.

Le 13 mai, à 9 heures, la commission fit une expédition aux villages turcs à l'arrière des lignes grecques. Bazar-Keui est atteint sans aucun incident. Une foule de réfugiés grecs, la plupart des femmes, fit une démonstration amicale quand la commission quitta Guemlek. Bazar-Keui fut trouvé complètement détruit, à l'exception de quelques maisons occupées par les troupes grecques.

La commission fut reçue par le commandant hellénique, chef du détachement de Bazar-Keui, qui déclara ne pas avoir été à Bazar-Keui au commencement d'avril. Le village était alors occupé par le 5 R.I. Ce n'est que le 15 que le commandant actuel prit charge de Bazar-Keui. Quand l'armée grecque gagna Biledjik, un régiment fut laissé pour assurer les communications. Cependant, quand elle battit en retraite, la population turque devint très agitée, pilla et brûla les villages grecs et arméniens de Kis Dervent et de Chindjiller. Beaucoup des habitants de ces villages détruits vinrent à Bazar-Keui. Au même moment, quelques paysans turcs attaquèrent les lignes de communications grecques; à la suite de ce fait, le commandant reçut l'ordre d'évacuer la population turque de certains villages situés dans son secteur. Ceci fut commencé le 16 avril; mais alors les réfugiés grecs et arméniens, quand les habitations turques furent évacuées, incendièrent ces dernières pour se venger.

Après cette entrevue, la commission visita le village détruit de Chindjiller. Il était entièrement rasé, mais quelques rares habitants vivaient encore dans ses ruines. Ils racontèrent que le village avait été mis à sac par des Turcs et que plusieurs d'entre eux avaient été tués dans leurs maisons.

La commission retourna à Bazar-Keui. Ville détruite systématiquement par le feu, pas d'habitants y vivant encore, aucune preuve d'explosion, aucun cadavre n'y fut découvert.

La commission visita alors Cheltikdji. Le village brûlait quand elle entra. Quatre soldats grecs furent surpris s'emparant des planchers des maisons dans le village; il est probable qu'eux-mêmes avaient mis le feu aux maisons qui subsistaient encore. Les habitants évacuèrent leur village quand ils virent ce qui se passait à Bazar-Keui; le lendemain il fut incendié. La commission n'a pu trouver de trace de cadavres.

La commission visita Gedelek, village entièrement détruit, mais il ne fut pas trouvé trace des vingt-sept personnes rapportées comme y ayant été massacrées. En atteignant les confins de Gedelek, une foule de réfugiés et de soldats qui avaient

commencé par faire une démonstration amicale, apercevant soudain Mulazim Suréyah Effendi, guide de la commission, l'attaqua; il fut tiré de l'auto et ce ne fut qu'avec de grandes difficultés qu'il put être ramené à bord du "Bryony".

La commission regagne le bateau à 6 heures, le chef d'état-major grec vint à bord et s'excusa de l'incident de l'après-midi.

Le 14 mai, à 9 heures, la commission siège à la propre maison du maire pour entendre les plaintes des Grecs et Arméniens qui peuvent en avoir à formuler. La commission fut très amicalement invitée à déjeuner par le maire, invitation d'ailleurs déclinée.

Le premier plaignant était le Dr. Mezbourian, chef du Comité arménien dans la région de Guemlek. Le docteur donne à la commission un aperçu général des atrocités qui ont été perpétrées contre les Arméniens depuis le commencement de la guerre. Dans cette région, dix-huit villages ont été détruits et la population réduite de 70.000 à 2.500 habitants. Quand il lui fut demandé quelle solution pourrait être trouvée à ce mélange de races, le docteur dit que la chrétienté ne pouvait exister sous un Gouvernement turc, même s'il y avait une gendarmerie interalliée.

Le dernier massacre arménien commença il y a un an, c'est-à-dire au début du mouvement kémaliste et à l'évacuation de l'Anatolie par les troupes alliées.

Des plaignants de Tchindjilar, Yeni-Keui, Kéramet, Murdigheuz furent entendus et tous racontent les massacres, les incendies d'août 1915 et du milieu de 1920. En particulier, les femmes de Filadjik, un village grec, furent alors écoutées. Elles nous dirent de terribles atrocités et déclarèrent que l'officier turc qui servait de guide à la commission était un des chefs qui ont perpétré ces massacres.

La commission continue son enquête à 2 heures de l'après-midi dans la maison du maire. Hommes et femmes furent entendus, quelques-uns de Vizir-Han, Kis Dervent, Elmalik, Soyoudjak, Tcherkesskeuy, Deli-Bazar et Orta-Keui; tous nous donnent à peu près le même récit: des Kémalistes venaient de temps à autres dans leurs villages, en premier lieu demandaient de l'argent et de la nourriture, puis prenaient des bestiaux et des chevaux et finalement, quand le village n'avait plus rien à donner, un massacre avait lieu et les habitations étaient incendiées.

En quittant la mairie, la commission rendit visite au général hellénique et prit le thé chez lui. Retour au "Bryony" à 6 heures 30; il demeure ancré à Guemlek pour la nuit.

Le 15 mai. La commission avait l'intention de se rendre à Koumla pour enquêter sur ce qui s'y était passé.

A 8 heures, de la fumée fut observée s'élevant au-dessus du village de Narli. La commission embarqua dans le canot automobile, qui malheureusement eut une panne et force fut de revenir à bord. A 10 heures, au-dessus de Karadja Ali un nuage de fumée s'élève. Comme le canot ne pouvait nous y porter, ordre fut donné de rester à bord, et le "Bryony" se dirigea vers les villages en flammes. A 2 heures, Narli fut atteint. Le village était encore une masse rougie par le feu et il fut décidé de débarquer à Karadja Ali, en pleine combustion à ce moment et sur la plage duquel on distinguait aussi des cadavres. Douze vieillards, dont une femme âgée, furent trouvés gisant sur la rive. Deux hommes étaient encore vivants et furent embarqués sur le "Bryony" par le docteur du bord. Il fut impossible de pénétrer dans l'intérieur du village à cause de la grande chaleur y régnant. La mosquée et l'école, malgré tout, placées sur un petit tertre, étaient les deux seules maisons non incendiées.

A 4 heures 30 la commission débarque à Kutchuk-Koumla. Le village est à peu près à 2½ kilomètres du point de débarquement. Les maisons sur la plage étaient entièrement désertées, et l'une d'elles était en flammes. Des chevaux avaient été envoyés par le général hellène qui, le jour précédent, avait été informé de notre intention de visiter le village.

La commission se dirigea vers Kutchuk-Koumla. Plusieurs centaines d'habitants, la plupart des femmes, étaient frappés de terreur et attendaient la commission à son arrivée.

Il fut difficile d'obtenir des renseignements exacts, si intense était la panique régnant parmi cette population, mais il fut compris qu'un détachement de soldats grecs et de brigands avaient traversé le village quelques jours auparavant et étaient revenus le matin même en passant par le débarcadère de Koumla.

La commission revint au bateau, suivie par l'entière population, qui se plaça sous la protection des Alliés et refusa de quitter la plage, tout en nous implorant de la transporter en un lieu sûr et tranquille. L'extrémité de la jetée, peu éloignée du "Bryony", était l'endroit le plus peuplé. Une lettre fut alors écrite au Général

Léonardopoulos lui demandant de prendre des moyens immédiats pour la protection du village de Koumla.

Cette lettre ne put lui être remise que le lendemain à 6 heures du matin. Le "Bryony" resta ancré au large du débarcadère et la nuit durant, il fit marcher ses projecteurs dans la direction de la plage et des collines avoisinantes pour assurer les réfugiés.

Le 16 mai. A 9 heures la commission descend à terre afin de recueillir toutes les informations possibles parmi les réfugiés qui se trouvaient sur le rivage. Un blessé et deux morts avaient été apportés par les indigènes.

Les réfugiés dirent à la commission que la veille, un groupe d'entre eux, vingt environ, essaya de se rendre à Guemlek afin de se procurer du pain; ils avaient quitté le village et, en arrivant au débarcadère, avaient rencontré un détachement de soldats grecs et de brigands sous le commandement d'un officier grec. Les femmes furent renvoyées au village, les hommes durent suivre les bandits; sur la route, quelques-uns d'entre eux reçurent l'ordre de retourner, les autres furent tués, le mouktar étant parmi ces derniers.

A 10 heures la commission gagna le village. Il était complètement déserté. Un caporal et dix hommes envoyés par le Général Léonardopoulos (par anticipation à la lettre envoyée le matin et qu'il ne pouvait avoir encore reçue) étaient de garde; le caporal fut interrogé par la commission.

Au retour au débarcadère, un officier d'état-major grec, envoyé par le général commandant la division de Guemlek attendait la commission. A la demande de cette dernière, il adressa aux réfugiés l'assurance qu'ils seraient protégés efficacement, promesse qui n'eut pas d'effet, d'ailleurs, sur la population.

Alors la commission se dirigea sur Kapakli. Le village était entièrement détruit. Deux ou trois habitants, terrifiés, furent trouvés parmi les ruines. Ils dirent à la commission que les indigènes étaient cachés dans la montagne, craignant d'être tués aussitôt qu'ils eussent paru.

La commission fit le tour du village et trouva huit corps, dont quatre de femmes. Trois des hommes morts avaient été tués une quinzaine auparavant et dans un engagement précédent. Les cinq restant avaient été tués la veille au matin. La commission trouva un bébé abandonné, qui fut emmené à bord.

Les trois survivants demandent à la commission d'être évacués sur un endroit tranquille. Il leur est dit qu'ils aient à prévenir les réfugiés se cachant dans la montagne et que, s'ils s'assemblaient sur la plage, ils seraient emmenés à Koutchouk-Koumla le jour suivant.

La commission se dirige alors vers Narli. Le village fut trouvé entièrement détruit. Pas de morts, un seul habitant restait encore: c'était un vieux Turc, qui dit être tout à fait heureux et fit sentir à la commission qu'elle n'était qu'une intruse!

Le "Bryony" reste ancré pour la nuit au large de Koutchouk-Koumla, où nous étions retournés.

Le 17 mai. A 8 heures 30, les deux officiers hellènes Costas et Papoultopoulos, qui étaient chefs du groupe envoyé de Guemlek, le 11 courant, pour visiter et désarmer les villageois entre Guemlek et Armoudli, furent envoyés à bord par un des officiers de l'état-major grec.

La commission les interrogea. Le jour de leur passage dans les lieux incendiés correspond exactement avec le moment où ces villages furent trouvés en flammes. Le Lieutenant Costas reconnaît avoir fait fusiller quatre Turcs. A part cela, il réfute tout meurtre et tout pillage.

A 9 heures 30, on quitte Koutchouk-Koumla pour Fisticli. Remorquons deux caïques qui doivent être laissés à Kapakli afin d'emmener les réfugiés pouvant descendre de la montagne à la suite de la promesse de la commission.

A peu près 200 d'entre eux furent trouvés rassemblés sur la plage. Laissant les caïques avec l'escorte nécessaire, le "Bryony" se dirige vers Fisticli. Le village paraissait entièrement tranquille. Sur le débarcadère, les marchands turcs et grecs vendaient leurs olives.

Un officier fut envoyé à terre pour prendre des renseignements. Les Turcs, affolés par ce qui se passait dans les autres villages, vendaient leurs marchandises avant d'évacuer pour Armoudli (le prix offert par les Grecs était certainement au-dessous du cours normal).

Armoudli fut atteint à midi. Le village semblait tranquille. Un officier fut envoyé à terre pour prier l'officier commandant le détachement hellène de se rendre à bord et dire s'il était nécessaire que la commission visitât le village.

Il fut décidé que la commission interrogerait les notables grecs et turcs, au débarcadère, à 2 heures.

L'officier hellène déclara que tout était calme, et qu'il avait mission de surveiller le village seulement.

Il raconta plusieurs cas de brigandage dans les fermes environnantes.

Les représentants des comités grecs et turcs semblaient vivre en parfait accord, mais interrogés séparément, ils se plaignaient néanmoins les uns des autres.

La commission se réembarqua à bord du "Bryony" et se dirigea vers Kapakli pour remorquer les deux caïques qui furent ramenés pleins de réfugiés à Kutchuk Koumla.

En arrivant à Koumla, le représentant de la Croix-Rouge raconta qu'il avait causé avec le chef de brigands venu au débarcadère pendant l'absence du "Bryony" pour terroriser les réfugiés et se vanter de ses actes. Un message fut envoyé au Général Léonardopoulos l'avisant de l'arrivée du chef des bandits.

Le "Bryony" resta ancré au large de Kutchuk Koumla pour la nuit.

Le 18 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" retourne à Guemlek. A 9 heures, la commission descend à terre et visite le quartier turc et une mosquée pleine de réfugiés musulmans.

La commission interroge les plaignants du siège du Gouvernement turc. Tous sont frappés de terreur, ne reçoivent aucune nourriture, à part celle qu'ils peuvent se procurer et demandent d'être évacués puis dirigés sur un lieu tranquille.

En revenant à bord, la commission reçut à 1 heure un message sans-fil disant que l'"Inéboli" venait de quitter Constantinople pour évacuer les réfugiés se trouvant à Kutchuk Koumla.

La commission retourne à Guemlek, visite le maire et l'informe de son intention d'évacuer les réfugiés turcs.

A 6 heures 30, retour à Kutchuk Koumla. A 9 heures, le bateau arriva et embarqua les réfugiés. Le bébé que nous avions à bord fut confié à une femme turque. L'embarquement se termine à 2 heures du matin et l'"Inéboli" se dirige sur Constantinople.

Le 19 mai. Le "Bryony" reste ancré au large de Kutchuk Koumla. Les réfugiés pour qui il n'y avait pas eu de place sur l'"Inéboli" et qui avaient été laissés en arrière furent gagnés de confiance et beaucoup parmi eux retournèrent au village chercher des provisions.

A 1 heure, le chef de brigands Houtchi Yorghis, rencontré par le représentant de la Croix-Rouge, fut amené à bord par un officier d'état-major, ordre du général commandant les troupes hellènes. Il déclara qu'il s'était vanté la veille, étant pris de boisson et que, réellement, il était le guide du détachement par le Lieutenant Costas, envoyé pour désarmer les villageois.

Dans la soirée, l'"Inéboli" et trois autres bateaux revinrent à Koumla. Les réfugiés qui restaient encore furent évacués.

Le 20 mai. A 6 heures 30, le "Bryony" et les bateaux envoyés par le Croissant-Rouge quittent Koumla pour Guemlek.

Avis est notifié aux réfugiés de se rassembler sur la plage pour embarquer. A midi, la commission va à terre pour constater le progrès fait dans l'évacuation. Les officiers helléniques demandent à ce que les hommes valides fussent laissés en arrière, tout en garantissant qu'ils seraient traités convenablement. Cette proposition fut acceptée par la commission.

La commission retourne à terre à 3 heures 30. Elle voit les derniers réfugiés embarquer. Les bateaux levèrent l'ancre.

A 4 heures, le "Bryony" quitte Guemlek pour Touzla, où il doit attendre les instructions envoyées par télégraphie sans fil concernant le voyage dans la région de Yalova.

Le 21 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" jette l'ancre à Yalova. Un officier est envoyé à terre pour informer le chef du détachement grec que la Commission inter-alliée venait d'arriver.

A 9 heures, l'officier grec commandant le détachement se presenta à bord et fut interrogé par la commission. Il déclara qu'à son arrivée à Yalova, il y a de cela environ un mois, il avait trouvé tous les villages des alentours brûlés. A sa connaissance, des brigands opéraient dans la région, mais les consignes étaient de tenir seulement Yalova, dont ses patrouilles ne s'éloignaient jamais de plus de 2½ kilomètres.

A 10 heures, la commission vint à terre. Elle est rencontrée par une foule de réfugiés grecs, la plupart des femmes.

La commission siège au quartier général grec et prête attention aux plaintes formulées par les réfugiés hellènes, spécialement ceux de Fouladjik.

Elle pria l'officier hellène de se retirer et le caïmacan fut alors entendu. Il déclara qu'avant la guerre, la population du district de Yalova était mi-chrétienne et mi-turque. Yalova elle-même était une ville turque.

A l'époque actuelle, il n'y a que 300 Turcs à Yalova et quelques centaines dans les villages éloignés de Somanli et Ak-Keui.

Le caïmacan demanda à la commission d'évacuer la population turque restante en un lieu de sécurité. A la sortie du quartier général grec, la commission trouva les réfugiés grecs en proie à une rage folle. La cause était que Hafis Ahmet (un des guides de la commission et notable d'un village voisin, ayant débarqué le matin même avec la commission) avait été accusé par quelques femmes grecques comme ayant été impliqué dans plusieurs massacres perpétrés dans le voisinage. Ce fut avec les plus grandes difficultés et seulement en captant l'esprit de la foule sur un autre point qu'il put gagner une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tchinedjik et la commission se rendit à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide, mais pas détruit. La mosquée avait été pillée mais pas brûlée et aucune trace ne fut trouvée des horribles massacres rapportés comme ayant été accomplis en cet endroit.

Le prêtre grec montra à la commission des tombes turques fraîchement recouvertes.

Le "Bryony" se dirigea alors sur Enguri. La commission descendit à terre et fut reçue par l'officier commandant le détachement hellène. A sa connaissance, seuls des actes de brigandage avaient été commis dans les environs.

La commission se dirigea alors vers les deux villages assemblés de Kodjadéré. Ils se trouvaient entièrement détruits. Pas d'habitants, aucun cadavre ne fut trouvé, partant aucune information recueillie.

La commission retourne au "Bryony," qui demeure ancré au large la nuit durant.

Le 20 mai. A 8 heures 30, retour et arrivée à Top-Hané, Constantinople.

[E 6450/201/44]

No. 57.

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 546.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 1, 1921.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the financial situation here and the re-establishment of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* customs duty, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan on a collective *démarche* made by his French and Italian colleagues and himself on the 30th May, in pursuance of a decision taken at the High Commissioners' meeting on the 27th May.

2. It is interesting to note, as a sidelight on the Italian attitude, that in the interval between the decision of the High Commissioners and the *démarche* of the chief dragoman, Mr. Ryan's Italian colleague, who was clearly acting under express instructions of the Italian High Commissioner, displayed great anxiety to attenuate that part of the representation to the Grand Vizier containing the suggestion that the Turkish Government might themselves ask for the constitution of the Financial Commission. It looked rather as though the Italian High Commissioner wished this suggestion to be put in such a form that he could disavow it and represent it as emanating from the chief dragoman only, if he were reproached with supporting the application of any part of the Treaty of Sévres.

3. Mr. Ryan took an opportunity of suggesting to his Italian colleague that his hesitation was perhaps due to the commitment entered into by the Italian Government to support all the demands of the Angora Government in regard to the Peace Treaty. He observed that such scruples, however honourable, were perhaps exaggerated, as Angora had not ratified the Sforza-Bekir Sami agreement.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

M. QUINET, M. Galli and I called on the Grand Vizier on the 30th May to effect the collective *démarche* regarding the financial situation decided on by the High Commissioners at their meeting on the 27th May. We stated that we had been sent to see his Highness in consequence of a statement made to the High Commissioners by Sir Adam Block, as president of the Provisional Commission of Control. Sir Adam Block had represented the situation of the Treasury in the gravest possible light. There was an enormous deficit. Salaries were in arrear, and the Treasury had come to the end of such expedients as had hitherto enabled it to tide over its difficulties. We said that immediate measures had been suggested in order to relieve to some extent the present financial distress. The first was a diminishing of expenditure by reducing the personnel of departments which were at present overloaded with useless functionaries. The other measure was the re-establishment of the *ad valorem* customs duty, which, according to experts, would produce the substantial increase in revenue, estimated at £T.200,000 a month.

2. After urging the immediate adoption of these measures, we went on to say that while they would afford relief, they would not effect a radical cure. We therefore submitted to the Grand Vizier's consideration the question of the immediate constitution of the Financial Commission or the temporary attribution of the Provisional Commission of Control of the powers which were to have been conferred on the Financial Commission by the Treaty of Sèvres. We recognised that the general situation had changed so considerably since his Highness took office that there could be no question of the Allies imposing on the Turkish Government a particular portion of the Treaty of Sèvres at the present time. We made it clear that what we were putting forward was a suggestion that the Turkish Government might find it in their own interest to ask for the Financial Commission which with its wider powers and greater elasticity of action would be able to render far more assistance to the Government than the Provisional Control Commission were able to do.

3. The Grand Vizier said that in the matter of reduction of staffs the Government had themselves taken the initiative and were considering very carefully what reductions could be made. He admitted that in certain departments, like the Admiralty (which M. Quinet had specifically mentioned) and the War Office, there was room for economy. He doubted whether much could be done in certain departments, e.g., the Ministry of Justice. He said that expenditure on officers' salaries had already decreased, and stated in reply to a question from me that no allowances were being paid to families of officers serving with the Kemalists.

4. Turning to the *ad valorem* question, the Grand Vizier repeated all the threadbare arguments against a return to the *ad valorem* system. He, moreover, cast doubt on the estimates of increase of revenue from this source. He said that in any case the advantage would be illusory, as the Americans would not agree to the maintenance of the "droits de consommation" concurrently with the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* customs duty, and he seemed to think that if the "droits de consommation" were not maintained the loss to the Treasury would balance the gain from the restoration of the 11 per cent. duty.

5. We returned the usual answers to the general arguments advanced by the Grand Vizier. We said that to ask the Allies to agree to the quintupling of the specific tariff, because otherwise there would be two tariffs in Turkey, was in fact to ask the Allies to waive their demand for a return to what they considered the only legal system because Angora had created something else. We said that our Governments were immovable in their decision not to agree to the quintupling. We observed that the restoration of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* was contemplated as a provisional measure, pending the general settlement of affairs of Turkey, and that during the transition period the existence of two customs tariffs could hardly be regarded as more serious than the existence of two Governments. As for the practical difficulties, we said our information was that they were by no means insuperable, and that it would be possible both to reconstitute a staff of valuers and to overcome the difficulties of fluctuation in the price of goods.

6. On the financial side, we said that the estimates of increased revenue had been made by experts who most certainly have taken into account the depression of trade. We added that while the Allied Powers were willing to see the "droits de consommation" maintained concurrently with the 11 per cent. duty, we understood it to be

the opinion of the experts that even if the "droits de consommation" had to be suppressed there would be on balance an increase of revenue as a result of the re-establishment of the *ad valorem* duty. We said we would enquire further into this point. M. Galli pointed out that if the Grand Vizier's argument were sound the American attitude would render the quintupling of the specific tariff no less useless than the restoration of the *ad valorem* duty, as the Americans, according to the Grand Vizier's showing, would contest any increase in customs duty concurrently with the retention of the "droits de consommation." I myself, in order to test the strength of the Grand Vizier's opposition, asked his Highness whether, if the Americans abandoned their opposition to the retention of the "droits de consommation," we could say firmly that the Government would re-establish the *ad valorem* system. Tewfik Pasha did not seem personally adverse, but said he would submit the question to the Council.

7. The conversation ended at this point without the Grand Vizier having said a single word about the suggestion regarding the Financial Commission.

Constantinople, June 1, 1921.

[E 6461/531/44]

No. 58.

Colonel Baldwin to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received June 6.)

My dear Oliphant,

Paris, June 4, 1921.

THE identic note of which you enclose a copy in your letter of the 2nd instant draws attention to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, which authorises the Straits Commission to levy dues on shipping and declares that, in the light of modern practice, the provisions of the relevant articles of the treaty are retrogressive.

It is impossible, as the note seeks to do, to compare the straits with waterways such as the Elbe or the Scheldt, but, on the other hand, I rather question the expediency of comparing them with the Panamá and Suez Canals. To such a contention the Governments concerned might reply that, whereas the canals had to be constructed at great expense and require continual outlay for works of improvement and dredging, the straits are a part of the sea and require no works of improvement, dredging or upkeep in the sense in which these terms are used in connection with an artificial waterway, or even, for the matter of that, with a river which has invariably to be made navigable for vessels of deeper draught than it would carry in its natural state.

To my mind, the strongest argument against the assertion made in the note is that there is an essential distinction which is universally recognised between the "droits de péage," or tolls, and the "taxes," or navigation dues, which the treaty authorises the commission to impose on shipping using the straits. The former, which represent a survival of the recognition of the right of the possessor to close a passage should be so desired or, alternatively, to derive a revenue from the users should be engaged to keep it open, have been practically abolished, and any tendency to revive this system would, as the note suggests, be reactionary. Taxes or navigation dues, on the other hand, are universally recognised as being payments for services rendered and may not in any case provide a revenue for the owner.

The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, when an international body, analogous to the Straits Commission, was constituted to open and keep open the mouths of the Danube. The principle of the imposition of dues of this description has not only never been questioned, but is being extended in respect of all international rivers, and its application, having regard to the guarantee of security which is offered by the Straits Commission, requires no justification in that case.

Yours sincerely,
JOHN BALDWIN.

[E 6204/143/44]

No. 59.

Earl Curzon to Earl Granville (Athens).

(No 254.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1921.

WITH reference to previous telegraphic correspondence respecting reported atrocities by Greeks in the Ismid Peninsula, I transmit to you herewith copy of an

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M 2

interim report of the Commission of Enquiry received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.*

2. You should communicate this report without delay to the Greek Government and request them to furnish you without delay with their observations on these grave allegations.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 6777/143/44]

No. 60.

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 555.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 4, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 541 of the 1st June, transmitting to your Lordship the Report and Journal of the Allied Commission which investigated alleged atrocities in the Yalova and Guemlek areas, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a report, dated the 1st June, of the Commission of Enquiry despatched to the Ismid Peninsula.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Commission of Enquiry, Ismid Peninsula, to the British High Commissioner.

(Confidential.)

Your Excellency,

June 1, 1921.

WE have the honour to submit the following report in accordance with your instructions and with the terms of reference for the above-named Commission of Enquiry:—

1. Credible evidence has been produced as to crimes committed during the last twelve months by both Greeks and Turks. There is no doubt that there has been a large number of atrocities in the Ismid Peninsula, and it appears that those on the part of the Turks have been more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks.

We attach a résumé of our investigations upon which our opinions are based, and will prepare a schedule giving full details.

2. The present state of affairs is largely due to racial feeling and age-long vendetta, now fanned to an intense pitch by exaggerated stories which promote fear and excitement.

3. Greek regular troops have been implicated in recent excesses—both officers and soldiers—more especially lately when the troops have been on the march.

In the zone which is effectively occupied by the Greek army there is order, but it appears to be maintained at the cost of oppressing the Turkish population. This evil is accentuated by the Turkish civil administration which, particularly in the neighbourhood of Ismid, is venal and corrupt, and allows itself to be used by the Greeks to carry out their policy.

The Greek military authority admits that nothing is done to maintain order in districts not actually occupied by Greek troops.

4.—(a.) The commission recommend that full advantage should be taken of the existing Turkish organisation for the maintenance of order and that this should be expanded and made more powerful. European officers to be made available to give assistance to the Central Government and this especially in the way of control of officials charged with the administration of justice, such European officers also being made responsible for reporting to their Government any infringement of international law by either belligerent.

Also that pressure be brought to bear upon the Greek military authorities to maintain civil order and justice by means of this organisation in such portions of Asia Minor as they occupy or can control.

* See No. 47.

(b.)—(1.) Where either side is in the ascendancy the survivors of the other in many cases become fugitive; the men often become brigands. The estimate given by the Greek Colonel Commandant of the 11th Division at Ismid was of some 12,000—15,000 Christian refugees in Ismid itself, mostly women and children.

The Greek army have instituted conscription of those Ottoman subjects who are Christian refugees, who have to leave their families in great distress.

Moslems who are now in the power of the Greeks are in a state of great fear and wish to escape or to be given protection. Such Greeks who still remain in the north of the Ismid peninsula fear an advance by Nationalist troops and may become fugitives at any time.

(2.) The commission recommend that the Christian refugees should be removed now to a region which is, and will remain, under Greek Government, or which will be under the protection of the Allies, and that husbands and fathers who have been taken by conscription from those dependent on them should be restored to their families. Also that the Armenians should be removed to an area under the protection of the Allies.

The members of the commission are under the impression that those Moslems who have become brigands will return to their homes and to peaceful pursuits when assured of settled conditions under Moslem administration, and that Greek brigands, if offered an amnesty, will take the opportunity of trusting the Allies in a scheme for colonisation in a Greek zone. These men appear usually to have become brigands only when driven from their homes or after desertion from Turkish military service.

We have, &c.

H. M. FARMAR, Lieutenant-Colonel.

VITELLI, Temporary Colonel.

WILKONSKY, Lieutenant-Colonel.

O. H. VAN MILLENGEN, Major.

Enclosure 2 in No. 60.

Memorandum respecting Crimes committed by the Greeks.

LES principaux excès reprochés aux Grecs se sont produits à partir de juillet 1920, époque à laquelle les forces militaires grecques ont occupé le pays.

Ces excès sont imputables soit aux troupes régulières, soit aux bandes.

(a.) Les troupes régulières au moment de leur arrivée dans le pays (juillet-août) exercèrent des violences contre plusieurs villages musulmans notamment dans la région à l'est de Beigos. Des habitants furent tués, des troupeaux furent enlevés, des maisons ou même des villages entiers brûlés. Il faut y joindre les méfaits individuels de soldats appartenant aux détachements grecs: extorsion d'argent, vols, brutalités et meurtres.

Dans les régions occupées, l'autorité militaire grecque se livre d'abord à de nombreuses arrestations et à des exécutions sommaires (notamment à Beigos-Tchiboucli).

De nombreuses perquisitions sont opérées en vue de rechercher les armes; elles donnent lieu à des méfaits individuels, violences et vols. Les abus individuels, favorisés par une discipline insuffisante, ne sont généralement pas réprimés.

Les violences contre les villages reprennent en mars-avril au moment où les troupes grecques abandonnent la partie est de la péninsule, se portent dans la région d'Ada-Bazar. Elles affectent surtout les villages turcs entre Koudra et Ada-Bazar, dont un assez grand nombre eurent des habitants brutalisés ou tués, des femmes violées, le bétail enlevé, et des maisons brûlées.

(b.) Les bandes grecques, formées de gens ayant eu en général à souffrir des violences turques et poussés autant par le désir de se venger que par l'appât du butin, ont opéré pendant l'occupation grecque avec une liberté d'action qui permet de conclure que l'autorité militaire grecque n'a pas fait le nécessaire pour s'opposer à leurs méfaits.

Dans la région de Chiole on peut même considérer comme très probable, sinon certain, que l'autorité militaire grecque a favorisé leur constitution et leur action.

Dans la région qu'ils occupent actuellement, les forces grecques ont armé et employé comme auxiliaires des réfugiés d'anciens villages grecs pillés ou brûlés par les Turcs. Ces bandes, par leurs coups de main sur les villages turcs situés en dehors de la zone d'occupation effective des troupes grecques, et par les atrocités qu'elles y commettent, ont ravivé les haines et amené des représailles féroces dont les villages grecs ont fait les frais, notamment dans la région au sud d'Ismid.

Les Grecs ont employé également comme auxiliaires un grand nombre de Circassiens, musulmans du Caucase, réfugiés au nombre de plus de 30,000 dans la région à l'est d'Ismid, et qui sont devenus ennemis des Nationalistes.

Ces Circassiens fournissent d'excellents éléments semi-réguliers, mais forment également des bandes, dont l'action mal contrôlée comporte des excès et concourt à perpétuer le régime des représailles continuelles qui ravage et dépeuple peu à peu ce pays.

En résumé, dans les régions occupées effectivement par leurs troupes, les Grecs assurent l'ordre, mais au prix d'un régime d'oppression dont souffre la population musulmane.

Dans les régions qu'ils n'occupent pas effectivement, ils favorisent l'action de leurs bandes et sont ainsi responsables, en partie, du régime de guérillas et d'atrocités qui y règne.

Enclosure 3 in No. 60.

Memorandum respecting Turkish Atrocities.

C'EST à partir de mars 1920, et surtout en juin, juillet 1920 (préparation des offensives grecques), que les violences à l'égard des chrétiens, qui s'étaient atténuées depuis l'armistice, reprennent de l'extension et un caractère de férocité particulier, surtout à l'égard des Grecs.

Les bandes turques, plus ou moins Kémalistes, opèrent dans tout le sandjak d'Ismid et jusqu'aux environs de Scutari (Pachakeuy, 20 kilom. est de Scutari).

Elles sont, le plus souvent, aidées par les habitants turcs des villages voisins. Un grand nombre de villages sont ainsi pillés ou brûlés, et leur population, plus ou moins décimée, obligée de s'enfuir.

Il faut citer, en particulier, Yenikeuy au sud de Chale; une douzaine de villages dans la région nord et nord-est d'Ada-Bazar; une douzaine de villages dans la région sud d'Ada-Bazar, dont la grosse agglomération d'Ortakeuy, près de Gueive (16,000 habitants), et plusieurs villages au sud et sud-est d'Ismid.

L'occupation militaire grecque, à partir de juillet 1920, éloigne à l'est et au sud-est de la péninsule les opérations des bandes turques, mais, au sud du golfe d'Ismid, la région de Karamoursal reste un centre nationaliste irréductible d'où partent des bandes aidées par la population des villages turcs, qui attaquent les villages grecs de la contrée.

Ces expéditions ont souvent comme motif ou comme prétexte les excès commis par des bandes adverses.

Elles reprennent une activité particulière au printemps 1921 et se poursuivent jusqu'aux environs sud d'Ismid, amenant la destruction de tous les villages chrétiens de cette région sauf un (Bagchedkik).

Les autorités grecques ont fourni une liste de 32 villages pillés ou brûlés, avec plus de 12,000 personnes massacrées, 2,500 disparus, et le reste de leur population (plus de 15,900) réfugiée à Ismid.

La commission, étant donné les nombreux témoins qu'elle a pu interroger, estime qu'il y a lieu d'admettre ces faits comme fondés, en tenant compte d'une certaine exagération dans les chiffres.

[E 6786/1/44]

No. 61.

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon. — (Received June 13.)

(No. 570.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 8, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has reached me from French sources regarding the situation at Angora:—

2. A conflict is said to be developing between the Kemalist and Unionist sections of the Nationalist groups. Both sections have certain points in common, e.g., aggressive chauvinism, and dislike of Bolshevik principles. Both are at present determined to rely on Bolshevik aid in order to obtain a fulfilment of nationalist aspirations.

3. The Kemalists are, however, believed to be ready to drop the Bolsheviks, if they can obtain satisfaction from the *Entente*. Whereas the Unionists, knowing themselves to be irretrievably compromised with the Allies owing to their war record, desire a

permanent alliance with the Bolsheviks. Enver and Djemal are regarded as hand in glove with the latter, and are in fact, considered to be practically Bolshevik agents.

4. Enver is credited with the determination to supplant Mustapha Kemal as head of the Nationalist group. There are said to be at present at Angora a large and important band of his adherents, who are devoting their efforts to obtaining the direction of affairs on behalf of the Unionists.

5. In this connection there is a report that Bekir Sami's fall is really due to the fact that he was responsible for the arrangement with Great Britain for the exchange of prisoners, whereby an important group of Unionists were released and enabled to return to Angora, where they have reinforced the Unionist movement to supplant Mustapha Kemal. The latter could not openly oppose the release of Turkish prisoners, but was incensed by the folly of Bekir Sami in thus effecting a reinforcement of his opponents, and therefore withdrew from him the support of the Kemalist Party.

6. I have the honour to annex a memorandum by Mr. Ryan giving his views on these questions.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

WHEN the recent crisis in Angora became known here it was generally supposed that it was due to a conflict between moderates of the Bekir Sami type and extremists whose extremism consists in a determination to reject any settlement with the Allies except on the basis of the complete realisation of the National programme as laid down at Erzeroum in September 1919 and in the National Pact subscribed by the Constantinople Deputies in January 1920.

2. For several days past reports have been current that the true inwardness of the crisis was quite different, and that it was the result of a definite attempt on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress to secure control of the National movement and to oust the present leaders, especially Mustapha Kemal. It is alleged that something in the nature of an unsuccessful *coup d'Etat* was organised by the adherents of Enver Pasha, including his uncle Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat Bey. At the same time that these reports reached Mr. Rattigan from French sources a similar version was published in the "Réveil" of the 6th June, a weekly paper published by an Armenian, who probably got his information from the same French sources. My French colleague told me that he personally believed this information, which had come through from Trebizond. I received on the 7th June more or less the same information from a possibly, but not necessarily, independent Turkish source.

3. We still have very little precise information as to what has passed in Angora. There is some little evidence to support the French account. There appears to be little doubt that the Angora Government has held up certain of the released Malta deportees. It is also stated, though this is less certain, that Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat have recently left or been expelled from Angora.

4. It is perfectly certain that Enver has for a long time past been active on lines of his own, and that Mustapha Kemal and the soldiers most intimately associated with him have no desire to be superseded by Enver Pasha and his group. It is, moreover, probable that the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in control of the Nationalist movement, firstly, because he has been much more in their pockets than Mustapha Kemal; secondly, because he is more compromised in the eyes of Europe; and, thirdly, because they probably suspect the Angora leaders of being at heart ready to come to some settlement with the Allies.

5. It would be a mistake, however, to attach undue importance, from our point of view, to the alleged struggle between Unionists and Kemalists. It amounts, so far as its effect on us is concerned, to little more than personal rivalry between two groups, both of which are equally hostile to Great Britain, equally anxious to stir up trouble for us in Mesopotamia, Egypt and India, and equally xenophobic in their general attitude. If a struggle has really taken place, its result has been to leave in the ascendant, not Kemalists who are prepared to sacrifice anything of the National programme for the sake of a settlement with Europe, but Kemalists who stand for the whole of the National programme, and whose attitude towards the British Government

is one of unmitigated hostility. They have shown signs, it is true, of being alarmed by the open dissatisfaction of the French Government at their recent counter-proposals, but they have shown no signs of being willing to give the French real satisfaction. They dislike Bolshevism and mistrust Bolsheviks, but they stand by the Bolshevik Alliance, and, unless I am mistaken, they mean to stand by it unless they can get from the Allies far more favourable terms than have so far been offered or even thought possible.

6. It is possible, though, I admit, not demonstrable, that the Kemalist leaders themselves are exaggerating any recent trouble between them and the old gang of Unionists in order to frighten the Allies with the spectre of an extremism more extreme and, above all, more Boloesque than their own. The advantage of this would be to drive a wedge between us and the French, and to counteract the tendency of recent events to throw the French completely into the arms of Great Britain and throw both together on to the side of the Greeks.

7. The Italians, having served their purpose, count for less and less in Anatolia. They no longer exert any authority, even in the districts temporarily occupied by them. On their own side, however, they are frightened of the situation as a whole, lest the bottom should fall completely out of their policy of securing a strong economic position in Turkey and posing as the one European Power which in Islamic questions is disinterested. To this I attribute the publicity recently given, through Italian channels, to statements that Angora is not really extreme, and that, while determined to eject the Greeks, the Kemalist leaders have no desire to prolong the war a moment longer than is necessary for the realisation of reasonable and legitimate aspirations.

8. Nothing should distract our attention from what are to us the main features of the situation, namely, that the Angora leaders are united in bitter hostility towards Great Britain; that, while anxious to play the French off against us, they have no intention of giving anything away to the French, and that if by their own resources or with Bolshevik aid they defeat the Greeks, their subsequent attitude towards the greater Allies will be one of extreme intransigence over such questions as controls, capitulations, zones of influence and disarmament. It appears to me, personally, that unless we are prepared to yield to their present exigencies and to make the best of their eventual intransigence, it is inevitable that we should join issue with them. If military considerations render this impossible, we must make up our minds to the fact that we have been defeated by Turkish Nationalists. If, on the other hand, we make up our minds to destroy Kemalism, we can only do so by coming to a close understanding with the French regarding common action. This should not be impossible if the French and the Kemalists both maintain their present attitude as regards the Briand-Bekir Sami Agreement. The Italians have committed themselves so much to the Kemalists as against the Allies that the sooner we can eliminate them the better. We should co-operate with the Greeks, but we should make it clear that we are doing so with a view not to consolidate the Greek position in Asia Minor, or even in Eastern Thrace, but to liquidate the Greek occupation of these countries with a minimum of reaction unfavourable to ourselves. We should aim at getting rid of the Greeks without emboldening the Nationalists, and without sacrificing the minorities in the future Turkey. We should aim at destroying Kemalist chauvinism and creating, under the Sultan, a tractable, but not too reduced, Turkey.

[E 6462/1/44]

No. 62.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 1623.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador, in the course of conversation with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 1st instant, said that his Government were becoming anxious as to the general situation in Turkey. Their agreement with Angora was apparently not being confirmed, French prisoners were still in Turkish hands, and the necessity for military measures of defence in Cilicia remained. To his enquiry how His Majesty's Government regarded the situation, Sir Eyre Crowe replied that the position in Constantinople itself undoubtedly caused the British Government much anxiety; the position of the general in command of the small British force was a very delicate one, and was rendered all the more difficult by the persistent refusal of the French Government to consent to that unity of command

in this theatre which had been recognised as so essential in every part of the field during the war.

2. M. le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, bringing together the admitted want of co-operation between French and British agents in the East and the doubts continuing to spread in French public opinion as to British co-operation with France in the West, made an eloquent appeal for a general understanding between the two countries which would set the *Entente* on a proper business footing. He felt sure that at present they were drifting apart, and that, in the existing state of European politics, separation spelt disaster.

3. Sir Eyre Crowe informed his Excellency that he cordially agreed with the view that more genuine co-operation, covering the whole field of foreign policy, ought to be assured, and that he hoped an occasion might be found when next the heads of the two Governments met to probe this question a little more closely. M. le Comte de Saint-Aulaire was very emphatic in declaring that, whilst the chief danger to France lay in the possibility of a powerful Germany starting a war of revenge, the British Empire was mainly vulnerable in the East, where France had no important separate interests, except as regards the maintenance of her position in Syria and the recovery of her financial and industrial interests in Turkey. He could not understand how the pursuit of these modest French aims in the East could in any way embarrass British policy, and he felt sure that all ideas of France pursuing a line that was in any way a hindrance to Great Britain was pure imagination. He, for his own part, would always advocate a close understanding with England, based on France giving every assistance she could to Great Britain in the East, whilst England stood firmly by France on the Rhine.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 6849/143/44]

No. 63.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 1638.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 14, 1921.

HIS Majesty's Government have followed with increasing anxiety the recent developments in the general political situation in the Middle East, culminating in the rejection by the Angora Government of the agreement with France on the subject of Cilicia, the withdrawal of the Italians from Adalia, the open hostility to all British interests proclaimed by the Kemalist Government, its growing intimacy with Moscow, and finally, the imminent reopening of active military operations on the Græco-Turkish front.

2. The situation calls for a fresh review of the political and military problems facing the Allied Governments, which they can only hope to solve satisfactorily by close co-operation between themselves. From such information as has reached His Majesty's Government, they gain the impression that the French Government is equally alive to the dangers confronting the Allies. In these circumstances, they have carefully considered the most appropriate means of meeting the situation so as to form a comprehensive plan of action.

3. In order to gain greater certainty as to the actual numbers, condition and disposal of the Greek forces, the British military attaché at Athens, who is at present at Smyrna, has been directed to furnish a full report based on personal inspection and enquiries, whilst at the same time the Greek Government has been asked to extend special facilities to a British general whom His Majesty's Government propose to despatch from Constantinople direct to the Greek front, charged to make similar investigations for the purpose of furnishing an authoritative report on all relevant factors of the military situation with the minimum of delay.

4. In the interval of time available before those reports are received, it is important to decide on some definite line of policy.

5. Hitherto the attitude of the Allied Governments has been one of professed neutrality between the Greeks and the Kemalists, although we have evidence that the Greeks have not been entirely unsuccessful in drawing arms, ammunition and supplies in certain quantities from Italian, and to some extent even from French, sources. As a result, it is probable that Angora, able freely to obtain arms, supplies and money from Russia, has been placed at a substantial advantage, which may have increased the confidence and truculent spirit of the Kemalist leaders.

[6831]

N

6. His Majesty's Government have no desire to prejudge the prospects of the Greek army, and they are by no means persuaded that it may not still be capable of achieving some decided success. It seems to them unlikely, however, that in its present situation, without moral or material support from the Allies, that army can achieve sufficiently decisive results to impose any lasting peace; and they therefore consider it imperative that the Allies should take into account the alternative situations which may arise and their probable consequences. The alternatives appear to them to be, broadly, two. On the one hand, the Greek army without achieving decisive results, may win some inconclusive, though considerable, success. If this should occur, an opportunity would present itself for negotiating satisfactory terms of peace; but the effect of such a success would not be lasting; the opportunity, if not immediately grasped, would probably pass; and the strain of protracted and inconclusive campaigning would gradually tell upon the Greek troops. On the other hand, the Greek army might be defeated in the near future and driven back. His Majesty's Government see no immediate reason to apprehend such an event; but they are convinced that the Allies should consider the consequences for themselves, should it unfortunately take place. The British military authorities at Constantinople are of opinion that, in the event of a Greek retirement, the Ismid Peninsula could not be held without strong Allied reinforcements against any serious Kemalist advance; that if the Ismid Peninsula were abandoned, Constantinople would be untenable; and that, if and when the Greeks fell back on Smyrna, the straits themselves could only be held temporarily pending a complete evacuation of the Allied troops. It is evident that so great a Turkish success as this would signally enhance Turkish prestige, would strengthen Turkish confidence in Russian support, and would render unattainable any satisfactory settlement in Asia Minor. Such a situation would endanger Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, compelling France and Great Britain either to strengthen their garrisons in these provinces or to abandon them. Thrace would probably become untenable. In other words, a Turkish success would jeopardise every Allied gain in the war and remove all prospects of peaceful reconstruction in the Middle East.

7. His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that some steps are immediately necessary in order to shut out all possibility of such a catastrophe. The solution which they would most desire would be some definitive settlement between the Greeks and the Turks which the Allies could approve and both those parties accept; and they are prepared to make suggestions as to the form which such a settlement might take. Their first aim is naturally towards a solution of that kind, because, while bound by honour and friendship to the Greeks, they desire to maintain a friendly and helpful relation, if that be possible, with the Turks. They are convinced, however, that no negotiations with the Turks can have much chance of success unless both Constantinople and Angora are led to see that the failure of the negotiations will be followed by consequences more serious to themselves than a mere return to the *status quo* of the present moment. With that object, they would wish to discuss at once such measures as may be practicable and desirable in that contingency for strengthening the Greek army with moral and material support; and they would from the outset of the negotiations make it clear to the Turks that the application of such measures of assistance to the Greeks will follow promptly on the failure of the negotiations or a refusal on the Turkish side to negotiate. They consider, moreover, that agreement on such measures is necessary, not only to give the negotiations a reasonable prospect of success, but also as an insurance against their failure and the disastrous consequences which might overtake all Allied interests in the East in the event of a Greek retreat.

8. They suggest therefore that the Allies should at once approach the Greek Government in this sense. They believe it by no means improbable that the Greek Government, when informed of the assurances of help that the Allies would be prepared to give them in the event of the negotiations with the Turks being refused or breaking down, might be prepared to listen to a suggestion from the Allied Governments which would secure to Greece the maintenance of her rights under the Treaty of Sèvres in Europe and in other respects, in return for a solution of the Smyrna problem that would admit of a renewed approach to the Turks with the view of arriving at a pacific settlement of the existing *impasse*. Such a settlement might be on the lines of offering to Turkey the maximum modification, short of complete Turkish sovereignty, and consistent with the safety of the Greek population, of the arrangement respecting Smyrna proposed at the London Conference. This would allow for the creation of an autonomous Turkish province under the protection of the Powers, guarded by a locally recruited gendarmerie under a proportion of Allied officers. All Greek troops would

be withdrawn as soon as the Allied Powers were satisfied that the new force was in a position to carry out its responsibilities, which should include the duty of repelling raids from without as well as maintaining order within.

9. To this proposal, which should go a long way to satisfy the Turkish claims with regard to Smyrna, might be added a number of additional concessions and alleviations, concerning which, if the principle of negotiation be admitted, we shall be prepared to enter into friendly discussions with the French Government and with our other Allies.

10. Further, we should be quite willing to accompany these concessions by a frank and sincere assurance to the Turkish Government that if they showed a reasonable spirit in meeting the Allied Powers the latter would make it a cardinal point of their future policy to assist Turkey in rebuilding the Ottoman State within its new frontiers on a surer foundation.

11. If to an arrangement on these general lines the assent of the Greek Government can be obtained, His Majesty's Government would propose that communications should be entered into with as little delay as possible, in a form to be arranged between the Allied Governments, with the Sultan's Government at Constantinople and with Angora, with a view to an agreement on the lines suggested. The communication would have to be coupled, as already explained, with a clear intimation of the course which the Allied Governments would be compelled to adopt should the extremist party in Turkey refuse to come to terms.

12. The assistance to be offered to the Greeks might, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, take several forms short of actual participation as belligerents. They might, on the one hand, relax the existing restrictions on Greek liberty of action in matters of finance, facilitate the supply to the Greek army of arms, ammunition and supplies and perhaps permit the enrolment of volunteers in the Allied countries. On the other hand, they might, by measures of blockade or otherwise, do their best to cut off supplies reaching the Kemalist forces across the Black Sea or by other maritime approaches.

13. At the same time it would be only just to declare that, should the Angora Government decline the proposed settlement, and should the Greeks, with Allied assistance, be victorious, the terms in regard to the future of Smyrna which they are asked to accept as a feature of the proposed accommodation would no longer be insisted upon by the Allies.

14. It is assumed by His Majesty's Government that, while these negotiations are proceeding, and still more in the event of their failure, the Allied Governments, while not receding from the decisions arrived at in London with regard to a final withdrawal of the Allied forces from Constantinople in favour of a friendly Turkish Government, will regard it as essential to maintain their present military position there. A sudden withdrawal or a diminution of the forces required to safeguard the capital might precipitate the peril which it is desired to avoid and render the negotiations abortive from the start.

15. Such, in general outline, is the plan which suggests itself to His Majesty's Government as the best available means of extricating the Western Powers from the existing anxious position in Turkey and arriving at a settlement which will be honourable to all the parties concerned.

16. His Majesty's Government are particularly desirous to act in these respects in harmony with the French Government, whose broad interests in the East they conceive to be identical with their own, and in close co-operation with whom lies, in their opinion, the best chance of success.

17. You should place yourself at once in communication with M. Briand, in order to acquaint him with the general purport of these proposals, to which you should invite his support. Should he desire a fuller and more intimate discussion of them than is possible either by telegram or despatch, I shall be happy to come to Paris myself, for the purpose of such a conversation, at the earliest date that may be found convenient.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7044/143/44]

No. 64.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 237.)

My Lord,

Athens, June 3, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 212 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo dealing with the resistance which the inhabitants of his district have been offering to the attempts of the authorities to enforce the mobilisation decrees.

As Mr. Knight points out, the Government are now forced officially to admit the failure of the reservists to answer the call, in spite of the assertions which they have hitherto been bold enough to make to the contrary. Contradictory reports continue to appear in the papers; for instance, the "Protevoussa," M. Gounaris's organ, declared a few days ago that only 25 per cent. of the recruits in Crete had joined the colours, but that the percentage in the rest of Greece was "astounding," while other papers stated that the Cretans had responded exceedingly well to the call! For an estimate on the total numbers enrolled please see the military attaché's report enclosed in my despatch No. 230 of the 1st instant.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Vice-Consul Knight to Earl Granville.

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

Volo, May 31, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that considerable interest was aroused by a telegram from Athens, published yesterday in the local press, to the effect that a new official method of dealing with the defaulters from military service was about to be put into operation. In this morning's papers it was announced that an official circular had been addressed to the local military and police authorities in which reference was made to a "considerable number" of such defaulters, who were gravely warned that if they persisted in their present course they would be ineligible for any Government office or public employment, and for voting at parliamentary or municipal elections. Finally the community at large were exhorted to unite in combating the "scourge" of "anypotaxia." It is difficult to believe that such menaces can have been seriously expected to intimidate either the defaulters themselves or their relations and, if this is the "new official method" foreshadowed yesterday, it is safe to predict that its failure will be complete, as far as this district is concerned.

The existence of the "Pelion Division" referred to in the penultimate paragraph of my previous despatch on this subject has been confirmed by subsequent private reports. Its members are said to be increasing in numbers and to amount certainly to several hundred men, although it is impossible to obtain accurate figures. They frequent chiefly the southern slope of the mountain range, and maintain themselves by burning charcoal which they supply to the villagers in return for food, except meat, which they occasionally requisition from the shepherds. This, save for the latter, satisfactory state of affairs is likely to come to an end if the authorities attempt to reduce the "legionaries" by interfering with their supplies, in which case brigandage, from which Mount Pelion has been quite free of late, would probably soon become rife. There have been recent instances of highway robbery in almost every other part of Thessaly, some even finding their way into the newspapers, and all attributable to the determination to evade military service at whatever risk. Large rewards have just been officially offered for the capture of various leading banditti, alive or dead.

There can be little doubt that the people's sympathies are almost entirely with the defaulters, and the recent show of activity on the part of the authorities, while it has met with practically no result, has given rise to serious resentment in the villages. It seems that the soldiery or police billet themselves on the inhabitants, devastate their farmyards and gardens, and make themselves offensive generally. It is related that one such party entered a cottage in Kissos, made an inspection of the chimney, but did not detect through the smoke the son of the house who was in hiding within; and his mother afterwards complained bitterly that they had none the less insisted on her

killing and serving up her fattest pullets, of course without payment, before leaving the dwelling.

The reference, already quoted, to a "considerable number" of defaulters is interesting in that it is, as far as I am aware, the first official admission which has appeared here that all is not well. Hitherto, one has read of nothing but the innumerable throngs of reservists rushing to the colours, full of exuberant enthusiasm and irrepressible ardour.

I have, &c.

W. L. C. KNIGHT.

[E 7021/143/44]

No. 65.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 515. Most Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 20, 1921.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Sir E. Crowe, acting on my instructions, sent a message to the Italian Ambassador on the morning of the 16th instant that he would be glad if his Excellency would call upon him the same afternoon. When the message reached the Italian Embassy the Ambassador had already left on his way to the Foreign Office, as he proposed to call upon Sir E. Crowe for the purpose of making some communications of his own.

2. Sir E. Crowe opened the conversation with M. de Martino by taking up the subject of my projected visit to Paris, and began by confirming what his Excellency had previously been told as to the groundlessness of the reports in the papers that Mr. Vansittart was engaged upon confidential negotiations in Paris. Mr. Vansittart's visit was devoid of any official character: he had gone on leave to deal with entirely private affairs. It was, however, true, as had already been explained to his Excellency the day before, that the Greco-Turkish situation was causing grave anxiety to His Majesty's Government. They had come to the conclusion that some further effort must be made without much more delay towards the re-establishment of peace in the Middle East. If the Supreme Council could have met now, an opportunity would have offered for an exchange of views between the Allied Governments as to the line of policy to be pursued in view of recent developments in Anatolia and at Constantinople; but so far we had not succeeded in bringing about an early meeting of the Supreme Council, and, meanwhile, the situation in the East was assuming a more and more menacing complexion. In these circumstances I had decided, with the authority of the British Government, to proceed to Paris in order to have a frank informal conversation with M. Briand and to arrive, if possible, at a common understanding. I had proposed to M. Briand to start on the 17th and to remain at his disposal the two following days, suggesting at the same time that the Italian representative in Paris should be invited to take part in the conversations. Sir E. Crowe added that I was anxious to give the earliest intimation of my plan to the Italian Government, and begged M. de Martino to telegraph to Count Sforza asking him to authorise Count Bonin to attend the proposed informal discussions in Paris. M. de Martino expressed his warm thanks for this communication, which he promised to telegraph to Rome at once.

3. Sir E. Crowe then spoke to the Ambassador very frankly on the general subject of political co-operation between the British and Italian Governments. He went once more over the ground covered by me in my recent conversation with M. de Martino, and laid stress on the difficulty experienced by me in reconciling the constant assurances of Count Sforza as to his desire for the closest friendly relations with us, with the series of transactions entered into by the Italian Government behind our backs with other Powers, either hostile, or standing in peculiar relations to us. He observed that if the discussions in Paris were, as we hoped, to lead to a fresh effort to bring about an accommodation with the Angora Government, we had to apprehend that the Italian Government, supposed to be tied to us by an "active alliance," would find themselves fettered by the agreement they had made with Mustapha Kemal, under which they undertook to promote a policy diametrically opposed to that which the Allies, including Italy, had agreed upon among themselves and to which they had set their signatures in the Treaty of Sévres. When M. de Martino tried to take exception to stating the case so frankly, Sir E. Crowe asked him to explain how the Italian Government were going to fulfil their engagements with Angora to give their full support to all the demands of the Angora Government

in the discussions with the Allies. M. de Martino admitted that this was a terrible dilemma, and he had no suggestion to offer as to how it could be met, except to suppose that the Italian Government would find a way to be true to the Allies. Sir E. Crowe said that his remark was merely intended as an illustration of the position in which His Majesty's Government found themselves placed owing to the secret arrangements entered into by Italy unbeknown to the Allies.

4. I myself, as M. de Martino must have observed himself, took an equally grave, if not a graver, view of the conclusion by Count Sforza of an agreement with Afghanistan, again behind the back of His Majesty's Government. Coming after the Angora agreement, and after the protest which I had made with regard to that transaction, this repetition of the same objectionable procedure in an equally important matter had come as a great shock, and I was frankly at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could go on protesting their close friendship for and desire to act with us, and at the same time do things of this sort. I, on my part, desired to be perfectly frank in the matter, and earnestly hoped that M. de Martino would explain to Count Sforza as clearly as possible how serious was the view that I took of the situation so produced. I had always been willing to work with Italy, but this was made almost impossible if such things as I complained of continued.

5. M. de Martino made no attempt to defend Count Sforza on either count: he professed to disapprove altogether both the arrangement with Kemal and the Afghan agreement. He added that his own position in the matter was rendered a little difficult by the fact that he was suspected of working against Count Sforza; there was consequently a danger that what he reported from here might be considered at Rome to be coloured by a desire to exaggerate difficulties in order to do Count Sforza harm. For this reason M. de Martino expressed the hope that I would also instruct you to express our views to the Consulta. He declared that he had faithfully reported all that I had told him on Sunday last. He would, after the conversation to-day, telegraph again in the sense of what had been said. Meanwhile, Sir E. Crowe assured him we had not failed to send instructions to you, and he told the Ambassador the substance of Count Sforza's reply to you which you had just telegraphed to us. M. de Martino said he himself had been charged with a reply message, which he proceeded to read, and which was found to be more or less in accord with your message, except that it ended with the suggestion that whilst the Italian Government had no wish to do anything as regard Afghanistan, they hoped we should reciprocally act with them in regard to Albania. In answer to Sir E. Crowe's expression of surprise as to what this meant, M. de Martino explained that there were syndicates of British business men busying themselves with concessions in Albania which filled the Italian Government with suspicions and apprehensions.

6. Sir E. Crowe was entirely unable to admit that there was the remotest analogy between the situation in the two countries, and M. de Martino did not press the point.

7. Sir E. Crowe then raised the point of the alleged assurance received by the Italian Chargé d'Affaires at this Office concerning the attitude of disinterestedness, or rather detachment, which His Majesty's Government were assumed by Count Sforza to have adopted towards the affairs of Afghanistan. M. de Martino said he did not remember at all the particular communication that might have been made to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires, but stated that what Count Sforza undoubtedly relied upon was a telegram which he, M. de Martino, had sent to Rome on the receipt of a written communication from this Office, in reply to an enquiry on his part, enclosing a copy of a White Paper and calling particular attention to a letter appearing in that paper in which Sir Hamilton Grant lays stress on the fact that Afghanistan is now an independent country and has entire freedom as regards both foreign and internal affairs.

8. Sir E. Crowe said that this was no doubt a correct description of the theoretical situation, but it was inconceivable that the Italian Government should not have known that Afghanistan stood in a peculiar relation to the Government of India, and the fact that Count Sforza entered into this agreement without any previous discussion with the British Government, with whom he professes to be so anxious to co-operate on all matters—and, he added, without even informing us afterwards except when *we*, having become acquainted with the matter from other sources, remonstrated with him—seemed to make it clear that he had some reason in coming to this arrangement, of which he preferred that we should know nothing.

9. M. de Martino emphasised Count Sforza's categorical declaration that the agreement had no other object but to promote Italian commercial interests. Sir E. Crowe suggested to M. de Martino that it would take a very powerful magnifying glass to discover the commercial interests of Italy in Afghanistan. Moreover, Count Sforza had admitted in his conversation with you that the mission would have duties not connected with commercial matters, namely, to report on the activities of the Russians and Turks in Afghanistan, although this was described as only an incidental part of their functions. When M. de Martino again assured him that the mission would not be composed of diplomats, but of the agents of Italian commercial houses and banks, Sir E. Crowe said that, if the Ambassador would not mind his making a very frank statement, he would call his attention to the fact, which had been mentioned to his Excellency on more than one occasion, that we had no reason to trust the proceedings of the agents of Italian banks in the East, whom, unfortunately, we found engaged everywhere in the most pernicious anti-British propaganda. He could only say that the idea of having the Banco di Roma and their agents established in Kabul was not a matter upon which British interests were to be congratulated.

10. M. de Martino assured Sir E. Crowe that he was deeply impressed with the necessity of putting an end to the feeling which he could quite understand had been created here by these and other incidents. He was quite determined to do all in his power to get the relations of the two countries back on a footing of harmony and hearty co-operation. He asked what, as regards the Afghan Treaty, had better be done. Sir E. Crowe replied that, while he had not seen the text of the treaty, he gathered that one of its main features was the promise to send an Italian mission to Kabul. He did not know whether anything was stipulated as to the date on which this mission was to proceed: he thought the Italian Government would be wise if they prevented that mission from starting. It ought not to be difficult, he thought, for them to find reasons, first for delay, and perhaps later for the total abandonment of the mission. In any case, he thought His Majesty's Government would expect to be further consulted before that mission actually proceeded on its way.

11. M. de Martino took everything that was said in very good part, and repeated his promise to make it clear how unfortunate was the impression created here by the Italian proceedings.

12. Sir E. Crowe then took the occasion to refer also to the visit of the Italian man-of-war to Alexandria. On this subject M. de Martino was ready with an explanation and handed him a short note, according to which the fault for this particular incident lay with the Italian representative at Cairo. According to a report now received from the latter, he had not understood from Lord Allenby, when he saw him, that there was any objection to the visit of an Italian ship, and he had consequently not at the time made any report to Rome at all, so that the Italian naval authorities were in complete ignorance of the objection which had been raised by His Majesty's representative. Now that the Italian Government were aware of our views, they will be quite prepared, if we desire it, to recall the ship. Sir E. Crowe said they had better recall it at once, and M. de Martino said he would immediately telegraph, but he had no doubt it would be done.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7168/143/44]

No. 66.

M. Rizo-Rangabi to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 22.)

My Lord,

Greek Legation, London, June 22, 1921.

A COMPREHENSIVE memorandum, the elements of which have just reached me, I shall have the honour to submit to your Lordship as soon as the same is decoded. Meanwhile I have just received an urgent telegram from the Prime Minister, M. Gounaris, from Smyrna. M. Gounaris informs me that he considers the present juncture so pressing that it precludes every delay on the issues at stake, that it demands that an exhaustive survey of the actual situation should be placed before the British Government and that an exchange of views between your Lordship and himself is necessary for the adequate safeguard of the national and European interests held in trust by the Greek army for the pacification of the East and settlement of the questions involved.

Although, for the above reasons, M. Gounaris is convinced of the necessity of such an exchange of views, before taking any decision he has directed me confidentially to enquire of your Lordship whether the British Government would consider it opportune. In such a case M. Gounaris proposes immediately to start for London, accompanied by M. Baltazzi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

A. RIZO-RANGABÉ.

[E 7154/143/44]

No. 67.

Conferences between M. Briand and Lord Curzon, June 18 and 19, 1921.

JUNE 18, 10:30 A.M.

AT 10:30 Lord Curzon, accompanied by Sir Horace Rumbold, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Osborne, met M. Briand and M. Berthelot in the former's room at the Quai d'Orsay.

Lord Curzon reviewed the whole situation since the London Conference, giving M. Briand the most recent information in the possession of His Majesty's Government relative to conditions in Greece and Turkey, and examined the possibilities inherent in a resumption of hostilities.

He pointed out that the moment was opportune for a renewal of Allied mediation, and then discussed the terms on which the Allies should base their proposals. These were briefly an extension of the London proposals regarding Smyrna, demilitarisation of that part of Eastern Thrace beyond the Chatalja line, possible further modification of financial control, a general assurance of support to a reconstituted Turkey, a possible suggestion to the Turks that the Allies would see no objection to Turkish expansion in the Caucasus, the abolition or modification of the tripartite agreement, and the other concessions contained in the London proposals.

With regard to Smyrna, he would propose an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty, administered by a Christian Governor with the assistance of a mixed gendarmerie under European officers. Greek troops to be withdrawn as soon as the gendarmerie could ensure security in the province.

With regard to Thrace, he pointed out the obstacles to the Enos-Media line, and suggested, as alternative concessions to Turkish demands, the enforcement of the provisions regarding Adrianople contained in the Minorities Treaty between Greece and the Allies, and the demilitarisation of part of the Chatalja line.

His proposal would be to submit a solution on these lines to the Greeks, and if they accepted it, to open negotiations on this basis at Constantinople and Angora. Were the Greeks to refuse, the matter would of course be at an end. The communication to the Turks would be accompanied by an intimation that a refusal would involve the withdrawal of all the concessions contained in the present offer and in the London proposals, as well as possible assistance to the Greeks in the form of a relaxation of financial restrictions, a removal of the embargo on the export of munitions of war, and possibly a blockade of Black Sea and Mediterranean ports of Asia Minor.

He pointed out that unity of action among the Allies was an essential condition of success, but that, given loyal co-operation, the omens were favourable.

Finally, he asked that the French Government should agree to the assumption by General Harington of supreme command at Constantinople, a stipulation which would have considerable effect on the Turks.

JUNE 18, 3 P.M.

Lord Hardinge joined the Conference.

M. Briand thanked Lord Curzon for his very complete review of the situation, and expressed his entire agreement in the proposal for mediation.

French information was to the effect that the Greek army was better organised, but was tired of fighting, and that the Nationalists were apprehensive and anxious for a settlement. There was therefore a tendency for peace on both sides, and the moment for mediation was opportune. Failure of Allied mediation would, however, render the situation worse than before.

As to Smyrna, he thought it possible to satisfy the Turks on the lines proposed.

The port of Smyrna was suffering from military occupation, and therefore commercially of no great value in present conditions. This was realised in Greece, but Greek *amour-propre* had to be safeguarded. Though King Constantine might wish to, he could hardly leave Smyrna while the offensive was pending, although his alleged ill-health was perhaps designed to meet this difficulty. There were also political difficulties at Athens, but acceptance by the Greeks would really depend on their confidence in impending hostilities.

As regards Thrace, M. Briand pointed out that it was the interest of the Allies to effect the transference of the Government from Angora to Constantinople, in which place the Turkish Government could be more readily controlled. But the Nationalists would refuse to come to Constantinople as long as the Greeks threatened its suburbs. The treaty solution of the question was both geographically and ethnically illogical. He would therefore suggest the creation of an international zone in Thrace under an international gendarmerie. He was in favour of the early evacuation of Constantinople.

With regard to finance, in which French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities.

The Turks, he said, regarded the "zones of influence" of the tripartite agreement as the worst encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, but might be prepared to give freely all the concessions desired. M. Briand would be willing, on behalf of France, to renounce the tripartite agreement, and thought it might be possible to induce Italy to do the same once her economic interests were secured in some other manner.

He was opposed to accompanying the submission of the Allied proposals to the Turks by threats, as he feared this would endanger acceptance.

Lastly, he said, the French Government were in entire agreement with the general proposals of His Majesty's Government, and had in fact been about to make a similar proposal for mediation.

Lord Curzon welcomed this evidence of Franco-British unanimity, and hoped that Italian adherence could be obtained.

With regard to Thrace, any proposal to modify the treaty had lapsed when the scheme for a commission of enquiry was abandoned in London. M. Briand had not referred to his own proposal, but had suggested instead an autonomous Thrace. This His Majesty's Government could not accept. Moreover, it would be useless to offer mediation at Athens on condition of the abandonment of Thrace as well as Smyrna.

With regard to threats, he pointed out that M. Briand was under a misapprehension if he thought it was proposed to threaten the Greeks in any way; so far from threatening them, it was intended to offer them help in the future should the Turks refuse our proposals. It would, however, be necessary, while offering such great concessions to Turkey, to have a threat in readiness in the event of refusal, and he knew, from his experience of the East, that a stick behind the back was very useful in dealing with Orientals.

With regard to procedure, M. Briand had suggested simultaneous action at Athens, Constantinople and Angora. He pointed out that it was essential to approach the Greeks first, for otherwise they would say that the Allies had trapped them.

With regard to finance, he welcomed M. Briand's offer of further modifications.

He strongly welcomed the generosity and statesmanship displayed by M. Briand in assenting to the abrogation of the tripartite agreement, and he counted on French co-operation at Rome. M. Briand had said nothing as to the plans for approaching the Turks, but he gratefully accepted his offer of united action in the proposed negotiations.

Further, M. Briand had said nothing in regard to the command at Constantinople; he must emphasise this point, as it was of the utmost importance as a demonstration of Allied unity.

M. Briand in reply said that he agreed to offering mediation first at Athens and subsequently approaching the Turks. He was ready to endeavour to secure Italian aims under the tripartite agreement by other methods, as, for example, a Turkish offer of free concessions.

He enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not, on their part, meet the Turkish demands in regard to Mesopotamia.

Lord Curzon said that he was ignorant of these demands, and that he considered it preferable not to raise the question of mandated territories. There was a further

difficulty, in that Mesopotamia was now dealt with by the Colonial Office and not by the Foreign Office. He would, however, be interested to know what it was that the Turks had asked.

M. Briand replied that he could not enlighten him on this point, as he had refused to discuss the matter with *Bekir Sami*.

With regard to the tripartite agreement, it was necessary to find a new formula, for the Italians would be ready to yield the letter but not the substance of the agreement.

With regard to the Constantinople command, he said that French opinion was insistent that the French position in Turkey should be safeguarded, but he had no doubt that the matter could be resolved at once.

M. Berthelot said that the Italians would resist unless some guarantees were provided, such as possibly an undertaking by Great Britain and France not to seek concessions in the Italian zone.

Lord Curzon said he understood *M. Berthelot* to propose replacing the Allied agreement by an undertaking as between gentlemen, a suggestion in which he concurred.

There followed some further discussion of the question of command.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the obligations of the Allies to protect the Christian minorities under the tripartite agreement could not be ignored, and that the advantages conferred thereby were inseparable from the responsibilities it imposed.

M. Briand agreed, but pointed out that it was impossible to protect the Armenians everywhere.

Lord Curzon reiterated the views of His Majesty's Government relative to the protection of minorities.

Further discussion ensued about the tripartite agreement. *M. Briand* pointed out that should this prove to be the sole obstacle to peace Italy's refusal could not be maintained.

Lord Curzon thought that the situation was rendered easier by the fact that the agreement had never been ratified.

He then asked whether *M. Briand* would examine his proposal relative to Thrace, since His Majesty's Government could not go beyond it.

M. Briand thought that it would not satisfy the Turks, and suggested a return to the Commission of Enquiry originally suggested in London.

Lord Curzon said this would ensure failure at Athens.

M. Briand thought the Greeks would accept if they really wanted peace, but agreed that the final form of the Thracian solution could only be arrived at when the negotiations had begun.

Lord Curzon asked what the French Government would say if the Greeks demanded the recognition of King Constantine as the price of their acceptance.

M. Briand did not believe they would do so, but added that in no case could the French acknowledge King Constantine.

JUNE 18, 5 P.M.

The Italian Ambassador, Signor Galli and *M. Kammerer* were also present.

M. Briand explained the general proposals to the Italian Ambassador, but suggested a revival of the plan for Commission of Enquiry for Thrace should *Lord Curzon's* proposal be refused.

The Italian Ambassador agreed to the proposal as regards Smyrna and to a Commission for Thrace.

Lord Curzon supplemented *M. Briand's* explanation. He pointed out that if the Greeks refused at the start, nothing more could be done, and the responsibility would rest on them. His Majesty's Government could not, he said, go further than the demilitarisation of a zone beyond Chatalja. With regard to action at Athens he proposed drafting a preliminary invitation; the actual proposals would only be submitted at a further stage.

The Italian Ambassador explained that he was not empowered to accept anything, but would immediately consult his Government. He must, however, make the fullest reservations as to the abrogation or modification of the tripartite agreement.

M. Briand explained to him at some length that it was intended to safeguard all Italian rights under the agreement.

Lord Curzon pointed out that His Majesty's Government must insist on the maintenance of responsibility for the Christian minorities.

Lord Curzon then raised the question of procedure at Athens and Constantinople, and discussed how far the Allies should recognise the duality between Constantinople and Angora. It might be found desirable for each of the Allies to send a representative to the latter place, but he emphasised the supreme importance of all three Governments acting together and conducting negotiations in common, and he referred to and condemned the French and Italian separate agreements with the Nationalists. If an agreement were arrived at it might be by the three Powers acting together and signing a single document, not by each Power seeking to obtain a separate agreement and special advantages for itself. He also insisted that the offer to Turkey should be accompanied by an intimation of penalties for refusal.

M. Briand did not agree, as he considered that the Allied stick was not big enough to be effective and would only irritate the Turkish extremists. If any threats were to be made, he would prefer to threaten both sides, but, in the circumstances, he would abstain from threatening either party at the beginning.

Lord Curzon repeated that there was no case for threatening the Greeks, but that the British Government feared that concessions to the Turks would be fruitless unless accompanied by a threat.

M. Briand said that the French nation would not tolerate a conflict with the Turks by an anti-Turkish or pro-Greek *geste*.

Lord Curzon said that British opinion was equally opposed to going to war. But if the Turks refused the concessions offered to them, these must automatically lapse.

M. Briand agreed. He added that the psychological moment had arrived for mediation, since both sides were in a difficult situation. It was the duty of the Allies to do what they could, and he personally believed they would succeed. He enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not approach the Soviet Government with a view to cutting off this source of supply to the Turks. The threat involved in this procedure would have a great effect on Turkish extremists.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Nationalists had a treaty with Moscow and were in closest possible touch with them. The object of the Allies was to detach the Turks from Moscow. His Majesty's Government were prepared to promise all possible assistance to the Turkey of the future if mediation were accepted. He doubted, however, whether it would be of the slightest use to approach the Soviets.

The Italian Ambassador was of like opinion.

The meeting then broke up.

JUNE 19, 10:30 A.M.

Present :

<i>M. Briand.</i>	<i>Lord Curzon.</i>	Italian Ambassador.
<i>M. Berthelot.</i>	<i>Lord Hardinge.</i>	Signor Galli.
<i>M. Kammerer.</i>	Sir H. Rumbold.	
	Mr. Vansittart.	
	Mr. Osborne.	

Lord Curzon read the draft telegram to Athens which he had prepared, and gave a copy to *M. Briand* and the Italian Ambassador, both of whom expressed themselves as delighted with its terms. The latter undertook to submit it immediately to his Government.

M. Briand enquired whether the telegram should be despatched before the three Governments had agreed on the exact terms to be submitted to the Greeks and Turks.

Lord Curzon thought the telegram should be sent at once, but stated his readiness to proceed to the immediate settlement of the proposed terms of settlement.

M. Briand said that he could not accept all Lord Curzon's proposed terms without consulting his Government; he agreed as to Smyrna, but not as to Thrace.

Lord Curzon said he could not go beyond what he had suggested yesterday, i.e., the arrangement in regard to Adrianople, guarantees for the Moslems in Thrace, and demilitarisation. But he was not prepared to accept either autonomy or a commission of enquiry; the latter had been refused by the Greeks, and we could not now impose it.

M. Briand said that the success of mediation depended on meeting the Turkish demands. The commission of enquiry had, he added, been accepted in principle in London.

Lord Curzon replied that this was a question of fact. The proposal for the commissions had been refused and had therefore lapsed, and other proposals had been devised in its place. The Allies were in no way committed to a commission. At this stage it was necessary to settle not the ultimate basis of peace, but the conditions on which Greece would commit her case to the Allies. She would refuse to give up Thrace. If, at a later stage, the Turks raised the question of Thrace it could then be considered, but meanwhile we could wait until they did so.

M. Briand assented, as it was only a question of procedure.

The Italian Ambassador said that it was very undesirable to give the Greeks the impression that they had Allied support on the question of Thrace.

M. Berthelot pointed out that a settlement of Thrace might ultimately be arranged between the Greeks and the Turks, and the presentation of our proposals to the Turks did not prevent us from modifying or adding to our conditions at a later date.

Lord Curzon agreed. If the Greeks asked about Thrace we should refer them to our proposal for demilitarisation. If the Turks refused to accept our terms without the inclusion of Thrace we could discuss the matter further. But let us open the first door before worrying about what might be behind the second.

M. Briand said that the question of Thrace was therefore reserved.

Lord Curzon asked the Italian Ambassador whether it was necessary to await a reply to his first telegram to Rome before sending off the telegram to Athens. His Excellency replied that it was necessary to await the Italian agreement on principle, but he expected a reply this evening.

Lord Curzon read to the meeting a telegram from the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, saying that the Greek offensive was suspended.

M. Briand observed: "L'offensive est suspendue à nos lèvres."

Lord Curzon raised the question of Bekir Samy's visit to Rome and his alleged mission to the French and Italian Governments.

M. Briand said that the visit was entirely unofficial, and might be intended to delay final decision. But he looked to a union of the Constantinople Cabinet, under Izzet Pasha, with the Nationalist moderates, including Mustapha Kemal, a combination with which we could come to an agreement.

The question of the Constantinople command was then discussed, and M. Briand accepted the formula arrived at before the meeting.

The Italian Ambassador said he must obtain his Government's concurrence.

M. Berthelot said it would be easy to satisfy the Italians on the question of minor appointments.

M. Briand thought it would be desirable not to make a public advertisement of General Harington's assumption of command lest it should be interpreted as a threat, and so endanger the negotiations.

Further discussion followed as to the best means of securing to Italy the substance of her advantages under the tripartite agreement. The Italian Ambassador said it was of vital importance to Italy, as it represented the sole Asiatic fruits of her victory.

M. Briand referred to the Turkish susceptibilities as to the encroachments on their sovereignty, and to their readiness to give the concessions involved. He added that question was not an urgent one, and suggested that this concession be left until the Turks demand it.

The Italian Ambassador repeated his reserves.

M. Berthelot said that the assumption of command at Constantinople must not be too formal; the necessary orders would be sent to General Charpy.

Lord Curzon said that the important thing was that it should come into force at once.

Lord Curzon said that we were telegraphing to Athens. What was the next step? The Greek Government would either refuse or ask what were our conditions. In the latter case we should have the conditions ready. He therefore offered to prepare a draft reply to the Greek enquiry for later discussion with the two Governments.

M. Briand gladly agreed to this proposal.

Lord Curzon said there was no advantage in discussing the terms further at present, since no reply to the first telegram would in all probability be received from Athens for a week after its despatch, and the terms of the second telegram must necessarily depend upon the answer to the first.

The Italian Ambassador said it would be better to forward the second draft direct to Rome from London. Lord Curzon agreed.

Lord Curzon asked a further question as to the alleged missions of M. Franklin-Bouillon and Signor Tuozi to Angora. M. Briand replied that M. Bouillon had no mission from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report upon the situation. Count Bonin informed Lord Curzon that Signor Tuozi had been stopped by the Italian Government at Rhodes.

Appendix I.

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received June 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Following from Lord Curzon:—

Paris, June 20, 1921.

"Please inform the Prime Minister that I have found M. Briand very well-disposed towards renewal of mediation, for which he thinks psychological moment has arrived. I gave him all the information in our possession and read to him Colonel Nairne's telegrams. French information is to the effect that both Greeks and Nationalists will welcome a solution of their present difficulties which they can accept without loss of *amour-propre*.

"Following procedure has been adopted: A telegram drafted by me and accepted by M. Briand and by the Italian Ambassador, after consultation with his Government, is being despatched to Athens to-night instructing Allied representatives there to address a joint invitation to Greek Government to accept mediation and place themselves in our hands (see my telegram No. 389).

"If they agree, we shall submit to the Greeks, and, in the event of Greeks' acceptance, then to the Turks, the terms based on Chequers' programme, upon which, after prolonged discussion, we have found ourselves in general agreement here.

"I have also persuaded M. Briand to agree to suspend tripartite agreement in its present form, though on this point we shall have more difficulty with Italians.

"I have throughout insisted upon united action, whether at Athens, Angora or Constantinople, and have deprecated recourse to independent or clandestine negotiations conducted by any of the Allies.

"Whether result be favourable or the reverse, at least the first step has thus been taken towards a possible reconciliation."

Appendix II.

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 389.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Following from Lord Curzon:—

Paris, June 19, 1921.

"The Allied Governments, after consultation together, have decided to offer their good offices with a view to averting a renewal of hostilities in the Near East and to securing an honourable and lasting peace. They are profoundly convinced that, whatever be the immediate result of renewal of conflict between Greek and Turkish forces in Asia Minor, there are not to be found therein the prospects either of any enduring pacification of the East or of a solution compatible with the real interests and ultimate capacities of either party. The belligerents themselves will possibly not dissent from Allied Governments in this definition of the objects which they should hold in view, and any result which fails to attain them, even if it brings a temporary advantage to one or other party, will be stamped with ultimate failure. In the circumstances, Allied Governments feel that they are only discharging an international duty, as well as an obligation of friendship, if they inform Greek Government at this critical juncture, before hostilities are reopened, that, if Hellenic Government is disposed to place its interests in their hands, they are prepared to attempt task of conciliation. Should Greek Government decide that they are not prepared to accept outside intervention or advice, the Allied Powers cannot persevere in an action which would obviously be fruitless. In such a case the responsibility for consequences of renewed struggle will rest exclusively on Greeks themselves.

"On the other hand, should Hellenic Government decide, in its own interests, to accept intervention of the Powers, the latter will be prepared to state frankly to Greek Government the terms upon which their assistance will be proffered, and, in the event of these being accepted, to approach Turkish Government with a view to immediate suspension of hostilities and to negotiations for conclusion of peace.

"An identic telegram is being sent to your colleagues at Athens, and you should immediately join with them in making this proposal to Greek Government and in inviting from them a prompt reply."

(Sent to Athens, No. 1; repeated to Foreign Office, Rome and Constantinople.)

Appendix III.

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received June 19.)

(No. 386.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Following from Lord Curzon for Sir E. Crowe:—

Paris, June 19, 1921.

"Agreement was reached this morning with French by which General Harington will assume immediate command of Allied troops in Constantinople, necessary instructions being sent by French Government to General Charpy.

"It was further agreed that military commission should supervise three sub-commissions—

- "1. Sub-commission of control, presided over by an Italian officer.
- "2. Sub-commission of gendarmerie, presided over by a French officer.
- "3. Sub-commission of 'special elements,' presided over by a British officer.

"It also agreed that post of permanent secretary-general of financial commission should be attributed to a Frenchman and post of inspector-general of customs to a British official; a third analogous post will probably be devised for an Italian in order to maintain the principle of equal distribution.

"The Italian Ambassador here was unable to accept above arrangement without instructions from Rome, but is submitting them immediately to his Government, and I do not apprehend any difficulty on their part.

"Please inform War Office."

(Repeated to Rome and Constantinople.)

[E 7222/143/44]

No. 68.

M. Rizo-Rangabé to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 24.)

My Lord,

Greek Legation, London, June 23, 1921.

REFERRING to my letter of yesterday's date, I now have the honour, in conformity with the instructions of my Government, to submit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum, despatched to me from Smyrna on the 20th instant. The memorandum, drawn up by the Prime Minister, M. Gounaris, after a complete survey of the situation in the Near East, embodies, with the full concurrence of His Majesty the King, the definite conceptions arrived at by the Royal Government concerning the political and military aspects of this situation as it now presents itself.

I have, &c.

A. RIZO-RANGABÉ.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Memorandum.

AT the moment of the resumption by Greece of military operations in Asia Minor, the Greek Government feels itself in duty bound to place before the British Government the fundamental causes of the struggle being undertaken by the Greek people. The Greek representatives at the London Conference did not fail confidentially to give proof to the British Government of their conciliatory spirit, which was prompted by their earnest desire to secure definite peace without further sacrifices. The Greek Government is convinced that the British Government was well aware that this attitude did not emanate from any doubt as to the ability of Greece to bring this conflict to a victorious issue. Unhappily, a similar spirit of conciliation did not prevail with Angora. Intoxicated as a result of the agreements entered into with France and Italy, the Turkish representatives did not even consider worthy of answer the proposals made to them by the conference, notwithstanding that these proposals offered in their favour modifications of essential points in the Treaty of Sèvres.

It is well known that the hostile concentrations observed, and the fear of reinforcement of the Kemalist lines opposed to the Greek army by troops drawn from the Turkish forces in Cilicia, made it incumbent upon the Greek Government, on the ground that the security of the Greek army was menaced, to decide on the offensive which took place on the 23rd March.

The offensive revealed how well founded were the apprehensions of the Greek army command as to the enemy reinforcements, which made their appearance when the armies came into collision, it being moreover demonstrated that they were in even greater numbers than had been anticipated. Notwithstanding complete success on the southern front, which resulted in the seizure of the railway from Ouchak to 50 kilom. beyond Kara-Hissar, on the northern front of Broussa the Greek army encountered before Eski-Sheir an unexpected enemy concentration which disposed not only of men greatly superior in number to those formerly present, but also of a far stronger artillery both in number of guns and heavier calibre, the latter, obviously, being available as the result of surreptitious raids on inter-Allied munition depots.

Fighting with incomparable gallantry, the Greek army occupied, one after the other, the very strongly fortified enemy defences; but, because of the losses sustained by the Greek forces owing to the sudden appearance of the heavy artillery, the general in command was compelled to order a postponement of the operations in order to resume them after fuller preparations. In the face of reports spread abroad in the European press, the Greek Government deems it necessary to emphasise the fact that, confronted with these conditions, the Greek army halted the attack on its own initiative. The enemy did not even dare to leave his trenches, and made not the slightest attempt to interfere with the return of the Greek troops to their original positions. And when, after the suspension of our operations on the northern front, the enemy attempted a supreme effort to achieve some kind of success, concentrating nearly all his available forces from Eski-Sheir and launching an attack near Toulou-Bounar against our southern army, he met with complete failure, being repulsed with heavy losses.

From the operations of March, however, one fact stood out clearly, and that was that the enemy had assumed a new character quite different from the one he had shown

up to that time. Instead of undisciplined hordes fighting with indifferent war material, the Greek army now found itself confronted with an organised military force possessed of efficient war material, including guns, even to weapons of heavy calibre.

This new phase of the war, revealed for the first time by the March operations, placed the Greek Government under the necessity of providing measures to reinforce and strengthen the Greek army in such a way as to allow no doubt as to its fighting superiority in every respect over the enemy as he now appeared.

The Greek Government did not hesitate for one moment to prosecute this course, in full consciousness that in doing so it was realising the irrevocable determination of the whole Greek people, unanimous that, with its own forces, its will should be imposed on the enemy in Asia Minor. This conception of the Government tallied absolutely with the facts; for the Greek people willingly and enthusiastically proffered themselves for the provision of men for the reinforcement of the army and of financial means necessary to carry out the struggle. The National Assembly unanimously voted a loan of 625,000,000 drachmae, the entire Greek people applauding this decision. The recruits of the seven classes called to the colours far exceeded in number those who had responded to any previous summons to the ranks. Of the three classes first called, it was forecast on the results of previous calls that the number who would present themselves would amount from 40,000 to 45,000, which estimate was communicated to the British Government last March. As a matter of fact, on this occasion 53,000 men came forward to join their units.

Of the four classes called up subsequently, two of which classes were of older men and consequently considerably reduced in number, 58,000 rallied to the colours instead of the 45,000 as had been estimated.

The above facts prove in a way beyond all doubts that the Greek Government has judged accurately when it based its action on the conviction that this its policy, serving the paramount and vital interests of Greece, justifying every sacrifice, responds to the deeply-rooted conscientiousness of the whole of the Greek people, a conscientiousness which has manifested itself in the most eloquent way by the willingness with which the entire nation has offered its blood and treasure to carry out the struggle. It was impossible for the Greek people to conceive this policy in a different light from that in which the Government viewed it.

In the most deeply cherished and sacred memories of the Greek nation an historical past, extending over many centuries, replete with glory and an unapproached civilisation, links the lands in which this conflict is, being carried out to-day for the future of the Greek race, which for thirty centuries and more has preserved, and still preserves, its superiority in every respect over every race which has migrated from Asia. It needs but a glance at the map to convince anyone, and especially every Greek conscious of the destiny of his race, that Hellenism needs this naturally-formed geographical unit of the shores, European and Asiatic, of the Aegean Sea, with the islands therein, in which to thrive and develop freely so as to fulfil its mission—a mission to stand as a bulwark affording security to Europe against dangers from Asia, which dangers, owing to her geographical position, Greece is the first to sustain, and to form a bridge linking the two continents for the common benefit of a civilisation uniform on both shores.

Inspired by these convictions springing from the national soul, the Greek people accepts with an unshakable determination the policy which is being pursued to-day by the Greek Government, a policy which it does not regard as a chance episode in Greek history, nor as an accidental occurrence into which it was thrust by the circumstances of the world war, but as the fulfilment of an historical necessity in the direction towards which the Greek people has always felt an irresistible propulsion, arising both from the impressive memories of the past and the imperious necessities of the present and future. In pursuit of such a policy, which so plainly and so inalienably corresponds with eternal Greek interests—if the use of such a word as "eternal" is permissible when speaking of human affairs—the Greek Government is at the same time fully conscious that, representing on this point also the conviction of the people, this policy does not conflict with wider issues relevant to the new international status now being created. To the contrary, it contributes strongly to the realisation of aims which are of paramount importance to the said status, in which comes first and foremost the aim of establishing a real and lasting peace in the East, which is impossible without rescue of the territory concerned from the intolerable Turkish administration.

Moreover, the existence of important interests to Great Britain in the satisfactory settlement of the regions in question does not escape the attention of either the Greek Government or people, and as these interests coincide as regards their general direction and their particular bearing in these regions with the interests of civilisation in general,

the Greek Government considers the policy it is pursuing with the assent of the Greek people is serving a purpose of general beneficent utility.

Since the establishment of the Greek Kingdom this concurrence of the wider British interests with their own has been recognised by the Greek people and their political leaders, and that is why Greece has always regarded England as the one Great Power which, not only for her sincere liberal spirit, but also because of this concatenation of interests, was the one called upon to proffer her support for the liberation of Hellenism from foreign domination. In each of the many instances when this assistance has been forthcoming it has been recognised instinctively by the Greek national conscience as a fresh manifestation of this twofold motive of liberal spirit and common interest, encouraging the hope of co-operation with England. This is also one of the deep and fixed conceptions of the Greek people which all Hellenic Governments have followed. No less was this principle maintained by those Governments which were, nevertheless, represented by political opponents, for reasons of internal politics, as being in opposition to the will of the Greek people. The present Government is also permeated with this same policy.

Great Britain, being, as a matter of course, above all other great and small Powers interested in the security of the freedom of the Straits and the free use of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, cannot but recognise as the faithful and sincere guardian of this freedom Greece, who, also in her own interests, is determined to fulfil this mission, and is capable with her own resources to carry it out.

At this moment when Greece, with her whole heart and soul, enters the arena ready to sustain heavy sacrifices, the Greek Government deems itself in duty bound to manifest to the British nation the deep consciousness which inspires the Government and people, and the hope which the Greek people nurtures in its bosom that England also shares these views as set forth above—a hope that supports Greece in the struggle she is now undertaking.

At the last conference in London the Greek delegates made it clear to the British Government that they were inspired by these conceptions, freely and sincerely expounding in confidence to the British Government their thoughts and opinions, and listening willingly to any suggestions put forward by the British Government. And now when the resumption of the struggle in Asia Minor is imminent, assuming a new shape and with forces considerably increased, the Greek Government again deems itself in duty bound to interpret to the British Government these views common to the Greek people. The Government reiterates its willingness to hear and consider with the warmest interest any suggestion made by the British Government tending to adapt the situation, which will shape itself out of the struggle into which Greece is entering at the imperative dictates of the interests and rights of the Greek nation, to the policy expounded in this memorandum. Such is the policy guiding the Greek Government as the agent of the will of the Greek people in this struggle.

Smyrna, June 20, 1921.

[E 7168/143/44]

No. 69.

Earl Curzon to M. Rizo-Rangabé.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22nd June, in which you inform me that M. Gounaris is anxious to discuss the present situation with me and is prepared to start for London at once, accompanied by M. Baltazzi, should his proposal be considered opportune.

2. In reply I have the honour to inform you that, much as I appreciate M. Gounaris's offer, I am of opinion that it would be preferable that the Greek Government should formulate and forward their considered reply to the Allied proposals recently submitted to them rather than that individual Ministers should put themselves to the trouble of leaving Athens at the present moment in order to deliver the reply in person.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7222/143/44]

No. 70.

Earl Curzon to M. Rizo-Rangabé.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 23rd June enclosing a memorandum prepared by M. Gounaris embodying the views of the Greek Government regarding the Near Eastern situation.

2. While I am unable to agree with all the contentions therein advanced, I welcome the expression of the Greek Government's willingness to hear and consider any suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government. This offer is peculiarly opportune at a moment when the Allied representatives at Athens have invited the Greek Government to accept their mediation, and it encourages me to hope for an early and favourable reply.

3. His Majesty's Government are at one with the Greek Government in desiring to achieve a real and lasting peace in the East, and it is their sincere hope and belief that this object can be attained by mediation, and that further hostilities with all the consequent sacrifices can thereby be avoided.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 6934/531/44]

No. 71.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris.)^a

(No. 1760.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 29, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1396 of the 20th May and to your despatch No. 1776 of the 16th June, I transmit to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a note from the Norwegian Minister here regarding the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres relating to the levying of dues on vessels passing through the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, together with the draft of a note in reply thereto and to the identic notes received from the Swedish, Danish and Netherlands Ministers here, which has been prepared by His Majesty's Government.

2. I request that you will communicate this draft to the French Government and enquire whether they concur in its terms or wish to suggest any amendments. If they concur, His Majesty's Government would propose that identic notes in the terms of the draft should forthwith be addressed to the four neutral Governments by the Governments of the three principal Allies.

3. Your Excellency should further enquire whether the French Government also share the view of His Majesty's Government that the above draft may be regarded as a sufficient answer to the identic notes on the same subject addressed by the four neutral Governments to the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris on the 2nd May and circulated by the Conference secretariat on the 9th May. The latter notes asked for information regarding the nature of the taxes to be raised by the Straits Commission.

4. The Italian Government are being similarly consulted through His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

Note from the Norwegian Legation.

LES articles 37 à 61 du Traité de Paix de Sèvres, signé le 10 août 1920, créent une Commission des Détroits qui, entre autres, aura aussi la faculté de percevoir des droits de navigation.

Il s'agit dans ces articles de l'institution, sur un terrain géographiquement exactement délimité, d'une Commission internationale, ayant son propre pavillon et une organisation autonome, avec un cadre de fonctionnaires, un corps de police et des attributions étendues.

^a Also to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome), No. 537, *mutatis mutandis*.

Les articles 45, 53 et 54 du traité en question prescrivent que les frais occasionnés par la création de cette commission seront payés en dernier ressort par les navires utilisant les détroits, sur un pied de parfaite égalité, sans aucune distinction.

Il résulte donc de ces prescriptions que la navigation, qui jusqu'à présent n'avait qu'à payer les droits de phare, prélevés par l'Administration générale des Phares, sert soumise à l'avenir à une augmentation de frais considérable.

Sans vouloir entamer la question de savoir si la perception de droits dans les détroits est justifiable ou non, il paraît toutefois au Gouvernement norvégien que cette perception est peu en accord avec l'abolition pendant la seconde moitié du siècle dernier de tous les droits de péage : l'abolition des droits de péage du Sund : Convention de 1857 ; des droits du Stader : Convention de 1861, et des droits de l'Escaut : Convention de 1863.

Le Ministre de Norvège est instruit d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique sur la réaction que les dispositions de la Commission des Détroits crée par rapport aux conventions susmentionnées, qui justement avaient pour but d'abolir tout droit de péage, et d'ajouter que le Gouvernement norvégien, qui n'est pas représenté dans la Commission des Détroits, désire pour l'avenir se réserver tous ses droits.

Légation de Norvège, Londres, le 2 mai 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Draft of Note to the Scandinavian and Netherlands Ministers.

HIS Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the identic note addressed to them by the Danish, Netherlands, Norwegian and Swedish Governments, regarding the provisions of Part III, Section II, of the Treaty of Sèvres, relating to the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus.

2. Without raising the question of the justice of the imposition of dues on shipping using this waterway, the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments point to the alleged trend towards the abolition of dues on shipping in the case of other international waterways during the last half century, as illustrated by certain conventions such as those reducing or abolishing the dues on the Sound, Elbe and Scheldt. Attention is also drawn to the absence of Netherlands and Scandinavian representation on the "Commission of the Straits," and the rights of the four Governments are reserved.

3. His Majesty's Government do not consider that there is sufficient similarity between conditions on the Straits and on the waterways cited by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments to warrant the application of the same principles, particularly in view of the fact that the necessity of devising an international control to keep them open and free to all nations in peace and war did not arise on the Sound, the Scheldt and the Elbe. In the case of the Straits the events of the last few years have shown that this necessity has arisen in the most acute form. Further, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept the general contention that the trend has been towards the abolition of dues on international waterways. Such contention ignores the essential distinction which is universally recognised between tolls or "droits de péage" and taxes or navigation dues. The former represent a survival of the recognition of the right of the riparian sovereign to close a passage, should he so desire, or, alternatively, to derive a revenue from the users, should he engage to keep it open. It is true that such tolls have been practically abolished, and that any tendency to revive the system would be retrograde. Taxes or navigation dues, on the other hand, are universally recognised as being payments for services rendered, and may not in any case provide a revenue for the riparian sovereign. The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was, for instance, specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In virtue of that article and subsequent treaties, the European Commission of the Danube, which is responsible for the control of navigation and the maintenance of the channel of the river at its mouth, levies dues to cover the expenses of the commission and the cost of maintaining and policing the channel. The commission has incidentally been forced since the war to increase the dues charged by them by 200 per cent. on account of the great rise of their expenses. In the case of the navigation on that part of the Danube which has been declared international between Ulm and the point at which the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube begins, article 16 of the draft Act of Navigation for the Danube, as adopted at the first reading, provides for a moderate tariff of dues to be applied exclusively to the works for which they are levied,

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and not for purposes of revenue, and to be charged without discrimination based on nationality or similar considerations.

4. At the same time His Majesty's Government would refer to the statute on the régime of the waterways of international concern which was negotiated at the recent Conference on Communications and Transit held under the auspices of the League of Nations at Barcelona. Article 4 of this Convention provides that in "the exercise of navigation . . . nationals, property and flags of all contracting States shall be treated in all respects on a footing of perfect equality," while article 7 reads as follows:—

"No dues of any kind may be levied anywhere on the course at the mouth of a navigable waterway of international concern, other than dues in the nature of payment for services rendered, and intended solely to cover in an equitable manner the expenses of maintaining and improving the navigability of the waterway and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interest of navigation. These dues shall be fixed in accordance with such expenses, and the tariff of dues shall be posted in the ports. These dues shall be levied in such a manner as to render unnecessary a detailed examination of the cargo, except in cases of suspected fraud or infringement of regulations, and so as to facilitate international traffic as much as possible, both as regards their rates and the method of their application."

5. It would appear then that two principles have become established in the treatment of navigable waterways of international concern during the last half century: the first demanding the abolition or reduction of all dues not specifically levied in respect of services to the shipping on which they were imposed, and applied to those services, and the second laying down that all dues and charges shall be levied on a footing of absolute equality between all vessels, whatever the port of origin, destination or departure, their flag or ownership, or the nationality or ownership of their cargoes. The first of these principles, as will be shown below, is not in any way contravened by the dues to be levied on shipping using the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosphorus, and is indeed specifically laid down in the first paragraph of article 53 of the Treaty of Sévres, while the second principle is embodied in article 54 of the same treaty.

6. His Majesty's Government are glad that the special provisions of the Treaty of Sévres, providing for absolute equality and impartiality in the imposition of the Straits dues, have been noted by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments. Apart from the administrative expenses of the commission, these dues are primarily to be devoted to necessary works and the provision of material facilities for all shipping, and partly for a small force of maritime police, which in view of the menace from local disturbances to the unobstructed passage of vessels through the Straits should generally be welcomed. This consideration, connected as it is with the local political conditions, is again evidence of the difference in treatment which the problem of the Straits calls for as compared with the Scheldt, the Sound and the Elbe.

7. With regard to the composition of the commission, the principal Allied Powers in drafting these provisions of the treaty were unanimous in considering that in the interests of efficient administration the size of the commission should be reduced as much as possible. It was inevitable, however, that those countries should be represented or invited to be represented on the commission who either by their sacrifices in the recent war have at last made it possible to open this waterway to the commerce of the world, and are now primarily responsible for guaranteeing that it should so continue open, or who, by their geographical position, are vitally interested in the free flow of trade through the Straits.

8. In these circumstances the mere presence on the commission of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, whose vessels together formed the bulk of the shipping using the Straits before the war, and who are deeply interested in the prosperity of Mediterranean commerce, should afford to those Governments who are not actually represented on the commission sufficient guarantees that the dues on vessels using the Straits will not be so raised as in any way to hamper the free movement of trade and shipping.

9. His Majesty's Government confidently trust that in view of the foregoing consideration the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments will not desire further to pursue their representations.

Foreign Office, July , 1921.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA.

[E 4211/533/65]

No. 72.

(Secret.)

Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs summoned to meet in Cairo during March 1921, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies: Telegraphic Correspondence regarding Policy in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and Arabia.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 1.)

(1.)

Mr. Churchill to Colonial Office.

(Received Colonial Office, 5.5 A.M., March 15, 1921.)

COX and General Haldane arrived here on the 11th. Conference opened on morning of the 12th with short introductory meeting followed by formal political and military committee for discussion of reduction of expenditure in Mesopotamia. Political committee presided over by myself consists of Cox and staff with officials of Middle East Department, Arab Minister being called in as required. Military committee presided over by General Congreve consists of Haldane and staff, Ironside, Trenchard and his staff, Radcliff and Crosland. The two committees will hold combined meetings to co-ordinate recommendations. Sir Herbert Samuel will arrive on 16th by which date I hope to be free to discuss Palestine and Trans-Jordan leaving Mesopotamia committees to work out details. Opportunity is also being taken to consider Aden, Somaliland and Arab Littoral of Persian Gulf.

High Commissioner for Cyprus will pay short visit on 18th.

(2.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Received Colonial Office, 8.30 P.M., March 14, 1921.)

(Personal and Secret.)

PROSPECTS Mesopotamia promising, but there are three points on which I require your help.

First. I think we shall reach unanimous conclusion among all authorities that Feisal offers hope of best and cheapest solution.

If so, I can go ahead on this line? Formula would be: "In response to enquiries from adherents of Emir Feisal the British Government have stated that they will place no obstacles in the way of his candidature as Ruler of Iraq, and that if he is chosen he will have their support." Do you think you and Lord Curzon have said enough to the French to justify my proceeding on this basis? If so, all the better because we do not want any premature disclosure and agitation to be made by them.

If, however, you feel that further reference to the French is necessary, surely now while you are helping them in Germany would be the best moment for settling with them; and in this case they should be asked to treat this communication as confidential for the present. On the receipt of your assent to this formula I shall tell Lawrence he can communicate formula to Feisal. On this, Feisal will at once proceed to Mecca, passing through Egypt on the way. We do not want any announcement, even in guarded terms, of formula if it can be possibly avoided until Feisal is at Mecca and Sir P. Cox at Baghdad about the middle of April. Method of choice will require careful study in order to avoid confused or meaningless expression of Mesopotamian opinion. Time is short as Sir P. Cox must return, and all my plans depend on clear settlement with him before we separate. I have no doubt personally Feisal offers far away best chance of saving our money. Please therefore endeavour to telegraph to me as soon as you possibly can that I am free to make plans on basis of formula.

Secondly. I have not received any official account of your Turkish negotiations, but Reuter's summaries indicating probable settlement have caused general satisfaction and relief to all concerned with Mesopotamia. Can I now assume and so inform military that we need not prepare against Turkish inroad or intrigue in Mosul this year? Have you been able to stipulate for this with Turks? If I take this as a basis it will greatly simplify my task of reducing garrison quickly without giving up Mosul. On the other hand, if assumption is subsequently falsified all my dates of reduction will be upset. Please, therefore, if possible, telegraph to me that I can count upon immunity from Turkish interference in near future.

Thirdly. [? Groups missing.] Incredible waste now proceeding in Mesopotamia can only be cured by driving large numbers of troops and followers out of country and off our pay list. On this, I propose, provided my general plan is accepted, to take immediate and drastic action, thus securing large saving in 1921-22. I am met by assertion that many thousands of men and followers could not begin to leave country if shipping were available. Already it is declared that troops are being delayed at Basrah through lack of shipping, and certainly time table reduction of garrison to pre-rebellion figures by the 31st March on which we were counting is already fortnight in arrears. We have to carry everybody back sooner or later, and keeping them waiting eating up our mutton is pure waste. Will you, therefore, kindly tell Shipping Controller or send him personal message that he is to meet my requirements and carry troops and followers away from Basrah as fast as I can bring them to port. Exact figures will be furnished in a few days, but considerable additional shipping will be required in the Persian Gulf as soon as possible, and extra charge will be nothing compared to saving through earlier demobilisation.

I am provisionally telling military that they may assume that we will carry away promptly whatever troops they bring to Basrah, and that they have done their part when they have brought them to port. Please confirm this. I should also be obliged if you would impress on India Office that we cannot agree to be charged for these men for several months after they return to India.

To sum up. If in three or four days you can give me favourable answers on these three points I shall hope to send you definite and detailed programme of action.

I propose leaving here 31st March, arriving London about 7th April.

(3.)

Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill.

(Secret and Personal.)

March 16, 1921

IN reply to personal and secret telegram received Colonial Office 14th March.
Reply to three points in your telegram is as follows:—

First. We have repeatedly hinted to the French that if there is a strong demand for Feisal from Mesopotamia, and peace can be restored by establishing him as Ruler in Iraq, we should not feel justified in vetoing his candidature. Unless initiative comes from Mesopotamia, however, our position with the French will be embarrassing, and we think it will be very difficult to reconcile procedure you propose with the attitude we have adopted with the French Foreign Office in this matter. We think it essential, therefore, that real initiative in any demand for Feisal should come from Mesopotamia. Sir Percy Cox and Miss Gertrude Bell will no doubt advise you as to whether this initiative will be forthcoming. You will doubtless recall, however, that Feisal when sounded in London as to his personal attitude made it perfectly clear that he would not become a candidate for Iraq until Abdullah's claims had been disposed of.

Second point. We have entered into no stipulation with the Turks which excludes the possibility of a Turkish inroad or intrigue in Mosul this year. Turkish Delegation in London has recognised that we have offered very considerable concessions, but have protested against our proposals in regard to Smyrna, and against absence of any concession in Eastern Thrace. We have no certainty that settlement will be accepted by Turks. Turks are reported to be concentrating troops on Greek front, and Greeks may feel compelled to attack them. We are quite unable to control either side, and no truce has been arranged. Should fighting occur it is difficult to judge what its reaction will be on Mesopotamian front. We are, however, warning

Turks that if any hostile action is taken in Mesopotamia we shall consider ourselves at liberty to arm the Greeks.

Third point. I am in full sympathy with your desire to cure the waste and reduce troops in Mesopotamia. I have asked the Secretary of State for War and Shipping Controller to take up the matter at once.

(4.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Received Colonial Office 11.15 P.M., March 16, 1921.)

PROCEEDING on assumptions contained in my telegram of the 14th March addressed to you, I am now in a position to present definite proposals for action. These are concerned only with first stage of reduction in Mesopotamia. I have been strictly limited by the rate at which troops can be brought to port, the maximum quantity of shipping available, also length of time troops are retained pending demobilisation on our charge in India.

All authorities, including Cox, Generals Haldane, Congreve, Ironside, Radcliffe, Colonel Lawrence and Major Young, have reached complete agreement on all points, both political and military. One-third approximately of troops, for which provision was made in estimates of 1921-22, will leave country as fast as shipping becomes available. Proportionate reductions will be enforced of staffs, auxiliary services of all kinds, followers and animals. Mr. Crosland, financial representative of War Office, estimates resultant saving on estimate for Palestine and Mesopotamia in 1921-22 at 5,500,000*l.*, provided prompt action is taken at all points. Further saving would result if India could be induced to shorten up time, during which troops remain on our charge after repatriation to India.

I propose that garrison as thus reduced to 23-battalion scale shall remain during dangerous hot-weather period intact; but that if, firstly, country remains quiet internally, and is not disturbed from outside; that, secondly, Arab Government proves a success; and, thirdly, good progress be made in training of the local levies and development of Arab army, a further reduction to a 12-battalion scale with further resultant savings shall take place in October, but these are contingent upon course of events.

All concerned have also reached provisional conclusions upon normal or permanent garrison for Mesopotamia, which it is hoped to reach some time in 1922-23. I will not trouble you with details at this time of the respective parts to be played in this scheme by Imperial military forces, by air forces and by local forces. When I return all these will be explained by me, but principle has been accepted by all that cost of garrison in Mesopotamia in 1922-23-24 shall not exceed an average of 5,000,000*l.*-6,000,000*l.* a year. Of course, fulfilment of this third stage depends upon successful political administration.

Arrangements have been made in spite of above reductions to hold whole country, including Mosul and Kirkuk, without a hiatus until local levies are trained. Political conditions involve Feisal solution for Iraq with a separate Home Rule arranged under the High Commissioner for mandatory of Kurdistan. I will explain this also on my return.

Samuel arrives to-morrow, and shall endeavour to secure further reductions in Palestine, although the amounts which are involved cannot be large.

I request approval in principle of these proposals so far as immediate reductions are concerned, and assistance of my colleagues in rendering them effective.

I append (1) proposed procedure in regard to Emir Feisal and policy in Iraq and Kurdistan; (2) detailed telegram prepared for me by General Radcliffe on military aspect; and (3) financial forecast by Mr. Crosland.

Policy with regard to Iraq.

Consideration of reduction of Mesopotamian expenditure has been proceeded with in Conference on assumption that I may expect shortly a favourable reply to my telegram of 14th March. Objects which are to be aimed at can best be obtained by adopting following procedure. Sir Percy Cox to arrive in Basra early April and

announce forthwith (? remission of) sentences of military courts and the decision of His Majesty's Government to grant general amnesty, with one or two exceptions, for persons interned or exiled in connection with 1920 disturbances. Feisal, as soon as possible, to proceed to Mecca and thence to telegraph on about 23rd April to his friends in Mesopotamia saying that British Government had informed him, in response to their enquiries, that they would place no obstacle in the way of his candidature as ruler of Iraq, and that he would have their support if he were chosen; that he, after discussion with his father and brothers, had decided to offer services Iraq. We think that Feisal, in order to counter anti-mandate propaganda in Mesopotamia, should make it clear that he was prepared to accept terms of mandate as laid before the League of Nations, but we are not of opinion that he can do so unless I am authorised to guarantee that by so doing possibility of subsequent readjustment of relations between mandatory and properly constituted Government of Mesopotamia will not be precluded. Such readjustment to take form of modification of the mandate into a treaty providing for continuance of the support of the mandatory subject to adequate safeguarding and maintenance of latter's special interests and privileged position in Iraq. In addition, he would telegraph Naqib and Saiyid Talib, as representing Provisional Government, saying he hoped to have their support and personal co-operation in the future. At the same time Abdullah would communicate with those friends who formerly supported his candidature, saying that he had withdrawn in favour of Feisal. Having seen from his friends primary effect of this, Feisal would either send representative or himself come to Mesopotamia during Ramazan. It is anticipated that Feisal's announcement, followed by arrival in country, would result in such a definite expression of public feeling on his behalf as would render unnecessary for us to ask the Congress to discuss question of ruler, and they would simply directly or indirectly confirm his nomination. This having been done, Feisal would dissolve present Provisional Government, namely, the Council of Ministers, and call Naqib or someone else to form Cabinet. The foregoing recommendations have unanimously been adopted, and I urgently request you to obtain Cabinet sanction for them in time to allow me to concert final details with Cox before he leaves Cairo.

Policy in Kurdistan.

Having regard to article 62 of Treaty of Sèvres, Southern Kurdistan has not hitherto been brought under Provisional Government of Mesopotamia, and High Commissioner had intimated that he proposed to deal direct with local officials in Kurdish areas until expiration of year allowed by article 5. Acting on assumption article 62 is no longer operative, and that accordingly there is no question of Southern Kurdistan at any future date opting for union with Northern Kurdistan, the Conference has considered what line of policy with regard to purely Kurdish districts should be pursued. Our conclusion was that if at this stage any attempt was made to force them under rule of the Arab Government they would undoubtedly resist, and a complication would thus be added to our withdrawal. We recommend, therefore, that they, together with the Iraq Government, should be informed that our intention under mandate is to maintain existing arrangement until such time as a representative body of Kurdish States may opt for inclusion in Iraq. The advantage of this solution will be to enable us to recruit Kurdish units under British officers, and thus to accelerate reduction of Imperial forces in certain areas. This policy will also tend to discount the endeavours of Turks to seduce Kurds in our territory.

Iraq. Military.

1. The Conference recommends, after full consideration by military and civil authorities, and agreement of all concerned, that the following further reductions in Mesopotamia garrison should be made as soon as reduction to a total of 33 battalions and 6 cavalry regiments, &c., already in progress, has been reached: 2 British battalions, 1 British cavalry regiment, 8 Indian battalions, 3 Indian cavalry regiments, 2 sappers and miners companies, 5 field batteries, 4 pack batteries.

2. It will be apparent from this that, of 14 that were due for relief by fresh units, 8 Indian battalions can be returned now to India without relief, and orders should be issued at once stopping the despatch to Mesopotamia of corresponding

relieving units from either India or Egypt, as may seem best. As the General Officer Commanding considers that there are only 3 battalions whose immediate relief is imperative, arrangements should be made, unless it is already too late, to stop despatch of further 3 relieving battalions. It is considered that, in view of further reductions contemplated in the autumn, remaining 3 battalions should stay for few months required, but should be made up to strength, and such of their personnel as can be demobilised should be repatriated.

3. I understand, in this connection, that we are threatened with charge of sum of 2,500,000*l.* in 1921-22 for Indian units maintained in India to provide reliefs for units in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. The above-mentioned large reductions and further reductions which I contemplate later in year compel me to ask War Office to arrange with India to get rid of the whole, or almost the whole, of this charge without delay.

4. Reduction to 33-battalion level is not at the present moment proceeding as quickly as it might, the reason being the lack of sufficient shipping at Basrah, which at present is only sufficient to evacuate about 3,000 men per week—whereas, if sufficient shipping were provided, 5,000 per week could be evacuated; and it is hoped to be able to increase this rate to 6,000 per week. It is of the utmost urgency therefore, in order that maximum financial saving in 1921-22 may be effected immediately, to increase shipping at Basrah to capacity of 6,000 per week.

It is estimated that if additional shipping can be counted on at Basrah from 1st May, all combatants to be reduced on new decisions will have been evacuated by the end of June, by which date the garrison will be down to 23-battalion level, except as regards auxiliary services, which in turn will then be speedily reduced *pro rata*. In addition, General Haldane is confident that he can further reduce substantially the local transport, Indian labour and followers.

5. You will doubtless settle in consultation with India the order of priority in which units are to be repatriated, having regard to length of service *ex* India and other considerations.

6. Consequent upon the reduction of garrison, it is estimated that there will be some 25,000 surplus horses and mules in Mesopotamia. India declines to take any of these. It is proposed that as many as possible should be sold locally if the Remount Department does not need them elsewhere, and that the remainder should be destroyed immediately in order to avoid needless drain in new financial year. Please telegraph fully and very urgently on this point.

7. On all above measures, together, I am advised by Mr. Crosland we may expect following savings in 1921-22 provided immediate energetic action is taken: Reduction of troops after allowing for sea transport charges, 1,200,000*l.*; relief units in India, 1,500,000*l.*; local transport, Indian labour and followers, 2,000,000*l.*; horses, forage, 800,000*l.* Total 5,500,000*l.*, of which roughly 500,000*l.* would be transferred to other votes from Mesopotamian vote.

(5.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Secret and Personal.)

March 18, 1921.

I AM very anxious no misunderstanding should exist between us. Formula about Feisal which was suggested in my telegram of the 14th March was not intended for publication, but as a definite indication of the limits within which our policy could be framed.

In my long telegram to you of the 16th March, present procedure for his adoption is fully unfolded. This procedure, which was devised by Cox, Miss Bell and Lawrence, carries with it unanimous opinion of all authorities here. We are quite as fully conscious as you are of desire for securing a spontaneous movement for Feisal in Mesopotamia as a prelude to his being countenanced by us. Unless we have a mind of our own on the subject it is by no means certain that this will occur. Situation is complicated by variety of claimants to Throne, several of whom are quite impossible, and none of whom affords a prospect of suitable effective Arab Government capable of relieving our military commitments. As an instance, if

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chosen, Ibn Saud would plunge the whole country into religious pandemonium. Saiyid Talib, who is acutely intriguing for job, is a man of bad character and untrustworthy. Naqib is tottering on the brink of grave. That Shereefian system offers far better prospects than these, we have no doubt whatever. It is, in fact, only workable policy.

Among Shereefians we are equally agreed that Feisal is incomparably more suitable than Abdullah, who is weak and would not command elements of support essential to Shereefian system.

Moreover, it would ensure failure of policy in both directions at once to put weak brother on throne of Irak and leave [?] excessively active brother loose and discontented to work off his grudges against the French by disturbing Trans-Jordania.

Both Cox and Miss Bell agree that if procedure indicated in my telegram of the 16th is followed, appearance of Feisal in Mesopotamia will lead to his general adoption. But this will be partly because the mere fact that we have allowed him to return will universally be interpreted as if it were a coupon election candidature. On the other hand, anything less than this course may lead to an incoherent verdict by a small majority in favour of an unsuitable candidate at elections scarcely worthy of name in so scattered and primitive a community. Therefore, we must take course prescribed by us and make other arrangements on assumption that it will be identical or continue present policy [one corrupt group] drift and waste. Last sentence your reference to Feisal is presumably [one group corrupt] conversation with him when these matters were under Foreign Office. We think that we are very much better informed of his real views and wishes; we are sure this statement, of which the source is recognisable, no longer represents the facts distinctly. All my proposals which were sent you on 16th hang together, and you reject my policy. I shall have further consequential proposals to make within a few days. Amongst these will be an assurance to French that present intrigues in Trans-Jordania against them will be effectively brought to an end. I have given my closest attention to this whole matter, and am supported by the advice of best and most responsible authorities on the subject. Considering that you were in favour of Feisal before I took this office, and that I even had to exert myself to delay a Cabinet decision in his favour till I had considered the question more fully, I could not help being disconcerted by the first part of your telegram of the 16th. I do hope you will give me personally the support to which I am entitled in a task which I certainly have not sought.

Many thanks for the second and third parts of your telegram, which give me the information that I require. Of course, if Turks disturb Mosul all dates and figures of reduction will thereby be affected. However, I am proceeding on assumption that this will not occur.

I hope for dispersal of conference on 24th, so early reply is requested.

(6.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Received Colonial Office, 11-30 P.M., March 18, 1921.)

CLEAR the line.

Part I. In conference with Sir Herbert Samuel and military authorities, I have now considered question of Palestine policy and garrison. This garrison has been reduced in last six months from 25,000 to 7,000. Shortage of shipping, as [?] also] in the case of India, is delaying the evacuation and increasing expense. Two cavalry regiments, four battalions, one brigade of artillery are still awaiting ships, provision of which is of the greatest possible urgency. I cannot recommend any further reduction at present in view of large reduction now being effected, but a careful scrutiny of winding up charges which is now proceeding may [one group omitted] important savings.

Part II. We consider it necessary immediately to occupy militarily Trans-Jordania, for the following reasons:—

1. To secure a settled Government there which will prevent Palestine being disturbed by raids.

2. To enable us to stop present intrigues against French. They are certainly entitled to demand this from us, and it is only means we have of gilding the Feisal pill.
3. To [one group omitted] the reopening of the Hedjaz railway and re-establishment of pilgrimage to Mecca. This again reacts on subsidy to Hussein, which, while his present indigent condition due to falling off of pilgrimage continues, we shall certainly have to pay.

Generals Congreve and Radcliffe have examined most carefully military aspect of occupation. Garrison required at Amman would be one battalion, two squadrons and two guns. This is considered adequate in every way to control country to avoid risk to troops. General Radcliffe is telegraphing separately on this subject to Chief of General Staff. This will entail an increase of one Indian battalion and one Indian cavalry regiment for next six months only. Local forces will be sufficiently trained by end of year to relieve troops now in Northern Palestine to extent of this increase. Thus only additional charge involved is cost for six months, which is estimated at 153,000/.

Part III. Military arrangements for occupation of Trans-Jordania proceed on assumption that satisfactory arrangement with Abdullah is reached, and that either he will become a governor in our name under High Commissioner of Palestine or that someone agreeable to him will undertake this task with his approval and support. As we cannot contemplate hostilities with Abdullah in any circumstances, there is no alternative to this policy. We must therefore proceed in co-operation and accord with him. On the other hand, Abdullah with best will in the world will not be able to restrain his people from disturbing the French and even making war upon them unless he is fortified and restrained at once by presence of a British force, which must be strong enough to provide for its own safety. You will see how this development of policy is a definite part of general policy of friendship and co-operation with Shereefian influence, and you will also observe how it harmonises with plan we are endeavouring to pursue in Mesopotamia.

Part IV. After hearing case fully set out by High Commissioner and by General Congreve and fortified by views of Colonel Lawrence, I have no doubt whatever that occupation of Trans-Jordania on basis of an arrangement with Abdullah is right policy for us to adopt, and that it will afford best prospect of discharge of our responsibilities with future reduction of expense. In this connection, the statement which, as reported in Reuter, was made in House of Commons that Palestine costs 7,000,000/ is not concurred in by Mr. Crosland. Total amount in estimates of financial year 1921-22 is not expected to exceed 4,000,000/. Of this a large proportion arises out of arrears and terminal charges due to India on repatriation and demobilisation of large number of troops already reduced from this theatre. Principle is accepted by all that cost for year 1922-23 of Palestine garrison, including Trans-Jordania, will not exceed 2,000,000/, and as local forces are trained and assume responsibility there will be further reduction. Thus Palestine and Mesopotamia together ought not to require in 1922-23 more than 8,000,000/ as against 30,000,000/ in present year if my policy of an arrangement with Shereefians is accepted and successfully carried. And it is hoped for this reduced sum to discharge all obligations of our mandate.

Part V. On Monday, the 28th March, I am to meet Abdullah at Jerusalem, and I request authority to approach him, and if possible settle with him on line above set forth. You would thus be able to say to French: "So far from our acquiescence in a Feisal candidature for Mesopotamia, if desired locally, being an embarrassment to you, it is, in fact, through our concomitant arrangements with Abdullah in Trans-Jordania the surest means of securing you from disturbance and annoyance from Arabs in south."

(7.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Received Colonial Office, 6.45 P.M., March 20, 1921.)

IN order that you may see the full plan which we are elaborating I indicate various readjustments of the subsidies to Arab chiefs which will be entailed.

Bin Saud has power to attack lower Euphrates which was raided by some of his followers a few weeks ago. By the reduction of our garrison disorderly elements will be encouraged and Feisal's arrival will displease Bin Saud. I propose therefore that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000*l.* a year paid monthly in arrears conditional upon his maintaining peace with Mesopotamia, Koweit and Hejaz. Sir P. Cox believes that a subsidy of this amount will ensure his goodwill over a difficult period, and it may under settled conditions be reduced. Hussein and Bin Saud must be treated on the same footing, and I propose that the former be paid a similar subsidy conditional upon improvement in the pilgrimage arrangements, and on his promise to recognise peace treaties and to use his influential help in instituting order and good government in Arab areas.

In Yemen conditions are difficult since we are not in touch with Imam. Agreement with him would permit outlying detachments of Aden garrison to be withdrawn, and in consequence effect a considerable saving of military expenditure. I consider that if we can get in touch with him we might offer him subsidy of 2,000*l.* a month as part of our accommodation. Our greatest means of influencing him is our control over Idrisi pressure on his western frontier. To keep this weapon in my hands I propose to offer Idrisi subsidy of 1,000*l.* a month on the condition that he excludes foreigners from his area.

(8.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Secret.)

March 21, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and circulation to the Cabinet:—

I hope the decision which the Cabinet will take to-morrow will be in the sense of [one group undecypherable] reasonable latitude in handling of Mesopotamian candidature. I do not underrate in any way difficulties [one group undecypherable] delicacy of problem. There will certainly be local opposition to any Shereefian candidate owing to vigorous pressing of personal claims by rivals on the spot. But we have no doubt whatever that best guarantee for stability of government and quick reduction of expense and responsibility would be adoption of Feisal by a substantial preponderance of public opinion. In all the Arab world there is no other competing principle capable of maintaining an Arab State on modern lines than the Shereefian. On the other hand, I am deeply conscious of danger that by a too [one group undecypherable] open advocacy of Feisal we might defeat our own ends. This must be handled by Sir Percy Cox on the spot [two groups undecypherable] he gets back the better as much intrigue is rife in his absence, and we wish to have liberty to do our best in unostentatious ways, having regard to all foregoing conditions, to secure adoption of Feisal. Of course the more spontaneous demand for him the better [three groups undecypherable] there will be. Bear in mind also that Feisal must be given some assurance that we wish him well, and that he has a good chance before he will expose himself to the labours and embarrassments of candidature.

Now as to the French: if Feisal is chosen they will certainly believe, whatever we say, that we have so willed and they will be quite right. You alone can judge whether any further communication to them is necessary. There are many advantages in making none until Sir P. Cox is back in Mesopotamia.

(9.)

Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill.

(Very Urgent. Secret.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1921, 10.30 P.M.

CABINET devoted exhaustive consideration to your proposals this morning. They were much impressed by collective force of your recommendations, and were in close agreement with concluding paragraphs of your telegram of the 21st March. It should not be difficult to reconcile procedure suggested by you, which is generally accepted with due regard to our engagements and relations with the French; and it was thought that order of events should be as follows:—

Sir P. Cox should return with as little delay as possible to Mesopotamia, and should set going the machinery which may result in acceptance of Feisal's candidature and invitation to him to accept position of ruler of Irak. In the meantime, no announcement or communication to the French should be made. Feisal, however, will be told privately that there is no longer any need for him to remain in England, and that he should return without delay to Mecca to consult his father, who appears from our latest reports to be in a more than usually unamiable frame of mind. Feisal also will be told that if, with his father's and brother's consent, he becomes a candidate for Mesopotamia and is accepted by people of that country, we shall welcome their choice, subject, of course, to the double condition that he is prepared to accept terms of mandate as laid before League of Nations, and that he will not utilise his position to intrigue against or attack the French. Your remark in an earlier telegram of series that acceptance of mandate by Feisal does not preclude subsequent readjustment of relations between mandatory and Mesopotamian Government is concurred in, although it does not appear to be necessary at this stage to talk about a treaty.

If above conditions are fulfilled, Feisal would then from Mecca make known at the right moment his desire to offer himself as candidate, and should make his appeal to the Mesopotamian people. At this stage we could, if necessary, communicate with the French, who, whatever their suspicions or annoyance, would have no ground for protest against a course of action in strict accordance with our previous declarations. We trust that this procedure will commend itself to you and Sir P. Cox, and that you will act accordingly.

Cabinet then discussed your proposals for Trans-Jordania, as to which considerable misgivings were entertained. It was felt that almost simultaneous installation of the two brothers in regions contiguous to French sphere of influence would be regarded with great suspicion by them and would be interpreted as a menace to their position in Syria, deliberately plotted by ourselves. Further, while reasons for your recommendation of British military occupation of Trans-Jordania as a guarantee against these perils were appreciated, it was urged by our military advisers that this occupation would involve a military commitment, the extension and duration of which it was impossible to forecast. Nor was it clear that Abdullah would accept such a position as that suggested, in a territory too small for a Kingdom, and subject to conditions identical with those which it is proposed to exact from Feisal as regards the mandate and no intrigue against the French.

Presence of Abdullah in Trans-Jordania, from which he may be reluctant to go, and general desire of His Majesty's Government to fulfil earlier promises to King Hussein about independence of Arab territories, undoubtedly favour an Arab rather than a Palestinian solution. But the price to be paid for these advantages seems to be high and the results doubtful.

The Cabinet was of opinion that you ought to be acquainted with these misgivings before you see Abdullah, and that you should not exclude other plans from your mind. It might, for instance, be possible, while preserving Arab character of the area and administration, to treat it as an Arab province or adjunct of Palestine.

As regards Southern Kurdistan, your proposals were approved. But you must expect attempts from Angora Government to seduce Southern Kurds into co-operation with their northerly brethren with a view to incorporation in Anatolian State.

Question of proposed subsidies to Arab chiefs did not appear to demand

immediate decision, and calls for careful examination by more departments than one. It was therefore reserved for discussion with you after your return.

Proposals in regard to military reductions and shipping contained in Part V of your telegram of the 16th March were agreed to, and Secretary of State for War was authorised to arrange all details with you.

(10.)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Received Colonial Office, 7-20 P.M., March 23, 1921.)

AM much obliged both to you and to the Cabinet for approval to general policy we propose to pursue in Middle East which has been given. Sir P. Cox does not see any difficulty in proceeding according to lines of Cabinet suggestion, but attaches great importance [?] "to Feisal's" omitted] arrival in Mesopotamia before election takes place. This can presumably be arranged as a result of appeals and invitations to him from his powerful and numerous religious and racial supporters in the Iraq. With other observations of the Cabinet in regard to this part of the subject I am in agreement, and we will bear them carefully in mind.

2. Am not quite clear whether it is contemplated that someone in London should at once approach Feisal. I think it would be better were Lawrence, who has his entire confidence, to send him the private telegram appended strictly within limits of which you have approved. This really is more non-committal [?] than an official communication, and it will, coming from Lawrence, be quite sufficient. Feisal will then proceed to Mecca, and Lawrence, at some point on the route, will have to talk with him quietly.

3. About Trans-Jordania. I do not seem to have made myself quite clear. We do not expect or particularly desire, indeed, Abdullah himself to undertake Governorship. He will, as Cabinet rightly apprehend, almost certainly think it too small and we shall make it as [one group undecypherable] as possible. But that his influence should be upon our side and that [?] person elected for local Governorship shall be one in whose nomination he has cordially concurred is the vital point. Abdullah has power to do a great deal of harm, particularly against French in Trans-Jordania, and if he became actively hostile we should have no means of coping with him. The actual solution which we have always had in mind and for which I shall work is that which you described as follows: "while preserving Arab character of area and administration to treat it as Arab province or adjunct of Palestine."

Political affairs ought to be very favourable if this could be achieved under an Arab local Governor agreed upon between us and Abdullah and cordially backed by him. But [?] with everyone here military and political alike I must emphasise certainty that without presence of a small British force no order or stability of government can be established in Trans-Jordania. In favourable conditions which we anticipate a single squadron might be sufficient for local purposes.

The reason why it is necessary to have larger numbers is solely because General Congreve, Commander-in-chief, and General Radcliffe, representing General Staff, properly insist that force must be capable in all eventualities of looking after itself. Both these officers are agreed that on lines proposed no risks would be run. With intention to reduce further our military commitments in Palestine as elsewhere in Middle East I am in hearty sympathy, and I think have given proof of this. But after hearing unanimous opinion of everyone concerned here, including most particularly Sir Herbert Samuel [?s], actual political officers on the spot, I am convinced that restoration of stable conditions in Trans-Jordania is an indispensable preliminary to further reduction. I may add that a by no means inappreciable revenue can be raised in Trans-Jordania in such conditions. Civil Government will be no additional charge to Palestine or to His Majesty's Government. Lastly, we must remember that in Trans-Jordania we have accepted international responsibilities and ought to take reasonable steps to discharge our undertaking. Otherwise when French say "Will you allow us to come in and punish people who are preparing

to attack us in our own territory? Keep order yourselves or let us do it for you," what is our answer?

From our side of the line of partition Arabs have already [two groups undecypherable] and blown up French railway bridge, and French aeroplanes, on the other hand, have dropped retaliatory bombs on flocks of Gilead. This lamentable situation must be brought to an end.

4. General Gouraud, now on his way to Syria, has expressed a [?] desire to see me at Jerusalem on 29th. I shall confine myself as regards Mesopotamia and Feisal to reiterating that choice of a ruler must rest with people of Iraq and that we cannot in advance undertake to rule out any candidate whom they desire and whom we do not consider undesirable. I shall at the same time say that nothing has been or can be settled at present until wishes of Mesopotamian people have been fully expressed, and on this I shall point out local candidates who are in the field and other candidates who are now pressing their claims.

About Trans-Jordania as result of my interview with Abdullah I hope to be able to give general satisfactory assurances of our intention to do all we can for preservation of order on French borders and to prevent French from being disturbed and annoyed from out of our territory. That they have themselves been tentatively in communication with Abdullah there is some reason to believe.

After my interviews with Abdullah I will telegraph to you further, and I do not require any further instructions at present time unless you wish to send me any.

5. Show the following message to the Prime Minister, and, should he agree, have it delivered to Feisal preferably by Forbes Adam. *Begins:*—

Following from Lawrence for Feisal. Things have gone exactly as hoped. Please start for Mecca at once by quickest possible route leaving Haddad temporarily as Hedjaz representative in London. I will meet you on the way and explain details. Say only that you are going [?] to see your father, and on no account put any [?] thing in press. *Ends.*

(11.)

Colonial Office to Mr. Churchill.

March 24, 1921.

CLEAR the line.

From Shuckburgh. Private.

My telegram of 23rd March, No. 26, reference communication to Feisal crossed your No. YZ.98 to Prime Minister of same date. Procedure recommended in part 2 of your telegram has now been approved by Prime Minister, and Lawrence's message conveyed in part 5 of your telegram has been communicated to Feisal this evening by Forbes Adam. Feisal, acting on Lawrence's advice, will start as soon as possible. Date of his departure will be communicated to you later.

I presume that you will inform Cox.

(12.)

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill

(Received Colonial Office, 2-5 A.M., March 29, 1921.)

CLEAR the line.

1. Issue of March 10th of "Near East" mentioned that draft mandate for Mesopotamia has been published in a White Paper. Consequently, by time I arrive text will have reached Baghdad. It is urgent that the final approval by the League of Nations, or at any rate their general acceptance, should be announced speedily, otherwise extremists in Iraq who are out for no mandate will think that there is still time to defeat it.

2. I note that in Foreign Office telegram to yourself, No. 83, dated March 22, it is stated that discussion of subsidies to Arab chiefs had been reserved for your return, as the question did not demand immediate decision.

As regards proposal made in the case of Bin Saud, it is most urgent that decision should be come to before I reach Baghdad [?]. I beg to observe that increase of his subsidy is an essential factor in the general scheme of policy presented by conference. [? As you are] aware, it is contemplated immediately on my return to send an officer to Bin Saud to explain to him [? decisions of] conference as regards [? assumption of] title and his subsidy and conditions we require from him in connection with our Shereefian policy in Mesopotamia. If communication of our concessions is delayed until after Feisal has announced himself they will obviously lose much of their effect.

Addressed to Churchill: repeated Colonial Office.

[E 4027/31/88]

No. 73.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received April 5.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 avril 1921.*

Cher Sir Eyre,

AU cours de notre dernière conversation au Foreign Office, nous nous sommes entretenus de l'Émir Abdallah et de ses proclamations aux populations de Syrie. Vous aviez exprimé l'avis que ces documents étaient probablement antérieurs à l'action exercée sur ce fils du Roi du Hedjaz par le Gouvernement britannique.

M. Briand, à qui j'avais fait part de cette observation, vient de télégraphier que ces documents datent, en effet, des mois de novembre et de décembre derniers. Il n'en considère pas moins, toutefois, la pression exercée par les autorités britanniques comme demeurée sans effet.

Nos autorités en Syrie possèdent une lettre adressée le 17 février par Abdallah à Talaat Pacha, chef druse du Djebel, dans laquelle l'Émir lui parle de sa prochaine arrivée dans le pays et de leurs communs espoirs. D'autre part, notre Haut-Commissariat à Beyrouth a envoyé à M. Briand la traduction d'une lettre adressée par Ahmed Mehonid au Chérif Ali, cousin d'Abdallah, établissant que l'attaque du pont de Mekeriné, sur la ligne Damas-Caïffa, le 22 février, a été montée par les Chérifiens.

Je crois devoir attirer votre attention sur ces faits. Ils constituent, aux yeux du Gouvernement français, une preuve de l'esprit d'hostilité des Chérifiens à l'égard de la France en Syrie. Cette situation rend les rapports entre les autorités de Palestine et de Syrie très délicats, ainsi que vous pourrez vous en convaincre par les quelques extraits ci-joints d'un rapport que M. Briand vient de recevoir de Beyrouth.

Notre représentant en Syrie a certainement parlé de ces questions à Mr. Winston Churchill. Je crains, toutefois, que le séjour de ce dernier à Jérusalem ait été trop court pour lui permettre de se rendre un compte exact des difficultés et des malentendus que ces affaires arabes peuvent amener dans les rapports franco-anglais. M. Briand redoute des incidents qui obligeraient nos autorités en Orient à réagir vigoureusement contre les organisations chérifiennes.

Je vous fais part de ces appréhensions, persuadé que le Foreign Office fera, en ce qui le concerne, tout ce qui dépend de lui pour l'établissement en Orient d'un état de choses favorable aux bons rapports franco-britanniques.

Veuillez croire, &c.
SAINT-AULAIRE.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Extract of French Report from Beirut.

VOUS savez dans quelles conditions l'agitation menée en Transjordanie par les éléments chérifiens a abouti au coup de main dirigé contre la voie ferrée entre Deraa et Caïffa et aux combats qui ont suivi cette opération. La bande qui a exécuté cette opération comprenait de 150 à 200 hommes et avait été rassemblée dans la région d'Irbid, alors que le représentant anglais à Irbid écrivait au conseiller de Deraa au lendemain du combat du pont de Mekeriné:

"Nous avons envoyé hier, 23 février, une patrouille de gendarmes aviser les riverains de la voie ferrée que toute agression contre cette voie serait sévèrement punie."

Un télégramme du consul de France à Djeddah, du 13 février, m'annonce que le Prince héritier du Hedjaz, Ali, accompagné de 250 hommes, est parti par mer pour El Ouedj, d'où il doit rejoindre l'Émir Abdallah à Maan. Cette nouvelle fait suite à la lettre du 30 janvier, par laquelle notre agent à Djeddah vous a signalé que, par suite de la trêve conclue entre Ibn-el-Saoud et le Roi Hussein, celui-ci, libre de porter ses efforts vers le nord, a envoyé récemment 30,000 livres turques or à son fils Abdallah à Maan et doit lui dépêcher son frère l'Émir Zeïd, connu à Damas pour ses idées extrémistes. Il convient d'observer à ce propos que sans les subsides anglais au Hedjaz le Roi Hussein n'aurait à sa disposition que de très faibles ressources.

Si les autorités britanniques ne peuvent contrôler les mouvements qui s'effectuent en Transjordanie, elles devraient tout au moins empêcher les ports de Djeddah, El Ouedj et Akaba de servir au débarquement de matériel et de renforts qui sont acheminés vers la Transjordanie.

Il résulte des renseignements envoyés du Caire que l'Émir Abdallah a installé un poste de cinquante hommes à Akaba et un poste à El Guerra, à mi-chemin entre Akaba et Maan. Ainsi Akaba lui sert de base pour tout son approvisionnement en armes, cartouches, uniformes et argent, le tout provenant d'Égypte ou du Hedjaz.

Or, dans les cartes récentes de Palestine, le port d'Akaba est englobé dans le district de Ber Sebaa. De sorte que la base et peut-être aussi le poste intermédiaire d'étapes de l'Émir Abdallah dans ses opérations ouvertes contre nous sont en territoire de mandat anglais. S'il en est bien ainsi, il appartient à nos Alliés de remplacer les garnisons chérifiennes d'Akaba et El Guerra par des troupes britanniques, qui mettront fin à l'action chérifienne.

Si, au contraire, Akaba et El Guerra ne sont pas en zone de mandat anglais, ces points appartiennent au Hedjaz et rien ne nous empêcherait en théorie de procéder à une mesure de politique navale à Akaba pour couper l'Émir Abdallah de sa base et interrompre ses relations avec l'extérieur.

La mission de Soubhi-el-Khedra, que Lord Hardinge a récemment représentée au Gouvernement français comme le résultat d'une pression exercée par le Gouvernement britannique sur Feysal pour nous rendre service, sert, en réalité, à intensifier le recrutement des bandes de l'Émir Abdallah. Toutes les informations venues du sud et reçues à Damas montrent que l'action de Soubhi-el-Khedra s'exerce dans un sens nettement contraire à celui qui vous a été indiqué.

Soubhi Bey Khedra est l'ancien chef de la Sûreté de Damas sous le régime de l'Émir Feysal. Il est un des organisateurs des bandes armées de la Bekaa en 1919. Aventurier sans scrupules, partisan de "l'indépendance arabe," connu pour son fanatisme et ses sentiments extrémistes, il fut, avec Ali Gholki et Ahmed Merowed, un des agents les plus actifs dans les troubles de la zone est; condamné à mort par contumace à notre entrée à Damas, il se réfugia en Égypte, où il sert depuis plusieurs mois la cause de l'Émir Feysal.

Il est revenu en Transjordanie depuis le commencement de janvier, apportant, dit-on, des effets militaires pour l'armée du Chérif Abdallah. Puis il s'est rendu dans le Hauran, recrutant dans les villages du caza de Bosr à Esqui Cham des volontaires pour le chérif. Il a parcouru la partie sud du Djebel Druze, a rendu visite à Rachid Talih à Sourfida, a fait de la propagande anti-française dans la montagne et est reparti à Amman avec un groupe de volontaires, parmi lesquels Assad-el-Atrache.

Il semble donc difficile de pouvoir considérer Soubhi Bey Khedra comme un messenger de paix en Transjordanie, où son action nous est aujourd'hui, comme autrefois dans la zone, ouvertement hostile.

Beyrouth, le 7 mars 1921.

[E 4048/2430/88]

No. 74.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

LE Gouvernement de la République a eu maintes fois l'occasion d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet de la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Jaffa-Jérusalem.

A la suite de ces démarches, il avait été entendu qu'une discussion aurait lieu sur place avec les intéressés pour le règlement de cette affaire. Les représentants de la compagnie se sont donc rendus en Palestine, où ils ont exposé leur point de vue en janvier et février à Sir Herbert Samuel. Cette discussion est restée sans résultat.

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Toutefois, dans une lettre en date du 14 février, Sir Herbert Samuel a admis qu'une compensation était due à la compagnie sur la base de l'article 311 du Traité de Sèvres. L'Administration de la Palestine a aussi invoqué, à la page 3 de cette lettre, l'article 287 dudit traité. Cependant, à la même page 3, cette Administration prétend n'avoir aucun titre à racheter le Chemin de fer de Jaffa-Jérusalem sur la base de l'article 311 tant que le mandat britannique sur la Palestine n'aura pas été définitivement régularisé. La conclusion de la même lettre est que l'affaire ne pourra être réglée par l'arbitrage prévu à l'article 311 du Traité de Sèvres "qu'après que le mandat aura été garanti."

La compagnie a alors réclamé le bénéfice de l'article 287 du Traité de Sèvres (invoqué antérieurement à son profit par l'Administration britannique), pour réclamer une indemnité de perte de jouissance pendant la période qui s'écoulera jusqu'à l'arbitrage. Cette demande a été rejetée.

Les conséquences qui déroulent de cette situation sont les suivantes :

Une société française titulaire en Turquie d'une concession, dotée en outre de droits étendus en vertu de l'accord général financier franco-turc du 9 avril 1914, sise sur le territoire du mandat britannique ne peut obtenir :

Ni la restitution de sa concession, ni la gestion de ses lignes, ou aucune espèce de remise en possession.

Ni la mise en réquisition régulière de la ligne par l'autorité britannique avec paiement d'un prix équitable de réquisition. Elle ne peut pas obtenir non plus une indemnité quelconque ou même la constitution immédiate d'un tribunal arbitral prévu au Traité de Sèvres.

Le Gouvernement de la République estime que cet état de choses ne saurait durer. Comme M. Paul Cambon a eu l'honneur de le faire connaître à son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté aux Affaires étrangères le 12 juin dernier, il ne demande pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'engage à reconnaître dès maintenant aucune somme précise, en vue du règlement définitif de l'affaire, ni qu'il accepte pour l'examen de cette réclamation des principes auxquels il peut répugner. Toutefois, M. Briand estime nécessaire de constituer immédiatement le tribunal arbitral prévu à l'article 311 du Traité de Sèvres et d'appliquer intégralement toutes les dispositions qui y sont contenues.

Le Gouvernement français ne désire pas préjuger de la question de savoir si le Traité de Sèvres est applicable ou non : les parties sont toujours libres de rédiger à leur gré le compromis d'arbitrage ; il suffirait donc de décider que cet arbitrage sera régi par les règles figurant au Traité de Sèvres comme si ce dernier était en vigueur.

Cette procédure semble s'indiquer par l'esprit de la discussion prolongée qui a eu lieu à la commission chargée à Londres en février 1920 de mettre sur pied les clauses économiques du Traité de Sèvres. Le représentant du Gouvernement français chargé de cette négociation a affirmé à plusieurs reprises la nécessité pour le Gouvernement de la République de sauvegarder les intérêts de la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Jaffa-Jérusalem. Parmi les points sur lesquels ont porté les récentes discussions qui ont eu lieu à Jérusalem, il en est que la rédaction de l'article 311 entendait expressément écarter : l'alinéa 4 dudit article spécifie notamment que le tribunal arbitral "jugeant en droit comme en équité, devra prendre en considération tous les éléments d'appréciation, sur la base du maintien avec réadaptation du contrat "de concession." Il semble donc qu'il n'appartient pas aux Gouvernements d'imposer leur interprétation, mais bien au tribunal arbitral de décider afin que chacune des parties en cause aura fait valoir ces arguments.

M. Briand estime que le Gouvernement britannique devrait verser en attendant à la compagnie une somme mensuelle lui permettant de faire face à ses obligations courantes.

Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté entend faire procéder à l'expropriation de la société, cette expropriation devrait être accompagnée soit d'un règlement à l'amiable du préjudice subi, soit d'un recours immédiat à un arbitrage équitable. Le Gouvernement de la République est tout prêt à désigner dès maintenant, selon les termes de l'article 311, son arbitre pour le règlement de la contestation.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 1^{er} avril 1921.

[E 4035/4035/91]

No. 75.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 5.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, April 4, 1921.

I AM directed to refer to my letter of the 26th March to the Hon. R. C. Lindsay enclosing a copy of a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies informing him that the message from Colonel Lawrence to the Emir Feisal recommending the latter's early departure for Mecca had been communicated to the Emir.

A telegram has since been despatched to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine asking him to inform Colonel Lawrence that the Emir Feisal was sailing on the steamship "Malwa," and would arrive at Port Said about the 13th April, where he would expect Colonel Lawrence to meet him.

Mr. Churchill has now telegraphed that the Emir may ask Colonel Lawrence to accompany him to Jeddah, and has expressed the hope that in that event Lord Curzon would not see any objection to Colonel Lawrence accepting the invitation.

This Department would be glad to be favoured with an early expression of Lord Curzon's views in the matter in order that the necessary instructions may be telegraphed to Colonel Lawrence through His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 3838/4/91]

No. 76.

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah).

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1921.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 34 and 35 of 21st March: Hussein's fears of Wahabite attack.

Aden reports supply of 400,000 rounds of ammunition to Idrisi at Hodeidah in February to help him consolidate his position there on British evacuation.

At same time Idrisi bought two Ford motors in Aden for use inland from Hodeidah. There has been no supply of war material for use against Hussein.

2. Bagdad state recent flights from Koweit in connection with boundary dispute probably give rise to aeroplane rumour, which Wahabites may have spread for moral effect. Reports continue regarding collection of forces in interior by Ibn Saud, whose objective is, however, thought to be Hail and not Mecca. Further enquiries are being made regarding alleged British support.

3. Should Hussein renew his protests you should confine yourself to reassuring him in general terms.

[E 4084/4084/88]

No. 77.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 6.)

Sir,

Downing Street, April 5, 1921.

I AM directed to transmit to you, to be laid before Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copies of correspondence with the High Commissioner for Palestine relative to the approval of the draft Ordinance to be known as "The Incitement to Hostilities Ordinance, 1921," and to suggest, for Lord Curzon's consideration, that the action taken by His Majesty's Government in regard thereto should be brought to the notice of the French Government with an expression of the hope that similar legislation may be introduced in Syria.

I am, &c.

H. J. READ.

Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

Sir, Jerusalem, March 11, 1921.
I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram and to forward, for your information, a copy of a draft Ordinance which will strengthen the criminal law in regard to publications inciting to hostilities. The Ottoman Penal Code and the existing press law contain no articles adequate to deal with the evil.

The Ordinance has been laid before the Advisory Council and approved by it.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 77.

Draft Ordinance.

WHEREAS it is necessary to take measures to punish the incitement to hostilities against the Government of friendly Powers;

Be it enacted by the High Commissioner for Palestine, after consultation with the Advisory Council, as follows:—

1. The following addition shall be made to article 86 of the Ottoman Penal Code:—

"Whoever in Palestine, by making any speech in a public place or in a public gathering, or by publishing any writing or by any other means of publication, seeks to excite war or armed insurrection in or against a friendly State adjacent to Palestine, shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding £ E. 100 or with one of these penalties."

2. This Ordinance shall be known as "The Incitement to Hostilities Ordinance, 1921."

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 3 in No. 77.

Mr. Churchill to Sir H. Samuel.

(Telegraphic.)

Downing Street, April 1, 1921.

YOUR despatch No. 128 of 11th March: Draft Ordinance, incitement of hostilities.

I approve.

Enclosure 4 in No. 77.

Legal Secretary to the High Commissioner to the British Consul, Beirut.

Sir,

Jerusalem, March 14, 1921.

I AM directed by the High Commissioner to forward to you a copy of the Ordinance which is about to be issued by the Palestine Government in order to check the incitement to hostilities against friendly Powers neighbouring to Palestine.

It was found that the existing provisions in the Ottoman Penal Code and the press law were inadequate to prevent inflammatory publications directed against the French authorities in Syria.

The editor of a paper at Haifa was prosecuted for publishing an article of the kind some months ago, and was convicted by the District Court; but the Court of Appeal held that the offence was not covered by the press law. In order, therefore, to strengthen the hands of the Administration this Ordinance has been passed, and I am directed to ask that you should communicate its terms to the French authorities and inform them of the reasons for passing it.

N. BENTWICH, Legal Secretary.

[E 4164/3816/65]

No. 78.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 990.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1921.

N the course of a conversation this afternoon the French Ambassador reverted to the question of the Emir Feisal and Abdullah, and repeated to me, with even greater emphasis than before, the views which are entertained by the French Government upon the question.

As regards the anti-French pronouncements and actions of Abdullah in Transjordan, Sir Eyre Crowe had remarked that the proclamations to which the French Government objected had in all probability been issued before the pressure applied to Abdullah by his brother, Feisal, and his father, King Hussein, at the instance of the British Government. This had turned out to be true so far as these particular proclamations were concerned, but further investigation had revealed to the French Government that proclamations or pronouncements of a date posterior to our intervention had been made, not less hostile to France in their phraseology and purpose. Further, in the "Times" of this morning was reported an interview by its correspondent with Abdullah, in which he had expressed himself in terms equally unfavourable to France.

I replied that the question of the future position of Abdullah in Transjordan was now in the hands, not of the Foreign Office, but of the Colonial Secretary, but that from such information as I had received I was convinced that Mr. Churchill would only acquiesce in Abdullah remaining there provided he gave full assurances as to not pursuing an anti-French policy, and further, I said that I might tell the Ambassador in confidence, though not for official use, that so anxious was the Colonial Secretary to bring about this result, that he had actually proposed the stationing of a British garrison in the country, in order to ensure that good relations and peace on the frontiers should prevail. I had no idea whether the Government would or would not accept the suggestion, but at any rate it was conclusive evidence of our *bona fides* in the matter.

As regards Feisal, his Excellency produced a fresh weapon from his armoury by reminding me that on an earlier occasion I had protested very strongly to his predecessor, M. Cambon, against the possible selection by the French of Mohammed Said as successor to Feisal at Damascus, at a time when it was thought that the French might conceivably fall out with the latter. Mohammed Said was an individual who had been expelled from the country by Lord Allenby. Inasmuch as the French Government had at once given us the assurance that we demanded, how could we reciprocally refuse to meet their wishes about Feisal in Mesopotamia?

I replied that, quite apart from the personalities of the two individuals, there was no analogy whatever between the two cases. What we had asked the French to do was to refrain from setting up, by an arbitrary act of their own, a man of no standing, whose conduct and character were open to the gravest suspicion. What the French were asking us to do was not to refrain from setting up Feisal as Ruler of Mesopotamia ourselves, because that we neither had the power nor the intention of doing, but to refuse to accept him if he were chosen by the people of Mesopotamia.

The French Government, I said, seemed to argue as though we were going to behave in Mesopotamia in exactly the same way as they were behaving, and would probably continue to behave, in Syria. Such was not the case.

We were endeavouring to carry out the promises as regards the institution of an Arab Government and an Arab ruler which we had repeatedly made since the day when we marched into Bagdad. Three years ago we had asked the population of Mesopotamia to choose their Government and their ruler. They were at that time too feeble or too disunited to do either. They had now got, or were in the process of getting, their Government, and they were likely before long to choose their ruler. If, as I had before told his Excellency, they chose Feisal, not because we imposed him, but because they wanted him, no British Minister could get up in either House of Parliament and state that we declined to ratify this choice because the French had fallen out with Feisal in Syria and desired us, as an act of friendship to them, to reject the victim of their quarrel. I should decline myself to do anything of the sort.

His Excellency went on to repeat his former asseverations that if Feisal and Abdullah were chosen the French nation would infallibly believe that they had been chosen on the special ground that they were enemies of France.

I protested most vehemently against this unwarrantable inference, and pointed out to the Ambassador that we had entered into relations with Feisal long before the

French were aware of his existence; that we had made the treaty with King Hussein which brought the Arabs into the war; that we had made the march with Feisal that captured the Hedjaz Railway and ended in the conquest of Syria; that we, and not the French, had captured Damascus and placed Feisal in power there; that at no stage in our transactions with him had Feisal fallen out with us; that the French themselves had accepted him at the first conference in Paris as plenipotentiary at the Board; that they had had frequent and amicable relations with him since that time; and that because they had chosen to fall out with him, or to fight him at Damascus, I did not in the least see why we should reverse the whole of our policy of the last three years and treat as an outcast the man with whom they had failed to get on. In any case, to accuse us of favouring Feisal because he was an enemy of France was a really unwarrantable suggestion, inasmuch as, on almost every occasion—and there were many—when the British Government or Foreign Office had been brought into contact with Feisal during the last two years, we had insistently—in season and out of season—pressed upon him, at the cost sometimes almost of rupture, that we were bound by obligations to our French Allies which must be similarly accepted by them, and that, if they were not so accepted, it would be impossible for us to fulfil our own engagements.

When the Ambassador replied to this that the French would never forgive or form any other opinion about a man who had shed the blood of Frenchmen, and that they had even been unable to allow such a person to cross the soil of France on his return to his own country, I remarked that a similar consideration did not seem to have deterred them from coming to terms with Mustapha Kemal, who had probably slain a great many more Frenchmen than Feisal had ever done, or from establishing cordial relations with Mustapha Kemal's principal lieutenant, Bekir Sami Bey, who had lately been clasped in their embrace both at London and in Paris.

The conversation ended by the Ambassador remarking that he had discharged his duty by acquainting me with the views that were universally entertained in his country, and by my pointing out to him that I had been equally candid in my reply.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4035/4035/91]

No. 79.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1921.

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th April, regarding the possibility of the Emir Feisal asking Colonel Lawrence to accompany him from Port Said to Jeddah, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that his Lordship sees grave objection to Colonel Lawrence being permitted to accept the invitation.

2. When it is known that the Emir is a candidate for the Throne of Mesopotamia it will be necessary for Lord Curzon to reiterate the assurances which have been given to the French Government to the effect that the Emir Feisal has not even referred to Mesopotamia during his conversations with the Foreign Office, nor has sought to enlist the support of His Majesty's Government to his candidature for the position of ruler of that country.

3. In view of the language held by the French Ambassador in his conversation with Lord Curzon on the 23rd March, a record of which is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference,* his Lordship anticipates considerable difficulty in convincing his Excellency of the good faith of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

4. The task would be doubly hard if, after meeting the Emir at Port Said, Colonel Lawrence, known to be an official of the Colonial Office and to have been with Mr. Churchill during his tour in the Near East, were to accompany the Emir even as far as Jeddah on his return to Mecca, from which place he is presently to start with a view to setting himself up as candidate for the Throne of Iraq.

5. Lord Curzon therefore earnestly hopes that Mr. Churchill will not take a step which will not unreasonably confirm the French Government in the impression that His Majesty's Government have broken their faith with them and have not only deliberately planned the Emir's candidature but also done their utmost to further it at each stage.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

* See Part VI, Chapter VI, No. 160.

[E 4075/4/91]

No. 80.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1921.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform you that the Emir Feisal called at the Foreign Office on the 31st ultimo, prior to his departure from the United Kingdom. In the absence of the Secretary of State his Highness was received by Mr. Lindsay, whom he requested to express to Lord Curzon his deep gratitude for the manner in which he had been treated during his visit and for the assistance he had received from His Majesty's Government.

2. Mr. Lindsay took this opportunity of impressing upon his Highness the importance of avoiding any line of action which would be likely to create difficulties between the British and French Governments, and pointed out to his Highness that His Majesty's Government, in their anxiety to serve the best interests of the Arabs, were running considerable risk of gravely offending their French ally. Should events fall out in the manner which it was understood that the Emir himself most desired it would behove his Highness to prove by his conduct that the confidence extended to him by His Majesty's Government had not been misplaced.

3. The Emir replied that he had, ever since his interview with Lord Curzon in 1919, fully appreciated the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the question of Syria, and that when he saw M. Clemenceau in Paris shortly afterwards he pledged himself to behave loyally towards the French on condition that they endeavoured to meet his wishes in regard to Arab self-government. The Emir believed that M. Clemenceau would have carried out this condition, but those who succeeded him in office took a different view of the situation, and appeared anxious to relegate his Highness to a position analogous to that occupied by the Bey of Tunis. He had, however, been unwilling to abandon the cause of his people in order to secure for himself a position of well-paid inactivity.

4. The Emir protested that he had, in circumstances of the greatest difficulty, exercised his authority to prevent Arab attacks on the French from British territory, and he wished His Majesty's Government to be assured that he would always impress on all his followers the great importance of avoiding any action that could embroil the British and the French authorities.

5. Mr. Lindsay then expressed the hope that the Emir's father, King Hussein, would eventually realise, if he had not already done so, that he would best serve both his own interests and those of his country by maintaining and trusting in his friendship with Great Britain, and that the state of affairs in the Arab world was more likely to improve if he would abandon his continual complaints and assume an attitude of confident reliance upon the goodwill and assistance of His Majesty's Government.

6. The Emir then enlarged upon the peculiar difficulties of his father's position. King Hussein had staked his all on Great Britain, and by doing so had incurred much odium in the Moslem world, which no one was better able to appreciate than His Majesty's Government. If, while the criticisms and even reproaches of his co-religionists were incessant, he acquired the impression that His Majesty's Government were looking askance at him it could not be wondered at that he became nervous and irritable. He must not be judged too severely. He was conscious all the time of his entire dependence on His Majesty's Government, and when he received from them any mark of favour his gratitude and pleasure knew no bounds.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 4267/3816/65]

No. 81.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 11.)

Cher Lord Curzon,

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 7 avril 1921.

J'ai été heureux de pouvoir causer un peu avec vous des affaires arabes avant mon départ pour Paris. Notre conversation me permettra de faire connaître à M. Briand toute la cordialité et la franchise avec laquelle nous discutons nos difficultés communes.

Vous m'avez dit que le Gouvernement britannique, malgré les graves objections du Gouvernement français, se verrait peut-être obligé de tenir compte du désir des populations arabes si celui-ci semblait se manifester en faveur des princes chérifiens. Je vous ai expliqué les raisons pour lesquelles notre opinion publique considérerait Feysal et même Abdallah, non pas comme d'anciens alliés, mais comme des adversaires dont l'hostilité n'avait pas désarmé. Notre opinion ne pourra manquer de faire un rapprochement entre l'attitude actuelle du Gouvernement britannique et celle adoptée par le Gouvernement français au sujet de Mohammed Saïd et de tous les mécontents de la zone britannique dont les offres de concours sont systématiquement écartées par les autorités françaises. Cette attitude témoigne du prix que mon Gouvernement attache à mettre très au-dessus de ces questions de politique musulmane l'intérêt supérieur de la collaboration de nos deux pays.

Telle est bien également je crois, la pensée du Gouvernement britannique. Je l'affirmerai à M. Briand lorsqu'il me parlera de Feysal et de sa famille.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SAINT-AULAIRE.

[E 4346/117/89]

No. 82.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 30.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that an independent Emirate of the Jebel Druse has been constituted under the French mandate and a convention to that effect has been signed at Beirout.

Selim Attrash will be the Emir, and there will be one or more French conseillers dependent upon the French délégué at Damascus.

The Hauranese sheikhs appear desirous of a similar concession, and, in view of the present French conciliatory attitude, something of the sort might mature. Those Hauranese sheikhs who had been imprisoned for complicity in the attack on the train at Kharbat-el-Gazala have been released; and I fancy the French are somewhat loath to inflict upon that district the heavy fines necessary to satisfy all the claims arising from that incident. For the vicinity of Damascus the same reluctance is not so manifest, for the French mission has just handed to me, after a delay of barely three weeks, a sum of £T. 270 gold, which was a fine inflicted on the village of Daraya for the theft of the animals and merchandise of a native of the Ajloun.

Metaib-el-Attrash has been sent by the French to try and win over Reshid Bey Talii. Their meeting at Kom-el-Hissa was unproductive, as they appear merely to have decided to use each other's good offices in the French and Shereefian camps respectively.

(Copies to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4323/3777/88]

No. 83.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 12.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, April 11, 1921.

I AM directed to transmit to you, to be laid before Earl Curzon of Kedleston, the accompanying copy of a telegram from the High Commissioner for Palestine relative to a visit of French troops to Enghib on the Sea of Galilee, and containing suggestions with regard to early transfers of territory, under the provisions of the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

2. The Secretary of State is inclined to the view that it would be preferable, from the point of view of minimising the chances of disturbance, that the delimitation of boundaries should first be carried out by the Boundary Commission, and that occupation should proceed in accordance with the progress of delimitation.

3. With regard to the question of approaching the French Government, I am to enquire whether Lord Curzon considers it advisable to act as suggested in the last sentence of Sir H. Samuel's telegram.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, April 6, 1921.

ENGHIB, situated on east bank of Sea of Galilee, in district now inhabited by us, but to be transferred to French under convention, has been visited by French troops. This has disturbed local population, who fear French may return and arrest Syrian refugees there. Desirable end uncertainties by effecting transfers of territory provided by convention as soon as possible. Is it necessary to await detailed settlement of frontier by commission, or could occupation be arranged now in accordance with general lines stated in convention, leaving any doubtful areas under present administration until decision reached by commission? Provisional arrangements on these lines could be made locally if so directed by Governments. If this not considered practicable, can French be asked not to disturb *status quo* by sending troops into our present area pending final settlement of boundaries?

[E 4408/117/89]

No. 84.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 35.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a few notes upon the Druses. While they may be said to be equally divided at present into pro- and anti-French camps of equal strength—the former opinion prevailing in the northern part, the latter in the southern—yet, as they have not really changed their traditional policy of siding at the last moment with the winning side, their professions of political learnings may be taken to be a mere cloak to their real sentiments. In short, they are simply pro-Druse.

Their real feelings are based upon the decisions taken at their "khahwa," or meeting of their ukals (religious sheikhs).

The chief ukal is a certain Ahmad-el-Hajari, of Kanawat, and the second is Sheikh Youssef Hassan Jerbouh, of Sweida.

I am assured that their feelings of antipathy to all other religions—Christians especially—are undiminished even now, despite their outward attitude of courtesy.

The number of men capable of bearing arms, 16 years to 60 years, is estimated by themselves at 30,000.

In view of the above remarks, the political inclinations attributed to individuals by my Druse informant in the ensuing list of notables must not be taken to be in any way permanent, but merely to represent the latest opinion "at the moment of going to press."

In each case the clan name is given first. This is often the plural form of the simple family name, which is given second if different from the clan name. Thirdly comes the political opinion of the clan as a whole. Then follow details of its individual notables, their villages, their politics, starting with the chief of the clan. The clans are given in order of importance.

1. Jebel Druse Clans.

(a.) Attrash or Turshan Clan. Attrash. Divided.

1. Selim Pasha, of Ura. The new Emir of Jebel Druse. Has some claims, according to the French délégué, to be recognised as the paramount chief. The most powerful and wealthy of the chiefs. Has a house in Damascus, where he spends most of his time. The French have just given him a motor-car. Also has houses and property at Ari and Sweida. Pro-French.
2. Nessib Pasha, of Salkhad, son of Nassam, cousin of Selim, and next to him in importance. Probably pro-French at present, though my informant very correctly says of him "real opinions not known."
3. Abdul Ghafar, of Sweida, son of Ibrahim Pasha. Pro-French.
4. Faris Bey, brother of above. Pro-French.
5. Nejm of Urman, son of Nejm. Pro-French.
6. Faris Bey, of Debin, son of Said. Pro-French.

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7. Sultan Pasha, of Kuraya, son of Zokan, who was hanged with other Druses before the war by Sami Pasha-el-Faruk, chief of the pro-Shereefian section of the clan.
8. Hussein Pasha, of Auz, son of Naif. Pro-Shereef.
9. Abdul Karim Bey, of Sweida, son of Ibrahim Pasha. Pro-Shereef.
10. Assad, of Sweida, son of Faris. Pro-Shereef.
11. Ferhan, of Maleh. Pro-Shereef.
12. Salman Bey, of Em Rimman. Pro-Shereef.
13. Metaib, of Resas, son of Hilal. Pro-Shereef.
14. Ibrahim, of Sweida. A bad character, anti-foreigner and anti-Christian. Pro-Shereef.

(b.) *Awamreh Clan*. Amer. Pro-Shereef.

1. Talal Pasha Amer, of Sha'aba. Pro-Shereef and an enemy of Selim Attrash.
2. Zeid Bey Amer, of Sha'aba. Pro-French.
3. Turki Amer, of Hit. Pro-Shereef. The bodyguard of Abdullah. His father was hanged by Sami Pasha Farouki, the Turkish general, about 1912.

(c.) *Halabiat Clan*. Halabi. Pro-French.

1. Faris-el-Halabi, of Hit. Pro-French.
2. Selim-el-Halabi, of Sawara. Pro-French.

(d.) *Abou-el-Fahr Clan*. Pro-French.

1. Mahmoud Abu-el-Fahr, of Slem. An akl (religious sheikh). Pro-French.

(e.) *Selam Clan*. Pro-Shereef.

1. Hassan Selam, of Tarba. Pro-Shereef.
2. Selim Selam (brother), of Tarba. Pro-Shereef.

(f.) *Haneidat Clan*. Haneidi. Pro-French.

1. Hussein Haneidi, of Mejdal. Pro-French.
2. Fadlullah Haneidi (cousin), of Mejdal. Pro-French.

(g.) *Azzam Clan*. Formerly pro-French, now becoming pro-Shereef.

1. Kufan-el-Azzam, of Dweir. Was pro-French, but changed, as dissatisfied with French subsidy.

(h.) *Mougawish Clan*. Pro-Shereef.

1. Selim-el-Mougawish, of Khalikhli. Pro-Shereef.
2. Mouaddah-el-Mougawish, of Khalikhli. Pro-Shereef.

Latter acted as postman for the Shereef during war against Turkey.

(i.) *Zahreddin Clan, of Soura*. Uncertain.

Hail Zahreddin, of Soura. Uncertain.

(j.) *Sharaf Clan*. Pro-Shereef.

1. Ferhan Sharaf, Sheikh of Tema. Pro-Shereef.
2. Moayad Sharaf, Sheikh of Tema. Pro-Shereef.

(k.) *Abdullah Clan*. Pro-Shereef.

1. Abou Hassan Abdullah-el-Abdullah, of Hout. Pro-Shereef.

(l.) *Barabra Clan*. Barbour. Pro-Shereef.

Related to the Attrash Clan, with whom they share the village of Kraye. Hamel-el-Barbour, of Kraye, and Em Rimman. Pro-Shereef.

The two akls referred to in paragraph 3 of this report are not supposed to have any pronounced political opinions.

2. Lebanon Druses.

My informant knows little about them, and they are outside the Damascus State. I add what I have learnt, however, as one or two are concerned in local politics.

(a.) *Jamblat Clan*. Pro-French.

(b.) *Talii Clan*. Mostly Pro-Shereef.

Rashid Bey Talii, of Mazraat-es-Shuf. Pro-Shereef. Now a vizir of Abdullah. The most intellectual and influential of the Lebanon Druses. Was Feisal's vali of Aleppo, and a former deputy under the Turks for the Lebanon.

(c.) *Hamade Clan*. Pro-French.

(d.) *Reslan*. Pro-French.

Moustafa Reslan. Pro-French.

[NOTE.—Hasib Dabin, now at Makran-es-Sharki, is a well-known pro-Shereefian agitator, but of subordinate rank, being a junior officer in Abdullah's army.]

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4409/117/89]

No. 85.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 37.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 26, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that Reshid Bey Talii has now gone with several followers to join Abdullah. Ten days ago Feisal telegraphed to the latter to remain quiet for ten days. These are now expired.

The Awamreh family is second in importance only to the Attrash family and, being pro-Shereefian, is at enmity with them.

Druses from the Awamreh village, supposed to have been instigated by their chief, Talal Pasha Ameer, have burnt the new Emir Selim Attrash's house at Ari. The latter is summoning a meeting of Druse sheikhs to obtain redress.

The French apparently do not intend to remain quite supine with regard to the Druses. They have imprisoned at Deraa the sheikh and notables of Deir Ali in which four Frenchmen were murdered some months ago. They have also started collecting a fine there.

My Druse informant's own village, which is near Damascus, has been forced to deliver up 120 rifles—all antiquated or spoilt—and 50 rounds per rifle are now being demanded. The village (Jaramana) contains about 150 houses and 400 able-bodied men.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4406/117/89]

No. 86.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 29, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that two members of the French mission here have just left for Tadmor (Palmyra), accompanied by a son of Nuri Shalan and Mohamed Ossimi. My Druse informant confirms the departure of the latter, and adds that he hears there are some 300 camel-loads of ammunition and rifles at Tadmor waiting to be despatched to Irak.

Owing to the strict postal censorship it is impossible to obtain much news from outlying places like Tadmor, or even from Homs, Hama or Deraa, except by the accident of getting in touch with a recent arrival from one of those places who stops here for some time.

Permission to visit any place thus reported on and a motor-car at my disposal would be the only means of satisfactorily sifting these persistent rumours of gun-running.

While doubting whether the fact that Ossimi accompanied the above French officers to Tadmor is due to more than that he asked for conveyance there and secured it, and, while imagining that Nuri Shalan's son was taken merely by way of escort, I am inclined to believe that gun-running may well be the object of Ossimi's visit.

Any attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Easton to carry out an investigation on the spot might quite possibly lead to a peremptory request for his withdrawal, despite his friendliness with the French. The latter's authorities certainly desire his removal, and

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may demand it shortly. About ten days ago the request by General Headquarters for his continued residence here was refused by the commander-in-chief at Beirut.

Commandant Trabaud, the French Governor of the "Grand Liban," is leaving to-day with the Syrian Catholic Patriarch of Beirut for Tadmor to investigate a claim concerning the convent of Deir Mar Elias there.

2. The following have been deported from Damascus for anti-French propaganda and communication with Emir Abdullah to their own towns:—

- (1.) Mohamed Shreiki, of the Syrian Committee, to Lattakie.
- (2.) Aff-el-Solh to Beirut.
- (3.) Yussef Heidar, owner of the anti-French paper "Jeridat-el-Mufid," suppressed on the French occupation, to Baalbeck.

Other deportations are expected.

3. Three Hauranese were to have been executed on the 27th in the citadel for the attack on the train at Khirbet-el-Gazala. The execution, however, has been postponed.

4. Abdullah is said to have divided his forces into three parts:—

- (1.) Destined for Kuneitra.
- (2.) " Deraa.
- (3.) " Kerak and Shubakh.

5. Hassib Dabian and Turki Amer have returned to Jebel Druze, together with the Druse Ali-el-Ali carrying letters for certain Druse chiefs.

6. It is rumoured that General Gouraud may offer to accept a Turkish prince as Emir of a united Syria. Prince Burhaneddin is freely discussed as a possible nominee.

7. It is also rumoured that the French intend to leave certain depots of munitions behind when they evacuate Cilicia. If there is any truth in this, they would be imitating the action which they accuse the Italians of having done a little further north.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4474/1977/91]

No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 15.)

Sir,

India Office, April 14, 1921.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 26th November, 1920, on the subject of the maintenance of the régime of the Capitulations in the Hedjaz, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegraphic correspondence on the subject exchanged with the Government of India.

Mr. Montagu is inclined to the opinion that the effective control which it is possible to exercise over King Hussein is of so slender a nature that it is not a matter of great practical importance for Indian pilgrims whether the Capitulations are retained or abolished. Should, therefore, considerations of policy arising from the terms of the Turkish treaty and from the status now accorded to King Hussein lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to maintain in the Hedjaz the régime of the Capitulations, Mr. Montagu would not be disposed to question the validity of the conclusion from the point of view of the interests of Indian pilgrims.

Some form of arrangement to take the place of the Capitulations would, however, appear to be necessary, and the Secretary of State would be glad to be kept informed of any steps that may be taken in this direction.

I am, &c.

L. D. WAKELY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 87.

Mr. Montagu to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.)

December 20, 1920.

FRENCH and Italian Governments have invited His Majesty's Government to join in protest to King Hussein against abolition of Capitulations at Jeddah which

Hussein is reported to contemplate. Foreign Office have asked Jeddah to report telegraphically on his present attitude. Meanwhile they have asked French and Italian Governments on what grounds they would base their representations in face of recognition of independence of Hedjaz by principal Allied Powers.

Please telegraph your views with reference to Indian pilgrims. Is there evidence that Capitulations have in fact benefited Indians in the past?

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 87.

Government of India to Mr. Montagu.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram of 20th December last.

February 8, 1921.

We have no evidence of pilgrims benefiting directly from the Capitulations. They have derived benefit from presence of [? British] consulate, but how far that protection springs from rights under the Capitulations or depends on personal influence or prestige is difficult to say. Probability is that, with disappearance of Capitulations, consulate's powers of protection would in time be seriously circumscribed. We therefore incline to opinion that Capitulations should, if possible, be retained, or, if they have in fact lapsed, be restored in some form in the interests of our pilgrims and also of British subjects resident in the Hedjaz, but that no attempt should be made to extend their scope beyond what was customary under Turkish régime, British protection being kept as unobtrusive as possible.

[E 4509/100/93]

No. 88.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 240.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, April 15, 1921.

FOLLOWING telegram from Lawrence for Secretary of State for Colonies:—

"I had long interview with Feisal to-day, quite secretly. I read him first Mr. Churchill's statement of policy to Abdulla, as in minutes of meeting of 28th March; then explained time-table as drawn up by Sir P. Cox, and gave him drafts 1 to 4 of telegrams to and from Irak proposed by Sir P. Cox.

"Feisal expressed his appreciation of general policy outlined, and promised to do all he could to make his part of it work. He will guarantee neither to attack nor intrigue against French. He will accept mandate condition if he is allowed in his public statement in Irak to add qualifying clause accepted by His Majesty's Government, by which modifications in mandate may be made, after ratification of organic law, by negotiation between duly constituted Government of Mesopotamia and British Government. He will agree to establish friendly relations with Bin Saud on condition of Hedjaz immunity from Wahabi attack. He thinks that if he is given a free hand for first few weeks after Ramadan in Bagdad and neighbourhood, there should be little doubt of success of his candidature, but he thinks that his position as an outside candidate vis-à-vis the British administration there may be very delicate, and to keep him in proper touch with Sir P. Cox and his wishes he asks for British adviser on his personal staff. This must not be an official of Mesopotamian Government for many reasons, but it must be a person of weight in whose judgment he can trust, and he asks for loan of Colonel Cornwallis from Egyptian Government to accompany him to Mesopotamia. He makes this a condition of his going.

"He wants undertaking from His Majesty's Government that, if he is elected, his wishes will be considered in the matter of any future British staff engaged for Mesopotamia, and that, after consultation with Sir P. Cox, such changes as are considered necessary in present British personnel employed shall be made. He regards people of Irak as not fitted yet for responsible Government, and if he is left at the mercy of local people in all things there will be a disaster. He will require British help sometimes against his own people, and he hopes his opinion on permanent garrison will be taken eventually. He hopes that you and Sir P. Cox will accept these points, and will notify him of date in May when he should reach Suez to embark for Basrah. Meanwhile, he will expect to receive telegram No. 1 from Bagdad, and as soon as it is

received will start sending the replies to it. When his election is a fact he will ask Sir P. Cox to arrange a friendly accord between himself and Bin Saud, and will do his best to bring in father as third party. Abdulla warns me this will be difficult, since Hussein flies into hysterics and resigns whenever any suggestion of an accommodation is pressed upon him. Until subsidy question is resolved, Feisal prefers not to urge upon his father to sign and ratify peace treaties and quarantine regulations we propose. I communicated to him at his demand the gist of your telegram of 12th April about subsidies. He observed this left matters still hanging. Lord Curzon in January last agreed to principle of a subsidy which has been intermitted since March 1920. This pledge of Lord Curzon has been communicated to his father, and I promised to bring it also to your notice. He thinks at present 2,000l. a month is minimum subsidy necessary to keep Hedjaz on its feet.

"We then discussed Transjordan. He presumes that Abdulla will have sent to King Hussein the Arabic draft of our proposals which we gave to him in Jerusalem. He thought that relations of High Commissioner of Palestine and Arab Governor of Transjordan were not clearly enough defined, and suggested that latter's position would be improved if he were given the right of appeal to Colonial Office in matters of importance when divergencies between him and High Commissioner had arisen. He recognises the necessity for political subordination to Jerusalem, but is anxious for administrative independence. Feisal does not leave Suez till 21st April, so that if any further points occur to you it will be possible for me to see him again up to 20th April."

(Addressed to Foreign Office for Secretary of State for the Colonies; repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 4323/3777/88]

No. 89.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 15, 1921.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your letter of the 11th April on the subject of the delimitation of the frontier between Syria and Palestine.

2. While appreciating the reasons which lead Mr. Secretary Churchill to the view that delimitation of the boundary should precede occupation of the territories to be transferred, Lord Curzon is disposed to consider that the temporary occupation of these territories by agreement between the British and French High Commissioners, which is apparently the course advocated by Sir H. Samuel, might also recommend itself to the French Government, and he would prefer to approach them with this suggestion rather than with the alternative request referred to in the last paragraph of Sir H. Samuel's telegram.

3. His Lordship would propose therefore, subject to Mr. Churchill's concurrence, to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to approach the French Government, and to suggest that occupation of the areas in question might be arranged forthwith between the High Commissioners for Syria and Palestine in accordance with the general lines of the Anglo-French Convention, leaving any doubtful areas under the Administration by whom they are at present controlled, and without prejudice to any rectifications which may be decided upon by the Boundary Commission when it undertakes its work.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 4280/4/91]

No. 90.

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah).

(No. 36.).

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 16, 1921.

MY telegram No. 30 of 5th April: Hussein's fears of Wahabite attack.

Bagdad now report interview with Ibn Saud's envoy, in which latter stated he was unable to give assurance regarding Ibn Saud's attitude towards Hedjaz if Hussein

again refuses to permit Wahabis to take part in pilgrimage. He was, however, confident that pilgrims would not be attacked by Ibn Saud.

You should endeavour to persuade Hussein, if he shows signs of wishing to do so, not to place difficulties in the way of the Wahabis making the pilgrimage.

[E 4566/455/91]

No. 91.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 25. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, March 31, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 12th-31st March, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 91.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 12-31, 1921.

(Secret.)

Reported Advance by Wahabites.

KING HUSSEIN has produced no evidence in support of his statement that he has information of an imminent attack by the Akhwan, beyond the report that Khalid has returned to Khurma, bringing with him 150 rifles from Nejd.

On the other hand, rumours such as preceded the raids in the Taif district in December are again current, coupled with reports of the intention of the Masruh to seize any favourable opportunity that offers of revolting against the King and joining hands with the Akhwan should they attack the Hedjaz in force. Further reinforcements of troops are being sent to Taif.

An agent has reported a lengthy conversation with one of the sheikhs of the Harb, the gist of his remarks being that the promises made by King Hussein and his sons as to the continuance of tribal subsidies have been falsified, that the Bedouin, in great distress from the loss of the bulk of their camels through scarcity and during the war, the withholding of supplies by the King, the lack of money, and the scant consideration shown to their representations, are everywhere ripe for revolt, and would welcome any opportunity of bettering their condition.

Their difficulty lies, however, in finding a leader with sufficient initiative to instigate a combined revolt, and repeated secret meetings with this end in view have been unproductive, while at the back of their minds is apparently a deep-rooted fear that the King would in the event of internal trouble be supported by the British Government, and that the tribes would be starved into submission by a rigorous blockade.

Distress among the Bedouin is increasingly apparent, Jeddah being full of starving and poverty-stricken tribesmen from the surrounding country, reduced to selling their clothes and even their weapons, and the trend of information during the last few months goes to show that any external difficulties of King Hussein will almost certainly be taken advantage of by numbers of the Hedjaz Bedouin, and more particularly by the Harb, should the King persist in his present mistaken tribal policy.

The flying visit of Emir Ali to Rabegh had only a momentary effect, and the King's virtual blockade of that place has apparently only resulted in still further incensing the tribesmen.

Ibn Saud and the Idrisi.

The report of the Idrisi having been provided with munitions on the evacuation of Hodeidah has furnished King Hussein with further fuel for his resentment.

Extracts from communications received from him on the subject are attached.

The information was furnished to him by Abdullah-ibn-Hamza, the Emir of Kunfidah.

The latter reported about the middle of February that emissaries from Riyadh had announced at Ebha that the Wahabites would retain in the name of Ibn Saud whatever they captured by right of conquest, and that Hassan-ibn-Aidh was only a minor chief and had no right to a voice in Asir affairs.

Three emissaries had been sent to the Idrisi, and letters summoning Sheikh Faraj-ibn-Said (Beni Shehir-esh-Sham) and Sheikh Shebili-ibn-el-Arif (Beni Shehir-el-Yemen). The former excused himself, but the latter was reported to have proceeded to Riyadh.

Other emissaries from Nejd were in Muhail, and with the Rijal-el-Ma'.

The Imam has been "successful," and Ali-ibn-Abdu, of Birk, continued to hold up dhows bound for the Hedjaz, and had been to confer with the Idrisi at Midi.

King Hussein's comment on the above was that Ibn Saud and the Idrisi were clearly plotting to attack him, terminating with the characteristic taunt that apparently they were powerful enough for Great Britain to treat them as the equals of France in considering their interests, while neglecting his own.

Further reports of more recent date through Kunfidah were to the effect that Ibn Saud's deputation was still with the Idrisi, and had received presents from the latter, and that Wahhabies-in-Asir had prevented the importation of tobacco, were everywhere entering houses and breaking-up "shishas," and were destroying the domes of tombs in Jizan, Sabia, Abu Arish and Midi.

Nasir-ibn-Abd-er-Rahman (cousin of Ibn Aidh, of Ebha), was reported to have been released by the Idrisi, and to have attached himself to the above deputation.

An attempt by the Wahhabies to capture Suleiman-ibn-Ali near Muhail, and to collect "zikat" had failed, the Al Musa apparently defeating a combination of Wahhabi elements and the Beni Thuwwah.

Seyyid Mustafa had arrested certain notables of Hodeidah and sent them to Midi, for their alleged complicity in the plundering of a dhow by the Zaranik, laden with munitions for the Idrisi.

It had been reported that war material had been landed, either by the British or the Italians, for the Imam at Mokha, as had been done for the Idrisi at Midi.

No mention was made of possible French activity in the former connection, and King Hussein, ignoring the reference to the Italians, seized on the above reports as evidence of the contradiction between the desire expressed by His Majesty's Government to preserve peace in Arabia, and their apparent readiness nevertheless to supply rival chieftains, except himself, with munitions.

No reply has been received from Bagdad or Bahrein as yet which would give an indication for the grounds, if any, for King Hussein's accusation as to aeroplanes arriving in Riyadh, and, for the reason given in my telegram No. 35 of the 21st March, no notice has been taken of his communication on this subject or his similar allegations in respect of the Idrisi and the deliberate support of his enemies by Great Britain.

The consideration that many of King Hussein's actions and words may be treated largely as bluff, or as a test of how far he can persist with impunity in a policy of obstruction and pin-pricks until his claims are satisfied, does not, however, imply that he should be permitted entire licence to vilify His Majesty's Government on any and every pretext, as has become his habit of late.

Delay in opening of Kamaran.

Steamers have been now instructed to sail for Jeddah direct, and the Kamaran station will not apparently be in operation for some time yet.

The steamship "Lycaon" sailed under official instructions that the opening of Kamaran had been postponed until the 15th March, but after delaying her voyage six days, in order to reach Kamaran on that date and entering the inner anchorage, the station was found to be closed. A protest for the loss incurred and the necessity of entering and leaving a dangerous port without cause has been lodged on behalf of this ship, the master maintaining that a wireless message from Aden, notifying him of the displacement of the southern channel buoy, gave additional confirmation to the instructions already received.

Refund of Kamaran Dues.

In view of King Hussein's propaganda against shipping companies in the matter of alleged overcharges on quarantine dues, the local agents of Messrs. Holt under my instructions are refunding direct to pilgrims the 5 rupees Kamaran dues collected in anticipation of that station being in operation in February.

Figures received from Singapore conclusively prove that the allegations made by King Hussein this year are baseless, and I have informed him accordingly.

The refund direct has been considered advisable, as adherence to the normal rule of this company against refunds elsewhere than at Singapore would result in a delay liable to furnish King Hussein with further material for his attempts to discredit, in the eyes of the pilgrims, the arrangements of the companies which carry them.

In the case of the Dutch steamers, a notice has been published that the consul for the Netherlands, through the action of the King, has forced the agent concerned to refund dues which the companies had fraudulently overcharged.

Local Quarantine Arrangements.

Pilgrims, since the final arrangement made as to the form of payment of dues, are being only detained for twenty-four hours in quarantine, the King being apparently nervous of incurring unpopularity by himself collecting the excess P.T. 15, originally charged for the second and third days, his attempt to foist this upon the agents having failed.

The pilgrims undergo none of the prescribed measures, and in the case of the "Lycaon" were sent to the further island, where no sanitary appliances exist. In view of the fact that the minimum period of voyage to Jeddah, under observation, amounts to twelve days, the detention of pilgrims for an additional period of observation only, without any attempt at carrying out sanitary precautions, again sufficiently shows the extent to which financial and other considerations tend to confuse purely sanitary measures while quarantine control remains in the hands of the Hashimite Government.

The "Lycaon" was further unnecessarily detained at Jeddah, firstly, owing to the quarantine authority failing to expedite the disembarkation of the pilgrims; and, secondly, by a medical inspection being delayed while, it is stated, the Director-General was negotiating the purchase of some canary birds. A protest and a request for the co-operation of the authorities in ensuring the minimum delay to steamers scheduled only to remain in Jeddah for a few hours, received the characteristic reply that the facilities offered at Jeddah were such as could not be found in any other port in the world.

German Enterprise.

A number of catalogues of agricultural machinery and other goods, in English and German, have been received addressed to the agency, and in addition such catalogues are being posted direct to Aref Bey in Mecca, offering the most favourable terms for payment and transport.

One such catalogue, forwarded here by Aref Bey for translation, draws attention to the ability, owing to current conditions, of German firms to offer better service and more favourable prices than their British or American competitors.

Rupee currency.

A panic has been created locally and in Mecca by a private circular received from Bombay stating that a series of twenty-five issues of 100-rupee notes, dating from 1915, are fraudulent, and there is some danger of rupee notes generally not being accepted in consequence.

The Kajmakam of Jeddah, speaking for the Government, emphasised the need of either calming local opinion by a prompt official denial, or making arrangements, firstly, to redeem such notes sent from the Hedjaz; and, secondly, to take steps to prevent their being imported by ignorant pilgrims, should the notice prove to be correct.

He has seen some of the notes in question and states they are not to be distinguished in any way as fraudulent, and have evidently been in constant circulation.

There is always the possibility of the notice being circulated in order to discredit Indian paper, and the matter has been referred to Bombay by telegram for confirmation.

Egyptian Aukaf.

The King has expressed some anxiety as to the continued cessation of the supplies for the Egyptian Tekiya, and informed me he had instructed merchants to issue an equivalent on credit on his own responsibility.

It will be recollected that allegations have been previously made as to the misappropriation of former stocks by the Government, especially in Medina.

Medina Pilgrimage.

The first caravan is announced as due to start in the middle of April.

The Yenbo-Medina road is still closed by the Hamada, and the Government has disclaimed responsibility for any losses by robbery.

Successive sheikhs appointed by the King to safeguard the route have failed to do so, the last, it is stated, having a caravan robbed under his eyes by his own tribesmen. As the Juheinah are virtually independent of the King the sheikhs concerned were probably implicated, and share the proceeds.

Red Sea Patrol.

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 24th March, and sailed for Port Soudan the next day.

Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 465. Emir Habib Lotfallah has been appointed a private adviser to King Hussein in foreign affairs, in addition to the official appointment of Rafiq-al-Rufaqa.

No. 467. An official acknowledgment of two insulting anonymous letters addressed to the King.

A notice calling on every good Moslem to assist in the arrest of Hamza Gouth, and, if necessary to kill him, on the grounds that he was implicated in the theft of articles from the Medina Haram.

Note.—King Hussein requested the assistance of the French consul-general in arresting Hamza Gouth in Syria, at the time the latter was in Cairo, as well as of this Agency in procuring his extradition from Egypt. The notice is obviously due to political motives, the King being nervous of his connection with Ibn Rashid, and of his known opposition to himself.

A letter from the Syrian Union in Cairo addressed to "His Hashimite Majesty Hussein I, King of the Arabs," with the telegram of protest sent to Geneva.

A similar communication from the Central Committee of Mesopotamian Societies.

No. 468. A schedule of charges to pilgrims for this year.

The announcement of the death of Ibn Sabah as a martyr and victim of political ends.

No. 469. An official notice drawing attention to the alleged counterfeit Indian notes, and repeating the notice as to the non-acceptance of rupee notes from pilgrims which appeared in No. 456.

"Al Falah."

Since the departure of the editor for Egypt, no further issues have been published.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 91.

King Hussein to British Agent, Jeddah.

(Extract from Translation.)

March 18, 1921.

I HUMBLY beg Great Britain again, to carry out what is mentioned therein (letter of 21st Zil Ka'ada 1336), as I have no aim or object which necessitates affecting her interests in the least, not only with France, but with the Idrisi and Ibn Saud,

I need not say after this that there is an end to patience, and that every question has some beginnings from which the result may be known. We have finished fighting the Turks, and now on the one hand I am fighting the great Ally France, and on the other hand Great Britain, through Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, as may be clearly known this time from the material help given them by her.

Enclosure 3 in No. 91.

King Hussein to British Agent, Jeddah.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

March 20, 1921.

I HAVE private information that the Wahabites (both nomad and settled) are advancing to attack us.

Everybody knows that Ibn Saud is hardly able to provide ten camels from one village to another, but I, knowing for certain that aeroplanes one after another are coming between Mesopotamia and Riyadh, have good reason to be sure of what is mentioned; and rather than fight against Britain, I will go down to Jeddah in shame, and thus diminish my responsibility for bloodshed, avoid committing such an offence, and causing the annihilation of the Arabs.

Enclosure 4 in No. 91.

Shipping Intelligence to March 26, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 26th March, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
Iran ..	British	Bombay	March 15	..	Packages.
Mansourah	P. Soudan	Suez ..	March 11	" 12	..	2,596
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 12	" 12	..	560
Porto Maurizio	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 13	" 13	..	22
Tantah ..	British ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	535
Lycan	Singapore	Liverpool	" 17	" 20	1,315	50 tons
Khosrou	Bombay	" 18	38,802
Sumatra ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	Java ..	" 21	March 23	1,365	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 21	" 21	..	28
Tantah ..	British ..	P. Soudan	Suez ..	" 21	" 22	..	1,081
Mansourah	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 25	" 26	..	523
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 26	" 26	..	292

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 24th and left on the 25th March, 1921.

[E 4700/4531/93]

No. 92.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, April 20, 1921.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to transmit herewith the accompanying copies of telegraphic correspondence on the subject of the interviews between Colonel Lawrence and the Emir Feisal in Egypt, and to request that, if Lord Curzon sees no objection, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby may be instructed to move the Egyptian Government to agree that the services of Colonel K. Cornwallis, D.S.O., C.B.E., should be put at the disposal of His Majesty's High Commissioner for Mesopotamia at the first possible opportunity.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 92.

Mr. Churchill to Colonel Lawrence (Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 19, 1921.

THIS telegram is being addressed to Cairo and repeated to Jerusalem to make sure that you receive it before you see Feisal again, but you should in future keep me fully informed of your movements.

[6831]

T 2

I assume that Jerusalem telegram No. 87 was sent by you, and that you had not then received my telegram of the 16th.

Following is reply to your telegram No. L8 of the 15th April. Taking the points in order:—

1. Feisal may be assured by you that in his first public statement in Irak he will be allowed to say that His Majesty's Government have agreed that after ratification of the Organic Law, modifications in the mandate may be made by negotiations between duly constituted Government of Mesopotamia and His Majesty's Government.

2. In same way that I explained to Abdullah you should explain to Feisal that while His Majesty's Government cannot absolutely guarantee that Ibn Saud will be able to restrain his followers from attacking the Hedjaz, by making him dependent upon their financial support they are taking the line which appears to them to be most likely to achieve this object.

3. To attach a British official to Feisal now would, I consider, compromise our assurances of neutrality. As an alternative, Sir P. Cox has proposed that Colonel Cornwallis should be sent at once to Mesopotamia as a member of his own staff to be used as liaison with Feisal when the latter arrives. Foreign Office are being asked to instruct Cairo accordingly. Colonel Cornwallis's services can of course be transferred to Feisal later only if latter makes good.

4. As regards future British staff, you may tell Feisal that we will certainly give sympathetic consideration to his wishes. We are confident that in the event of his being chosen there will be every desire on the part of the officials remaining in the country to help him to make his régime a success, and we hope very much that he will come to Mesopotamia with an open mind.

5. I presume that Feisal is nervous that he may be forced in Mesopotamia into the same position that led to his rupture with the French in Syria, but he must rely upon the good offices of the strong staff of British advisers of whom, as Sir P. Cox points out, he will have the benefit to restrain the Nationalist tendencies of his Ministry.

6. You may also tell him that though they cannot of course bind themselves in advance to accept whatever recommendations he may make, His Majesty's Government will always be prepared to consider his views on the question of the strength and composition of the British garrison in Mesopotamia.

7. I agree with Sir P. Cox that Feisal should wait a little while before deciding on what date he should sail for Basra. A message from us can always be sent him through the British agent in Jeddah.

8. You may assure him that Sir P. Cox will do all he can to arrive at a satisfactory *modus vivendi* between himself and Ibn Saud, but that it is an essential preliminary as between his father and Ibn Saud that a conciliatory spirit should be displayed by King Hussein.

9. The monthly figure for Hedjaz subsidy appeared in your telegram No. L8 as 2,000*l.* instead of 20,000*l.* This explains my telegram of the 16th. In any case His Majesty's Government cannot consider making payments to King Hussein beyond the figure sanctioned by the Cabinet, namely, 5,000*l.* a month and a possible gift of 20,000*l.*, both being subject to satisfactory undertakings on his part. There appears to be no advantage in holding out hopes that any larger sum will be sanctioned on receipt of budget statement from Mecca.

10. If he thinks that he is being unfairly treated by the local representative of His Majesty's Government the Arab Governor of Transjordan will of course have an ultimate appeal to the mandatory, but that this contingency will arise I see no reason whatever to anticipate.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 20, and Bagdad, No. 22.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 92.

Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Cox (Bagdad).

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 19, 1921.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 28, time did not admit of further consultation with you before despatch of my telegram of to-day to Lawrence. I hope that you will agree with general lines of it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 92.

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, April 18, 1921.

REFERENCE to Lawrence's telegram L8; repeated to me under Cairo, No. 240. My comments are as follows:—

1. My copy contains words "he will accept mandate conditionally." Is any other condition, beyond that contained in clause which follows above sentence, stipulated by him?

2. His undertaking regarding Ibn Saud is a puzzle.

3. It must, I think, be clear to you that after what has passed here and assurances that have been given our [?] neutrality would be altogether compromised if we were to send [?] him here with a well-known officer attached to him, and I could not agree to it. I propose, however, following alternative which seems equally well to serve the purpose. Send Cornwallis here at once as a member of my own staff and I will use him for liaison with Feisal's staff when latter comes. With such a distinguished visitor in my sphere it is very natural that I should utilise the services of an officer who knows him, in order to give him and myself confidence in concert with our mutual dealings. This solution will I trust be accepted, and I hope Cornwallis will come at once to say he is appointed to my staff and refrain from any mention of connection with Feisal. If Feisal makes good he can in due course transfer Cornwallis's services to himself.

4. As regards future British staff, I think that we may agree to consider Feisal's wishes sympathetically in such matters. I hope very much that he will come with an open mind as I am confident that he will find that in the event of his being elected there will, on the part of officers remaining here, be every desire to help him to make his régime a success.

5. He must rely on good influence of British advisers as regards people of Irak.

6. With reference to permanent garrison, His Majesty's Government are in best position to reply to him as to his request to be consulted.

7. Telegram, one worded slightly differently, has already been despatched to his father. It is advisable that he should see effect of these telegrams and their replies and await advice of his friends here before deciding when to start.

8. Judging from demeanour of Ibn Saud's delegates here I have every reason to hope that, should Feisal be elected, Ibn Saud would be quite ready to meet him half-way in effecting satisfactory *modus vivendi*, provided that King of Hedjaz displays same spirit of conciliation.

(Repeated Cairo for Lawrence, 591 S.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 92.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, April 17, 1921.

YOUR telegram containing the decision of the Cabinet on the question of the Hedjaz subsidy reached me in Jerusalem but not in time to communicate with Feisal. When he mentioned need of 20,000*l.* a month I said that he was most favoured in knowing the real financial position in the Hedjaz. He then admitted that that figure was a guess, and he promised to send from Mecca an authentic budget for our guidance, and promised to urge his father to treat us in future with confidence. He is urging Abdullah to meet him on 20th April. If this meeting is arranged I will make endeavours to be present, since the three brothers might be brought to a definite issue about Transjordan. Abdullah can for the present keep external peace there; his rule, however, is more of a picnic than an administration, and can only be made scientific by an exceptional British adviser or, as was contemplated in our original scheme, by his resigning in favour of a Governor-General [*sic*], and I think the sooner the better. Abramson promises well. Proposition of my going to Jeddah, although fenced round, was avoided.

Enclosure 5 in No. 92.

Mr. Churchill to Colonel Lawrence (c/o High Commissioner, Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 16, 1921.

FROM my telegram of 15th April, which crossed your telegram No. 18, you will have learnt that Cabinet have agreed in principle to payment to King Hussein of a subsidy of 60,000*l.* plus a lump sum of 20,000*l.* It has always been assumed here that it was absolutely necessary to maintain principle of equality as between Hussein and Ibn Saud, and it was on these grounds that I recommend Cabinet to grant same amounts to both chieftains, but we naturally do not want to pay Hussein more than is really necessary. Have you any reasons to suppose that Hussein would be willing to accept less than his rival? A sum of 5,000*l.* paid to Feisal before his departure from England has, you will remember, already been earmarked as charge against Hussein's subsidy. I had also contemplated treating in the same way 5,000*l.* paid to Abdullah. This involves immediate reduction of 10,000*l.* from first year's payment to Hussein, and strengthens the ground for not confining subsidy, at any rate in the first instance, to what you describe as minimum necessary to keep Hedjaz on its feet. On other points raised in your telegram I will telegraph as soon as possible. Meanwhile, let me have your views on subsidy question with least possible delay. Message to Feisal authorised in my telegram of yesterday should, if not already delivered, be withheld pending further instructions from me. Please repeat your reply to Bagdad.

(Repeated Bagdad, No. 19, for favour of immediate views on points raised in Lawrence's telegram.)

Enclosure 6 in No. 92.

Mr. Churchill to Colonel Lawrence (c/o High Commissioner, Cairo).

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 15, 1921.

FEISAL may be informed that he may tell his father that, subject to certain conditions to which I am sure he will agree as they are what the Middle East Department would counsel in the Arab interest, Cabinet have consented to the payment of a subsidy of 60,000*l.* a year. In addition they would agree to the payment some time this year of a lump sum of 20,000*l.* Unless you think the subsidy alone will cause great disappointment you need not tell Feisal about this. It is always better not to give away good things wholesale. King Hussein should also be told by Feisal that I hope you will be able to visit him at Jeddah a little later in the year and make a definite agreement. Give Feisal friendly messages from me, enjoin the utmost discretion, and explain to him that the reason why you are not accompanying him to Jeddah is not to excite wrongful French suspicions.

There is no objection your telling Feisal what is being done as regards Ibn Saud.

[E 4708/482/89]

No. 93.

Note on a Conversation with General Haddad.—(Received April 21.)

Lord Curzon,

GENERAL HADDAD called yesterday to give me an account of the conversation he had had in Paris with M. Berthelot, which took place on the 13th instant.

M. Berthelot opened by saying that, officially, he had two communications to make to the General: (1) That Emir Feisal was regarded as the enemy of France, and (2) that it was the intention of the French Government when preliminary arrangements, such as the confirmation of the mandates, had been completed to divide Syria into two Administrations—that of Damascus and that of Aleppo.

As regards the Emir, the General had then reminded M. Berthelot of the way he and the Emir had worked together in Paris when M. Clemenceau was Prime Minister; and, while accepting what M. Berthelot might have to say officially, pressed him strongly to express his personal view of the Emir; in this way the General had elicited from M. Berthelot the admission that he himself believed personally in the loyalty of the Emir's character, and on this the General had not hesitated to make the personal admission that he considered the Emir to have fallen into the hands of very bad counsellors last year in Damascus.

On the second point the General repeated to me at length the immense exordium which he uttered to M. Berthelot with the object of proving his sincerity of motive when he warned the French Government against the course they intended to pursue and the disastrous effects the proposed policy would have. He had, he said to M. Berthelot, in similar circumstances warned the British Government against the policy they were pursuing last year in Mesopotamia, and his warnings had been listened to but disregarded, with results as unfortunate as those which would now ensue to the French in Syria. He, speaking on behalf of the Emir, did not wish things to turn out so. He wanted the Arabs within and without Syria alike to be equally contented. He did not believe they would be contented in Syria unless they had an Arab ruler over the whole of Syria who must be a Shereefian—whether Abdullah or another. He had related the exertions the Emir Feisal had put forth to restrain the recent agitation in Transjordan. He had stated the Emir's conviction that good relations between France and England in Syria were essential to the peace and prosperity of the Arab countries, and his firm intention to continue his efforts in the same direction in the future.

M. Berthelot had listened courteously to General Haddad's language, and had allowed him to gather the impression that later on his views on Syrian affairs might be worth considering.

On the whole General Haddad seemed well content with the result of his conversation. He thought that not only had he not made matters worse, but that he had perhaps made them a little better.

R. C. L.

April 19, 1921.

[E 4928/117/89]

No. 94.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 31, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that it is my considered opinion that English popularity and prestige are at present under a cloud in this town, as compared with their position shortly after the armistice.

The reasons for this appear to be somewhat as follows:—

1. The extreme unpopularity of the Zionist policy in Palestine, which is disliked by the Christian, distrusted by the Mahommedan and scourged by the press. All who have interests in Palestine appear to fear that these will eventually suffer at the hands of the Zionists, and that they and all Arabs in general may be ousted from Government posts and even from their lands by the former. In my No. 39 I have ventured to suggest that some effort be made to correct this impression, and I enclose a cutting from the "Suria Jedida" which I had inserted as a "trial run." It is taken directly from the "Daily Telegraph" of the 11th March.

2. The alleged "betrayal" of the Arabs by us. The rabid Shereefians consider that we abandoned the Emir Feisal in his hour of need; nothing short of an Emir of Damascus chosen from his family would content them. They seem to be convinced that England could force such a nomination on the French if she chose; and these extremists see in our policy in Transjordan an encouragement which, however, does not go nearly far enough to content them and their self-interested aspirations.

The Syrians, in general, would probably prefer independent misgovernment by men of kindred race to government by the French, who have certainly failed to achieve any measure of popularity except with the Catholic Syrians. The latter are, of course, delighted with the situation at present, though I fancy the snubs they receive with unflinching regularity may end by rendering them less contented.

The only sections which I should consider at all genuine in their professions of pro-British feelings are the Orthodox Greeks and the Syrian Protestants, though individuals, such as Ali Riza Pasha Rickabi, must not be forgotten.

Pecuniary interests appear to me to play a higher rôle in Syria than in any portion of the East with which I am acquainted, and by far the largest section of the upper classes is only "pro-anyone" so far and so long as it can see an immediate compensation.

An Arab Kingdom would mean lucrative posts for its henchmen, while England was popular as long as she opened her purse. At her withdrawal there was a general

* Not printed.

reshuffle, and most persons of this type are now accepting (rather smaller) doles from France and singing her praises when there is anyone likely to hear them and report them to the French Mission.

This class I am inclined to regard as political nonentities, and they are only worth serious consideration in so far as their attitude may affect that of the smaller bands of zealots.

The Kurds are ostensibly pro-French, though they too have not met with a treatment in accordance with that which they might feel entitled to expect. Some of their notables I believe to prefer the Turkish régime to any, and the attempted French rapprochement with the Kemalists and the mooted nomination of a Turkish Prince as Emir are probably welcomed by them.

Other local candidates for this dignity—should it ever be decided upon—are Nessib Bey-el-Bakri, who pretends to be a descendant of Abu Bekr, and Ahmed Nami Bey, of the Koreich tribe—who married a daughter of Abdul-Hamid. The latter has much the more supporters. There is also the Emir Said-el-Jezairli—a grandson of Abdul-Kador—who is chiefly notable for his incapacity, ignorance and conceit.

None of these persons could, however, hope to retain power indefinitely unless they received substantial financial aid. There is a deficit in the revenue this year of more than half a million, and the State is already heavily taxed. It is hard to say whether the French are really seriously considering the advisability of nominating a Turkish Prince, and paying him the large subsidy required as part price of peace with the Kemalists.

It will be clear from the above that I believe that the occupying Power of this country could always receive a large majority at a referendum, unless the proceedings were conducted with absolute impartiality and by secret ballot.

Finally, I believe that Syria could, if left to its own devices, be auctioned to the highest bidder; that no mandatory power would content the people for long or ever win their hearts; that they are now ready for a change; that if they cannot dispense with a mandatory power their experiences of the French have made many regret us in comparison—largely because we spent more here—and that they would probably prefer America to either.

The Italian consul-general here—who is a "conseiller de légation" and the hierarchic head of all posts in Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and the Hedjaz—has been trying in various insidious ways to acquire a certain preponderance. He has not always been very scrupulous in his manoeuvres and is not on good terms with the French Mission. The latter openly accuse the Italians of providing the Kemalists with arms.

3. As France is the "top dog" here at present, her protection of Mesopotamian agitators—and the intrigues of these latter—cannot fail to further undermine our position. The local inhabitant can hardly fail to draw his own conclusions from the presence of a notorious person like Mohamad Oseimi in a car belonging to the French Mission and in the company of some of the latter's members, on a recent visit to Tadmor.

In my No. 38 of the 29th I reported this, and the alleged object of Oseimi's visit.

To sum up:—

1. There are so many different interests and different parties here, that no single definite Arab policy of ours could possibly meet with unanimous approval.

2. We are unpopular with most subjects of this State, and the French are going the right way about to become disliked.

3. The only way to be "popular" here is to spend money freely on subsidies to the "bosses" of the various parties; and in a lesser degree to construct communications and foster commerce.

4. There are not fifty men in the town who would fire a shot in support of the Shereef, until they knew he was winning. There would be, however, numbers in at the death.

5. The French seem to have succeeded in sowing the seeds of the discord among the Druzes; and probably hope to keep them from exterior mischief in this way.

6. Zionism is certainly very unpopular.

7. There is a mild reign of terror here, and everyone appears terrified of getting into the bad books of the French. Very few of the real Shereefian supporters have ventured near me, and all believe that their actions and visits are repeated to the French Mission.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4930/117/89]

No. 95.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 2, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Governor and Director for the Interior have left for Beirut to take part in the official reception to be offered General Gouraud.

The Director of Finance will act as Governor. An honorary delegation from Damascus will also leave shortly, but I have not yet obtained their names.

I append the list of persons who have been appointed members of the honorary Damascus delegation to the Beirut Fair, which will open on the 15th, and I take this opportunity of giving notes about those who appear to call for such remark, so that it will not be necessary to refer to them again in any further despatch of my series "Damascus Personalities." I hope to complete this series shortly:—

1. *Fozi Bey-el-Bakri*.—Mahommedan notable; was in trouble with Jemal Pasha and joined Feisal. Later became pro-French through jealousy of Feisal and his brother Nessib-el-Bakri; of the latter, more later.

2. *Mohamed Said-el-Yusuf*.—Mahommedan notable, and owns enormous estates; pro-European, and speaks English and French fluently; only 22, and a great friend of Hussein Ibbish, of whom more later. Said and his brothers were educated at the Agricultural College, Cirencester. He takes no part in politics; is very friendly with Colonel Easton and myself; but is also quite friendly with the French. Owns large lands in the Bekaa and also near Bisan. Has no grudge against the Turks. He is a Kurd. The late Abdurrahman Pasha-el-Yusuf, his father, was the recognised head of the local Kurds; also leader of the pilgrimage for some time, and a deputy in the Turkish Parliament, despite his lack of education. He was considered pro-French and to have some pretensions to be Emir of Syria. Was president of the Medjliss Shura. He was killed by Hauranese brigands, during the attack on the train at Kherbet-el-Gazala, on account of his reputed pro-French and pro-European leanings. Alaeddine Droubi, of Homs, the Prime Minister and Minister of War, was deliberately killed also. The present Director of the Interior was maltreated and nearly killed at the same time.

3. *Rushdy-el-Succari*.—Mahommedan merchant.

4. *Hassan Sioufi*.—Mahommedan silk merchant and notable.

5. *Emir Tahir-el-Jezairli*.—Algerian resident notable. Grandson of the famous Abdul Kader. Imprisoned for three years by Jemal Pasha. Very pro-French, but is not at all anti-British. Well off.

6. *Kalil Sara*.—Greek Catholic banker and merchant.

7. *Ameen Melluk*.—Greek Orthodox merchant and notable.

8. *Habib Kahaleh*.—Greek Orthodox editor of the "Suria-el-Jedida." I referred to him in a special despatch No. 39. Besides desiring a small subsidy for publicist articles, he has expressed his willingness to provide information. He is trusted by the French, as his selection on this committee proves, and he will probably prove worth cultivating.

9. *Izzet Shaoui*.—Greek Catholic landowner and member of the municipal council.

10. *Yusuf Linyado*.—Jew, banker and merchant.

(Copy to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4846/117/89]

No. 96.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 5, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that while the budget for the year ending the 31st March, 1922, has not yet been completed, it is estimated at about 1½ million dinars. The gold dinar may be taken, roughly, as 1l. paper. The modern calendar, not the Greek, is in use.

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The revenue is estimated at about 800,000 dinars; so that a considerable deficit appears certain, and that existing taxes must soon be raised or new ones imposed.

The chief sources of revenue are the following:—

Tithes, werko (the old vergui on land and property), temettu, cattle tax.

I take this opportunity of correcting previous statements *re* customs duties.

This State does not receive any share of duties in respect of goods landed at Beirut or Haiffa and destined for here. In the time of Feisal such share was claimed, but without result.

Parcels from abroad, however, are taxed 11 per cent. on the invoices, or on the local estimate of the value of the goods.

Permission must be obtained to import alcohol even from the Grand Liban, and heavy fines are inflicted here for neglect of this formality.

In addition, for every ton arriving by train a sum of 30 Syrian piastres is levied, while on loads arriving by animal transport 15 Syrian piastres is charged per animal, whether harnessed to a cart or used as pack-animal and irrespective of weight carried.

There is, further, a municipal octroi created by the French. For each donkey, horse or mule load, 3 Syrian piastres; for a camel load, 6 Syrian piastres; for a lorry or car, 12 Syrian piastres. There is a similar octroi at Hamah, Homs and Deraa.

The Syrian piastre is rather less than 1 penny.

Régie.—The Ottoman Régie, which has eight years to run, levies a duty of 75 per cent. on imported tobacco and cigarettes. This duty is only paid once for all Syria. The director here is M. Gutowski, an Ottoman subject.

Ottoman Public Debt.—This is still collected from the six taxes. The proceeds are sent to Paris. There are branches in each caza and a French inspector here, M. Wagner. But I learn that the debt will shortly sever any further connection with Constantinople and report direct to the French High Commissioner at Beirut. The employees will all be natives or French nominees, and Arabic its official language.

Municipal Taxation.—The new municipal taxes are innumerable, and all pre-war taxes have been vastly increased, but, while I enclose a list of them for reference, I have not translated them, as I have already notified the local authorities, after consulting His Britannic Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, that British subjects were only to pay those taxes agreed by the Beirut council of dragomans of 1909 and 1913, and that only up to the percentage in force before the 1st October, 1914, adding that, should the authorities consider further taxation an absolute necessity, they must obtain the consent of His Majesty's Government before claiming anything additional from British subjects.

The local authorities have of course not accepted my point of view; and I have now taken the matter up with the French Mission, in the hope of getting a definite ruling as to what taxes are payable and what are not.

(Copies to Jerusalem, Cairo, Bagdad and Department of Overseas Trade.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4847/117/89]

No. 97.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 5, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that there have been frequent acts of brigandage in the kaza of Zebdani, in the Anti-Lebanon, which includes the villages of Sargaya and Bludan. The latter village contains house property of the Edinburgh Mission Hospital at Damascus.

The chief persons responsible are:—

1. At or near Zebdani—

(1.) The Tal family. Chief: Kasim-el-Tal.

(2.) The Bey family. Chiefs: Ahmed Assad Bey, Mohamad Said Bey, Mohamad Abu Fayad Bey, Kalil Kabalan Bey.

2. At or near Bludan—

Mohamad Ali Moussa.

3. At or near Sargaya—

The Shammatt family. Chiefs: Tofik-el-Shammatt, Hussein Shammatt, Ferhan-el-Shammatt, Yussuf Abdul Rahim Shammatt, Shehab-el-Shammatt.

These are all Mahommedans, and, besides pillaging persons and houses, Christians and Mahommedans alike, they have not stopped short of murder.

Just before the French occupation, Tofik-el-Shammatt went to Zebdani and held up the kaïmakam and robbed his safe. Feisal took punitive measures, killed and arrested some of the clan and burnt their houses.

The rest fled to the French, and were joined later by those imprisoned, who joined a revolt in the prison here during which 470 prisoners were killed, but many escaped.

The French have since arrested about thirty of this clan, but now there is talk of releasing them, which, if done, could only lead to a renewal of brigandage.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4927/455/91]

No. 98.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 26. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 10th April, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,

Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

(Secret.)

Jeddah Report, April 1-10, 1921.

Quarantine.

SUBSEQUENT to the call of the Steamship "Lycaon" at Kamaran on the 15th March, when that station was found closed, a Dutch pilgrim ship arrived at Jeddah direct, and the pilgrims were accordingly sent to the islands for observation.

Kamaran was then opened, but the agency was not made aware of the fact until after the arrival of the next two pilgrim ships (when this information was furnished by the Netherlands consul), and after the despatch of the last report stating that such ships had been instructed to sail to Jeddah direct.

The pilgrims on these two ships were disembarked at Kamaran and the measures stipulated in the convention were carried out, the papers being endorsed accordingly.

On arrival at Jeddah, they were however detained in quarantine and the pilgrims were sent as before to the islands.

The attention of the Government was drawn to this action as being contrary to the previous assurances received, and a meeting was arranged with the kaïmakam of Jeddah and the director-general of quarantine with the object of again placing the latter, as well as the Government, in full possession of the facts and of attempting if possible to arrive at an understanding for the future.

Previous to the arrival of these steamers—one British and one Dutch—Thabit Bey had threatened that unless the dues payable for the two last Dutch steamers, and for the British ship "Achilles" next due, were immediately forthcoming from the agent in gold, he would refuse pratique to the "Achilles."

Owing to the agent being temporarily short of enough gold to meet both these dues, and the heavy call made on him by refunding Kamaran dues to some 5,000 pilgrims the cash for which had to be purchased by gold, and the insistence of the Government on immediate payment, this was offered at once in rupees at the local equivalent, or in gold if time were given for obtaining the latter.

The rupees tendered in immediate payment were returned with the receipts, the official concerned refusing to take back the latter, whereupon the agent was accused of having attempted to cheat the Government by fraudulently retaining both the receipts and the money, and a complaint was addressed to me on the subject. As this particular payment concerned Dutch ships alone, I referred the Government to the consul for the Netherlands, while at the same time making the position quite clear as regards the "Achilles."

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The fact that payment in gold had been made before for British ships, and could be made, from the separate account of the Holt Agency, for the Steamship "Achilles" added additional weight to the protest immediately made to the King against the threat of the director-general to again refuse sanitary facilities to a British ship, in itself totally unjustifiable, and quite unwarrantable in the present circumstances.

After some difficulty, the matter was finally settled by my informing the King that, in order to avoid the consequences of the hasty and ill-advised action of the director-general, I would personally guarantee that the dues for the "Achilles" would be paid in gold in the ordinary course, but that threats of the nature made, not for the first time, by the quarantine authority could not be tolerated.

The matter was further made quite clear to Thabit Bey himself in the presence of the kaïmakam. He of course denied having taken any such action, until confronted with his own letter, whereupon he apologised for what he attempted to treat as an unfortunate misunderstanding.

It may be pointed out incidentally that a telegram had been received from Mecca, the day before the director-general proceeded to carry his threat into effect by forbidding lighters to proceed to the "Achilles" on her arrival, informing me that no difficulties were being made, and that instructions had been already issued that the payment for the "Achilles" would be accepted in the ordinary course.

The whole question of quarantine was again carefully discussed and explained. The director-general attempted to confuse the issue as much as possible, but with the assistance of the kaïmakam was induced to admit that the detention of the pilgrims at Jeddah after the opening of Kamaran was not in accordance with the convention, that the Hashimite Government did not admit the provisions of the convention as sufficient in all cases, but that whatever were the reservations considered as necessary regarding the further detention of pilgrims, the ships conveying them could not be expected to remain in quarantine and submit to delay on a purely local decision contrary to the provisions of the international convention, which alone they were entitled to consider as authoritative.

It was therefore agreed that after the inspection of the bill of health on arrival, the quarantine flag should be immediately lowered, and free access be allowed whether all the pilgrims had been disembarked or not. The director-general pointed out that this was ridiculous, if they had to be quarantined, in which I fully agreed with him, but on having the reason pointed out to him, he was forced to admit that if the convention held good as regards the right of steamers to *libre pratique*, it should be equally applicable to the pilgrims on board. I informed him that his notification as regards the necessity of further detaining pilgrims, despite a clean bill of health from Kamaran and on arrival, should a death from whatever cause have occurred at any time on the voyage, would be taken as official in further reference of this question to Mecca, in which he and the kaïmakam concurred.

A brief résumé of the whole question was furnished to the King, together with a translation of the relevant portions of the 1912 convention, with a request for a definite answer in writing as to whether the Hashimite Government intends to adhere unconditionally to the convention as promised, or wishes to make any reservations, together with a formal protest in the interests of pilgrims themselves and British shipping against further unnecessary quarantine detention and delay after the provisions of the convention have been duly complied with.

The Holt pilgrim ship "Helenus" on arrival next day was given immediate *pratique*, on the grounds that no deaths had occurred. The papers showed that one death had actually taken place, but this was possibly held to be cancelled by a birth, which left the number of pilgrims as before.

The formal reply of the Hashimite Government to my protest against the threats made by the director-general of quarantine, before her arrival, to refuse facilities to the "Achilles," was that no reply was necessary, as the "Helenus" had not been detained, and that hasty conclusions should not be arrived at before ascertaining the facts.

I considered it advisable to return this communication, confining myself to the remark that my representations had referred to the "Achilles," and to specific threats made before the arrival of either ship, and not to any subsequent action of the above official.

The above letter is typical of many similar communications, emanating ostensibly from the Hashimite Foreign Office, so-called, but in reality dictated on the spur of the moment by King Hussein.

Difficulties in dealing with the Hashimite Government.

During the latter's last visit, I had an opportunity of witnessing how the business of state is conducted. The King receives a letter, calls his private secretary, or the official concerned, and gives an immediate outline, sometimes brief, more generally long and involved, of what he wishes to say in reply.

The scribe then leaves his presence to draw up the answer, which on submission is frequently added to by one or more postscripts in the King's own hand.

Replies to the plainest and most ordinary of communications, as well as to more complicated and important matters, are thus dictated entirely at the hazard of King Hussein's mood of the moment.

This may account for the fact that the majority of communications from or through this agency during the past year, and especially during the last few months, have received answers from the Government which are either completely irrelevant, deliberately obstructive, or in some cases little short of insulting; and so they may be expected to continue until King Hussein considers he has reasons for changing his attitude, is taken to task and induced to treat His Majesty's Government with more outward respect, or ceases to reign.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

The Government shows no disposition to assist in the prompt and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of deceased pilgrims, particularly in respect of furnishing the necessary death certificate for comparison with the return ticket, in order for the latter to be authenticated by the agency.

A large number of claims for refund in the Straits Settlements are in particular held up in default of this authentication required by statute, and if King Hussein persists in refusing to assist the agency in this matter, he will be informed that the heirs concerned will be notified of the reason.

It is perfectly legitimate for a consulate to require the assistance of the local Government, firstly, by furnishing lists from their own records in order to trace pilgrims; and secondly, by forwarding the tickets for the endorsement required with a death certificate in support.

The estimated value of such estates is arbitrarily assessed beforehand, and the dues payable demanded before sale from the consulate concerned, in gold. In view of the fact that the "Qibla" is now publishing serially a list of all such estates from the year 1333 onwards, showing the value (as assessed by the Government, and not as realised on actual sale), less dues and expenses, and that it is significantly stated that all such have been handed over to the consulates for disposal, I am endeavouring to obtain King Hussein's agreement to—

- (1.) The assessment of dues after sale on the actual amount realised, and not on the Government's prior estimate.
- (2.) The payment of dues by the consulates after sale by deduction from the total realised, as a corollary to the above.
- (3.) Their payment at the rate of exchange at which the value of the estate is arrived at, instead of at a higher rate demanded in gold.

The excess of the amount estimated for last year's effects, over that realised, amounted to over 22 per cent. The value was converted from rupees into piastres at 8 P.T.=1 rupee, while the rate demanded in payment of the dues in gold was at 6½ P.T.=1 rupee.

Currency.

The refusal of the Hashimite Government to accept any payments to its Departments except in gold is causing increasing difficulties to arise.

In January 1920 King Hussein agreed that rupees, whether silver or paper, would be accepted both by merchants and his Government. Subsequent notifications, however, only mentioned merchants, and the Government has since repeatedly refused to accept rupees, at any rate of exchange. Recent instances are the case of the shipping agent mentioned above, and the return of the dues on pilgrims' effects, tendered in rupees by this agency. No gold is available for the latter payment, and it cannot be expected that the agency should purchase it in the market at a premium in order to further fill King Hussein's coffers.

It is submitted that pressure should be brought to bear on him to accept rupees in cases where gold is not readily available. There is no reason why the Hedjaz

should be the only country where payment in gold at a premium should be enforced, and the King has already had to accept subsidy payments in rupee paper.

Although the Government of India is not disposed to consider the supply of rupees with a view to their being made the normal currency of the Hedjaz, it would nevertheless seem desirable that rupees, which are legal tender for merchants under penalty, should be equally accepted by the Government.

The King's common plea, that the Bedouin will never accept rupees, has already been proven false in Jeddah and its neighbourhood, and it is only his obsession, that wealth is represented by a pile of gold sovereigns, and his own anxiety to collect as many of these as possible, that stands in the way of the removal of present anomalies and difficulties.

Indians in Mecca.

Since the departure of Captain Nasiruddin and the closing of the Mecca office, Indians resident in Mecca have apparently become somewhat alarmed as to their future.

Certain of them complain further that they are being threatened by King Hussein's secret agents, the latter stating that the King has in his possession Captain Nasiruddin's diary and other papers, incriminating a number of Indians as being anti-Arab and agents of the British Government.

The assistant mudir of police and a shawish are stated to have been sent to prison for having failed to search the luggage of the Mecca representative and his clerk when this was sent down to Jeddah.

Rabegh.

Reports were current recently that trouble had occurred in and around Rabegh with Mudayana, and that a band of Wahhabies had attacked Asfaan (on the direct Mecca-Rabegh route). Shereef Mohsen, the kaïmakam of Mecca, was sent with some irregulars and guns to Rabegh, but this measure is probably intended to be rather a reminder of the King's authority than directed against the Mudayana. The latter abound in the Harb territory, but are no more than small bands of brigands, unconnected with the hinterland, who make use of the fear inspired by the name to further their own ends.

Medina.

Shereef Shahaat is reported to have left for Kheibar with a small force to put an end to tribal disturbances in that district.

Emir Ali is stated to have come to an agreement with the Humada and the direct Yenbo-Medina route is expected to be shortly re-opened.

Ahmed-bin-Mansur has returned to Mecca.

Jeddah Water Supply.

The distribution of water has been reduced, and a strict ration-system introduced. The King was finally compelled to accept my offers to obtain coal for the condenser, and a small quantity was obtained for him from the Soudan. Experiments are now being made with patent fuel. The hopes entertained of utilising the wells and springs mentioned in a former report have as anticipated come to nothing, but a certain quantity of very bad water has now been discovered in a disused cistern some 4 miles from the town.

Openings for Agricultural Machinery.

King Hussein has considered the various suggestions and information placed at his disposal, but in expressing his gratitude for the trouble taken, takes the opportunity of stating that nothing further can be considered for the present, in view of the heavy expense he has to incur in guarding the Hedjaz from an attack by the Wahhabies.

Taif.

All is reported quiet and Emir Zeid returned to Mecca at the end of March.

Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 470. Notifying the handing over of effects of deceased pilgrims to the consulates concerned, announcing the publication of all details.

The invitation of Emir Abdullah to Jerusalem, where the opportunity would

be taken of visiting the Mosque of Aksa, and a telegram announcing his good reception.

No. 472. Announcing the return of Emir Abdullah to Amman.

No. 473. The departure of Emir Feisal from England.

An extract from "Al Ahram," No. 13393, under the heading "The Arab question and the return of Emir Feisal."

1. The favourable progress of negotiations between Emir Feisal and the British Government.
2. Foundations laid for establishing an Arab Government in Transjordan and in Irak, and the anticipated settlement of political and administrative details after Mr. Churchill's return to London.
3. The great importance of the interview between Mr. Churchill and the Emir Abdullah as affecting the Arab question and especially Transjordan.
4. The adherence of Transjordan to the Emir and acceptance of his authority.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

Shipping Intelligence to April 8, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 27th March and the 8th April, 1921.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
							Packages.
Khosrou ..	British	Bombay	March 27
Patroclus ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	London ..	March 28	" 28	729	..
Kariooon ..	" ..	" ..	" ..	" 29	" 30	1,642	..
Sittang ..	British ..	Rangoon ..	Venice ..	" 30	April 5	..	41,161
Mansourah ..	" ..	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 31	" 1	..	717
Madicoen ..	Dutch ..	Padang ..	America ..	April 2	" 4	1,683	..
Achilles ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	" 2	" 4	1,432	300 tons.
Helenus ..	" ..	" ..	London ..	" 3	" 4	1,295	150 "
Tantah ..	" ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 5	" 5	..	337
Vergemere ..	" ..	Yenbo	" 8	93

[E 4931/117/89]

No. 99.

Consul-General Satow to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Beirut, April 13, 1921.

WITH reference to the third paragraph of my despatch No. 47 of the 9th April, in which I reported that the Greek Orthodox Bishop had been omitted from the list of those invited to the luncheon given in honour of the Maronite Patriarch at which other ecclesiastical chiefs were present and that this was construed locally as a mark of disfavour, I have the honour to report that this omission was made up for by the giving of a luncheon by General Gouraud in honour of all the Greek Orthodox personalities, religious and civil, on Sunday, the 10th April.

(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4474/1977/91]

No. 100.

Earl Curzon to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 43.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 26, 1921.

I HAVE to refer to your telegram No. 374 of the 27th November relative to the régime of the Capitulations in the Hedjaz.

2. His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary to make any protest to King Hussein with regard to the abolition of the Capitulations, but as soon as he has become a signatory of the Treaty of Sèvres steps will be taken to secure from him an undertaking to recognise British subjects as such.

3. I should therefore be glad to learn your views as to the details of any such undertaking which may be rendered desirable by local conditions.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4474/1977/91]

No. 101.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 26, 1921.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your letter of the 14th April on the subject of the maintenance in the Hedjaz of the régime of the Capitulations.

2. Pending the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres by King Hussein, Lord Curzon does not propose to take any further action in the matter. His Lordship does not consider that an elaborate capitulatory system would be at any time desirable in the Hedjaz, but he proposes in due course to approach King Hussein with a view to arriving at some arrangement whereby His Majesty will recognise British subjects as such, which he appears at present somewhat reluctant to do.

3. Mr. Secretary Montagu will be kept informed of any steps taken in this direction.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 4939/117/89]

No. 102.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 7, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following were the operations of the French column under Colonel Paulet, sent down to clear up the district on the Palestine and Transjordan frontier after the blowing up of the bridge reported in my No. 10 of the 23rd February:—

The column consisted of all arms and reached Deraa on the 2nd March. The same day three persons were arrested at Shagara. The column reached Mezerib on the 14th. The same day villagers from Ghurbil, Saidie and Azb (unmarked villages near the Jordan, between Kuneitra and Fik) and tribesmen of Naim and Telwas tribes fired on and captured Captain Salece and a small French detachment, who were engaged on Boundary Commission work. They were afterwards released, as reported in section 1 of my No. 41.

The French later exacted an indemnity for this and arrested five persons. The force next proceeded to Tsil, Razania (unmarked), Khisfin and Fik. The villagers at the last place evacuated the village, but returned within the delay of forty-eight hours given to do so.

The column remained at Fik from the 18th to the 24th, and was joined there by three British officers from Samakh (for Boundary Commission?). During their stay the chiefs of that district and of the neighbouring tribes of Telwas and Dabla made their

submission. The following persons accused of murder and brigandage were executed at Fik:—

Abdul Hadi-el-Ahmad, of Fik;
Hussein-el-Ahmad, of Fik;
Ali-el-Uwaid, of Fik;
Bid Bin-el-Kassim, of El Al; and
Abdullah-el-Hassan-el-Khatab, of Talawia.

An indemnity was also fixed as follows:—

	£ T. (gold),
Shagara	250
Jamla	50
Khisfin	80
El Al	300

It was in this district that French aeroplanes bombed Bedouin encampments.

The Sheikh of El Al has been arrested; possibly he is the same as the Kassim above who was executed.

The column next proceeded by Old (lesser) Kuneitra, Huehniye and Hachimie (unmarked) to Kuneitra in two sections.

General Goybet visited Kuneitra earlier, and armoured cars have also been utilised in conjunction with the column.

(Copy to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 4938/117/89]

No. 103.

Consul-General Satow to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord,

Beirut, April 9, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that General Gouraud, French High Commissioner in Syria, reached Beirut on the 4th instant on the "Ernest Renan" and landed in the course of the afternoon. As imposing a reception as possible had been arranged in his honour, and the town was beflagged. Besides the local civil and military authorities, deputations were present from Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs. From Damascus also came a Druze deputation, under Selim Attrash, and some Roalla Arabs, while there was a deputation from the Aleppo tribesmen, the Milli of Viranshehir and the Shammar of Deir-ez-Zor.

Through indisposition I was unable to be present at the reception with the rest of the Consular Corps, but Mr. Mackereth attended, and the general received me on the 6th. He was most courteous, and, as is his custom, he laid great stress on the urgent need of unity and co-operation between France and Great Britain in these regions. He is evidently much pleased with his recent visit to London.

Since his return he has been much occupied with receptions and entertainments. Among the latter has been a luncheon to the Maronite Patriarch, who had come down specially to Beirut. The luncheon was attended by all the ecclesiastical chiefs, with the exception of the Greek Orthodox Bishop, who was not invited. This mark of disfavour is attributed to the fact that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch at Damascus is considered to have been, if not anti-French, at any rate too pro-British in his sympathies.

The local papers have naturally published articles expressing the joy of the native populations at the return of the High Commissioner and the hope that the situation will now become clearer by the settlement of various questions which have been preoccupying, if not exactly public opinion, at any rate those who profess to represent it. Among these is the taking of a census in the Lebanon, to be followed by the election of an administrative commission to take the place of the present commission which was nominated. It is hoped that the elected commission will become a sort of Lebanon Parliament. It is stated that Census Commissions will shortly be formed to carry out the census. This they will do by visiting each house in the various quarters of the towns and in the villages and gathering the necessary particulars—a somewhat slow and cumbersome method. The future form which the government of Syria will

take is naturally a fruitful source of discussion. Of late rumour has had it that a Turkish prince—possibly Prince Burhaneddin—will be the Emir of a United Syria. It has been suggested that this rumour emanated from the Haut Commissariat, which desired to learn how the idea would be received. It has provoked no enthusiasm. It seems doubtful whether people here have any clear idea as to what they really want, but possibly their ideal is, while getting rid of French control and guidance, to continue to enjoy French military and financial support.

(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW

[E 4978/31/88]

No. 104.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

A DIFFERENTES reprises, et notamment par une lettre particulière en date du 7 avril, l'Ambassadeur de France a eu l'honneur de signaler à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères l'esprit d'hostilité des Chérifiens à l'égard de la France en Syrie.

La lettre ci-jointe en copie, dont l'original se trouve entre les mains du Haut-Commissaire en Syrie et au Liban, démontre une fois de plus la responsabilité des fils du Roi Hussein dans certains coups de mains tentés en zone française. Ce document établit nettement que le coup de main dirigé le 22 février dernier contre la voie ferrée à Mekerin entre Deraa et Caïffa, a été prescrit par le Chérif Ali, frère d'Abdallah, et exécuté par Ahmed Mérouïd et Ali Khouli—bandits notoires—dont la livraison a été plusieurs fois demandée aux autorités anglaises.

Dans ces conditions, le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a l'honneur d'appeler à nouveau l'attention de sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston sur les graves raisons qui amènent le Gouvernement français à considérer que la remise de l'administration de la Transjordanie aux mains du fils du Roi Hussein a de très sérieuses répercussions sur la tranquillité des territoires sous mandat français.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 24 avril 1921.*

Enclosure in No. 104.

Ahmed Merouid to Cherif Ali.

(Traduction.)

JE présente mes hommages et mes devoirs à votre illustre personne.

Je vous écris ces lignes, Monseigneur, pour obéir à vos ordres.

Nous avons reçu avec respect votre lettre qui nous a été remise par l'Émir Hassan. Nous en avons compris la teneur.

Nous avons agi conformément à l'ordre qui nous a été transmis.

Votre humble serviteur est allé à Wadi Khaled avec les Arabes, en compagnie de l'Émir Hassan et de Mahmoud Abu Ras et leurs hommes. C'est fait, grâce à la collaboration du vaillant et zélé Ali Khouli. L'arche du milieu du pont a été démolie. Il en est de même des Metwali intrépides (?). Nous sommes prêts à répondre à un signe de vous quand il le faudra.

Votre humble serviteur,
AHMED MEROUID.

15 Jemada-el-Thani, 1339 (25 février 1921).

[E 5067/100/93]

No. 105.

Papers communicated by Colonial Office.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 29.)

(1.)

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, April 23, 1921.

IN Reuter's news of the 17th April, which has reached me the 23rd April, following paragraph is contained:—

"In course of interview" ("Morning Post" learns from Cairo) "Emir Feisal said that he was proceeding to Mecca for family congress. He stated he has received unofficial offer of Throne of Mesopotamia, and whether or not he accepts depends on the decision of his family and their wishes."

Paragraph has been excised from Reuter's as issued, but it must have appeared already in India and will eventually be here. It will certainly be understood, as worded, to mean that offer has been made by His Majesty's Government, and the removal of this impression is urgent, otherwise statement will constitute a serious impression on good faith of myself and His Majesty's Government. I strongly deprecated, as you will remember, any sojourn in Egypt either of Feisal or Lawrence, and understood Feisal would arrive at Suez unobserved and straightaway proceed on to Jeddah, accompanied or unaccompanied by Lawrence. I suggest in the circumstances, in issuing correction, opportunity be taken to make a clear statement of our attitude on following lines: That the reference to Feisal to having been offered Throne of Mesopotamia doubtless refers to some invitation which he has received from Mesopotamia; that to offer throne to anyone is inconsistent with declared policy of His Majesty's Government. From their intention His Majesty's Government have not departed, and they desire to be guided by wishes expressed by people of Mesopotamia, of course subject to their own concurrence as to suitability of person on whom choice may fall. Their attitude in regard to family of Shereef is that both the cause of Arab nationalism and the Allies alike owe him a lasting debt of obligation. Consequently, in answer to his enquiries, he has been informed that His Majesty's Government will not object to his candidature should a majority of the people of Iraq express a wish for one of his sons to rule over them, and, if elected, will give him their support. An announcement of this nature would also clear air here.

(2.)

Mr. Churchill to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 27, 1921.

YOUR telegram of the 23rd April: "Morning Post" interview.

There was also a sentence in the interview referred to to the effect that Feisal had implied that the cession of authority to France in Syria and the Zionist policy in Palestine were inevitable mistakes. In a subsequent issue a categorical denial of this was published by Haddad based on a telegram which he had received from Feisal himself. Thus the report has already been badly discredited and has created no stir here.

You stated in your telegram No. 28 that message No. 1 has already been despatched to King Hussein from Mesopotamia. Feisal has now been in Jeddah for some days and a reply cannot be long delayed. Until Hussein's reply has been received I am inclined to think that it would be premature to make any announcement on the lines suggested by you. It might then suitably contain a reference to the exchange of messages. If, when you have received Hussein's reply, you still consider that an announcement is desirable, the question will be reconsidered here. We decided at Cairo, you will remember, to use the phrase "in response to enquiries from adherents of Emir Feisal." I still prefer this to the wording now proposed by you. Also we substituted the word "chosen" for "elected."

[E 5151/117/89]

No. 106.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 55.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 16, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the secret police have made the following arrests recently, on accusations of espionage for Abdullah. Habeich, the chief of the secret police, and his sub-chief, Yussuf Trak, have their agents on all the trains:—

1. A certain Abdurrahman El Shureiri, referred to in my No. 45 of the 4th April, 1921, who declared himself to be a tax-collector in the Ajloun; but is apparently a cousin or brother-in-law of Ali Khulki.

The French do not appear to have obtained any evidence against him; but desire to "exchange" him for a clerk of the Emir Said Jezairli, who was recently kidnapped by order of Ali Khulki while collecting rents from Said's lands round Kerak and Es Salt. The capture was actually made by El Faour.

Shureiri was warned away when he attempted to pass Deraa by train without a passport; but then came into Damascus by camel—still without a passport. He is still a prisoner in the citadel.

2. Mohamed Jemil gave good references, and was made a policeman in the Kanawat quarter of this town. He has now been found to be the son of Ali Shureiki—kaimakam of Kuneitra under Feisal—who was condemned to death by the French and joined Mahmoud Faour. Mohamed Jemil is now under surveillance.

3. Two Mahommedans of the Bekaa were arrested at Mesgarah on their way to Abdullah, and accused of being spies.

The French Legal Counsellor and several French officers are expected to visit next week the new Emir Selim Pasha Attrash at Sweida, in the Jebel Druze.

The latter and his cousin Nessib called on me, and I have received a similar but rather vaguer invitation, of which I hope to avail myself later.

M. Soulier, the deputy for Paris, has been here and visited Palmyra.

(Copy to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 5163/31/88]

No. 107.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)

LE Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir au Comte de Saint-Aulaire que de nombreuses lettres de l'Emir Abdallah sont envoyées par ce dernier de Djebel Druze.

Une communication du Chérif Ali, au chef des cheiks d'Adjoun, a été interceptée par le service français des renseignements. Elle est ainsi conçue:

"Tenez-vous prêt avec vos hommes. Ne soyez pas découragé par le retard des opérations jusqu'ici; il est possible de chasser les Français en très peu de temps. Cependant, les conversations diplomatiques nous obligent à patienter encore une dizaine de jours et bientôt les ennemis de Dieu, de son Prophète et de la patrie sauront qu'ils ne peuvent échapper à la colère divine ni aux troupes qui les enserreront de tous les points de la Syrie."

L'Ambassadeur de France à Londres a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur ces agissements, qui ont déjà été signalés au Foreign Office par une note de cette Ambassade en date du 24 de ce mois.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 avril 1921.*

[E 5124/100/93]

No. 108.

Colonel Lawrence to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 2.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Cairo, April 22, 1921.

I RECEIVED your telegram of 19th April and High Commissioner's, Bagdad, telegram No. 591 S. on 20th April in Jerusalem, when I returned with High Commissioner from Amman. I communicated substance to Feisal in Suez yesterday before his boat sailed. For your points (there was no other mandate condition) 2, 3, 5, 6 he was very grateful. On 7 he asks further information and for an idea when he will be wanted, as his visit to Idrisi might be affected thereby. On 8 he will do his best with Hussein. He was disappointed with figure of subsidy, but any further remarks on this will come from Hussein.

According to Feisal, Abdulla is disappointed with arrangements proposed by us for Transjordan. This impression he gained from Auni Abdelhadi, who has done his best to influence Feisal in the same way. Desirability of sending Zeid up to see Abdulla Abdelhadi was suggested by Feisal.

I leave to-morrow by air for Jerusalem, and I think that I might, unless you have other wishes, return thence to England.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

[E 5065/4/91]

No. 109.

Earl Curzon to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1921.

MY telegram No. 36 of 16th April: Hussein's fears of Wahabite attack.

Ibn Saud, who has during last years forbidden his people to do Haj, has intimated his inability to prevent their participation this year.

Wahabites will necessarily be armed to some extent for self-defence, but Ibn Saud is prepared to give fullest assurances that pilgrims will not be aggressive in any way, provided corresponding assurances are given by Hussein that they will receive the same considerate treatment as other pilgrims.

You should endeavour to persuade Hussein to give the desired undertaking, assuring him that adequate corresponding guarantees will be given by Ibn Saud.

Feisal's good offices might prove useful in the matter.

[E 5362/455/91]

No. 110.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th–20th April, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Jeddah Report, April 11–20, 1921.

(Secret.)

Quarantine.

The final report of the Hashimite Government to the representations mentioned in the last report was to the effect that further discussion on the question was unnecessary, that they were already fully aware of all the provisions of the convention, and that the question of their approval was on the same footing as the approval of the British Government on the issues now under consideration.

It is satisfactory to note, however, that the next three pilgrim-ships to arrive after the last protest made to King Hussein and the final presentation of the whole question, have been granted *libre pratique*.

Orders were first given for the pilgrims on the second to be quarantined, but these were cancelled on it being pointed out to the director-general of quarantine that no reason existed even on his own grounds for this to be done.

The latter, who besides being director of the Hashimite Quarantine, is also in charge of the condenser and the hospital, and is King Hussein's general handy-man for all purposes, was too busy in connection with the preparations being made for the reception of Emir Feisal to be able to attend to the last steamer, by which, however, only a small number of pilgrims arrived.

One of the difficulties of his position, which he will not admit, nor will he accept any assistance in the matter, is his inability to understand the language or meaning of ship's papers and bills of health.

The pretence of reading the latter is gone through on board, but the papers are invariably brought ashore for translation, consideration and reference to Mecca, resulting in uncertainty as to the disposal of the pilgrims until the director-general has again proceeded on board.

Departure of Emir Zeid.

The Emir left Jeddah for Port Said on the 12th April. He asked me on behalf of the King to ensure that Emir Feisal should not visit Cairo, and was informed that I had already telegraphed the personal message to this effect from the King to Cairo, for transmission to the Emir. Emir Ali was anxious to join the party at Yenbo, and at King Hussein's request it has been since arranged that the mail-steamer shall be diverted to that port.

Emir Zeid informed me that all was quiet in the Taif district and surroundings, but that an epidemic, which he maintained was typhus, had appeared in the district, said to have been transmitted from the Wahabite forces. The latter were apparently suffering badly, and the Emir did not appear to attach much importance to the rumours of the alleged projected attack against the Hedjaz, both from the above cause and apparently for other reasons, as he smiled when his father's representations on the subject were mentioned to him.

He added that any discussion and settlement with Ibn Saud was quite out of the question where the King was concerned, but that it was to be hoped that Emir Feisal would, if permitted, be able to find a way out of the present *impasse*.

Rupee Currency.

King Hussein's notification as to the non-acceptance of rupee paper from pilgrims, referred to in former reports, is stated to be a counter to the official notifications published in the Indian vernacular press, advising pilgrims of the prohibition against removing gold from the Hedjaz, and, therefore, either to take no gold, or only sufficient for their actual needs while in the Hedjaz, as they would not be allowed to return with any surplus.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims.

The Government finally accepted the payment of dues on the 1920 effects in rupees as a concession for this year only, it having been made quite clear to them that on distribution the extra charge involved by gold payment would be notified to the heirs concerned.

In return for this partial concession the dues leviable on the value of return tickets of deceased Malay pilgrims, which normally should only be paid after the collection of the money in Singapore, were paid in advance from agency funds, it being made clear that this was only done to save inconvenience and delay to the Hashimite Government in this particular instance, and that this procedure could not be followed in future unless the Government were willing to assist in the prompt administration of such estates by furnishing the particulars and certificates requested, but so far refused, which would serve as a guarantee that the tickets would be realised in full.

It is now demanded that unclaimed estates should be made over to the Government.

A return ticket, stated to be the property of a deceased Hashimite subject, was sent to the agency for refund. After repeated reference it was found that nothing was known of the original owner, nor was any claimant present. The Government have

accordingly been informed that reference in such cases must be made to the country of origin, when the original owner and his heirs could be traced. It is suggested that the unclaimed estates of foreign subjects should properly be disposed of by the consulates concerned, and the proceeds devoted to destitute pilgrims, or sent to the country of origin for disposal.

Orders have been given for all effects left over from the last pilgrimage to be kept by the local customs. Among such effects must be a certain number which returning pilgrims did not have the opportunity of tracing, and the normal procedure should be for these, as well as the unclaimed estates of deceased pilgrims, to be handed over to the consulates for disposal.

A typical case of the official extortion to which pilgrims are subjected may be instanced:—

Two members of a party of Malay pilgrims died recently after arrival. The parents of one and husband of the other were present, but were forced nevertheless to hand over the effects to the Sharia Court for registration and custody, and for the collection of fees. After remaining in Jeddah for some time and attempting to obtain the effects, the claimants finally had to leave for Mecca, and are unlikely to obtain possession of the effects until next year, if then, in the normal course.

The fees charged, exclusive of dues on the effects, amount to P.T. 155

Mutawwifs have been given instructions to take charge of the return tickets of all pilgrims, which are not on any consideration to be allowed to be taken to the consulates, and have been given books in which to enter all particulars. The latter arrangement is excellent in intention, but it remains to be seen with what degree of efficiency it will be carried out, and how much will be extracted from the owner before recovery of his ticket.

The above is said to have been due to the action of the consul for the Netherlands, whose interest in and registration of Javanese pilgrims is strongly opposed by the King, in posting notices in his consulate inviting pilgrims who so desired to deposit their valuables and return tickets with him. A large number took advantage of his advice, until King Hussein heard of the matter, after which new arrivals were warned by the Mutawwifs concerned that an attempt was being made wrongly to obtain possession of the money and return tickets of Javanese and to interfere with their affairs, and pilgrims were deterred from visiting the consulate.

Disposal of Supplies.

Recent imports from India have for the most part not appeared in the market either in Jeddah or Mecca, the bulk as usual being earmarked for the "Shirkat al Wataniya," or stored against higher prices later.

Such flour as has been sold was disposed of at 3*l.*, rising to 4*l.* per bag or more, representing a clear profit of from 17-30 rupees per bag.

King Hussein is reported to have discovered that a large share of the profits of his company remained with his officials, who were further conducting their own business in the name of the Shirkat al Wataniya. Of a recent consignment of 500 bags of flour to Mecca, 300 were commandeered for the Shirkat al Wataniya, to be paid for at some future date. Of these 100 were taken by the Government and 100 for the troops, the remainder being retained, until complaints were made to the King.

The Qadi al Quza and leading officials were implicated, and, when taxed with the fraud, stated they could not be expected to live on the salaries paid them without helping themselves. It was impossible to deal with a matter, which on further enquiry was found to implicate practically the whole administration, but a scapegoat was found in the camelmen who transport the supplies from Jeddah. Their sheikh was imprisoned for being concerned in sending supplies to Mecca, which he should have known were for the use of pilgrims now in Jeddah, and for not having reported the matter.

This judgment, given publicly, met with general approval, except on the part of the camelmen, who afterwards refused to take further supplies until their sheikh was released, a number being imprisoned in consequence.

Medina Caravans.

The first caravan of 1,700 camels is reported to have arrived safely via Rabegh. Fodder, of which there is again a general scarcity, is being sent to Rabegh by dhow,

and further distributed along the route, and arrangements have been made by Sheriff Mohsen for escorts from Qadhimah onwards, 1,200 soldiers having been detailed for the purpose.

Reported Mudayana Activity.

Unconfirmed reports have been received of the recent presence north of Mecca of a large force, said to number 20,000. This number is certainly grossly exaggerated, and from the report that Sheriff Mohsen's nephew Ali prevented a party from interrupting the Rabegh route, the reports are probably due, as before, to the activities of bands intent on taking toll from the Medina caravans.

King Hussein has, however, profited from former experience to the extent of subsidising the Musaida, Belediyah and Hudheila (Hadayem), it is said, to the extent of 55,000L.

The recent despatch to Mecca of 40,000L., requisitioned through the Customs from Jeddah merchants, lends colour to this statement.

Asir Coast.

On it being pointed out that the action complained of by the King, of Ali-bin-Abdu, of Birk, having held up dhows bound for the Hedjaz, was taken at the instance of Hodeidah merchants themselves as a precaution against acts of piracy further north, the King replied characteristically that as Ali-bin-Abdu was apparently considered by the British as more capable than himself, he might with advantage be requested to take over the country in the name of his master, the Idrisi.

The communication went on to abuse the latter, to deny his right to be referred to in matters connected with Hodeidah, and in a similar strain.

His lieutenant was said to be sending supplies and arms to the Wahhabies in Taraba, from Birk and Midi, through the Ghamid and Zahran.

Customs.

A British subject recently imported a tobacco-cutting machine from Egypt, worth new 120L., and bought actually five years ago for 65L. The Customs refused delivery until 500L. had been paid, carefully evading, however, the mention of this sum as customs duty. After further evasions, both locally and from Mecca, the Government admitted this sum to be leviable as customs dues, and insisted on payment before the machine would be delivered.

As the owner had sunk all his capital in uncut tobacco, now on his hands in Jeddah, after having obtained permission to import a machine with which to treat it, and as the Agency was unable to do more for him than attempt to obtain a revision of this unjustifiable charge, and again protest at the imposition of duty without regard to the established scale and without notice, the importer is left with no option but to pay the 500L. or remove the machine and his tobacco, involving further heavy loss.

He had offered to hand over the whole at cost price to the Government and give instruction free in addition with the staff imported by him, but with no success.

The agent of Messrs. Holt has had sent him by the Blue Funnel Line a pair of masts for his pilot-boat, costing 4L. These have been assessed for duty at 15L., and delivery has been refused until duty at this estimate is paid.

The same gentleman imported a dog-cart costing 60L. On customs duty being demanded at 200L., and delivery refused unless it were forthcoming, the vehicle was returned.

Attention has been drawn before to the malpractice of the Hashimite Government in arbitrarily assessing all goods at twice to three-times their real value, and in many cases at a ridiculous figure, in order to levy a high duty.

It is submitted that this method of evading an open increase of import duty, resulting, in such cases as the above, in great injustice to importers, should not be permitted to continue unchecked.

The Government have on three occasions in the last year been called upon to abide by their published dues, and King Hussein gave an assurance that this would be done. Protests in individual cases are ignored, and the King has the satisfaction of levying what duty he pleases, without recourse to a notified rate which would be liable to incur opposition from the Chambers of Commerce and Governments concerned.

Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 475. The interesting announcement is made of the Haram having been provided with electric light.

The plant for the above is American, and was obtained through a local Dutch firm.

No. 476. An article on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the revolt, emphasising that the latter was intended to liberate all Arabia, and not instituted for more particular ends, and enjoining patience until all aspirations are realised and all Arab States are fused into one.

The revolt was undertaken on terms; the treatment meted out to the Arabs since was well known, and had been borne only in the hope of improvement.

The basis of the revolt had not been to establish a kingdom or to escape ill-treatment, but to raise the status of the Arab inhabitants themselves.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 110.

Shipping Intelligence to April 20, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 9th and the 20th April, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	April 9	April 9
Buitenzorg	Dutch	Java	Suez	" 10	" 12	1,798	..
Tantah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11	" 12	..	1,362
Porto Maurizio	Italian	Massaua	Suez	" 13	" 14	..	1,248
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	393
Telemon	"	Singapore	Liverpool	" 19	" 19	140	..

[E 5385/40/88]

No. 111.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, May 7, 1921

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Oliphant's letter of the 14th ultimo on the subject of the claim of the Ottoman Tobacco Régie in respect of the termination of their concession in Palestine.

2. Mr. Churchill presumes that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is satisfied that the majority of the capital of the concern is held by French nationals, and on this presumption he accepts in principle the view that the claim of the Régie should be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of article 311 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and that the actual coming into force of the treaty need not be awaited.

3. I am, however, to observe that a proposal to refer to arbitration a French claim in connection with the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway is already under consideration, that it would appear possible that there may be other French claims against the Palestine Administration, and that in any case it may be anticipated that the Régie will put forward a similar claim in respect of the termination of their concession in Mesopotamia.

4. It would appear to be an uneconomical and inconvenient arrangement for a number of separate tribunals to be constituted to adjudicate upon these various claims, and Mr. Churchill would be glad if Earl Curzon would consider the possibility of their being considered by a single Tribunal.

5. Mr. Churchill is awaiting a reply from the High Commissioner of Palestine to a telegram addressed to him on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, and on receipt of Earl Curzon's observations on the suggestion made above he will be prepared to communicate further with the High Commissioner for Palestine, and, if necessary, with the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, with regard to the claim of the Turkish Régie.

[6831]

Y

6. I am to enquire what arrangement Earl Curzon would propose with regard to the cost of the arbitration and the presentation of the case on behalf of the Administrations affected.

A copy of this letter is being communicated to the Treasury.

I am, &c.
G. GRINDLE.

[E 5513/4/91]

No. 112.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, May 10, 1921.

FOLLOWING is a translation of an Arabic message from King Hussein to Mr. Lloyd George, which has been handed to me by Hedjaz agent:—

"I offer my thanks and gratitude for information which Feisal brought to me that old feelings of mutual reliance and confidence are now restored in spite of the present political complications. My fundamental sense of loyalty and sincerity enables me to bear whatever may result from postponement of solution of Syrian question for a certain period. I do not wish that honour of Great Britain should suffer by any course which may be contrary to her principles, even if thereby I may find myself in a position which may wreck my history and increase hostility of the public towards us on the ground that we are far from being sincere. I maintain all I wrote in my letter dated 21st Okda, 1336, and still await a speedy solution of those matters outstanding between us which have no relation with international politics, e.g., the checking of Ibn-el-Saoud's encroachments on lands and zones which were not under his administration before the war, and return of such lands to their original condition under Turks. I speak thus in order that bloodshed may be avoided because the danger is now acute, and because it is particularly necessary that measures be taken now before it is too late to ensure complete peace during Haj season. I am transmitting the original Arabic text by despatch."

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 5583/104/93]

No. 113.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 13, 1921.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th May on the subject of the proposed amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia, and to transmit herewith, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copy of a telegram which has been despatched to the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia on the subject, and of telegrams from Mesopotamia and Palestine referred to therein.

I am to suggest that, if Lord Curzon sees no objection, an immediate communication should be made to the French Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government are contemplating the proclamation of an amnesty on the lines proposed by Sir Percy Cox within the course of the next ten days; they are of opinion that the simultaneous proclamation of a similar amnesty in Syria would tend to emphasise Allied solidarity in the Middle East; and that a further communication will be addressed to them specifying the exact date on which the Bagdad proclamation will be made, in time for them to ensure simultaneous action on the part of the French authorities in Syria, should they so desire.

I am, &c.
G. GRINDLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

Mr. Churchill to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, May 11, 1921.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 81, 92 and 93.

Your proposals and the terms of the suggested proclamations are approved, though I think it would be better if individuals who were paid servants of the Administration of the occupied territories were treated in the same manner as individuals not concerned in the rising of 1920. That is to say, that subject to consideration of each case on its merits, you should be authorised to extend amnesty to them. I am content to leave this point to your discretion.

Foreign Office have replied that from Egyptian point of view there is no objection. India Office have telegraphed to Viceroy and requested him to repeat his reply to you. We cannot finally fix date of proclamation until this has been received. Foreign Office consider that French Government should be informed of proposed action, and I am suggesting to them that an interim communication should now be made to the effect that it is anticipated that the proclamation will be issued within the next ten days, and that as soon as possible actual date will be communicated. You should telegraph to me at once, when you receive the Viceroy's reply to India Office telegram, the actual date on which the proclamation will be made, leaving us sufficient time to inform the French Government.

His Majesty's Government will in no circumstances make any payment with regard to repatriation expenses of exiles and fugitives who return in consequence of the amnesty.

(Repeated Jerusalem, No. 79.)

(Reference No. 134.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 113.

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

(Received Colonial Office, May 6, 1921.)

AMNESTY. I have not yet replied to Lawrence re individuals as, until my final proposals for an amnesty which are now under active preparation here have been completed, I am unable to say authoritatively which of persons, if any, on Lawrence's list will be excluded from its provisions. It is not feasible, pending official announcement of amnesty, date for which is not finally fixed, for a large party to travel together, and I did not, in point of fact, propose to ask Government to bear cost of journey. Hitherto, with the exception of Arab officers who fought for Allies and returned by "Miltiades," individuals have borne their own expenses. Would it not be cheaper for them to come overland by caravan.

(Addressed Allenby, Cairo; repeated Beirut for consul at Damascus, No. 672 S., and Secretary of State for Colonies.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 113.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 134.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, May 6, 1921.

FOLLOWING telegram has been sent to Bagdad:—

"The following Mesopotamians are at Amman with Abdullah: Ali-el-Bazarkas, Thabet Bilbey Abdil Nour, Maky Bey-el-Sharabty, Raouf-il-Shahwany, Said-il-Kilaak, Daoud Sabry. Abdullah is very anxious to get rid of them. As they are influential men he suggests that their presence in Mesopotamia would help forward Feisal's candidature. Do you approve their return?"

Abdullah will not pay for passages. He questions whether they can or will. Because of utility of their influence in favour of Feisal he urges British Government should pay. Will you pay?

Enclosure 4 in No. 113.

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

(Received Colonial Office, May 8, 1921.)

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 3rd May.

I am communicating to you in my telegram next following draft amnesty proclamation, which will be published immediately on the receipt of your reply, and be dated accordingly.

I would explain that wording of last paragraph is intended to apply to such individuals as Ajaima Saadon and Surchi, Kurdish chiefs, who are still actively hostile, and who, except after formal submission on appropriate guarantees, could not be allowed back.

Enclosure 5 in No. 113.

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, May 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram:—

"His Excellency High Commissioner is pleased to announce with the authority of His Majesty's Government, with effect from May, a general amnesty to political offenders on following basis. To all those who were concerned in rising of 1920 pardon is extended in respect of offences committed in furtherance thereof. Those who are detained or imprisoned will be set free. With following exceptions, those who are fugitives are permitted to return without fear of prosecution:—

"1. Individuals who were paid servants of Administration of occupied territories at time when they took part in rising.

"2. Individuals listed below who are believed to be responsible for commitment or abetment of certain heinous crimes and are at present time fugitive from justice: (a) Sheikh Dhari, his sons Khamis and Suleiman; Sarb and Salubi, sons of Mijbas; Daham, son of Fahad, all of Zoba tribe and all charged with murder or abetment of murder of late Colonel Leachman. (b) Jamil Nainawi Ali Jamil Madful, charged with being immediate instigator of murder at Tel Afar of late Captain Barlow, Lieutenant Stuart and other British officers. (c) Ibrahim Dilo, charged with murder of late Captain Salmond. (d) Jasim-al-Mualiu, charged with murder of late Captain Wrigley. (e) Nasr-ibn-Araodhir, Alawi-al-Jasim, Ibn Daraimidi, all of Bani Hasan, charged with murder of British prisoners. (f) Ibn Mahawwis, Ibrahim [?] Butairi Ahwaz, Abbas-al-Sachit, Fali Ibrahim [?] Haji, Safr-al-Ajairib, all of Jawabir tribe, charged with murder of Royal Air Force officers.

"As regards individuals not concerned with rising of 1920 but interned, exiled or fugitive in connection with political offences committed prior to said rising, his Excellency High Commissioner is authorised on the receipt of formal application addressed by individual to nearest British representative in principle to extend amnesty to them, subject to consideration of each case on its merits."

[E 5583/104/93]

No. 114.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris).

(No. 251.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1921.

DURING his recent visit to Jerusalem, Mr. Churchill learnt from M. de Caix that General Gouraud was thinking of announcing an amnesty shortly in Syria. Mr. Churchill said that His Majesty's Government were about to take similar action in Mesopotamia.

It is now proposed to proclaim an amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia during the course of the next ten days, and you should bring this to the notice of the French Government in case they desire to synchronise the issue of a similar proclamation in Syria as tending to emphasise Allied solidarity in the Middle East.

Exact date of Bagdad proclamation will be communicated to you in time to permit of simultaneous action on the part of French authorities in Syria should they so desire.

[E 5513/4/91]

No. 115.

Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 289.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 313 of 19th May: Message from King Hussein to Prime Minister.

Following for King Hussein from the Prime Minister:—

I thank your Majesty for your message conveyed to me through Lord Allenby.

Your assurances of loyal and sincere friendship afford a guarantee that a satisfactory solution will be found for all questions of mutual interest.

His Majesty's Government are confident that you will succeed in maintaining with Ibn Saoud those peaceful relations which are so essential for the prosperity of Arabia.

Please repeat to Jeddah.

[E 5774/117/89]

No. 116.

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, April 23, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the situation in this district since my previous despatch No. 15 of the 12th April, 1921:—

Franco-Turkish Peace.—Despite the conclusion of peace, the French are still on the *qui vive*. Reconnaissances by aeroplanes and motor cars are daily made in the direction of Membij and the Euphrates. The French say that at Diarbekir the local Moslems have set up an authority independent of Mustapha Kemal under one Nimet Bey, formerly a Turkish officer in Aleppo, and that he has a force under his orders to be used for attacking the French. In the Killis and Aintab regions French troops are being maintained and even reinforced.

Military Operations.—Matters are brighter for the French in the Djebel Zawayeh, south of Idlib, and latest newspaper reports announce that operations in that region are being crowned with success.

Marash.—An American who arrived on the 20th April from Marash after five days' journey, informs me that there are pro- and anti-Kemalist parties among the Moslems there. There are about 10,000 armed Moslems in the town, and they are drilling and having firing practice. They are under Turkish officers, who are in touch with Mustapha Kemal, but they have struck out an independent line, ignore the Franco-Turkish peace, and are prepared for attack or defence against the French forces. They are deficient in artillery. These independent Marash Turks took a leading part in the fighting at Aintab. Rumours that the French might advance on Marash have two or three times been the cause of threats to massacre the Armenian population, of whom 10,000 remain out of 50,000, the remainder having been massacred.

The American Relief Mission in Marash is not molested. A special permit from Mustapha Kemal was necessary before my informant could leave.

There are ten French prisoners in the town, nearly all disabled men. These are looked after by the Americans.

While anti-French feeling among the Moslems near the French zone is responsible for their ignoring orders from Angora, there are not wanting signs that Turkish officers and villagers are getting tired of protracted military operations and want things to end. My informant passed through a Moslem village just outside the French lines, where the villagers complained that they have been heavily taxed by the Kemalists, and wanted a French occupation, having favourable recollections of good treatment at the hands of a French detachment which had passed through the village.

In the French zone the Arab gendarmes, now under French control, were content with their lot, being well paid and well treated.

Local Situation.—Locally the French find it necessary to have frequent military parades in the town and firing practice with heavy guns and machine-guns very close to the town to impress the population, and a close watch is kept on the Moslem quarters of Aleppo.

Suspicion of Great Britain is still the dominant thought in the minds of the local

French officials. Most local troubles are attributed to British intrigue and annoyance at seeing the French in Syria. A strong leading article attacking England for her alleged attitude towards Syria appeared in the Arab paper "Al Ummah" of the 11th April, 1921. I brought the matter to the notice of the French High Commission Major in charge of the censorship, and he replied that England allowed criticism of France in Egyptian papers. I did not push the matter any further.

Commerce.—Commerce is stagnant. Aleppo which before the war traded with the greater part of Asia Minor lying to the north and north-east is now limited to the district lying within a radius of some 20 miles from the town.

(Copies sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Constantinople, Egypt and consul-general in Beirut.)

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 5779/117/89]

No. 117.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 27, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a few notes upon the remaining chief political personalities of this State. The former handbook on local personalities is now quite out of date, and, while excellent in its way, appeared to me to be too concise to give a real idea of the person described.

I have therefore ventured to give a few more details where such seemed likely to enable the reader to form a clearer estimate of character. I have had personal interviews with most of the people mentioned, and I have based my general summing up upon more than one opinion.

I have adhered to the order of the 1919 "Who's who in Damascus," though many changes have taken place in the members of the Government. The word "additional" signifies that what is given below is additional to the description in the above booklet, and that I am in agreement with the latter as far as it goes. The words "Delete . . . all" or "delete from . . . to . . ." signify that I am not in agreement with whole or part of the remarks of the booklet in question. In many cases persons have from interest or conviction changed their politics since the 1919 booklet was written.

Note.—The persons marked with an asterisk were willing to become honorary dragomans of this consulate, but have abandoned the idea on receiving posts under the French or the present Administration.

(A.) *Government Officials.*

1. Ali Riza Pasha Rickabi. Delete from "Strong." Now considered in favour of a British mandate. Viewed with great suspicion by the French, and in trouble with the Jezairli family. But to-day reported to have made his peace with General Gouraud, to be receiving 50*l.* monthly subsidy, and a likely candidate for a Ministerial post. At present not in any official position. He was Prime Minister when Feisal quarrelled with the French, but resigned, as realised it was suicide to provoke the latter. Strong and able, but probably quite unreliable.

2. Yaseen Pasha-el-Hashimi. Additional. No office at present. Accused of malversation while on War Council. Hates all foreigners. Appears quiet at present, but I fancy he is an irreconcilable.

3. Ala-ed-Din Bey Droubi. Additional. Had also been Vali of Sivas. Was first a member of the "Shura," then, after fall of Feisal, succeeded Elchi as Prime Minister. His hatred of Feisal made him pro-French, and for this he and Abdurrahman Pasha, the Kurd, were assassinated on the 20th August, 1920, at Kharbet-el-Gazala by the Hauranese sheikhs. Considered of a vacillating character, but met his death bravely.

4. Nuri Pasha-el-Said. Additional. Joined Feisal on his fall, and has continually tried to reconcile him and the French. Went with Feisal on most of his European trips. Believes Feisal should throw in his lot with the French.

5. Haddad Pasha. Additional. Considered pro-British, but of no strength of purpose, and devoid of administrative capacity.

6. Mussalli Pasha. Additional. Out of a job at present. Not a politician.

7. Mohamed Ali-el-Tamimi. Additional. A Palestinian extremist. Able administrator. Anti-French. Considered honest. Not employed at present.

7A. Rafik-el-Tamimi. Additional. The strongest of the three brothers, but an intriguer. Was one of the staff of the Arab liaison officer at Beirut (the latter being Jemil-el-Elchi) at head of the Independent Arab Party.

7B. Amin-el-Tamimi. Additional. Able administrator. Was secretary of the Prime Minister till French occupation.

8. Ahmed-el-Hassibi. Additional. Has some influence. Considered pro-British and anti-French. Not employed.

9. Abdul Hamid Pasha Kaltakji. Additional. Minister of War under Rickabi, by whom he is entirely influenced.

10. Shukri Pasha Ayoubi. Additional. Favours complete independence, and next to that is pro-British. While at Aleppo got on well with the late Sir Mark Sykes. No administrative capacity.

11. Ahmed Hilmi Effendi. Delete all. Palestinian. Hates French and favours independence or British mandate. Able financier. Considered honest and a partisan of Rickabi.

12. Suleiman Jokhadar. Additional. Now President of Court of Cassation. Not apolitical, and disguises his sentiments.

13. Emir Adel Arslan. Additional. A Lebanon Druze intriguer. Great friend of Emir Zeid. Favours complete independence. Backed the secret revolutionary societies.

*14. Tewfik Effendi Shamie. Additional. Landowner. Linguist. At Political Bureau under Rickabi, and under latter's influence. Favours independence or British mandate. Influential among the Greek Orthodox. Now director of the Arab orphanage.

15. Shakir Bey-el-Hambali. Additional. Mutessarif of Damascus Markez. Ex-chief of correspondence under Rickabi. Favours independence, but not anti-British. Not popular with the French. Considered able.

16. Mohamed Kurd Ali. Additional. Still Director of Education. President of the Arab Academy and a literary dilettante. Has another brother who is a lunatic. Nearly executed by Jemal, and then turned pro-Turk. Anti-British. The French, from political motives, support his literary aspirations for the intellectual advancement of the Arabs.

(B.) *Religious Sheikhs.*

1. Mohamed Effendi-el-Mahasini. Still Cadi. Pro-Arab, but prefers British to French. Non political.

2. Ata-el-Qesim. Additional. Intelligent. Pro-Arab, but not pro-Shereefian.

3. Mohamed Alieel Hassibi. Additional. Still Makib of the Esharat. Related to Rickabi, whose partisan he is. Honest. Brother of Ahmed Effendi-el-Hassibi. (Q.v. under Supplementary (A).)

4. Abdul Khair Effendi Abdin. Additional. Hates Feisal and pro-French. Unreliable, and sides with winning party.

5. Adib Taqi-el-Din. Additional. Anti-Feisal, sides with winning party, and now pretends to be pro-French. Ignorant.

6. Sheikh Bedr-el-Din-el-Hassani. Additional. During the war exerted his local influence to prevent the Turks succeeding in making the war a Jihad, and probably thus prevented a massacre of the Christians. I could get no political views out of him.

6B. Taj-el-Din-al-Hassani. Additional. Was chief of the Ulemas, Reis-el-Ulama, over whom he has a big influence, favours Feisal and is pro-British. Very anti-French, as the latter dismissed him recently from his post.

7. Sheikh Abdel Mohsen Effendi-el-Ustuwani. Additional. Keeps aloof from politics. Pro-Arab and prefers us to French. Now President of the "Shura." Another report says, "Very pro-French." Under these circumstances I expect he is only a time-server.

8. Ata-el-Ajlani. Additional. Religious. Keeps aloof from politics. Pro-Arab, and prefers us to French.

9. Sheikh Selim-el-Bokhari. Additional. Now Reis-el-Ulama, which corresponds to the Constantinople Sheikh-ul-Islam. I fancy he prefers the French to us. Of Turkish extraction, but family has been here a century. Father of Supplementary (A) 1.

10. Sheikh Mahmoud Abu Shamat. Not a politician.

11. Nothing to report.

12. Sheikh Abdul Khader-el-Khatib. Additional. Imam of the Big (Omaiya) Mosque. Pro-Feisal, and therefore exiled by the French, whom he hates; a partisan of (B) 6 B. Allowed to return, and now a member of the "Shura."
13. Sheikh Abdel Kader-el-Mograbi. Additional. Has a post in Educational Department. Not a politician. Honest.
14. Sheikh Said-el-Farra. Additional. Stupid and pretentious; a time-server.
15. Sheikh Amin Suweid. Additional. Pro-Arab, but prefers the British to the French.
16. Sheikh Abdul Kader-el-Muzfar. Very anti-French as well as anti-British. Considered venal, but unreliable.

(C.) Moslem Notables.

1. Dead.
2. Killed. And cf. my No. 42. Was at time President of "Shura."
- 2 A. Mohamed Said Bey-el-Yusef. Cf. my despatches Nos. 42 and 58. Correction. Pro-British, but pro-Turk also. He was educated at Wye Agricultural College.
3. Dead.
4. Dead.
5. Nessib-el-Bakri. Additional. At first a friend of Feisal, and with his two brothers accompanied him on his fall. But quarrelled with him, and is now pro-French and ambitious to become Emir of Syria. Ignorant and undependable. His brothers imitate him in politics. For Fozi-el-Bakri, see despatch No. 42.
6. Dead.
7. Emir Abdullah-el-Jezairli. Additional. Uncle of No. 8. The eldest living child of Abdel Kader. Anti-Turk and anti-French. Pretends to be pro-British, as our Ambassador once procured his release from a Turkish prison in Constantinople. He abandoned his French nationality to become an Ottoman, but has since regretted it. His brother, Emir Omar, was hanged by Jemal Pasha. Is believed to have made his peace with the French.
8. Nephew of 7. See my despatch No. 42.
9. Ata Bey-el-Ayoubi. Additional. Now Director-General for Interior. Considered very pro-French, and anti all other Europeans. Always trying to avoid the Capitulations, and I believe he is anti-European, French included.
10. Bedia Bey-el-Moayad. Additional. Director-General of Justice. Has been to Paris to discuss annulling of the Capitulations.
11. Sami Pasha Mordem Bey. Additional. Very rich, does not interfere in politics.
12. Rashid Pasha Mordem Bey. Additional. Son of Osman Bey. Member of "Shura" under Feisal. Intelligent. Pro-Arab. Rich.
13. Nothing to add.
- 13 E. Hadji Ali Bey-el-Abed, is a son of 13.
- 13 A. Mustafa Pasha-el-Abed. Additional. Keeps aloof from politics. Has a daughter, Nazik-el-Abed, who is an Arab extremist and has run away to join Abdullah. She is very anti-French and has much more force of character and influence than her father.
- 13 F. Mohamed Ali-el-Abed. A son of Ahmed Izzat Pasha, narrow-minded. Pro-French. Rich, but of no influence.
14. Ata Dalati. Additional. Neither he nor his sons are of any political importance.
15. Dead.
16. Dead.
17. Ahmed Effendi Ibbish. Additional. Like all the Kurds was pro-French, but very disappointed at the slights they have recently received. He is pro-British, but like most Kurds here rather pro-Turk.
- 17 A and B. Hussein Effendi Ibbish. Additional. Married a daughter of the Chief Kurd, the late Abdurrahman Pasha. Nuri has the same sentiments.
18. Shafiq Bey Kowatli. Delete "good character," Rich landowner. Was a Turkish spy and informer, now hates Feisal and the Arab Party and pro-French. Hated here.
19. Mohamed Ali Pasha Kodmani. Additional. Uncle of Ahmed and Avni, who have both joined Abdullah.
- 20 and 21. See special sheet.

22. Mohamed Bassam. Additional. Considered very pro-British, and helped our prisoners of war and interned persons—even to escape. Reputed not to care about politics, but only about commerce. I fancy that while not implicated in gun-running he could help me to inquire into it, if I can persuade him.

23. Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar. Additional. Fled to Egypt during the war to escape execution by Jemal Pasha. Member of the Syrian Union Party founded in Egypt under Habib Lutfallah Bey. Was Minister for Foreign Affairs up till French occupation, when he retired to Egypt, where he now is. Considered rather pro-British, but is a zealous Independence partisan.

24. Ferid Pasha-el-Yafi. Additional. Ex-Inspector of the Administrative Council in Cilicia, to which post the French appointed him. Jemal Pasha exiled him to Anatolia.

25. Refik Bey-el-Azem. Additional. Not now considered important.

26. Ghalib Bey Zelik. Delete "honest." Ex-President of Municipality. Intelligent, keeps aloof from politics, anti-French. Untruthful, and used to Turkish methods.

27. Nassib Effendi Hamzeh. Additional. Son of the famous Mufti of Damascus, Mahmoud Effendi Hamzeh. Employed by Feisal to form bands against the French near Hamah and Baalback. Ignorant. Very anti-French, and one of the heads of Abdullah's party here. Probably actively responsible for propaganda here in latter's favour. Rather pro-British, but very suspicious. He and his party took steps to ensure safety of Christians during the troubles preceding the French occupation.

28. Nothing to add.

29. Talib Effendi Halbouni. Additional. Now lives at Cairo.

30. Hassan Halbouni. Additional. Probably the richest man of Damascus next to Mohamed Said Bey-el-Yusef. Silk merchant. Honest. Pro-British, but not anti-French.

31. Hassan-el-Siouffi. Additional. President of local Chamber of Commerce. Merchant in manufactured silks.

(D.) Christians.

1. Gregorius IV. Additional. Generally popular. Pro-British, but has to beg money from French to pay his debts, and therefore afraid to show his sentiments openly. This has offended the Greek Catholics. Was in favour of Feisal, Arab independence, and the British mandate, and said so to the American Mandate Delegation. He at that time refused French bribes to vote for them. Is very friendly with (A) 14, very pro-Venizelist, anti-Turk, and pro-Irredentist.

2. Dimitri Cadi. Additional. Very pro-French. Has much influence on his flock and in the Hauran. I fancied he is pro-Irredentist, except in so far as his pro-French sympathies and the latter's present anti-Greek attitude clash with this.

3. Aniz Salloum. Additional. Pro-British; but has just accepted post in the Arab Academy, as he was short of money. Of Hamah, where cousins of his were hanged by Jemal Pasha. A great admirer of Rickabi.

4. Yusuf Bey Sabaa. Delete from "Intelligent" to end. Not considered very intelligent. Vacillating. Has been in turn pro-Turk, pro-Arab, pro-British, and pro-French. Ex-Commissaire of the Régie, which post has just been abolished. Now Commissaire of the Government at the electrical company, and just appointed Chef du Protocole and Dragoman of the Government.

5. Faris-el-Khoury. Additional. Ex-dragoman of this consulate. Was a deputy for Damascus under the Turks. Minister of Finance for Feisal under Elchi, when his (necessary) great increases of taxation made very unpopular. Jemal Pasha imprisoned him. Has great influence here, and Selim and Nessib Pashas Attrash consulted him re the proposed Jebel Druze constitution. Pro-British, and voted against the French mandate. Now very pro-Arab, and probably intriguing with Abdullah's chief supporters here. Has friends equally among Christians, Moslems, and Druzes. Being unemployed has reverted to his old profession of barrister. A good and convincing speaker.

5A. Faiz-el-Khoury. Additional. Is now studying law in Paris. Intelligent and good Arabic writer. Favours Syrian independence under British mandate. Condemned to death by Jemal, but pardoned.

6. Besshara Asfar. Additional. Ex-dragoman of German consulate. Non-political. Very pro-British, and was great friends with our officers during our

occupation. But is now keeping well in with the French, as commerce is his main consideration. From Deir-el-Kamar in the Lebanon. Of no influence.

7. Ghalib Shaoul. Pensioned and living in Beirut.
8. Jean Pahlavan. Additional. I considered him anti-British.
9. Khalil Absi. Additional. Greek Catholic. Very pro-French, and his sons are employed in the French mission. Related to the Greek Catholic Patriarch. Owner of a bitumen mine in Hasbaya.
10. Ahmed Effendi Tarazi. Nothing to add. But see Supplement ry (A) 19.

(E.) *Jewish Notables.*

1. Nessim Bey Addes. Additional. Now living at Cairo. Pro-British, but non-political.
2. Nothing to report.
3. Yusuf Abadi. Additional. Ex-member of the Mixed Commercial Court. Was once president of the municipality under the Turks. Untrustworthy and a time-server.
4. Yusuf Lanyado. Additional. Under Turks a member of the Mixed Commercial Court. Non-political, but rather pro-British.

(F.) *Druze Chiefs.*

See my despatch No. 35.

(G.) *Arab Chiefs.*

1. Nuri-el-Shalan. Additional. Ignorant and a time-server, and has always received a subsidy from the ruling power. He abandoned Feisal at last moment. Now receiving large sums from French to keep the peace.
- 1A. Nawaf-el-Shalan. Son of No. 1. Pretended to be pro-British and quarrelled with his father. This was probably only a manoeuvre to get money from us too. Anyhow, they are now reconciled.

Supplementary (A).

1. Nashhi-el-Bokhari. Son of (B) 9, director of military department. Pro-French. During the war was an inspector of prisoners of war under the Turks, and did nothing to alleviate their lot.
2. Yusuf Bey Sabaa. See under (D) 4.
3. Hamdi-el-Jelad. Director of the police. Ex-president of the municipality under Feisal. Kaimakam of Zebdani under Abdul Hamid. Brother-in-law of Ahmed Izzet Pasha. Now supported by M. Carrette, the French police inspector, though known to have forged a signature, and so obtained money from the Finance Department.
Told me he escaped from here for fear of Jemal Pasha, and wandered over Anatolia in disguise all the war. See also my No. 58.
4. Jemil-el-Elchi. Ex-War Minister and Foreign Minister under Feisal, whose aide-de-camp he was, and also Arab liaison officer at Beirut just before French occupation of Damascus. While there he betrayed Feisal to French, and as reward was made Prime Minister here by French. He soon gave dissatisfaction, and his Cabinet and he had to resign. He is now spoken of as a possible Prime Minister in new Cabinet of a new United Syria. Pro-French while it suits him.
5. Halim Harfoush. Director of the Consular Service Bureau. Ex-proprietor and editor of a Beirut paper, the "Beirut." Probably not very pro-French. Ignorant and incapable. Not a politician.
6. Lieutenant-Colonel Wahid Bey. Director of Gendarmerie and Public Security. Pro-French at present.
7. Sunum Moayad. Director of Public Debt. Feeble character, and obeys all orders of the French.
8. Sheikh Ibrahim Habeish. Inspector of the Secret Police, and a French tool of the Lebanon. Very anti-British.
9. Hamdi Bey Ibn-el-Nasr. Director of Finance. Obeys orders of French. Honest.
10. Dr. Shakir Kaim. Ex-dragoman of this consulate and a doctor. Now Director of Commerce, Agriculture and Public Works. Exiled to Anatolia by the Turks. Says he is pro-British. I do not agree with the report I have received of him, and do not think he is very trustworthy; but he may prefer us to the French.

11. Naaman Abu Shaar. Ex-Ottoman consul in Belgium under Abdul Hamid and agent of Ahmed Izzet Pasha. Apparently pro-French, but believed to be pro-British. Now a member of the "Shura."

12. Selim Bey Anhour. Lawyer, poet and Arabic writer. Intelligent, but intriguer and untrustworthy. Exiled to Angora by Jemal Pasha. A member of the "Shura."

13. Nejim Eddin-el-Droubi. Ex-Kaimakam of Homs. Now a member of the "Shura." Nephew of the late (A) 3. Exiled to Anatolia by Jemal Pasha. Pro-French in appearance, but probably pro-Arab.

14. Amin Bey-el-Husheimi. Secretary of the "Shura." Of the Bekaa. Very anti-French. Intelligent and very pro-British. One brother, Ibrahim, lives in the Lebanon, and is unpopular with the French. Another brother, Abdin, is in our service at Nazareth.

15. Ahmed Bey-el-Hassibi. No longer president of the municipality. Brother of No. (B) 3.

16. Hakki Bey-el-Azem. Governor of Damascus State. Commander of the Legion of Honour. Held small financial posts in Egypt, where he fled after offending Abdul Hamid. His elevation to post of Governor was not merited by any previous display of administrative capacity, but he is a French puppet. A former journalist and pamphleteer, and belonged to several anti-Turk Arab independence societies. Was always pro-French and anti-Feisal. I do not consider him anti-British except from motives of interest. Was friendly with my present dragoman in Egypt during the war.

17. Hashim Bey-el-Utasi. Spoken of as a possible Prime Minister in a new United Syria. Had similar rank.

18. Yahia-el-Sawaff. Simple, non-political. A rich merchant. More honest than some of his predecessors.

19. Ahmed Effendi Tarazi. A former spy of Jemal Pasha, and much hated here. Of weak character. Pro-French and anti-Feisal.

Supplementary (B).

1. Assad Haidar, of Baalbeck. Chief of the Muteweli sect. Very influential there. Was pro-Arab under Feisal; but his son Ibrahim is now a member of the Administrative Council at Beirut. This has influenced his father, who is now considered pro-French. The sect as a general rule hates the French.

2. Sheikh Assad-el-Sahib, of Irak. Has visited London and Paris. Declares he has great influence in Mesopotamia. Cunning and intriguer. Professes pronounced pro-British feelings, and pretends to have great influence over Mesopotamian exiles here. Says he voted for us; that he is anti-Turk, but proposes as a solution of present situation the recall of Abbas Hilmi to Egypt. He says he has received a letter saying the latter would like to become Emir of Syria, and appears to think French may be considering this solution.

Supplementary (C).

Emir Said-el-Jezairli. Son of Ali Pasha and cousin of (C) 8. Has pretensions to Emirate of Syria. Rash and ignorant. Has committed three acts of homicide through carelessness with firearms. Was very anti-French before the war, also anti-European and anti-Turk. Jemal Pasha exiled him. Joined Feisal, but probably as Jemal Pasha's spy. He soon left Feisal and stayed here. He took temporary charge of affairs upon the Turkish evacuation, and soon fell foul of Rickabi. See my despatch No. 28. Now pretends to be pro-French, but some day he is intriguing with Abdullah. Members of Feisal's staff were Ihsan-el-Jabri, Auni Abdul Hadi, Emir Adel Arslan, Sheikh Kamel-el-Kassab, Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar, Jamil Mordem Bey, Yassin Pasha-el-Hashmi and Muri Pasha-el-Said.

Supplementary (D).

Nedra Meshaka. Dragoman of this consulate. Protestant. Was dragoman before the war, during which he served in our Intelligence Department in Egypt. Held similar post here till my arrival and was also "chef du protocole." Popular with all sects and political opinions, and knows all the influential personages and Government officials, and most of the French employees and officers. A great friend of (A) 14 and (D) 5. A friend of the present Governor in Egypt during the war.

Supplementary (E).

Jacob Danon. The Grand Rabbi. A strong Zionist. No other political views but is not noticeably anti-British.

Supplementary (F).

Lebanon Druze families in order of importance:—

1. Roslan.
2. Jemlat.
3. Telhouk.
4. Abu Nakad.
5. Hamad.
6. Abdul Sahmad.
7. Abdul Melik.

Supplementary (G).

Mohamed Pasha Oseimi. Chief of the Ugeil Bedouin. Receives large subsidy from French, and allowed to control ingress and egress of firearms. Probably at the bottom of all gun-running from this State.

Supplementary (H).

Le Marchese Gaetano Paterno. Italian consul-general. Has rank of "conseiller de Légation" and came here with credentials as Minister to Feisal, but never presented them owing to latter's fall. Is reporting centre for all Syria, Palestine and Hedjaz. Very unpopular with the French, and outwardly friendly to myself and Colonel Easton. Has an English wife, who was born in Italy. I agree with the French that he has been trying to acquire some influence with the Arabs here, but think he has completely failed. He gave Feisal good advice at the crisis, which the latter disregarded. A typical Italian diplomat, who would like to bring about coolness between the French and us in any way.

Journalists (3).

Jaridat-el-Afrit. Editor and director "Kamel-el-Massri," an Egyptian of Zagazig. Founded under Feisal. Circulation was about 500, but it was suppressed a week after French occupation for an article saying the mandate should have been given to Britain or America, but not to France. He was condemned for this to five years, but pardoned after six months.

Now condemned to a week for an article in the same paper against the local Arab Public Prosecutor.

I have, &c.

C. L. S. PALMER.

[E 5784/455/91]

No. 118.

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 35. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period 21st-30th April, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdah, Jerusalem, Aden and to the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

*Jeddah Report for Period April 21-30, 1921.**Arrival of Emir Feisal.*

EMIR FEISAL arrived on the Khedivial mail-boat "Tantah" on the 25th April. He was accompanied by Emir Zeid and Emir Ali, the latter having joined the boat at Yenbo. His Majesty King Hussein arrived in Jeddah on the evening of the 24th. The town was decorated in honour of Feisal's arrival. Various complimentary calls were made and returned.

His Majesty King Hussein, accompanied by Emir Ali and Emir Feisal, called here on the morning of the 27th. A summary of his statement is attached.

Emir Feisal, whose intention was obviously to settle differences between his father and foreign Powers, asked me to call on him and state our difficulties. Accompanied by Major Batten and Ismail Effendi I called on him on the afternoon of the 27th and, in a meeting which lasted for more than two hours, we discussed (1) quarantine; (2) public health; (3) supplies; (4) capitulations; and (5) local currency and payment in gold.

With regard to (1) quarantine, Feisal agreed that His Majesty treated the question purely from a political point of view. Kamaran, in the opinion of His Majesty the King, should belong to the Hedjaz, and, as we had taken it, he asserted his right to quarantine control by employing Jeddah. Feisal said that if King Hussein had a representative at Kamaran who would countersign the bills of health he thought the King would carry out the International Convention to the letter. In the meantime, Feisal promised to try to persuade the King to abolish the practice of twenty-four hours unnecessary quarantine at Jeddah.

With regard to (2) public health, we pointed out the lack of proper hospital accommodation, the complete absence of trained nursing orderlies, and the inferior type of medical officer attracted to the Hedjaz service.

With regard to (3), (4) and (5) we pointed out the high price of rice, wheat and flour, and the hardships thereby imposed on the pilgrims, our powerlessness to interfere in the affairs of registered British subjects, and the injustice of the Government demanding payment in gold while allowing no gold to be exported from the country. All these points will receive Feisal's attention, and will be treated by him in a report.

Feisal also sent for the consul for the Netherlands and asked him to state all his grievances and difficulties.

Feisal during his short stay in Jeddah made a very good impression by his frankness, his statesmanship-like qualities and his broad-mindedness.

The King gave a luncheon party in honour of Feisal, and the Royal party left for Mecca on the afternoon of the 28th.

French and Feisal.

The French consul-general called on the King as usual, but not on the arrival of Feisal, thinking that a call on that occasion might be misunderstood. The King was angry, but we explained matters to both. On calling to say good-bye to King Hussein the French consul-general asked to be excused from attending the luncheon party, not from any personal reason, but in view of his Government's attitude to Feisal.

Water Supply.

Baron Pfyffer, from Cairo, presumably sent by Habib Lotfelleh, arrived here on the "Tantah" to report on the possibility of a water supply for Jeddah being obtained in the hills. The King is delighted with, and optimistic about, the two wells he has opened near Jeddah, but Baron Pfyffer, who called here, says the supply there is only temporary and is inadequate. Baron Pfyffer left for the interior on the 28th.

Quarantine.

A Dutch boat, the "Billiton," arrived with 1,401 pilgrims on the 27th without having called at Kamaran. The explanation given was that the ship's agent at Batavia said Kamaran would not be open until 27th April, obviously a mistake for 27th March.

The pilgrims were sent to the Island of Wasta for twenty-four hours, where there are no appliances for disinfecting pilgrims.

Relations between King Hussein and the consul for the Netherlands.

The consul for the Netherlands asked, perfectly rightly, for permission for the Javanese doctor to visit Javanese pilgrim houses. His letter was returned with the remark that he was interfering in matters in which did not concern him. He referred this to His Majesty the King, who did not answer his letters. On the King's arrival in Jeddah he was twice refused a personal interview, but, after seeing Feisal, was permitted to see the King but not to discuss the subject. The King, however, sent Feisal to discuss the subject.

King Hussein sent us a petition last week from Javanese pilgrims (all Dutch subjects) to deal with, saying that in view of the interference of the Dutch consul he would have nothing to do with him, and anyhow he only dealt with Great Britain. We pointed out the difficult position in which his action placed us, and he agreed to our returning the petition to him.

Medina.

Reports continue to be received of the insecurity of the Yenbo route and of the usual exactions from caravans.

Emir Ali, however, apparently had little difficulty during his journey, although he spoke feelingly of the strain of his work at Medina.

Sheriff Shahaat is reported to have been captured by the rebels at Khaibar, and a force of 500 soldiers with seven guns is said to have been despatched to his rescue.

Pilgrim Caravans.

The majority of the Javanese have reached Medina without molestation. Sheriff Mohsen was reinforced by Sheriff Ahmed Mansur from Medina, and various attempts at holding up the caravans were frustrated.

Current Rumours.

Emir Ali is to supervise the survey of a railway between Medina and Yenbo. It will be recollected that one of the reasons given by him for choosing the Wejh route on first proceeding to Medina was in order to consider the old Turkish project of a line from Wejh to El Ula.

Emir Abdullah is being provided with munitions secretly by the British for use against the French.

Opinion is divided as to whether Emir Feisal will join his brother, or, after a short stay in Mecca, proceed to Irak.

Press.

"Al Qibla," No. 477.

A petition submitted to King Hussein by certain Javanese assuring him of their fidelity and assistance against a party recently formed in Java inimical to his interests. The petitioners, to assist them in their object, ask for the appointment of a Hedjaz representative to safeguard Arab and pilgrim interests and to examine the passports of all leaving for the Hedjaz.

To avoid propaganda among pilgrims, members of the above party should be forbidden to enter the Hedjaz, even to perform the Haj.

The British Government is stated to have refused their entry into British possessions.

Nos. 478 and 479 contain reports of the Emir Feisal's arrival in Jeddah.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

Summary of a Statement made by King Hussein on April 27, 1921.

I HAVE come down to Jeddah especially to see you and to bring you and Feisal together at an interview, in order that both of you may bear witness to what I am now going to say.

Here is Feisal, who has come from London to convey to me a message from His Britannic Majesty's Government, saying that all my demands and the terms of the agreement between Great Britain and myself will be carried out. The British agent has previously communicated to me a similar message.

His Majesty's Government say that, with the exception of Syria and Palestine, everything will be carried out as originally agreed upon, and according to my wishes and desires. As regards Syria and Palestine, I am urged to exercise patience. But, as with everything else, there is a limit to patience, and although my patience is almost exhausted, I will try to keep patient till I see what is going to happen. Therefore I now say that I approve of what His Majesty's Government have suggested, and I earnestly hope that with their kind help all agreements will be carried out in due course.

If they are not carried out I shall have to carry out the intention expressed in my letter of the 21st Zil Kaidah 1336, of which I now hand you a copy, in which I explained all my views which still hold good.

In speaking to you as the representative of the British Government, I am speaking to the whole of Great Britain.

The British Government invited us to join them in the war for the sake of our mutual interests, and we appreciate the confidence reposed in us. We have nothing to do with France, nor have we any connections with her. It is the British Government only to whom we refer in all matters.

The British Government should understand that in the Arabian Peninsula lies the centre of British interests, and I am quite willing to employ British subjects as doctors, engineers, &c., in course of time.

I am not as other people. I am a true and sincere friend of Great Britain. My feelings and respect towards Great Britain have never changed, and never will.

I am greatly disappointed to hear that His Majesty's Government have asked that I will act in the same manner as I did during the critical period of the war, for this proves to me that His Majesty's Government think that my feelings have changed. But, I swear on my honour and that of my family (father and grandfather), that, even if I were placed in a most critical position, I would never change my feelings and respect towards Great Britain, and I can never forget her favours.

All that I have to do, in the event of my agreement with Great Britain regarding the independence of the whole of the Arabs not being carried out, is to abdicate.

If His Majesty's Government mean to refer to the pilgrim and quarantine questions of last year, I say that they were the result of differences of opinion between the local officials and Colonel Vickery, and are of no great importance, and had nothing to do with politics.

I know that we are not perfect and lack knowledge in many things, and, in cases of deficiency on our part, I should like you to advise and correct us, but not to force us.

I know that I cannot do without the British, and I must have the British forces in Mesopotamia, at least for security, and I should like to have a British ship in the harbour of Basra as well.

In short, I say that it should be clearly understood that I never rose for the sake of wealth, property or sovereignty, or for my sons to be kings, but in the interest of the Arabs and Arab independence. I do not mind if you have Ibn Saud, Idrisi or any capable person to take over the work from me. But it is most essential that His Majesty's Government should carry out the agreements, because they are not only in the interest of the Arabs and the Moslems generally, but of the British themselves.

I have been told by His Majesty's Government, through the Agency and otherwise, that they had to note with regret that I had opposed them in certain matters.

I again affirm I have never, and never will, oppose anything which is in the interests of Britain, and not only will I agree to everything she asks, if it is to our mutual interest, but I am always occupied in finding means to serve her interests myself, and to point out to her where her best interests lie.

The letter, of which I have again given you a copy in order to remove all doubt, contains my first and last words, and I can abate nothing from it, and stand or fall by the fulfilment of its provisions in their entirety.

Enclosure 3 in No. 118.

Shipping Intelligence to April 30, 1921.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st and 30th April, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Mansourah ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	April 21	April 22	305	Packages. 2,753
Tantah ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 25	" 25	"	595
Canadian Conqueror ..	British	Rangoon ..	"	" 25	"	"	58,763
Keemun ..	British	Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	" 26	April 26	1,329	"
Billiton ..	Dutch	Java ..	Amsterdam ..	" 27	" 28	1,401	"
Cerbolie ..	Italian	P. Soudan ..	"	" 27	"	"	897
Shushtar ..	British	Bombay and Karachi	"	" 28	"	807	12,468
Prometheus ..	British	Java ..	Liverpool ..	" 28	April 29	811	"
Krakatan ..	Dutch	Java ..	Amsterdam ..	" 29	"	1,618	"
Djemmer ..	Dutch	Java ..	"	" 30	"	1,793	"
Jason ..	British	Singapore ..	"	" 30	"	1,318	"
Akbar ..	British	Bombay ..	"	" 30	"	"	8,546

[E 5872/100/93]

No. 119.

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 21, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN asks me to communicate message, of which following is a paraphrase, to His Majesty's Government:—

"As already stated, I am prepared to carry out the wishes of His Majesty's Government, especially in the matter of which Feisal has informed me, and I have received from the people of Mesopotamia telegraphs [*sic*] asking for one of my sons. I am awaiting news of date of Feisal's departure in order to notify Mesopotamians.

I have delayed making any definite open announcement to avoid rumours. When date of his departure is fixed I will inform them of his appointment."

[E 5888/4/91]

No. 120.

General Haddad to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23.)

Sir,

Empire Hotel, Bath, May 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to enclose translations of telegrams just received from His Royal Highness Emir Feisal and His Majesty King Hussein, both dated the 17th May. Their urgency is indicated by their contents.

I have, &c.

E. HADDAD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

The Emir Feisal to General Haddad.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, May 17, 1921.

WHILE I am doing my best to arrange with Ibn Saud, his troops repeatedly encroached on the district of Taif on 1st May, and a force has also encroached on the tribe of Metair, north of Taif. On the 15th instant another force attacked the villages to the east of Taif and encamped there. May it be known.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

King Hussein to General Haddad.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, May 17, 1921.

REPORT to the British Government that it is only as the result of executing their wishes, prompted by my confidence in them, that I am found as I am. I have done all in my power to carry out their wishes. My least expectation is, therefore, that they will support me in this my critical position. I would have avoided calling on them, but our common interests being endangered there is no more room for hesitation. Ibn Saud yesterday encroached on the neighbourhood of Taif and murdered and pillaged. I do not want Hedjaz to be a burden on the British Government, but these are exceptional emergencies, and no reasonable time has yet been given for it to provide for its own requirements. Expecting urgent action.

[E 5583/104/93]

No. 121.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 275.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1921.

MY telegram No. 251 of 16th May: Amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia. Date of proclamation of amnesty has been fixed for 30th May.

[E 6002/4/91]

No. 122.

Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Mesopotamia.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 26.)

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 23, 1921.

FEISAL and King Hussein have both telegraphed to Haddad that Ibn Saud's forces are encroaching in the neighbourhood of Taif, and that on the 15th they attacked villages east of that town and encamped there. Please see your telegram No. 25 of 18th April: I presume that Ibn Saud's envoys were clearly informed that, as agreed at Cairo, continuance of Ibn Saud's subsidy was conditional upon his maintaining peace with Hedjaz, and that you put this condition into formal letter which you addressed subsequently to Ibn Saud himself. You should now communicate to him the report which we have received through Haddad, and inform him that, until we are satisfied that he is loyally fulfilling the conditions laid down by us, no further payment will be made.

[E 6049/117/89]

No. 123.

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, May 14, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 20 of the 23rd April last, I have the honour to report that the general situation in Aleppo and district is not satisfactory.

In the past fortnight three attacks on trains or on the line between Beirout and Aleppo have taken place. In one of these some military and civilian passengers on the train were killed or wounded. In the most recent attack part of the railway line was torn up and communication stopped for two days. The area of the attacks is between the stations of Ummerdjim and Hamdanieh, a district inhabited by the Mewali and Hadidi tribes. Strong French forces have now been despatched to the district in question and communications have been restored.

It is reported that the Mewalis, who are mainly responsible for these attacks, have been severely punished by the French.

Cases of holding up of vehicular traffic on the Alexandretta-Aleppo road and on the Aleppo-Bab road have also occurred during the past fortnight. In the case of traffic on the Alexandretta road the assailants on one occasion carried off the French mail.

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These attacks have caused much alarm among the population, who see in them an attempt at isolating Aleppo, and rumours of an Arab attack on Aleppo are rife. Rumour fixes the attack on the town for to-day or to-morrow. The French authorities are seriously concerned and look on an attack and a native revolt as probable, as is proved by their redoubling their military precautions within the last few days. The menace to Aleppo would appear real. Some days ago I was approached indirectly to know whether Great Britain would sympathise with a revolt of the tribes in Deir-ez-Zor district and of the Mewali tribes. I replied that Great Britain was France's ally and would stand by her, and that she strongly discountenanced any rising against the French and any propagation of a belief that Great Britain would sympathise with or help any such movement.

The population of Aleppo, both Christian and Moslem, is discontented with the present régime. This is due, in my opinion, more to the stagnation of commerce, due to Aleppo's isolation and to the high cost of flour, than to anything else. Unemployment and famine—especially in Ramadan—do not make for tranquillity.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 6155/455/91]

No. 124.

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 44. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 1st to 10th May, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL,

British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 124.

Jeddah Report for the period May 1-10, 1921.

Political.

Letters from the King and Feisal.

THE following letters have been received from the King and Feisal. I give them in full:—

Your honour,

I beg to present you my best longings. Mr. Lloyd George's telegram regarding the question of my withdrawal, communicated to me by you on the 1st March, has allowed me to discuss that question when I had the pleasure of seeing you in Jeddah last week after my son Feisal had explained to me what arrangements were made, and what decisions were arrived at, regarding the question with Great Britain.

Therefore, being willing to express my best thanks and gratitude to Great Britain, I hereby hasten to write this letter, begging your Excellency, firstly, to convey my greatest thanks and gratitude for the glad tidings brought to me by Feisal to the effect that the hopes and reliance were renewed, and became as they had been before.

But, in spite of what we are up till now suffering, owing to the change which happened to that reliance and confidence for no actual reason that I can see, or any cause that I can understand, my dutiful loyalty and original sincerity make me bear as well the postponing of the matter of Syria to a certain period begging the British honour not to take the trouble to do anything which would cause difficulty or hardship to its diplomatic career in order that we may not be liable to be again misjudged.

I stated to you in my last conversation that I am preserving the right of the contents of my letter of 21st Zil Ka'ada 1336.

I only beg Great Britain to expedite, at least, carrying out what has nothing to do with international politics, such as stopping the attacks of Ibn Saud and Idrisi,

and compelling them not to advance against any places that were not under them before the war, or during it, in order, at least, to avoid bloodshed, and obliging them to return to the same position as they were in in the time of the Turkish Government.

If you consider the period that elapsed between the date of my asking for the withdrawal and your aforesaid communication till now, it is not necessary to mention how dangers are increasing and becoming more acute, and particularly in the pilgrim season when it is necessary to take precautions for its security before it is too late.

I am awaiting the result, and God is the best help, my dear friend.

HUSSEIN.

May 3, 1921.

My dear Major Marshall,

I have received your letter relating to the quarantine question. I appreciate the importance of a definite settlement of this matter, so that the troubles which the pilgrims suffer every now and then may be avoided. I am trying to attain that end and will inform you of the result.

His Majesty, my father, sent you a letter yesterday stating that he is pleased with the new manner of policy and the principal terms which were previously agreed to.

In the meantime, however, he finds it unavoidable to draw the notice of the British Government to Syria. Though His Majesty does not want to bring up a matter which puts Great Britain in a critical position with respect to the present circumstances, yet he sees it necessary to remind you of the rights of the Arabs in that region and asks your support, of which we have always seen the useful results, on behalf of the question, so that it may not be neglected later on.

There is still the question of the Wahhabies and their expected invasion; it stands in priority, and His Majesty, my father, cannot look indifferently on it as the pilgrim season is now at hand.

Certainly your Excellency must appreciate the seriousness of the question and the necessity of taking effective steps so that nothing affecting the public security will occur thus leading to internal disorder of the country.

When I was in London His Britannic Majesty's Government gave me the required assurances about that subject, but, in spite of those assurances which I conveyed to His Majesty, my father, he has seen it convenient to allude to the subject in his letter, thus anticipating the prevention of any mishap in the future and hoping that you may refer to the higher authorities that question which promises to be dangerous to the country. With best respects.

Yours faithfully,

FEISAL.

I acknowledged these letters and sent your Lordship a telegram (No. 46 of the 5th May) on the Wahhabie question. Since then I have written both to the King and Feisal regarding the Wahhabie pilgrimage (your telegram No. 44 of the 4th May), but have not yet received a reply.

Two chiefs of the Muddayana (Wahhabies) named Sultan Din and Jamhore, with 1,000 followers and important sheikhs are in camp at Khalid Nauman (near Arafat). They are being hospitably entertained by the King.

A Mesopotamian deputation has arrived at Mecca, having come overland via Medina.

King Hussein continues to be very friendly with Ahmed Nadim Bey, late Vali of the Hedjaz, and frequently visits him in his house, remaining many hours. Nadim Bey's son is becoming a great favourite with the King, and is being entrusted with responsible duties.

Water.

Baron Pfyffer returned from the interior on the 30th April.

He went as far as Shamesi, on the Mecca road, and surveyed the ground in that neighbourhood. He says there is a plentiful supply of good water, and that a very good water supply could be brought to Jeddah for a sum not exceeding 60,000l. There is no doubt that this money would be forthcoming. I understand that Khandwani, the Indian merchant, has offered to instal the water supply, but I doubt if the King will accept.

Baron Pfyffer examined the water from the two wells opened by King Hussein near Jeddah. He reports the water to be of bad quality.

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The King is said to have offered Baron Pfyffer a fee of 200*l.* for his report, but this was refused on the grounds that he had no contract with, and was not engaged by, King Hussein.

Rumours.

It is stated—

- (a.) That several Turkish engineers have arrived at Medina from Asia Minor to repair the Hedjaz railway.
- (b.) That Feisal is arranging several deputations to visit the different Arab rulers, that he has made friendly relations and agreements with the Turkish Nationalists and Indian agitators, and that he has come here to unite the Moslem world.
- (c.) That on Shereef Feisal's entry into Mecca there was fighting between the different quarters of Mecca: the Misfala, Jiad, Goshashia and Suk-el-Lil. Several people were wounded.
- (d.) That shortly before the arrival of Feisal a Turk arrived at Mecca and was well received by the King. He came by an Italian steamer. From the description of this man he is probably Sheikh Abdul Qader Muzaffer, late of the Arab Club, Damascus.
- (e.) In an Indian newspaper named "Medina," that Emir Abdullah, along with delegates from the Imam and several other Moslem representatives of different Islamic countries, had attended a meeting in Asia Minor under the presidency of Syed Senussi of Tripoli.

Press.

Nos. 480 and 481 of "Al Qibla" contain numerous wires from Mesopotamian notables asking the King to send one of his sons. No. 481 contains the King's reply, saying he will do so.

No. 481 contains the notification of the award of the 3rd Class of the Order of El Nahda to Major Batten, 3rd Gurkha Rifles, acting British agent at Jeddah, and of the 4th and 5th Class respectively to Mr. S. J. Dilley and Mr. E. W. Mackinnon, of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., Jeddah.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 124.

Shipping Intelligence to May 10, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 1st and 10th May, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
							Packages.
Cerbolie ..	Italian	Yembo	May 2
Canadian Conqueror	British	Montreal	" 3
Shushtar	Bombay	" 5
Djembar ..	Dutch	Marseilles	" 3
Jason ..	British	London	" 3
Akbar	Bombay	" 5
Tantah	P. Soudan	Suez ..	May 1 ..	" 2	480
Porto Maurizio	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 5 ..	" 5	254
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 5 ..	" 5	968
Serpentara ..	Italian ..	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 7 ..	" 7	765
Ning Chow ..	British ..	Singapore	London ..	" 7 ..	" 7 ..	1,261	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 8 ..	" 9	3,338
Antenor ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	London ..	" 9 ..	" 9 ..	743	..

[E 6197/4/91]

No. 125.

General Haddad to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

Sir,

38, Sloane Street, May 28, 1921.

IN acknowledging receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, I have to express my gratitude for the prompt steps His Britannic Majesty's Government have taken, following on my application on the subject. I have also the honour to inform you that I have cabled to His Majesty King Hussein regarding this promising step towards the establishment of peace.

I have, &c.

G. HADDAD,
Brigadier-General, representing Hedjaz.

[E 6277/117/89]

No. 126.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord,

Damascus, May 13, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French have apparently decided to try to keep the different tribes to more or less definite zones.

The "Mukhtabas" of the 11th reports that the Roweilah have been asked to keep to the east of Lake Atibe.

Sheikh Ibrahim Habeish, the head of the local secret police, is to be transferred to the Grand Liban. His successor (M. Lecarte) has arrived here to take over his duties as Inspector of the Department of Public Security.

The "Fata-el-Arab," which the French suppressed last year, is to be allowed to appear again.

(Under flying seal to Beirut; copies to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[6280/117/89]

No. 127.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Damascus, May 18, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Mukhtabas" of the 17th May states that the French High Commissioner has informed the local authorities here that Mahmoud-el-Faour has been pardoned upon his own request and that his property in the French zone is to be restored to him.

The High Commissioner has refused the request of the Damascus Moslems to be allowed to collect funds for the Turkish Red Crescent upon the grounds that Turkey had not yet signed the Peace Treaty.

The railway and telegraph wires between Aleppo and here have again been cut by the Hadidiyin, Muwali and Alaouites near Hamah.

A French officer from Hamah declares the bands active there are headed by Turkish officers and that they have machine guns. The train was fired on.

(Under flying seal to Beirut; copies to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 6423/104/93]

No. 128.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 1658.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 3rd June, 1921, respecting the proclamation of an amnesty in Mesopotamia.

Paris, June 4, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

L'AMBASSADE de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire savoir par une note du 26 mai au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que son Gouvernement avait fixé au 30 de ce mois la proclamation de l'amnistie politique en Mésopotamie.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République à Beyrouth, informé aussitôt, vient de faire savoir par télégramme qu'il avait pris ses dispositions pour annoncer, le 8 juin prochain, à l'occasion des fêtes du Ramadan, les mesures de clémence accordées en Syrie. La coïncidence des décisions des Gouvernements britannique et français sera donc, à quelques jours près, assurée.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur de remercier son Excellence Lord Hardinge de Penshurst des communications qu'il a bien voulu lui adresser à ce sujet.

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 3 juin 1921.*

[E 6511/455/91]

No. 129.

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 49. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th-20th May, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Jerusalem and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Jeddah Report for the Period May 11-20, 1921.

(Secret.)

Nejd Pilgrimage.

ON receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 44 of the 4th instant, I wrote to King Hussein informing him that Ibn Saud was prepared to give the fullest assurances of the peaceful conduct of the pilgrims, provided King Hussein will give corresponding assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as other pilgrims. I said that I was quite aware that His Majesty made no distinction between pilgrims and treated them all with the same kindness and consideration, but pointed out that if he would give this guarantee it would be greatly appreciated by His Majesty's Government, who were well informed on His Majesty's views on the Wahhabies, as a step in the direction of peace, and that it might open the way for future negotiations on political matters.

At the same time I wrote to Emir Feisal on the same subject.

The King's reply showed clearly that he takes up the same attitude as he took last year on this question. He points out that the Wahhabism of the Nejd people is a hostile and political one. He says there is no objection to their coming by sea, but otherwise he takes up the same uncompromising attitude as he took last year. The letter contains many other irrelevant references.

Feisal discussed the question with his father and said that he thought that his father would approve of the Wahhabies coming to the pilgrimage if His Majesty's Government would guarantee that nothing would occur to threaten the security of the pilgrimage during the period the Wahhabies were in the Hedjaz. He suggested that the following conditions should be imposed:—

1. The Wahhabies should come in small parties, and should leave the Hedjaz directly after performing the Haj.
2. They should be unarmed.

3. That they should be met on the road by a committee who would give them the necessary passes for their visit to the Hedjaz.

In my reply to Feisal I quoted your telegram No. 47, and pointed out that His Majesty's Government accepted, and were satisfied with, the assurances of Ibn Saud and I thought that King Hussein might trust His Majesty's Government in this matter. I pointed out that Ibn Saud was unlikely to run the risk of incurring the displeasure of His Majesty's Government by any act of treachery. I suggested that the King might insist on the following conditions when giving his assurances:—

1. That Ibn Saud sends a highly responsible and powerful official with the Wahhabi pilgrims; and
2. That they only come with sufficient arms to protect themselves on the journey.

I pointed out that if the conditions were made too strict, Ibn Saud would suspect a lack of trust and we would be no nearer a solution of the question.

In his reply, enclosing his telegram to Haddad Pasha which was forwarded to you under my No. 49 of the 17th instant, Feisal points out the danger of a dispute between even two persons, which might lead to a big riot, so long as Ibn Saud and King Hussein are at war. He is going to discuss the question again with his father and let me know the result.

There is no doubt that King Hussein is very much afraid of the Wahhabies. I think he feels the weakness of his position in that, owing to his unpopularity, he might not receive the support of his own people. There is no doubt that, were they unarmed, the King would raise no objection to their coming, and it would be advisable to find out if Ibn Saud would be prepared to make concessions in the matter of arms if King Hussein gave the necessary assurances.

In my opinion, two things are essential before we can safely encourage the Nejd pilgrimage:—

1. That King Hussein himself, either by letter, wire or verbally, gives the necessary assurances to a representative of His Majesty's Government; and
2. That Ibn Saud sends, as Emir of the Nejd Haj, a responsible and powerful official who could control the Wahhabies.

Since the above was written I have received from Mecca copies of the telegrams King Hussein and Feisal have sent to Haddad Pasha. The former makes no reference to assurances regarding the Wahhabi pilgrimage, but asked for four aeroplanes, five armoured cars and money. He probably fears that should the Wahhabies come to the pilgrimage they will find out his military weakness.

Aeroplanes and armoured cars are out of the question, as the personnel would have to be of the Moslem faith. Some parts of the country also, especially in the neighbourhood of Taif, are probably quite unsuited for the military use of armoured cars.

The only way, in my opinion, we can police the pilgrimage is to ask Egypt to increase the Mahmal escort, or to send a battalion of Egyptian infantry under a tactful officer, such as Sadik Pasha, but I doubt if the King would accept this.

Reports have been received of fighting at Mateir, north of Taif, and at Al Ukheid, east of Taif—Feisal's telegram to Haddad Pasha on the 17th May, 1921. The hostile forces are under the command of Khalid, who, as formerly, is probably acting quite independently of Ibn Saud, though both King Hussein and Feisal think differently.

Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.

On the 12th May I wrote to the King informing him that it was again proposed to send the Indian hospital to Jeddah, and asking for his formal approval and consent, and asking if the same buildings, so generously given last year, could be again placed at the disposal of the hospital.

In his reply, full of irrelevant references to higher politics and cases of plague on the Khedivial steamers, His Majesty submitted his objection to the hospital, except a small private hospital of ten or, at the outside, fifteen beds.

On receipt of this letter I at once telegraphed to you (my No. 50 of the 17th May, 1921), and repeated same to Simla. I also wrote to the King pointing out the uselessness of a hospital of ten or fifteen beds in the event of epidemic disease and widespread

destitution, and pointing out that our desire was to assist him in medical matters while his country was still in an undeveloped state. I urged him to change his mind and give his consent.

Last year His Majesty gave his consent to me personally, and I did not anticipate any difficulty this year. Without his consent it is useless to open the hospital, as we require the buildings, and we are also dependent on him for water supply, of which, this year, I anticipate great shortage.

If His Majesty continues to oppose, pressure must be brought to bear on him, as I fear again much destitution and a large influx of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah immediately after the Haj. Even now prices in Mecca are very high.

General.

1. Emir Ali, accompanied by Emir Zeid, arrived in Jeddah from Mecca on the 10th instant. On the 14th he left by the Khedivial steamer "Mansourah" for Yembo and Medina. Emir Zeid returned to Mecca.

2. A case of plague occurred among the crew—a fireman—of the Khedivial steamship "Mansourah." The malady was contracted in Suez, and he fell sick two days before the boat arrived at Jeddah, but he returned to work and fell sick again at Port Soudan, where he was admitted to hospital and found to be suffering from plague.

The danger of plague being admitted to the Hedjaz, particularly to the northern ports of Wejh and Yembo, from Suez, is obvious, and I am instructing the Hedjaz quarantine authorities to take all possible precautions.

3. Local Government.—(a.) The camel hire to Mecca has been increased by Government order to P.T. 120. In addition a pilgrim pays P.T. 10 for a shukduf, and P.T. 5 for luggage without a shukduf. As a matter of fact pilgrims are paying much more. One case was recently brought to my notice in which an Indian pilgrim paid 42 rupees for a camel from Jeddah to Mecca.

As a rule a pilgrim pays 2 mejidiehs (40 piastres) more than the appointed hire.

(b.) On the arrival of one pilgrim ship—the "Homayun"—the pilgrims were disembarked while half of their luggage was left on board. The customs officials closed the gates and the pilgrims were left overnight on the quay, without any food or proper comfort, until their baggage arrived the following morning. This is typical of the incompetency and thoughtlessness of some of the local officials.

(c.) It is reported that 60 per cent. of the foodstuffs has been appropriated by the Government. The merchants have to pay three or four times the amount of the appointed camel hire to take their foodstuffs to Mecca. The result is that prices in Mecca are very high. Kerosene oil costs P.T. 26 an oke, sugar P.T. 22 an oke, and wheat bread is not found. It is said that postal employees in Jeddah are sending leaves by post to their colleagues in Mecca.

Current Rumours.

1. It is reported that Sheikh Feisal of Ahmedi has established an independent Government in the Hamada mountains, near Medina, and is issuing passes and charging dues from all who pass through his territory. He is said to have levied from pilgrims 1 to 2 gold pounds per camel.

2. That King Hussein, having failed in obtaining the favour of the Sunni Moslem world, is turning his attention to the Shias, amongst whom he is spreading propaganda in Mesopotamia and Persia. The King has warned the authorities in Mecca and Medina to respect, and take care of, the Shia pilgrims. There are a considerable number of Shia notables in Mecca at the present time. Previously Shias have always been badly treated in the Hedjaz, both by the Arabs and by the citizens of the Holy Places. Among the notables now in Mecca are Sheikh Abu Bataikh, Sheikh Mohamed Nur and Syed Zein from Mesopotamia, and Emir Abdul Rehman, son of Abdu Hadi, of Bahrein.

It is said that the King's present protection of the Shias is making a great impression on the Shia public, who will probably gladly accept King Hussein as Khalifa, as their Imam must be a son of the Prophet.

3. That King Hussein has wired to the brothers Hussein, Dr. Mohammed Hussein and Dr. Khalil Hussein, in Egypt, asking them to return to the Hedjaz.

4. It is reported that Shereef Shehaat has returned to Medina after his attack on the rebels of Khaibar, who were said to have been supported by followers of Ibn Rashid. Shereef Shehaat was defeated, and about 100 of his men were killed.

Press—"Al Qibla."

No. 482 contains a telegram from Michael Lotfallah, head of the Syrian Union, and Rashid Rida, head of the Syrian Congress, protesting against an article in the "Morning Post," in which Haddad Pasha is said to have said that Feisal would not think it wrong for Syria to be annexed to France.

His Majesty replied that this was pure intrigue, and the question must be decided by the will of the people of Syria. He commended them on having made the protest.

No. 484. In criticising an article by Shekeib Arselan the "Qibla" praises the Allies, and believes they are the only people who are going to fulfil their word, and further refers to speeches of the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

Shipping Intelligence to May 20, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and 20th May, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1921	1921		Packages.
Mansourah	British	P. Soudan.	Suez	May 11	May 14	..	356
Bencleuch	"	Batavia	Aden	" 13	" 15	915	..
Homayun	"	Bombay and Karachi	Bombay	" 14	" 17	871	12,298
Nelus	"	Java	New York	" 14	" 15	307	..
Atreus	"	Singapore	London	" 14	" 14	1,232	Planks.
Tantah	"	Suez	P. Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	607
Asmara	Italian	"	Massana	" 17	" 17	..	21
Deli	Dutch	Java	Suez	" 19	" 20	1,655	200 cases sugar.
Betwa	British	Rangoon	..	" 20	60,517

[E 6496/6496/89]

No. 130.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 449.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 28, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that his Excellency General Gouraud, High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Cilicia, Commander-in-chief of the army of the Levant, accompanied by Admiral Lebon, Naval Commander-in-chief, and a numerous staff, arrived at Port Said on the 17th May on board the battleship "Lorraine." A guard of honour of British troops was drawn up at the station, and his Excellency was met by the British consul. A special saloon was placed at the disposal of General Gouraud on the train for the journey to Cairo, where guards of honour of British and Egyptian troops lined the platform and the station square. His Excellency was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve, V.C., and by a representative of the Sirdar, and, after inspecting the guards of honour, drove to the Residency, where, with one aide-de-camp, his Excellency was my guest during the three days of his residence in Cairo. Later in the afternoon several official visits were paid. In the evening there was a dinner at the Residency.

The following morning General Gouraud visited His Highness the Sultan, accompanied by M. Gaillard, the French diplomatic agent, and by several members of his staff. There was a luncheon given subsequently in his honour by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Congreve. In the evening a number of the leading members of the British and French communities met his Excellency at an official dinner at the Residency.

On Thursday, the 19th May, General Gouraud visited the principal sights of Cairo,

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and in the evening was the guest of honour at a dinner at the French agency, at which Lady Allenby and myself were also present.

His Excellency left Cairo by special train on the morning of the 20th instant for Ismailia, when the same formalities were observed as on his arrival. He subsequently rejoined the warship "Lorraine" at Port Said, travelling down the Suez Canal on board one of the canal company's steamers.

During his stay at the Residency I had a conversation with General Gouraud on the subject of the situation in Syria, in the course of which his Excellency expressed himself as anxious as to the political situation and alarmed at what, in his opinion, were the aims of the policy at present pursued by the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah.

On his departure General Gouraud sent me a most cordial farewell message expressing the great pleasure he had derived from his visit, which he made by way of returning my visit to Beirut in the autumn of 1919.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,
High Commissioner.

[E 6719/57/88]

No. 131.

Count de Salis to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 18 of 27th January.

Vatican, June 9, 1921.

New French Ambassador, after presenting his letters of credence, has left for Paris. He is to return in time for Consistory in middle of the month.

The question of French protectorate in Palestine is understood to be under discussion, and according to some private information, which may well be correct, Ambassador is taking the line that San Remo Agreement with His Majesty's Government does not bind them in this respect.

[E 6723/3777/88]

No. 132.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 1736.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 11th June, 1921, respecting the occupation by France and Great Britain of areas in Syria and Palestine respectively allotted to them under the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

Paris, June 11, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR sa note du 21 mai, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu suggérer qu'en attendant l'achèvement de la délimitation des frontières entre la Syrie et la Palestine par la commission prévue à la Convention franco-britannique du 23 décembre, chacune des Puissances mandataires procédât à l'occupation de sa zone en conformité avec les lignes générales de la convention. Cette occupation laisserait cependant sous l'administration actuelle les fractions territoriales sujettes à contestation.

Le Gouvernement britannique demande si le Gouvernement français n'a pas d'objection à élever contre cette suggestion.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères s'empresse, en réponse

à cette communication, de faire connaître à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne que le Gouvernement français se rallie volontiers à cette proposition et donne des instructions dans ce sens au Haut-Commissaire de la République à Beyrouth en le priant de se mettre en relations directes avec son collègue britannique de Palestine pour la réalisation matérielle de ces instructions.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 11 juin 1921.

[E 6801/351/88]

No. 133.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, June 13, 1921.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to the letter from the Agudas Centre of the United Kingdom of the 21st June, addressed to the Foreign Office, relative to the status of the Agudas Israel Organisation, and to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the accompanying copy of a further letter which has been received from the Central Bureau of this organisation.

2. Mr. Churchill proposes, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to refer the Central Bureau to the Foreign Office letter of the 1st July giving them the assurance suggested by Sir Herbert Samuel in his despatch of the 16th July that their representations will receive consideration, and at the same time correcting the misapprehensions under which it appears, from paragraphs 2 and 3 of their letter of the 27th May, the Central Bureau are still labouring.

3. Mr. Churchill would be glad to learn in due course whether his Lordship concurs in the proposed reply.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Central Bureau of Agudas Israel to Colonial Office.

Sir,

279, Whitechapel Road, London, May 27, 1921.

I AM instructed by my committee to draw your attention to the following matter:—

The Vienna office of the Agudas Israel World Organisation has been accorded the privilege granted to the Zionist Organisation, of recommending to the local British passport officer approved applications for visas to Palestine.

Owing to the increasing number of members of our Polish branches who are desirous of travelling to Palestine, the representative of the Warsaw branch of our emigration centre called on the local British passport officer for the purpose of procuring the same facilities as are accorded to our Vienna office. On the production of credentials from the Vienna British passport office, the British representative in Warsaw acceded to our request to also grant such visas as are recommended by our Warsaw centre.

We are given to understand that owing to the subsequent intervention of a representative of the Polish Zionist organisation, the British passport officer in Warsaw wired to London for instructions.

I would respectfully draw your attention to the fact that the Polish branch of our organisation represents by far the majority of orthodox Jews residing in that country. They have nearly seven hundred local branches with a total membership of more than a quarter of a million, apart from these many thousands who, whilst adhering to our programme, are not yet enrolled.

You, Sir, will appreciate that there exists a keen desire amongst many of our Polish members to emigrate to Palestine, where they would certainly be a useful and constructive element, being for the most part composed of small traders, craftsmen and agricultural and technical labourers.

I am desirous by my committee to express the hope that in view of the facts above

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mentioned, you will cause instructions to be given to the British passport officer in Warsaw to accord to our Warsaw office a similar privilege as has been granted to our branch in Vienna.

I am, &c.

M. JUNG, JUN.

General Honorary Secretary.

[E 7125/7125/65]

No. 134.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 824.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 19, 1921.

IN view of the violent antipathy prevalent in France against King Hussein's family in general, and against Emir Feisal in particular, which has for many months past provided the material for frequent representations to your Lordship by the French Ambassador in London, it was inevitable that the speech of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the House of Commons on the 14th instant, foreshadowing the support of His Majesty's Government to the candidature of the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah as rulers over Mesopotamia and Transjordan respectively, should produce much bitter comment in this country.

Your Lordship is so familiar with the lines on which French public opinion and the French Government are wont to criticise British policy in this respect that I do not propose to give any detailed account of the numerous articles on the subject which have appeared in the press during the last few days. One point, however, is made by M. Herbet in the "Temps" to which I wish to invite your Lordship's attention, in case, as seems possible, it should prove to be of some importance, especially in view of the fact that M. Herbet's articles closely reflect the views current at the Quai d'Orsay.

The argument employed is briefly as follows: The Council of the League of Nations having intimated, by its note of the 15th June to the Principal Allied Governments, that the consideration of the "A" and "B" mandates must once more be adjourned, no Power is at present entitled to exercise any tutelage over the Eastern peoples "as Mandatory on behalf of the League." England is no more invested with a definite mandate in Palestine, Transjordan or Mesopotamia than is France in Syria; and, as the Council very justly observed in its note of the 15th June, "the more or less strict régime of military occupation and administration which naturally followed the war" still subsists. This provisional and essentially military régime justified the measures taken by General Gouraud in Syria, and also explains those taken by the British command in Mesopotamia; but it cannot permit the creation of a Kingdom of Irak for the benefit of Emir Feisal or of a principality of Transjordan for the benefit of Emir Abdullah. Such creation of States would be definitive, or would at least be claimed as such. It would be greatly in excess of the "powers of occupation and administration" exercised by England in the Levant. The projects of Feisal and Abdullah must therefore be put off to a later date. "For the good of Franco-British friendship, which it is the interest of King Hussein's sons to disturb, we should rejoice at this further adjournment."

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 7234/117/98]

No. 135.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, June 25.)

(No. 133.)

Sir,

June 2, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that on Friday, the 27th May, I proceeded from Haifa to Beirut on board H.M.S. "Iron Duke," by the courtesy of Admiral Sir J. M. Robeck, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G. On that evening and on the two following days I had the opportunity of holding several conversations with General Gouraud and M. de Caix. I returned to Jaffa on H.M.S. "Surprise," leaving Beirut in the evening of the 29th May.

2. General Gouraud spoke to me at great length about Transjordan. He made

it quite clear that the French had no intention whatever of admitting Abdullah to any position of authority at Damascus. He stated this not only as his own determination, but also as that of M. Briand. Their experience with Feisal had made it impossible for them to work with the Princes of the Shereefian family. Moreover, there was a strong feeling in Syria, which prevailed among large sections at Damascus, and which was particularly strong at Aleppo, against any such proposal. The country was now quite tranquil, and General Gouraud was not prepared to take any new course which might worsen the situation. He regretted the policy we were pursuing with reference to Feisal and Abdullah, and said that the French could not participate in it.

3. I replied that, although Abdullah had not spoken to me on the subject, I had reason to think that he would welcome an understanding with the French. I recalled the obligations incurred to the Arabs during the war, and said that if nothing that was acceptable to them was done either in Syria, Transjordan or Mesopotamia they would feel that they were unfairly treated. In such a case there could be no guarantee that Abdullah and his friends would not stir up trouble in Syria. I expressed this as my own view, and made it clear that Abdullah had not used any language of a threatening character. The arrangement which you had come to with him was for a period of six months, and he had given his word of honour that during that period he would not adopt a hostile attitude to the French. I felt some anxiety, however, as to what might occur at the end of the six months, particularly if it should happen that no settlement had been reached meanwhile in Mesopotamia.

4. General Gouraud expressed the view that the character of the advisers with whom Abdullah had surrounded himself did not inspire him with confidence. Headed by Ali Khulki and Rashid Bey Talieh, they had all been the leaders of the extreme anti-French party at Damascus. M. de Caix remarked that, with regard to the obligations incurred towards the Arabs during the war, there was evidently a misunderstanding between the British and the French. While we seemed to regard the promise of the independence of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo as a promise made to the Shereefian family and for their advantage, they (the French) regarded it as a promise made to the Arabs generally, not at all involving the establishment of one of that family on the throne of Syria, and, indeed, in view of the antagonism to them of large sections of the population of the country, almost precluding such a solution.

5. I said that I had also been much concerned at Abdullah's choice of his officials, but that he had pointed out to us that those individuals would be less likely to cause trouble if they were under his immediate control than if they had been kept aloof. I enquired whether General Gouraud would desire me to say anything to Abdullah, as I would certainly be asked on my return whether I could give any indication of the views of the French authorities as the result of my visit to Beirut. To this he at first replied that he thought it would be useful if I were to tell Abdullah that the French had no feelings of hostility to him personally, and would be glad to maintain friendly relations as neighbours, but that they could give no encouragement to the idea that he might be accepted at Damascus. I pointed out, however, that any such message might lead Abdullah and his friends to adopt a definitely hostile attitude, and that troubles might follow. I suggested that it would be better if I were to answer that the question was entirely one between Abdullah and the French, in which I did not feel myself authorised to intervene in any way. In this General Gouraud concurred. It was agreed that, if opportunity offered on the occasion of some visit by Abdullah to Irbid, Commandant Devaux, the French political officer at Deraa, might possibly visit him there, but no definite arrangement was made. I have been given to understand that Abdullah would welcome such an opportunity of getting into touch with the French.

6. In a later conversation General Gouraud referred to the question of the possible effect upon Abdullah of the disappointment of his hopes with regard to Syria, and said that, if trouble was caused in consequence and attacks were made from Irbid, he would intimate to me his desire to send a column of troops to Irbid to dispose of the matter. If necessary, he could send thirty aeroplanes to Amman to deal with Abdullah, should he adopt a hostile attitude. This would be done under the principle of "pursuit" in international law. I offered no observations on this suggestion, except to express the hope that the occasion would not arise.

7. General Gouraud gave a dinner party at the Residency on the 28th May, at which he made a speech in very friendly terms, referring to the alliance between Great Britain and France and the necessity of the two countries maintaining a common front in the East. He referred appreciatively to the passage in my recent speech at Amman in which I said that the British Government would not permit Transjordan to become a source of disturbance either to Palestine or to Syria, and that in this we were

glad to know that we had the co-operation of the Amir Abdullah. General Gouraud added that he hoped that the Amir would be wise enough to follow this advice. I append a copy of his speech and of the speech I made in reply.

8. I discussed several administrative questions during these conversations. A note of the conclusions reached was drawn up and communicated to M. de Caix, and is subject to confirmation by him. The note is appended to this despatch, and I should be glad to know whether the arrangements suggested have your approval.

9. I mentioned to General Gouraud immediately on my arrival the situation with regard to the declaration of an amnesty in Mesopotamia, as stated in your telegrams Nos. 97 and 98. He said that he had had no information that the declaration would be so soon as the 30th May. He had, in fact, let it be known that an amnesty would be proclaimed in Syria on the 8th June on the occasion of the Feast of Bairam. Although he regarded it as very desirable that the amnesties in Mesopotamia and Syria should be simultaneous, it would be very difficult to alter his arrangements now, and he thought it much better to make such an announcement on a definite occasion, such as Bairam, than on a date of no special significance. In view of these expressions, I thought it desirable to communicate his views to Sir Percy Cox at Bagdad by a wireless telegram, which I repeated to you.

10. General Gouraud expressed himself in conversation as much concerned at the attitude of the Angora Government, who had repudiated the agreement arrived at by their representative at the London Conference, and had put forward new demands of a remarkable character. Those demands included not only a frontier further south than that which had been agreed, but also the omission of the guarantees for the safety of the Christian population. He anticipated that there would be trouble in that quarter. He was convinced that the Kemalists were supported by the Bolsheviks, and that the Germans were behind the Bolsheviks. He did not think that the Turks could take Smyrna, unless the Greek army collapsed altogether, but he was certain, on the other hand, that the Greeks could never settle the question by force of arms.

11. I took the opportunity while I was at Beirout to visit the fair which had been open there for a month and was about to close. It was an exhibition organised on an extensive scale. There were nearly 400 wooden booths and a few larger exhibition buildings. The exhibits appeared to be almost exclusively Syrian or French. It was a fairly good commercial exhibition, not unsatisfactory as a first attempt. But it had cost the French Government no less than 2,000,000 fr., and it may be doubted whether the results were worth the expenditure. Owing to the commercial depression the business results are said to have been poor, and few visitors attended from elsewhere than Beirout and the environs.

12. General Gouraud and his officers lost no opportunity of showing kindness and attention to Admiral de Robeck and myself. I believe that the visit is likely to have a useful political result, which will be increased when General Gouraud comes to Jerusalem, as he intends to do at some future date.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Toast proposed by General Gouraud.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

C'EUT été pour moi en tous temps un honneur et un plaisir de recevoir le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique dans cette maison de France.

J'éprouve aussi un plaisir particulier à saluer près de vous, M. l'Amiral de Robeck, à côté de qui et des vaillants marins et soldats britanniques je m'honore d'avoir combattu aux Dardanelles.

Mais il me semble que votre visite, comme celle que je rendais hier à M. le Maréchal Allenby, prend dans les temps que nous traversons une signification particulière, en manifestant l'amitié et la confiance réciproques entre les représentants des deux grandes nations, amitié et confiance aussi nécessaires pour maintenir en Asie comme en Europe les résultats de la grande guerre qu'elles l'ont été entre nos soldats pour les obtenir.

Je sais, M. le Haut-Commissaire, que telle est aussi votre pensée, et votre Excellence me permettra de la remercier des sages paroles qu'elle a adressées à Amman, il y a six semaines, à l'Émir Abdullah.

Puisse l'Émir écouter la voix de votre Excellence et comprendre que, comme vous l'avez dit si bien, le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité est nécessaire pour procurer le bien-être de tous et que vous ne permettrez pas que la Transjordanie devienne un centre d'hostilités soit à l'égard de la Palestine, soit à l'égard de la Syrie.

Vous savez que de mon côté je suis fermement décidé, demain comme hier, à interdire, sur le territoire de mandat français, toute agitation qui puisse porter atteinte à la grande Alliée de la France, dans son pays de mandat.

Messieurs, je lève mon verre en l'honneur de Sa Majesté le Roi, de Sa Majesté la Reine, de leurs Altesses royales et des glorieuses armées et marine britanniques.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Sir H. Samuel's Reply to General Gouraud's Toast.

Le Général Gouraud, Mesdames, Messieurs,

JE vous remercie des aimables paroles que vous venez de prononcer.

J'ai longtemps désiré visiter mes voisins de la Syrie. La connaissance que j'ai eu le privilège de faire à Jérusalem avec M. de Caix, l'Amiral de Bon, l'Amiral Morny et le Général Garnier Duplessix a augmenté mon désir de connaître leur illustre chef, le Général Gouraud.

Et puis, il existe plusieurs questions d'ordre pratique et d'intérêt spécial aux deux Administrations qui pourraient être réglées bien plus vite par conversation que par la poste, surtout quand le courrier de Beyrouth à Jérusalem doit passer par Paris et Londres.

Je suis heureux aussi de venir à Beyrouth en compagnie de l'amiral commandant en chef la flotte britannique de la Méditerranée, et, par cette visite officielle, témoigner que la France et l'Angleterre, unies pendant la guerre, restent côte à côte en l'Orient après la paix.

Ceux qui ont combattu sur terre et sur mer contre le plus grand danger qui dans les temps modernes ait jamais menacé les libertés de l'Europe et du monde, n'oublieront sûrement pas cette camaraderie consacrée par tant d'actes héroïques.

En Palestine et en Syrie nous avons chacun nos propres problèmes et nos propres difficultés. C'était une sage remarque de Thiers : " Dans la politique il faut ne prendre rien au tragique et tout en sérieux."

Ces difficultés seront vaincues, ces problèmes seront résolus.

L'Administration de la Syrie et l'Administration de la Palestine sont chacune nécessairement responsable pour la solution de ses propres problèmes, mais c'est bien qu'on sache que ni l'une ni l'autre ne sera embarrassée par sa voisine soit directement soit indirectement, et que si des efforts seraient faits pour les éloigner l'une de l'autre ces efforts n'auraient pas le moindre succès.

Je désire aussi exprimer mon admiration profonde et respectueuse à l'armée française et à la marine française, qui pendant les dures épreuves de la guerre se sont conduites avec un courage merveilleux.

" Le Français," dit Chateaubriand, " aime le péril, parce qu'il y trouve la gloire."

De quel homme pourrait on dire cela avec tant de vérité que de son Excellence le Général Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la Syrie.

Personne n'a affronté plus grand péril; personne n'a trouvé plus grande gloire. En son honneur je lève mon verre.

Conclusions arrived at in Conversations at Beirout.

1. Boundary Commission.

The Commission to begin immediately a preliminary inspection of the western portion of the line. The second French representative may be absent at the outset.

2. Administration of Lake Huleh District.

Immediately after the Commission has completed this preliminary inspection the British Administration to take over the district up to a line to be determined by the Commission, without prejudice to any adjustments that may be necessary when the frontier is finally settled.

3. *Trains from Haifa to Nesib.*

The Haut-Commissariat de la Syrie has prepared an agreement under which a train service can be begun at once. They will send a copy to Jerusalem. If necessary, Colonel Holmes will come to Beirut to discuss any points that may arise.

4. *Waters of the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk.*

Article 8 of the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, provides that an expert examination of this question should take place within six months of the signature of that convention. It is agreed that this examination should be postponed without prejudice to the validity of the article.

5. *Hedjaz Railway.*

It is desirable that the French and British Governments should decide in principle the lines of an agreement under which part of the profits on the paying portions of the railway in the French and British zones should be devoted to meeting the loss on the remainder of the railway. The details of such an agreement and the arrangements for running trains and for providing for the repairs of rolling-stock would be settled between the local Administrations. (This is subject to confirmation by General Gouraud.)

6. *Extradition.*

The French authorities accept in principle the provisional procedure suggested by the Palestine Government. A copy of the previous communication on this subject will be sent to Beirut.

The matter will be dealt with definitely after the mandates are promulgated.

[E 7260/7255/89]

No. 136.

Mr. Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, June 24, 1921.

YESTERDAY, while on a tour of inspection near Kuneitra, General Gouraud was ambushed by four men disguised as gendarmes, and an officer with him was killed.

[E 7314/6496/89]

No. 137.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 516.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 15, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a communiqué which has been issued by the French agent and consul-general in Cairo, in connection with General Gouraud's recent visit to Egypt.

The communiqué is of interest as showing the considerable sums placed by the French Government at the disposal of their representatives for the purposes of propaganda in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Memorandum on General Gouraud's Gifts to Charity.

THE French Diplomatic Agency has issued the following:—

"During his stay in Cairo, General Gouraud, French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon, paid a visit, accompanied by the French Minister, to the Al Azhar University. The General was delighted with this visit. Memories of Morocco came back to him when he met the Moghrabi students. He remembered with emotion that

the population of Morocco had proved to him many times their attachment and that he had among them many good and faithful friends. General Gouraud handed to the French consul the sum of £ E. 100 for the University.

"As a souvenir of his visit to Cairo, the General gave the following gifts: To Mgr. Cadi, £ E. 100 for the charitable works of the Syrian Greek Catholic community; to Mgr. Cousian, £ E. 50 for the charitable works of the Syro-Armenian community; to T.R.P. Paul Rizk, £ E. 100 for the charitable works of the Maronite community; to R.P. Vicaire patriarchal syriaque, £ E. 50 for the charitable works of the Syriac community; and to M. Habib Debbane, £ E. 100 for the charitable works of the Syrian Greek Orthodox community.

"The General also gave a sum of £ E. 100 for the Syrian Moslems. As no Syrian Moslem charitable society exists at Cairo, the £ E. 100 have been sent to the French consulate, which will distribute General Gouraud's gift to the Syrian Moslem families of Cairo who have need of it."

[E 7350/35/88]

No. 138.

Sir Herbert Samuel's Speech delivered at Jerusalem, June 3, 1921.—(Communicated to Foreign Office via Colonial Office, June 28.)

WE are met together on the occasion of the birthday of His Majesty, King George V, to whom we would desire to offer our respectful congratulations and our good wishes for a long and prosperous reign over the vast dominions of the British Empire.

On the establishment of the civil administration in Palestine now nearly a year ago, I had the honour to convey to the people a gracious message from His Majesty. On that occasion I made a statement as to the lines of policy which the administration intended to pursue. On the 6th October last, at the inauguration of the Advisory Council, I made a second statement, reviewing the steps that had been taken during the interval. To-day, I would desire, first to give a brief survey of the measures that have since been adopted or that are now in contemplation, and next to address you upon the political situation in Palestine.

I rejoice to think that there is a keen desire among the people to enjoy the benefits of education. That is indeed the first condition of national progress. The Government has adopted a comprehensive scheme under which, in a period of four years, the whole country will be covered with schools. The people of the villages provide the building and furniture, and keep them in repair, and the Government provides the salary of the teaching staff, and the other costs of maintenance. During the last five months thirty-four new village schools have been opened providing elementary education for 1,360 children, while forty-six State-aided schools that had been opened by the inhabitants of villages during the last two years have also been taken over by the Government. An additional thirty-five new schools will be opened during the present financial year.

Measures are at the same time being taken for the development of the two Training Colleges for men and women, and, by next September, there will be under training about eighty students in the former and over fifty students in the latter.

Teachers have also been appointed to live among the Bedouin tribes and teach the children. All this has been done from the general revenue of the country without the need of imposing any extra taxation.

Grants-in-aid are being allotted to a large number of schools maintained by religious or other organisations.

I have used my best efforts to promote, where necessary, a satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the religious communities.

At my invitation a conference composed of the leading Moslems of Palestine was held in November last to consider the administration of Awkaf and other matters. That conference appointed a committee to consult with the Government. A plan for the election of a standing committee for Moslem religious affairs was proposed by them, and accepted in principle. The details have been decided at a number of joint sittings. The duties of the committee for Moslem religious affairs will be to act on behalf of the Moslem population in matters relating to Awkaf, and to appointments to Moslem religious offices. The Government has decided to restore the revenues of the Khaski Sultan Wakf, and certain other Wakfs of minor importance which were unjustly taken.

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by the Turkish Government and amalgamated with the general revenue of the country. This will give to the Awkaf council an additional income of about £ E. 18,000, and by means of this sum it is hoped that the Moslem authorities will establish a religious college in Palestine, which will revive the ancient traditions of the country as a centre of religious learning. I hope that the elections to the committee for religious affairs will be completed at a very early date. Meantime the funds referred to are being accumulated as from the 1st April, and will be held at their disposal.

An unfortunate dispute has taken place in the Orthodox Patriarchate, which has for some time paralysed the activities of that important body, and made its financial position difficult in the extreme. I appointed a learned commission to inquire into the dispute, and it has recently issued its report. A statement is being published on this subject. The measures taken by the Government will restore the authority of the Patriarch, and will gradually enable the debts of the Patriarchate to be discharged and its finances to be re-established.

The Jewish community of Palestine possessed no satisfactory organisation for religious affairs. I invited the religious and lay leaders of the community to a meeting in Jerusalem in February last. Two Joint Chief Rabbis and a Rabbinical Council, containing a lay element, were elected and have been accorded recognition by the Government as the religious authorities of the Jews of Palestine.

I turn to questions of economic development. The first condition here is the improvement of communications. Without good roads, railways, ports, posts, telegraphs and telephones a country cannot progress. The Government has been actively engaged in the construction and improvement of important main roads, so far as is possible with the funds at its disposal. The running of the railways shows considerable improvement, and there is continuous progress in the postal telegraph and telephone services. Expert investigations have been made, both at Haifa and at Jaffa, with a view to the consideration of the question of port construction.

The Government has prepared measures with a view to improving the breeds of horses, cattle and donkeys in Palestine. It would be of the greatest advantage to agriculturists for their stock to be raised to a higher standard. We proposed to purchase in Europe a number of stallions, bulls and donkeys of suitable breeds, the introduction of which will be certain to add greatly, in course of time, to the prosperity of the agriculture of Palestine.

On account of the very high cost of living in Palestine and the uncertainty as to the amount of foodstuffs available it was necessary last winter to prohibit the export from Palestine of the principal foodstuffs. A similar prohibition was enforced in Egypt, Syria and other countries upon exports of their produce. Prices having fallen and prospects of supply from Palestine, from Transjordan and from overseas being satisfactory, these restrictions have been repealed, and, as has already been announced, in the event of no unforeseen circumstances occurring, the Government of Palestine has no intention now or in the future of interfering in any way with the freedom of export.

Owing to the financial stringency throughout the world it has not yet been found possible to found an agricultural or mortgage bank, although much time and energy have been spent upon the subject. Steps are now being taken, however, which may have a better result. The funds belonging to the branches in Palestine of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank are being collected; all those sums will be devoted to the same purpose and will be made available for cultivators. Meantime the Government has advanced £ E. 370,000 in agricultural loans.

Last year's revenue was satisfactory. The revenue received by this Administration is much larger than that received by the Turkish Administration, but it must not be supposed from this that the rates of taxation paid by the people have been increased. They have not been increased, and, on the contrary, certain taxes, comparatively small in amount, have been abolished. The increase in revenue is partly due to the fact that the railway receipts and the receipts of the Ottoman Debt administration now come into the Treasury of the Government of Palestine. These two heads amount to over £ E. 1,000,000 a year, and against them there is to be charged expenditure upon the railways and upon the Ottoman Debt. The increase is partly due also to the growing prosperity of the country and partly to the fact that the taxes paid by the people all come to the Government to be spent for the benefit of the population, and are no longer diminished by wasteful or corrupt methods of collection.

I would mention that there is no charge upon the funds of Palestine for any expenditure in Transjordan.

The tobacco régime has been abolished in Palestine, to the great relief of the people.

With respect to administration, the police force has not yet reached a satisfactory standard of efficiency, and steps are being taken for its improvement. It is also intended to raise a new branch of the police force, to consist of about 500 men of a good standard drawn from all sections of the population. They will receive somewhat higher pay than the ordinary police and will be well trained and disciplined under British officials. This force will be employed partly in guarding the frontiers of Palestine against possible raids and partly as a reserve in the event of disturbances.

It is necessary to postpone for the time being the creation of the military defence force which was recently contemplated.

The heavy task of organising the various departments of an efficient administration is now nearly completed, although I am conscious that many defects have still to be overcome. I hope to be able to effect this year and next reductions in the number of higher officials employed in the administration.

With respect to immigration, which arouses so much interest, in this connection I stated in my inaugural address on the 7th July of last year that its extent must be proportioned to the employment available in the country. It is indeed necessary that it should be strictly so proportioned and, further, that the employment should be new work and work of a permanent character. Immigration has been suspended pending a review of the situation.

Rules have now been laid down that persons belonging to the following classes may be admitted into Palestine:—

- (a.) Travellers, i.e., people who do not intend to settle in Palestine and whose stay will not exceed three months.
- (b.) Persons of independent means.
- (c.) Members of professions who intend to follow their calling in Palestine.
- (d.) Wives, children and other persons wholly dependent on residents of Palestine.
- (e.) Persons who have a definite prospect of employment with specified employers or enterprises.

The enforcement of these rules will be in the hands of British consuls and of the Immigration and Travel Department of the Government of Palestine. In addition, a limited number of persons who, at the moment that the suspension of immigration was announced, had left their homes, had disposed of their possessions, and had arrived, or even had embarked at European ports in order to come to Palestine, will now be allowed to enter.

But it must be definitely recognised that the conditions of Palestine are such as not to permit anything in the nature of a mass immigration.

Among the new arrivals have been a number—comparatively, I am informed, a very small proportion of the whole—who are tainted with the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism, doctrines which carry with them the economic ruin of all classes in any country that they enter. The known members of this group have been arrested. All those among them who are aliens and who are not liable to be punished first for offences committed in connection with the disturbances at Jaffa will be expelled forthwith from the country. The closest care will be taken to prevent the infiltration into Palestine of other persons of that character.

I am anxious that the people of Palestine should be associated more closely with the administration established under the mandate, and the question of ensuring a free and authoritative expression of popular opinion is now receiving the closest attention of His Majesty's Government in London.

Meanwhile I propose to take immediate steps with a view of ensuring closer consultation on administrative matters of importance between the Government and responsible persons who speak on behalf of all sections of the population.

On the coming into force of the mandate it is intended by His Majesty's Government to make provision for the Government of Palestine in an instrument which will be registered with the Council of the League of Nations. The interests of the non-Jewish population will not only be fully safeguarded by the mandate itself, but will certainly be provided for also in that instrument, in which the future constitution of the country will be defined.

As has recently been announced, steps will at once be taken to re-establish the system of election in municipalities.

With respect to the serious disturbances that recently took place at Jaffa and the neighbourhood, I await the report of the impartial commission which is now investigating those events and their causes before pronouncing an opinion. But it is certain that nothing can excuse flagrant crimes, such as the murders, the assaults, and the looting

that then took place. Such events cannot but injure the reputation of Palestine and her people in the eyes of the world. They cannot fail also to affect the trade and industry and to retard the economic progress of the country. I feel certain that they are deplored and condemned by the thoughtful men of all sections, very many of whom, I am glad to recall, used all their influence during the recent disturbances to calm the excitement of the population at Jaffa and to maintain tranquillity elsewhere.

A large number of cases arising out of the disturbances are now being tried, and those who are found guilty of the crimes that have been perpetrated will receive their due punishment. To the families of the killed and to the injured I offer my heartfelt sympathy, and I feel sure that I may convey to them the sympathy also of all this assembly.

I earnestly desire to see this land of Palestine, which is one of the fairest on earth, the centre of sacred associations for hundreds of millions of men, inhabited by a people at bottom kindly and peaceable; most earnestly do I desire to see it progressing, in quietness and harmony, towards a prosperous and a noble future. Let Government and people unite their efforts for the sake of that ideal.

I turn now to the political situation. I am distressed that the harmony between the creeds and races of Palestine, which I have desired most earnestly to promote, has not yet been attained, and I have given anxious thought to the measures that are best calculated to secure it. Let me, in the first instance, refer once more to the unhappy misunderstanding that has existed with reference to the phrase in the Balfour declaration, "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." I hear it said in many quarters that the Arab population of Palestine will never agree to their country, their Holy Places and their lands being taken from them and given to strangers: that they will never agree to a Jewish Government being set up to rule over the Moslem and Christian majority. People say that they cannot understand how it is that the British Government, which is famous throughout the world for its justice, could ever have consented to such a policy. I answer that the British Government, which does indeed care for justice above all things, has never consented, and will never consent, to such a policy. That is not the meaning of the Balfour declaration. It may be that the translation of the English words into Arabic does not convey their real sense. They mean that the Jews, a people who are scattered throughout the world but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to find here their home, and that some among them within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants. If any measures are needed to convince the Moslem and Christian population that those principles will be observed in practice and that their rights are really safe, such measures will be taken. For the British Government, the trustee under the mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine, would never impose upon them a policy which that people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests.

[E 7395/7255/89]

No. 139.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office June 29.)

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, June 25, 1921.

I AM informed by the French consul-general that on the 23rd an attack made by a band of armed Bedouin on General Gouraud at a spot 12 kilom. from Kuneitra. About fifteen shots fired; one officer, Branet, killed. Governor of Damascus State was slightly wounded. The General's sleeve was pierced by bullets. Shots were also fired at the second car following, which returned the fire, and bandits fled. It is considered that the attack was made not by the local people, who warmly welcomed the General, but it is on the Transjordanians that suspicion falls. Many consider Ahmed Murawed implicated. In view of excellent feeling among local people, the General has continued his tour. I have instructed police and military authorities, Palestine, and British representative at Transjordan to do everything possible to apprehend guilty persons if they have taken refuge in our zone. I have sent a personal telegram to Gouraud.

[E 7445/455/91]

No. 140.

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 53. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, June 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period 21st May to the 10th June, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Jerusalem and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Jeddah Report for the Period May 21 to June 10, 1921.

(Secret.)

Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.

IN continuation of our correspondence on this subject, King Hussein wrote to me on the 23rd May, repeating his former objections and saying he did not wish any foreign institution which was not here in the time of the Turks to come to the Hedjaz before the country has been independent for a period of five years. I accordingly sent my telegram No. 53 of the 24th May to your Lordship, and repeated same to Simla.

King Hussein was, however, apparently not quite sure that he was acting rightly in this matter, because at the same time I received a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs saying that the Jeddah authorities had been instructed to carry out my plans with the new Arab hospital at Jeddah, and would I kindly visit same and give necessary recommendations. He stated, at the same time, that no provision would be made for female patients, as this was contrary to their religion. While thanking them for this privilege I regretted that I could not do this, as, after last year's experience, I considered hospital accommodation for female pilgrims absolutely essential. At the same time I pointed out that my services and those of the agency doctor would be available in the event of any outbreak of epidemic disease.

On the 27th May I received an urgent telegram from Simla informing me that the hospital staff left Bombay on the 17th May, and pointing out the prejudicial effect on the Moslem population of India if the hospital was sent back. I at once wrote to the King telling him the hospital had left, and asking him, such being the case, that it might remain until after the hadj. At the same time I wrote to Emir Feisal, asking him to use his influence with his father. The King replied that he could not alter his decision on the subject, but that as the hospital personnel were actually on their way they would be welcome and, if necessary, they would be available to work in the Arab hospital now being established. Feisal, in his reply to my letter, stated that he had used his influence with the King to the extent of incurring the latter's displeasure, but that the King would not alter his opinion. Feisal said the King's reason was that the presence of foreign hospitals in the holy places would be an opportunity for the King's enemies to spread false rumours. At the same time King Hussein sent Mohamed Tawil, the Director of Customs, to discuss the matter with me, and I told him I would rather send back the hospital than have it in Jeddah working under Dr. Thabit, the Arab Director-General of Quarantine.

At the same time I received a letter from the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, saying that the hospital would be welcome and the Hashimite Government had arranged for their comfort during their stay in the Hedjaz, which might be for one month or more, or even until after the hadj. Not only has this been done, but King Hussein has insisted on their being his guests for a time, and is issuing water and rations to them free of charge. I am rather opposed to this, but cannot yet insist on our paying for the rations without hurting the feelings of the King.

The small number of personnel, 46, as compared with the large number on last year's staff, has favourably impressed the King. At first I did not intend to open the hospital, except as an out-patient institution, until I had seen the King himself—he is coming to Jeddah when Feisal leaves—but yesterday I saw an Armenian suffering

from enteric fever and living in insanitary surroundings, so I ordered his removal to the Indian hospital. I am waiting to see whether the Arab authorities will object.

In the meantime, the local Government are preparing their own hospital and another medical officer, Dr. T. Fahmy, has arrived from Egypt by the latest boat.

Pilgrimage.

The total number of pilgrims who have arrived by sea is now 37,585, of which 33,647 have come from the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, 2,484 from India and 1,454 from the Soudan.

The steamship "Zayani" arrived from Karachi on the 31st May. All the pilgrims had single tickets, and I regret to say that about 100 were penniless and could not pay the boat hire of 12 piastres a head. They were searched and found to have no money, so were allowed to go free. Of these penniless pilgrims, some had been provided with a free passage by the Nizam of Hyderabad and some by the merchants of Bombay.

There were among the pilgrims a considerable number of Bokhara, Afghanistan and other frontier tribes and also twenty-four Russian subjects.

Of the 1,002 pilgrims on board, only twenty deposited money at the British agency.

The pilgrims from the steamship "Jeddah" (which arrived from Bombay on the 4th June) were disembarked without any local quarantine, as there was only one death on board during the voyage. The majority of the pilgrims were Indians, but there were a number of Afghans, Mesopotamians, Persians and five Bokharas. The brother of His Highness Mehtar of Chitral and Kazi Suleiman (magistrate of Patiala State, and author) were among the pilgrims. The pilgrims had return tickets, but forty-eight were penniless and had not sufficient money to pay the boat hire ashore.

Arrangements are being made at Mecca for another caravan to proceed to Medina after the Id (Ramadan Bairam). Sixteen pounds sterling per camel is the proposed rate, but it is expected that it will be raised to twenty before the caravan is completed. It is stated that Sheikh Feisal of the Hamada is still levying a tax on each camel and has men stationed at the entrance of the pass to collect the same.

The Lehabah tribe are reported to have looted a small caravan of Indian and Javanese pilgrims on their way back from Medina. All money, foodstuffs and valuables were taken, but the camels and shukdufs were left. Three Javanese pilgrims have arrived in Jeddah from Rabegh in a destitute state. They fell behind their comrades and were looted by Bedouin and deprived of everything.

General.

Emir Feisal will arrive in Jeddah on the evening of the 10th June to embark on the "Northbrook," which is due at noon on the 11th. It is not yet decided if King Hussein will accompany him to Jeddah.

Emir Ali has reached Medina in safety. He did not go direct from Yembo to Medina, but went from Yembo to Buwat and then to Medina via the railway line. He was accompanied by an escort of 300 people, including many sheikhs and notables.

It is reported that oil has been discovered in the Northern Hedjaz, between El Wej and El Ula, and also in the Farasan Islands, north of Kamaran.

Sheikh Mohamed Said Kadayani, a member of the new Kadayani sect, a new sect of some importance in the Punjab, has arrived in Jeddah and left for Mecca by motor car.

It is reported that Emir Feisal is arranging a conference of Arab leaders and important Moslems during the coming hadj, and has sent deputations to the various Arab rulers. An interview between Feisal and an Indian barrister, Mr. T. Kadir Bhai, is published in the Indian press. In this interview Feisal said he wished for a united Moslem world and that he would like a deputation from India to come to Mecca to discuss the matter. He is further stated to have said that his family had no intention to claim for the Khalifate, but that in their hearts they believe the Sultan of Turkey the lawful Khalifa of the Moslem world.

Apart from these current rumours, there is no confirmation of the congress referred to in your telegram No. 51 of the 21st May. I think that any congress which may be arranged will be of a private and not of an official nature.

Press.

"Al Qibla," No. 485, in an article entitled "What you have been ignorant of will appear to you in course of time," refers to a previous article in No. 448, referring to Dr. Weisman and the Zionist Society, and the support they had received from Great

Britain. It explains that it would be considered stupidity for the "Al Qibla" to be right and Great Britain wrong, but "the river might contain something which the sea does not," and a sincere friend might sometimes be compelled to be rude or mad in advising his friend. When the Zionists came to Palestine they circulated Bolshevik proclamations, and this cost Great Britain much money and the sacrifice of many lives.

In a quotation from "Al Ahram" newspaper No. 13424 on Transjordan, it states that matters are going satisfactorily there since the meeting of Mr. Churchill and Emir Abdullah. Military and civil officials have been appointed and the country has been divided into districts. The French Intelligence Department at Homs announced that Emir Abdullah had shot two spies. This is not true because, though condemned by a court-martial, Emir Abdullah had abrogated the sentence of death to one of imprisonment. The British Government had appointed an agent who had nothing to do with local Government just as in other independent countries. The British agent offered to obtain coal for the railways, but the Government refused for fear of foreign interference. The "Al Qibla" thanks Great Britain for complying with the desire of the inhabitants on the matter of independence, and the difficulty which formerly arose was because Great Britain is always slow and the Arabs are impatient. The Arabs should wait until everything is clearly settled.

"Al Qibla" No. 486 contains a Royal Proclamation, stating that the reason why the Hashimite Government had not yet sent Ambassadors to the various capitals of the Powers, and why they had not yet carried out schemes required for the welfare and prosperity of the country, was because they were still waiting for a solution of the remainder of the terms included in their agreement with the Allies.

A leading article in the same number of the "Al Qibla" refers to the unfaithfulness of the European Powers, and states that the reformation of the Treaty of Sevres is due to some secret action committed by Italy and France without the knowledge of Great Britain, and says that this will never prove the unity of the civilised world.

"Al Qibla" No. 487 contains a notification from the Acting Prime Minister that the Arab Government announces to all the Moslem world that many people are propagating, throughout Islamic regions, false rumours that the Hedjaz is in lack of security, water, and means of comfort. This is done to discourage those who wish to visit the holy places. He announces that, though the Government is only recently established, the country is in good condition and all means of prosperity and comfort are provided.

There is another article criticising the French policy and accusing the French of being unfaithful to the British, while the latter were the only cause of saving the French.

"Murshed-el-Ommah" (Tunis) of the 29th May, 1921.—King Hussein sent me a copy of this paper on the 28th May, and drew my attention to an article referring to the visit of the French warship to Jeddah, and the address delivered by King Hussein to the French admiral.

The paper publishes the King's Speech, and after giving a short comment on it, asks the following questions:—

1. What would be the penalty to the man who disunited and attacked the Moslems from behind, thus exposing the coastline to danger, which was followed by blockade of the ports and occupation?
2. Has any advantage been gained by the Moslems from the federation with the British Government and acting in compliance with her instructions, or has it led to disunity and downfall?
3. What would be the penalty of the man who had been the cause of ruining the Hedjaz Railway, which was constructed out of the private money of the Moslems in general, and which was of great service to all who visited the sacred places; and, further, who is that man so that the Moslems may charge him?
4. Who has been the cause of losing Bagdad, all Mesopotamia and Palestine, and putting the whole lot in the hands of the British, who are the enemies of Islam, thus making Jerusalem as merchandise to be bought by the Jews?
5. Which of the two is better and useful to the Moslems? What has been done by that Shereef or what has been done by the hero of Asia Minor?
6. What is meant by "His Majesty the Deliverer?" In the speech there was the following: "You have given back Cilicia, which is as you know, and occupied our country." Is it possible that this can mean anything else except that it is Turkish?

7. In his Government mouthpiece paper he is described as the "Deliverer," and there appears no reason why he should be called by that name; is it to be considered freedom and deliverance his revolt in the sacred cities and doing a way with the suzerainty of the Caliph, and enabling the British to practise influence on the Holy places of the Moslems, and the place of origin of their religion?

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Shipping Intelligence to June 9, 1921.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st May and the 9th June, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
							Packets.
Betwa ..	British	Suakim	May 28
Tantah ..	British ..	P. Soudan	Suez ..	May 21 ..	" 22 ..	874	2,299
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 21 ..	" 21	925
Serpentara ..	Italian ..	Suakim ..	Suakim ..	" 23 ..	" 25 ..	275	677
Peleus ..	British ..	Java ..	Liverpool	" 23 ..	" 23 ..	567	..
Elpenor ..	British ..	Singapore	Liverpool	" 23 ..	" 23	Planks
Nairung ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 24 ..	" 31	34,290
Celebes ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	Marseilles	" 25 ..	" 26 ..	1,246	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 26 ..	" 26	1,028
Rotti ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	New York	" 27 ..	" 29 ..	1,304	..
Duplex ..	British ..	Aden ..	Yembo ..	" 30 ..	June 3	6,328
Zayani ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 31 ..	" 2 ..	1,002	5,242
Orestes ..	British ..	Singapore	Liverpool	June 4 ..	" 5	300 tons planks
Jeddah ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 4 ..	" 9 ..	827	14,058
Hwah Jah ..	Chinese ..	Colombo	" 4 ..	" ..	937	500
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massana	" 4 ..	" 4	261
Tantah ..	British ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan	" 5 ..	" 5	1,803
Shushtar ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 7 ..	" 9 ..	806	1,534

CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[E 4941/1/44]

No. 141.

Consul Morga to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, March 22, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on my journey to Aleppo and the situation here:—

I left Smyrna on the 21st February. The situation in the Greek zone was calm. The Greeks were keeping order in all parts of it, and, judging by the fact that no attempt had been made by Moslems living under Greek administration on Greek communications, the Moslems appear to have accepted their present lot.

The Greek army is confident of being able to deal with the Kemalists forces, and the latter have made no serious attempt to attack the Greeks.

Veniselists are not being well treated by the partisans of the Constantinist régime; but both Veniselists and Royalists are united in desiring to continue operations against the Turks.

We called at Rhodes and Adalia. In both places Italians and Moslems are working hand in hand. At Adalia the control of shipping and passengers is carried out by Moslems and Italians. The latter have a garrison of about 200 men in the town, and seemed somewhat afraid of the Turks and subservient to them. An Italian sentry was put on our ship (British steamship "Palitana") during all our stay both at Adalia and Rhodes.

A Turkish notable and landowner of Alaya, named Tewfik, came on board at Adalia bound for Beirut and Egypt. He owns forests, and was travelling in connection with the sale of timber. He seemed an influential person, and was met by acquaintances at Mersina and Tripoli.

I had several conversations with him, during which he told me that Mustafa Kemal had reorganised his forces and had forbidden independent irregular chiefs like Edhem Bey, of Salihli, and Demirji Mehmed Efé, of Nazli and district, to operate unless incorporated in the regular army under his orders.

Tewfik further said that Kemal's propaganda was being carried on in Adalia and district. After a speech by one Shukri, from Angora, over 1,000 men had volunteered in Alaya district, and 300 Mausers had been handed in. Even the women were ready to go and fight. Recently the Italians had supplied 2,000 uniforms to Adalia district at 9½ Turkish liras a suit. Anatolia would not be settled until Smyrna and Armenia were recognised as being Turkish. The Turks were indifferent about the fate of Constantinople, where effeminate Byzantine Turks spent their time in amusements and fought for empty ministerial honours. Smyrna had been Turkish for 600 years, and Turks would never allow a people like the Greeks, who had been under their rule, to possess it. The Italians were good people, and so were the Austrians and Germans. The latter would succeed in not paying an indemnity to the Entente, and would soon become powerful again. If the British had kept one corporal in each large town in Anatolia there would have been order and prosperity in the country. A petition to that effect was once got up in Alaya, but the Italians stopped it. If the Smyrna and Armenian questions were settled to the satisfaction of the Anatolian Moslems, they would have no desire to follow the Angora Government in any other questions. As regards the French, the Turks thought they were, as a race, decreasing in number and decadent. Their treatment of women had not been good, and this had raised the local people against them.

At Mersina it was noticed that the trains to Adana were running. Apart from railway communication with Adana, Mersina had lost all trade with the interior. After sunset we heard rifle-firing near the town. It appears that villagers living close to Mersina, while peaceful by day, become brigands at night and snipe French forces.

Alexandretta is a base, and was a scene of great activity. Great quantities of military stores were being imported. The railway to Adana was nearing completion. Road communication with Aleppo was for the time being safe, but people going into the country, even fairly close to the town, were armed.

Beirut to Aleppo.—The only matter of note on the railway journey was at the railway station of Aboudouhoun, where an Arab cavalry patrol was seen. I was informed that they had been operating in the district of Idlib.

[6831]

Aleppo.—I called on General de Lamothe, who is in command of the 2nd division and is representative of the French High Commissioner, and on M. Reclus, Chief Secretary and Adviser to the Government of Aleppo. Aleppo, Alexandretta and Edder form an independent State under French control. The flag is white with the French colours in the corner and three golden stars on the fly. The Government is carried on by native officials under French control. The Moslem supremacy over native Christian elements is maintained.

I gathered from the French that the fall of Aintab had quietened things down and released a number of troops. Since the fall of that town trouble, which appears to be chronic, occurred and is still going on in the district of Idlib, south-west of Aleppo, where local Moslems, led, according to the French, by Turkish officers, have rebelled against French authority. A strong French column was despatched about the 9th March against these rebels. On the 13th March a fight took place near the village of Kennirji, where four French officers, including a major, were killed or mortally wounded. The public funeral of three of the officers took place at Aleppo on the 18th March. The body of the fourth officer remained in the hand of the rebels.

The officers who were killed belonged to the 19th and 22nd Algerian Tirailleurs.

Operations are still going on in Idlib region.

Apart from the Idlib district there is nothing of much importance to report. Peace has been made between the French and Hachem and Muchhem Beys, two Arab chiefs who control the Rakka-Edde region, east of Aleppo, and there is hope that communications with Bagdad will benefit as a result. During the week a camel caravan reached Aleppo from Bagdad after three months' journey, but this has been the only caravan which has succeeded in getting through.

General.—The French opinion is for peace with the Kemalists at all cost. According to General de Lamothe, peace with Turkey was necessary to avoid local trouble and its repercussion on the Moslem world; Turkish resistance in 1921 was much better organised and more formidable than that of the spring of 1920, and operations round Aintab recalled trench warfare in France. The general holds also the view that Kemal's forces would easily dispose of the Greek army.

Both French and Italians seem to have been persuaded (perhaps because they wished to be persuaded) that the Greeks were seriously defeated in their operations near Eskishehr at the beginning of this year.

The French have very little good to say of the Armenians. They profess to think they are not worth fighting for.

The general spoke of a Turkish concentration near Urfa, but thought it might be destined for operations near Bagdad or Mosul.

Conclusion.—Comparison of the French zone here and the Greek zone in Smyrna is immensely in favour of the latter. The Greeks have shown much more competence in dealing with their troubles than the French. They keep order in their zone and their troops have inspired respect into the Turkish troops and are capable of, and willing to, continue operations against them. Moreover, they are of opinion that Mustafa Kemal is putting up a bluff.

The French troops seem bewildered with the resistance they encounter, and exaggerate the Turkish power of resistance and offence. This has led them to make an agreement which looks almost like a capitulation. The conclusion of the agreement is announced as follows in the local press:—

"La France, continuant sa politique traditionnelle de sympathie et de bonté à l'égard de la Turquie, a réussi, grâce à ses efforts et malgré les difficultés qu'elle a éprouvées à faire adopter ses conceptions par ses Alliés, à faire bénéficier la Turquie d'un traitement aussi logique que possible; c'est ainsi qu'elle a pu obtenir que les pays de langue turque reviendraient au Gouvernement de Constantinople.

"La France, toujours soucieuse de remplir immédiatement ses obligations, a signé avec les représentants de Turquie à Londres un armistice en vertu duquel les pays de langue turque occupés actuellement par elle seront remis à la Turquie.

"Dans ces circonstances, la France, bien qu'ayant été toujours victorieuse et alors que la récente victoire d'Aintab venait une fois de plus de lui donner le droit de dicter sa volonté, a été uniquement guidée par le respect des droits des nationalités et par la répugnance qu'elle éprouve à infliger plus longtemps aux populations les horreurs de la guerre avec le malaise économique qui en est la conséquence.

"D'ailleurs, de sérieux avantages économiques lui ont été accordés en compensation de son geste de générosité."

This agreement only postpones trouble. It would certainly be better for Syria and Mesopotamia and for the Christians living in Turkey and are abandoned to the Turks if French and Italians withdrew their opposition to Greek action and co-operate with them; but French and Italians, feeling themselves unable to cope with the Turks, have to proclaim that Greeks cannot do so, and to oppose the continuance of their operations.

(Copies to Constantinople, Cairo and Beirut.)

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

P.S.—A piece of information, curious if true, by Tewfik, of Alaya, was that Enver Pasha was in Tashkend, and that when flying there, dressed as a German officer, he came down in Roumania and was taken prisoner. He was handed over to the British authorities, who were unaware of his identity and released him a month or two later.

J. M.

[C 12331/92/18]

No. 142.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 1634.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921.

THE French Ambassador, having asked to see me with a special message from his Government, called upon me at my private house yesterday, Sunday, morning.

His first point was with regard to the treatment of mandates at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. His Government had, as I knew, in deference to the objections raised in Washington, proposed that the consideration of Mandates A should not be taken at the impending meeting of the Council. He now, however, desired to suggest that this reserve should not apply to Mandates B, which touched upon no particular American interest, and he hoped that the British Government would join with the French in representing to Washington that it was desirable to dispose of these mandates without delay.

His Excellency then commenced a discussion upon the Silesian question, reading to me a prolonged telegram from M. Briand, containing the latest French version of affairs, as reported from Silesia two days previously. The telegram contained the usual complaint against the attitude of the British, upon whom the French sought to place all responsibility for the delays and difficulties that had occurred. It referred with particular asperity to the recent firing upon and imprisonment of French soldiers by a portion of the German bands. It threw upon His Majesty's Government the sole responsibility for the delay in setting up a neutral zone. In general, it implied that the situation in Silesia—which, it may be remarked in passing, was largely due in the first place to the deliberate inertia, and has since been aggravated by the concerted delays, of the French—was exclusively due to the maleficent activities of the British Government and the British representatives.

I said at once that I resented this tone of insistent complaint and reproach from the French Government; that there was in fact not a word of justification for it; that the boot was entirely upon the other leg; and that courtesy alone induced me to desist from repeating the demonstration which I had previously offered of the complicity of French soldiers and commanders in the rising, and of the procrastination of the French Government in dealing with the matter at this end. As to the incident of the French soldiers, I remarked that our information was that it had been due to a misunderstanding, and that it had been satisfactorily explained in Silesia. I informed him that a British soldier of the Black Watch had been shot, presumably by one of the Polish insurgents, in a fracas the day before; but I had not at once approached the French Government with a complaint about this. Such incidents were liable to occur in a situation of so much complexity and conflict.

The Ambassador seemed to think that the British were specially responsible for having allowed the French soldiers to be detained for twenty-four hours.

I declined, however, to discuss the matter further, saying that much larger issues were at stake.

As regards the neutral zone and the situation in general, his remarks were, I said, to a certain extent rendered obsolete by the events of the past two days. I read to him the greater part of a lengthy telegram from Sir Harold Stuart, dated only the day before in which was explained the plan for a progressive withdrawal

from the disputed area, by the insurgents on the one side and the Germans on the other: the inference being that the evacuated area would be occupied by the Allied Commission, using for the purpose the augmented Allied forces now at their disposal. The telegram reported that there was fair ground for believing that both sides would withdraw: the Germans to the left bank of the Oder, the insurgents to the eastern boundary of "Kreis." The whole object of the Allies should be to create this vacuum between the opposing forces, to get it effectively occupied by Allied troops, and to re-establish the authority of the Allied Commission.

It seemed to me, I added, that the appointment of Sir Harold Stuart had already exercised a most beneficial effect upon the situation. Personally, I had always held—and here the Ambassador indicated his assent—that it was a great mistake to place the commission entirely in the hands of military men. If the French had followed, or were now able to follow, our example in sending a prominent civilian, I was certain that much better results would be obtained. I thought that the French attitude in supporting General Le Rond had been one of the main contributory causes of the trouble. Now, however, that the commission were functioning better, it seemed to me superfluous and unwise to complicate the matter by sending a fresh body of experts to over-ride them. We had accepted this proposal merely in order to make things easier for M. Briand, but we now thought that it was more than doubtful whether it possessed any merit. Much the best thing would surely be to get the commission, after establishing their position, to make another report to the Allies. The matter could then be brought before a meeting of the Supreme Council—and here I pointed out that the delay in summoning the latter, which we were ready to attend at any moment, was due exclusively to M. Briand—and, if the Supreme Council wanted expert assistance, either in examining the report of the commission or in arriving at a decision themselves, they could doubtless procure it.

Inasmuch as I was about to send to Paris the important despatch inviting French discussion and co-operation in the settlement of the troublous affairs of Turkey and Greece, I thought it only right to acquaint the French Ambassador with the decisions of His Majesty's Government and the step I was on the eve of taking. Accordingly, I explained to him the exact sequence of events—not failing to point out the disastrous failure that had attended the attempt of the French Government to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal behind our backs. I indicated the dangers of the present position. I explained the policy which we had decided to recommend, namely: a mutual desistance from hostilities (unless the Greeks and Turks had already come to blows) with a view to negotiations to be undertaken by the Powers, these negotiations to involve certain very considerable concessions to the Turks, including a substantial modification as regards the future position of Smyrna; while, as regards the Greeks, an enquiry would be made into the conditions under which, if the negotiations were either refused by the Turks or broke down, the existing embargo upon the Greek purchase of arms, ammunition, aeroplanes, &c., could be removed, and a blockade instituted in the Black Sea in order to prevent the Kemalists from obtaining Bolshevik supplies. I told the Ambassador that the despatch concluded with an offer on my part to go to Paris any day, in order to discuss matters with M. Briand.

His Excellency, accepting my general account of the situation, expressed unofficially warm sympathy with the object that I had in view, and did not think that it would meet with anything but assent from the French Government.

Incidentally, he was very curious to know why it was that M. Veniselos had been in this country, and what was the nature of the consultations that had taken place with him. Obviously the Ambassador suspected that there had been some sort of plot between His Majesty's Government and that statesman.

I told him frankly that the very reverse was the case. I had seen M. Veniselos only with a view of ascertaining from him whether he thought it likely, in the present circumstances, that the Greek Government would accept such a suggestion as I had outlined, and whether, had he himself been in power, he would have given it a warm or a cold welcome. I had been relieved to hear from M. Veniselos that, while he expressed no opinion upon the present position of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, or on the policy of King Constantine, he nevertheless agreed that an attempt should be made to compose matters at the present juncture, upon lines in general accord with those that I had mentioned.

The Comte de Saint-Aulaire evidently regarded this information as of great value, and thought that it would make a material difference to the attitude of King

Constantine and his advisers in pursuing a reasonable policy if they had any idea that, in doing so, they were not liable to be assailed by M. Veniselos and his party for lack of patriotism or an abandonment of their country's interests.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 12330/704/22]

No. 143.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 501.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921.

I SAW the Italian Ambassador by appointment yesterday, Sunday.

He had just returned from Rome, and he desired to bring me the latest expression of the policy of Count Sforza. The latter, without being definitely wedded to the scheme which he had put forward for the territorial solution of the Silesian frontier question, nevertheless hoped that it would provide a suitable basis for discussion, and that it would be supported by the British representatives. However that might be, Count Sforza had instructed the Ambassador to tell me that, whenever the Supreme Council assembled, he would be found in general support of the British attitude and policy; that the main object of the Italian Government was to give a good chance to the new Government of Dr. Wirth; and that Italian policy was directed now, as it had been throughout, to the early re-establishment of peace in Europe.

I said that I was very glad to receive these assurances; but I could not help remembering that they preceded with almost mathematical regularity every Allied Conference which I had so far attended. I entirely believed that Count Sforza's general policy was on the same lines as our own; but I had usually found that, when a conference met, Count Sforza's sympathy either evaporated or at any rate was expressed only in formulas of a very general description; and that on many occasions, when we had expected his earnest and powerful support, this support had either been given in a very half-hearted way or had been altogether withheld. I thought, if I might venture to say so, that the best service Count Sforza could render to the Allied cause would be by taking a more definite attitude at the meetings of the Supreme Council on the points concerning which he was never tired of assuring us that his sympathies were entirely in accord with our own.

I then took advantage of the occasion to make a statement to the Ambassador, the need for which had long been in my mind, regarding the general policy pursued by the Italian Government in the Near and Middle East. We all of us knew, I said, that Italy was animated by a special feeling of regard for the Turks, and that she had throughout sought to build for herself a position of peculiar influence in Asia Minor. This had been particularly true of the Italian relations with Mustapha Kemal, whose delegation had been brought by Italians through Adalia to Europe, with whom they had kept up close relations, both in Rome and in Angora, and whom they were, rightly or wrongly, believed to have assisted in even more material ways. This did not, however, prevent me from regarding with considerable astonishment the secret treaty which Count Sforza had concluded with Bekir Sami Bey in London—an agreement concluded without our knowledge and behind our backs, and the contents of which we learnt only at a later date.

Here Signor de Martino interposed to state his impression that Count Sforza, while in London, had informed me of what he was doing.

I replied that I had no recollection of Count Sforza's having mentioned the matter to me at all, even in the most indirect or general way. Whether he had or not, he had most certainly not given me any idea of what the contents of the agreement turned out to be. It transpired that, although the Italians had no such excuse for hasty agreement as had the French, who were bent upon recovering their prisoners and extricating their stricken forces from a dangerous position in Cilicia, the Italians had sought to conclude an agreement with Angora which not only provided for their commercial position under the Tripartite Agreement, but also went so far as to promise future support to the Kemalists in pressing for the abandonment of the main clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres, as regards Smyrna and otherwise, which they themselves—that is, the Italians—had signed. This, I thought, was a most extraordinary position. I did not understand what defence could possibly be offered for it. That a party to a treaty which it had signed, and

the ratification of which it had urged, should, behind the backs of its Allies, agree to support the enemy in abrogating the main provisions of that treaty was to me quite inexplicable. Nor could I, I said, accept the defence of the Ambassador, which was somewhat diffidently offered, that there had been no concealment about the sympathies of the Italian Government throughout, since they had never been in favour of those parts of the treaty to which I had referred. This contention enabled me to ask at once why, then, had they signed the treaty as it stood; why had they not taken the opportunity, repeatedly presented to them, of effecting amendments; why, above all, had they attempted to compass their ends in this clandestine and tortuous way?

I went on to give another illustration, if the reports that I had received were correct, of a similar attitude on the part of the Italian Foreign Minister. The British Government, who had for eighty years had close relations with the State of Afghanistan, contiguous as it was to the frontiers of India, and who had throughout the greater part of that time subsidised and exercised complete control over the foreign policy of the Afghan rulers, had for some time been engaged in negotiating a new arrangement with the Afghan Government, which was on the verge of conclusion. Any day the British Government might hear that it was signed. Under it, the Ameer would once more receive a large subsidy from the British Government, and would thereby admit the superior and predominant political influence of Great Britain in his country. It was true that he was at the same time being assailed in Kabul by political missions and requests for treaties of alliance with the Soviet Government and with Turkey. Moreover, he had sent an Afghan mission of a somewhat suspicious character to Europe, and this mission was now travelling about from place to place. Great was my surprise when I heard that this mission had been in Rome, and that, without a word of reference to us, it had concluded, or was alleged to have concluded, an agreement with the Italian Government, who were forthwith to despatch a representative and mission to Kabul.

Whatever might be said for or against the policy of such an agreement, that the Italian Government should have concluded it, if they had, without any reference to us, was a proceeding against which I felt that I had the right to utter a vehement protest. What would the Italian Government have thought if, in some region contiguous to their possessions in Africa or elsewhere, the British Government had, behind their backs and without any attempt to consult them or keep them informed, concluded a secret agreement with the powerful ruler of such a region? If this report was true—and, in view of what had been done with Angora, it seemed to me not incredible—I desired seriously to ask the Ambassador in what direction his Government intended to go? Did they hold themselves at liberty, while professing a warm and close alliance with ourselves, to conclude behind our backs these secret agreements, which might very well be in direct conflict with our interests?

If that was the view of Italian policy, it seemed to me that Count Sforza was moving deliberately in the direction of a rupture of that concord upon which the peace of the world depended, and that I was justified in asking for some clear intimation from him as to what was his intention.

Signor de Martino declared that it was new to him that any such agreement had been concluded; but he remembered having either seen or heard in Rome of a delegation of Afghans, whom I think he said he had seen in picturesque costume on some official occasion. He was under the impression that your Excellency was aware both of their presence and of their object. He even believed that you must be acquainted with the agreement, if it had been concluded; and he was surprised that no communication on the subject had been received from you by the Foreign Office. He would at once enquire of his Government, as I undertook to do from your Excellency, what had happened in the matter.

His Excellency, who seemed to be very ill-acquainted with the history and position of Afghanistan, then went on to cross-examine me closely upon the degree of political independence enjoyed by that country.

I gave him a history of our relations with successive Afghan Ameer, and acknowledged that we no longer claimed to exercise that complete control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan which we had been in a position to do before the war. Had we still been in that position, an Afghan mission would not be wandering about Europe at the present time. But this fact did not alter the broad fact that Afghanistan, by virtue of its position and history, lay within the sphere of British political influence, and that, whether foreign Powers were or were not at liberty

to conclude separate agreements with its Government, it was almost inconceivable that an Allied Government, fully acquainted with the situation, as it must be, and affecting to march at our side in close co-operation for the settlement of the East, should conclude such an arrangement without any reference to ourselves. I had been a warm supporter of the Italian Alliance throughout; British armies had fought in the war on Italian soil for the defence of Italian interests and Italian territory; our policy with regard to Germany had been substantially the same. It was, therefore, a matter of much surprise and distress to me that Italy should conceive herself at liberty—without any interests at all, or with only insignificant interests, in the parts of the world to which I had referred—to strike out a policy of her own, sometimes in divergence from us, anyhow without our knowledge. I thought that the Ambassador could render a real service to his country, about the continued friendship of which with ourselves he had often spoken to me, by reporting frankly to his official superiors the doubts and apprehensions that were growing in my mind.

The Ambassador, who was a good deal concerned at what I had said, but who did not at any stage express dissent, undertook to do as I had asked.

I may add that, as regards the pro-Kemalist policy of his Government, I was able to point out with a certain amount of sardonic satisfaction that it had so far been a disastrous failure, inasmuch as, while Count Sforza's London Agreement had been repudiated in Angora, the Italians had found themselves in so perilous a position at Adalia that they had had to withdraw from that port. This failure would, I thought, render it easier for the Italian Government to adopt a different and more candid policy in the future.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7279/143/44]

No. 144.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 533.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 24, 1921.

THE Italian Ambassador, having asked to see me to present a message from Count Sforza, commenced by reading out a telegram from the latter, in which the Italian Foreign Minister deplored the lack of union which had recently characterised the policy of the Allied Powers in the East; suggested that, before resuming the discussion of this question at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, there should be a confidential exchange of views between them; trusted that from this examination there might emerge a new and harmonious Allied policy for those parts of the world; and ended by reviving the suggestion, which Signor de Martino had at an earlier date placed before me, namely, that there might be a resumption of the discussions, which had been initiated with Lord Grey just before the commencement of the war, concerning a Mediterranean agreement between Italy and Great Britain.

I said at once that no one was more disposed than myself to maintain the close harmony between the Allies, which had been the accepted basis of our action during the past few years, and to which, for my own part, I had been wholly loyal; but I felt bound to tell his Excellency that, in view of the recent policy and actions of Count Sforza himself, a more unfavourable moment for opening discussions as to a closer alliance or understanding could not, in my opinion, have been found, and that before I even entered into a discussion on the matter I should have to be convinced that there was a radical change in the attitude and policy of Count Sforza himself. While Signor Nitti's Government was in power there had been, as testified at numerous conferences, a close unity of spirit and action between our two Governments. We had almost always, at any rate in European politics, been found to take the same view, and we had jointly exercised our influence in the pacification of Europe. Since Count Sforza, however, had become Foreign Minister, he had preferred to pursue an Asiatic policy of his own, which was not only independent of ours, but in many respects quite inconsistent with it, and the recent symptoms of which had caused me the gravest surprise and alarm.

I then referred to the conversation which Sir Eyre Crowe, acting upon my instructions, had recently held with his Excellency, and I said that it was probably not necessary for me to do more than to recapitulate the main points, although I had something further to add to them. It was somewhat astonishing to hear a

complaint from Count Sforza of lack of unity between the Allies when he himself was mainly responsible for it. What was the good of talking about an alliance, when one of the Allies thought it open to him, while actually engaged in a conference with the others, to conclude an agreement behind their backs, or at any rate behind the back of one—namely, England—in which he openly pledged himself to support an enemy Power, in this case the Angora Government, against the Allied body of which he himself was a member, and against a treaty upon which his own signature was still wet? I had as yet heard no explanation or defence of this procedure, and I remained lost in astonishment at it.

The second point in which Count Sforza had claimed a liberty, inconsistent with any conception of an alliance, as I understood it, was that of the recent agreement which he had concluded at Rome with a mission from Afghanistan. Here again I was at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could reconcile such procedure with the sentiments which they now professed. If the defence were offered that Afghanistan was an independent State, the answer was at once clear, that no one knew better than the Italians, with their ramification of agents throughout the East, what were the real relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain, and how predominant had been for the last eighty years, and must continue for geographical reasons to be, the political influence of Great Britain at Kabul. If Count Sforza's proceedings were so innocent, why had he omitted to tell us what he was doing? I understood his defence now to be that Italy had commercial relations with Afghanistan which he was desirous of maintaining. I had yet to find anyone who could define to me their nature, and I doubted very much whether Count Sforza himself would find it easy to demonstrate their existence.

I had, however, received information within the last twenty-four hours which showed me very clearly what was the view taken of these innocent commercial relations at Kabul. I had seen a telegram from Afghanistan which categorically stated that the Government of Italy were prepared to sell arms and implements of every kind to the Afghan Government. If this were true, as I could hardly believe it to be, was it the kind of arrangement that Count Sforza, in his desire for a closer alliance with ourselves, thought himself at liberty to make? Hearing that the same Afghan mission had gone from Rome to Paris, I had taken the trouble to enquire what view the French Government took of it, and whether any similar action was contemplated there. I had only this afternoon received the reply that M. Briand would not dream of doing anything of the sort. It was obvious, therefore, that the views of Paris coincided very closely with those which I had ventured to express.

But I went on to say that my case was not confined to that of Angora and Afghanistan alone. Every Foreign Office in the world, the Italian, no doubt, not less than our own, had the means of securing information as to what was going on in most parts of the world. It could not be by a mere coincidence, nor could it be due to some great mistake, that from a dozen different quarters, not merely in the East, but in Europe, information reached me that Count Sforza was pursuing a policy quite independent of British interests, and sometimes sharply opposed to them. It was not possible or desirable for me to specify cases, but when I was aware of the fact that the Italian Foreign Minister would sometimes give simultaneous assurances of his support to ourselves on the one hand, and to other parties, with whom we were in disagreement, on the other, I could not feel very confident that a single or uniform policy was being pursued. I had not met with a similar experience in any other quarter, and the impression left upon my mind had deepened and strengthened with every month that passed. I felt sure that, until there was an open and permanent departure from this line of action it was useless to pursue the larger line of discussion which the Ambassador had recommended.

Signor de Martino, who had listened to my statement without protest, and, I think, also without much surprise, cordially agreed that it was impossible even to contemplate the discussion which his chief desired unless the ground was cleared by the removal of all the obstacles which the independent attitude of his Government had created. The remarkable thing was that at no point did he attempt any defence. This may perhaps be explained by the somewhat delicate relations that are believed to subsist between Count Sforza and himself, and which would perhaps render it not altogether disagreeable to one to see the other put into an unpleasant corner.

Indeed, the Ambassador went on to explain that he thought the case which I had presented had better be made to Count Sforza by yourself rather than by him.

This, I suggested, was a somewhat unusual form of procedure, and I had every confidence that he would adopt the more normal method of reporting to his Government the case which I had thought it my duty to make. If he was at all afraid that his presentation of the case would be open to suspicion, I would consider the propriety of giving instructions to you to support his representations.

Signor de Martino, changing the subject, then sought information from me as to what was in contemplation as regards the possible modification or cancellation of the Tripartite Agreement with Turkey. His Government were very much alarmed at the suggestion that this might be proposed. It represented their sole spoils of war, and public opinion in Italy would never allow of this modification.

I felt bound, not for the first time, to contest his Excellency's reading of history. In Europe, I pointed out that none of the victorious Allies had gained more out of the victory than Italy; while in Asia, where they had not, so far as I could remember, made any sacrifices, or even lost a man, and where their case for compensation arose solely out of a somewhat vague phrase in the Treaty of London, they appeared to claim as a right compensation, for which it was very difficult to find justification.

I told the Ambassador exactly what had happened at Paris. When I was discussing with M. Briand the concessions that it might be necessary to make to the Kemalist Party, in the event of negotiations being reopened with them, M. Briand had himself taken the initiative in remarking that, in his judgment, the Turks would be found to be just as sensitive about the infringement of their sovereignty involved in the Tripartite Agreement as they were about Smyrna or Thrace, and, accordingly, that a modification of that agreement would probably turn out to be one of the conditions of success. I had expressed my entire agreement with this line of reasoning, and while willing to adhere to any engagement which the British Government had made in what was, so far as we were concerned, only a self-denying ordinance, I yet felt that the French and Italian Governments would find it very difficult to get any Turkish Government to accept the agreement in anything like its present form, and that they had better put their heads together in order to find some way out of the difficulty.

M. Briand had taken the line, in the presence of the Italian Ambassador at Paris, that the advantages which France and Italy desired might be obtained in another way with the free consent of the Turkish Government; and I had said that I had no objection to any such an arrangement. It was, however, a matter for the French and Italians to arrange between themselves. All this was said in the presence of Count Bonin, who had, naturally enough, declined in any way to compromise his Government, and had expressed with candour the kind of reception which he thought any such modification would meet with in Italy.

There, I said, the matter must for the moment rest. I warned the Ambassador that, should we come to the point of resuming negotiations with Turkey, the subject could not in all probability be escaped.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.